

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 14, 2023

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January 14, 7:30 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian forces launched two waves of missile strikes targeting Ukrainian critical infrastructure on January 14. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted 50 missile and three airstrikes against Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Kryvyi Rih, Dnipro, Vinnytsya, and unspecified settlements in western Ukraine.¹ Russian missile strikes on Dnipro City damaged an apartment building, killing at least 5 people and wounding over 60.² The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces struck Ukrainian cities and settlements in two waves: first employing S-300 and S-400 systems in Belarus against ground targets in Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast in the morning and later launching 28 cruise missile strikes using Kh-101/Kh-555, Kh-22, sea-based Kalibr, and Kh-59 guided air missiles.³ The Ukrainian General Staff added that Ukrainian forces shot down 18 cruise missiles and three guided air missiles.

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuriy Ignat stated that Russian forces used missiles fired with a sharp ballistic trajectory, possibly modified S-300 and S-400 missiles or Iskander-M systems, to strike Kyiv, noting that Ukrainian forces cannot currently shoot these missiles down when fired from short-range.⁴ Ignat explained that S-300 and S-400 missiles launched from Belarus can hit Kyiv in less than two minutes. Ignat stated that Ukraine can only effectively prevent these strikes by destroying Russian S-300 complexes with Ukrainian long-range systems. Ignat added that Russian forces have previously used these modified systems to target Ukrainian infrastructure in Kharkiv and Mykolaiv oblasts.

The Kremlin continues to falsely claim that Ukraine poses an existential threat to Russia to reject Ukrainian offers of a peace summit and retain Putin's original maximalist goals.

Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations Security Council Vassily Nebenzya responded to Ukrainian proposals for a peace summit on January 13 with a series of false claims framing Ukraine as an aggressor that was, ludicrously, “about to attack Moscow.”⁵ Nebenzya stated that Russia's war in Ukraine will only end “when the threat to Russia no longer comes from the territory of Ukraine” and when “the discrimination [against] the Russian-speaking population” in Ukraine ends.⁶ Kremlin claims of discrimination against Russian speakers in Ukraine are a longstanding information operation seeking to justify Russia's invasion of Ukraine.⁷ Nebenzya reiterated the Kremlin's narrative that Ukraine's refusal to recognize Russia's illegal annexation of occupied Ukrainian territories and relationships with the West threaten Russia and claimed that Ukrainian ties with the West (rather than Russia's invasion and occupation of Ukraine) undermined Ukraine's sovereignty and cultural identity.⁸ Nebenzya claimed Ukraine is not interested in negotiations and is no more than a NATO paramilitary company—both longstanding claims that the Kremlin intends to delegitimize Ukraine as an independent actor and shift the responsibility for negotiations onto Western officials, who the Kremlin likely believes Russia can pressure into preemptive concessions.⁹ Nebenzya asserted that if the Kremlin cannot achieve its maximalist goals through negotiations, it will achieve them through military means.¹⁰ Nebenzya's speech again demonstrates that the Kremlin has not abandoned its maximalist goals in Ukraine, false justifications for its unprovoked war of aggression, and will seek to coerce the West to negotiate over Ukraine's head.¹¹

The Kremlin continues to use long-standing false narratives that the Ukrainian government is oppressing religious liberties as moral justification for its refusal to negotiate with Ukraine, likely in the hopes of turning international public opinion against Ukraine. Nebenzya claimed in his address that the “Zelensky regime” is an “authoritarian dictatorship” that desires “to destroy the canonical church in Ukraine—the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.”¹² Nebenzya likely deliberately misrepresented the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP)—a Kremlin-affiliated institution—as the official Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is a separate entity from the UOC MP. Nebenzya argued that such an “authoritarian dictatorship” represents a major obstacle to peace talks and requested a special meeting of the United Nations Security Council to discuss alleged state persecution of the “Ukrainian Orthodox Church.”¹³ Ukrainian officials are not persecuting religious liberty or the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, however. Russian officials are intentionally misrepresenting Ukrainian efforts to prosecute Kremlin-linked elements of the UOC MP as persecution of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church is an independent entity that continues to operate in Ukraine, while the UOC MP is a non-independent subordinate branch of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church, which has fiscally and rhetorically supported Russia’s war in Ukraine.¹⁴


Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continued to leverage the Wagner Group’s role in capturing Soledar to elevate his political stature and indirectly criticize the conventional Russian military. Prigozhin published footage on January 14, which he claimed was filmed in Soledar, promoting Wagner’s claimed role in capturing the town.¹⁵ Prigozhin introduced the Wagner Group commander who oversaw the capture of the settlement and extolled Wagner’s capabilities compared to the conventional Russian military.¹⁶ Prigozhin stated the Wagner Group succeeded due to its wealth of experience, its independence, its effective military equipment, and its superior management system.¹⁷ Prigozhin claimed the Wagner Group’s management system incentivizes commanders and subordinates to work closely together on the ground and allows the complaints of regular fighters to be heard.¹⁸ Prigozhin likely highlighted these elements, true or not, to distinguish the Wagner Group from the conventional Russian military and likely advertise for further recruitment and denigrate conventional Russian forces, lobbying for an increased role for Wagner Group—and himself—in the war in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways

- **Russian forces launched two waves of missile strikes targeting Ukrainian critical infrastructure on January 14.**
- **The Kremlin continues to falsely claim Ukraine poses an existential threat to Russia to reject Ukrainian offers of a peace summit and retain Putin’s original maximalist goals.**
- **The Kremlin continues to use long-standing false narratives that the Ukrainian government is oppressing religious liberties as moral justification for its refusal to negotiate with Ukraine and likely in the hopes of turning international public opinion against Ukraine.**
- **Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continued to leverage the Wagner Group’s role in capturing Soledar to elevate his political stature and indirectly criticize the conventional Russian military.**
- **Russian forces continued limited counterattacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line.**

- **Russian forces continued offensive operations around Soledar as well as in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka areas. Ukrainian forces are highly unlikely to still hold positions within the settlement of Soledar itself.**
- **Russian forces continued defensive operations and reinforced frontlines positions on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.**
- **Western officials are increasingly joining Ukrainian authorities in warning that Russia is preparing for an imminent second wave of mobilization.**
- **Russian occupation officials in Kherson continued measures to forcibly relocate residents to Russia.**
- **Ukrainian partisan attacks continue to disrupt Russian rear security efforts.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of January 14, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
- Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort);
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied Areas


Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line on January 14. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attempted to advance in the direction of Stelmakhivka (16km west of Svatove) and Makiivka (23km northwest of Kreminna).¹⁹ Another Russian milblogger claimed that the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Combined Arms Army of the Western Military District continued unspecified offensive operations along the Ploshchanka-Makiivka line.²⁰ Geolocated footage published on January 13 also showed Ukrainian artillery shelling several groups of Russian servicemen in Dzherelne, approximately 12km west of Svatove.²¹ The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Ploshchanka (17km northwest of Kreminna), Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna) and near Kreminna itself.²² The Ukrainian General Staff's subsequent reporting that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Kreminna suggests that Ukrainian forces may have advanced closer to the city.²³ The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).²⁴

Ukrainian forces reportedly continued to strike Russian positions in Luhansk Oblast on January 14. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions in Rubizhne (8km west of Kreminna) and Russian rear areas in Tarasivka (30km northeast of Svatove).²⁵

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of January 14, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Key Ukrainian Roads
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

The Ukrainian Main Defense Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine published an audio intercept on December 22 in which a Russian soldier operating in the vicinity of Chervonopopivka supported reports that Ukrainian forces captured part of the R-66 Kreminna-Svatove road in the vicinity of Zhytlivka (just south of Chervonopopivka). The Ukrainian General Staff has repeatedly reported since November 30 that Russian forces shelled Chervonopopivka, indicating Russian forces no longer control Chervonopopivka. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to establish a position in Chervonopopivka on November 27, indicating Ukrainian maneuvers near Chervonopopivka. The R-66 runs through Chervonopopivka and the road's capture by Ukrainian forces would be consistent with the evidence presented in the intercepted phone call plus the Ukrainian General Staff's reports.

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Soledar on January 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Rozdolivka (7km north of Soledar), Sil (5km northwest of Soledar), and Krasna Hora (5km southwest of Soledar).²⁶ A Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner Group fighters continued offensive operations near Krasna Hora and that they almost completely control the settlement.²⁷ The Russian milblogger also claimed that Wagner Group fighters conducted an assault near Pidhorodne (6km southwest of Soledar).²⁸ The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian assault squads in cooperation with units of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) conducted unspecified successful operations in the direction of Sil.²⁹ A Russian milblogger posted footage purporting to show Ukrainian forces removing wounded personnel from the railway station in Sil and claimed that Russian forces are currently fighting for control of the station.³⁰ Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces captured the railway station in Sil on January 13, although ISW still cannot independently verify these claims.³¹


Ukrainian forces likely do not hold positions in the settlement of Soledar itself despite continued Ukrainian claims as of January 14. Ukrainian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces control positions in the western outskirts of Soledar and are continuing to fight for control of the settlement.³² The Ukrainian commander of a separate tactical group under the alias Magayar published footage of a Ukrainian flag hanging outside a mine in the westernmost outskirts of Soledar and claimed the video proves that Ukrainian forces are still operating in the area.³³ The video did not show Ukrainian nor Russian forces in the vicinity of the flag. Geolocation of the footage shows that while the claimed Ukrainian position may be within Soledar’s administrative boundaries, the position is not within the settlement itself.³⁴ Other geolocated footage published on January 14 may indicate that Ukrainian forces are likely holding some positions immediately outside of Soledar.³⁵ A social media source claimed on January 13 that Ukrainian forces have established fortified positions on the west side of the T0513 highway near Soledar.³⁶

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on January 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut itself and near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Mayorsk (22km southwest of Bakhmut).³⁷ A Russian source posted footage on January 12 showing the commander of the Akhmat Kadyrov Special Purpose Police Regiment, Zamid Chalaev, denying rumors that he surrendered near Bakhmut.³⁸ The State Border Service of Ukraine reported on January 14 that Ukrainian forces eliminated Wagner Group assault personnel in Bakhmut and repelled continued Wagner Group attempts to reach the outskirts of the settlement.³⁹ One Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner Group fighters are abandoning head-on attacks against Bakhmut and instead are trying to encircle the settlement.⁴⁰ The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted an assault in the direction of Dyliivka (15km southwest of Bakhmut) and that Wagner Group fighters conducted assaults near Klishchivka as well as in the direction of Predtechyne (15km southwest of Bakhmut), attempting to cut off a section of the H-32 highway between Bakhmut and Kostiantynivka.⁴¹

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on January 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults within 27km southwest of Avdiivka near Vodyane, Pobieda, and Marinka.⁴² Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces still hold positions in the western part of Marinka and that Russian forces are trying to advance in the settlement, despite previous milblogger claims that Russian forces control Marinka.⁴³ A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also conducted offensive operations near Nevelske (14km southwest of Avdiivka) and Pervomaiske (12km southwest of Avdiivka).⁴⁴

Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack in western Donetsk Oblast on January 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Velyka Novosilka (55km southwest of Donetsk City) in western Donetsk Oblast.⁴⁵ The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued routine shelling along the line of contact in Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.⁴⁶

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of January 14, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



	Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours		Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory		Major Railroads
	Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24		Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory		Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
	Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*		Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives		


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued defensive operations and reinforcement efforts on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River on January 14. The Ukrainian General Staff and several Ukrainian officials reported the movement of Russian personnel, weapons, military, equipment, and ammunition as Russian forces redeploy units and concentrate forces to strengthen defensive capabilities along the southern axis.⁴⁷ Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo claimed on January 14 that Russian forces have almost completed the construction of a system of modern fortifications along the east bank of the Dnipro River. Saldo claimed the fortifications are an emergency backup and that he is certain Russian forces will return to Kherson City in 2023.⁴⁸ A popular Russian news source reported on January 14 that Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin stated that Russia will complete the reconstruction of all four spans of the damaged section of the Kerch Strait bridge by the end of February.⁴⁹ Russian forces continued routine strikes along the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River on January 14.⁵⁰

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian rear areas. Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian deployment point in Tokmak, Zaporizhia Oblast, during the night of January 13 and January 14.⁵¹ Fedorov also reported that two loud explosions of unspecified origin occurred in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, on January 14.⁵² Fedorov stated that preliminary information indicates that the explosions damaged a Russian military base situated on the premises of a factory.⁵³ No actors have claimed responsibility for the attack at this time. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration deputy Vladimir Rogov claimed on January 14 that Russian air defenses intercepted a Ukrainian missile in the vicinity of Melitopol.⁵⁴

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of January 14, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

ISW recoded the northeast section of Velykyi Potomkin Island in Kherson Oblast from reported Ukrainian counteroffensives to Russian claims based on Russian milblogger reports and video footage published on January 5 that claimed Russian forces recaptured that part of the island where Ukrainian forces placed a flag on January 2. ISW cannot confirm if Russian forces recaptured the same positions as Ukrainian forces as of January 5. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 3 that the island is in a gray zone because Russian forces are still operating in the northern part of the island. Geolocated footage published on January 2 does show Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions on an adjacent island east of Velykyi Potomkin Island, which indicates that Russian forces are still operating within the Dniester River delta areas.

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Western officials are increasingly joining Ukrainian authorities in warning that Russia is preparing for an imminent second wave of mobilization. UK news outlet *The Times* reported on January 13 that Western intelligence indicates that Russian President Vladimir Putin could send a fresh wave of mobilized soldiers to the front lines in Ukraine by April if Russian officials decide to launch a fresh wave of mobilization within weeks.⁵⁵ An unnamed western official stated that Russian regional recruitment offices are engaged in "serious preparations."⁵⁶ The official added that a Kremlin-sponsored poll also showed that Russians are anxious about the war but support its continuation in fear of a defeat.

Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov attempted to limit growing confusion and alarm among Russian audiences regarding the expansion of mobilization eligibility. Peskov commented on contradictory official reports that Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov terminated mobilization exemptions for fathers of three or more children, stating that "the Kremlin knows nothing about such termination."⁵⁷ Peskov's response neither confirmed nor denied that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has terminated or plans to terminate deferrals for fathers with more than three children, however. Controversy continues among Russian domestic audiences regarding the likelihood and implications of a coming second wave of mobilization.⁵⁸

Kremlin officials continue to propose expansions of the categories of Russians eligible for mobilization. Russian Investigative Committee Head Aleksandr Bastrykin stated on January 13 that foreigners are receiving Russian citizenship in droves and are bypassing military service, including more than a million migrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus over the past five years.⁵⁹ Bastrykin argued that Russia should consider participation in the "special military operation" a priority for naturalized Russian citizens.⁶⁰

Russian authorities continue efforts to use religion to justify their force generation campaigns and recruit forces to partake in the war in Ukraine. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on January 13 that the Chechen Republic Spiritual Administration of Muslims Chairman, Mufti Salah Mezhiyev, will deploy to Ukraine to fight and perform religious activities.⁶¹ The milblogger also claimed that Russian officials are forming a battalion of imams and training theologians, including Mezhiyev, at the Special Forces University in Gudermes, Chechnya.⁶²

Russian officers continue attempts to eliminate publicized dissent among Russian servicemembers. A wife of a mobilized soldier in Russia's 392nd Motorized Rifle Regiment told a Russian news outlet that Russian military command sent mobilized soldiers serving in the regiment to frontline trenches as punishment for recording a video appeal about their lack of equipment.⁶³

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue to coerce residents of occupied Kherson Oblast to evacuate. Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan reported on January 14 that Russian authorities are attempting to lure Kherson Oblast residents to move to Russia using "mythical"

promises of money and housing certificates.⁶⁴ Khlan claimed that Russian forces announced that they will forcibly evacuate hospital patients and leave patients who choose not to evacuate on the street on an unspecified future date.⁶⁵ Khlan claimed that occupation authorities are also dismissing hospital staff despite reported medical personnel shortages and the ongoing import of Russian medical professionals.⁶⁶ Kherson occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo stated on January 12 that his administration "evacuated" 160,000 residents of Kherson Oblast to unspecified "safe" locations.⁶⁷ Khlan dismissed the claim that thousands of Kherson Oblast residents have chosen to evacuate without evidence.⁶⁸

Ukrainian partisan attacks and resulting Russian security crackdowns continue to disrupt Russian rear security efforts and occupation authorities' efforts to establish stable control. The Ukrainian Resistance Center identified the car that exploded on January 13 on the outskirts of Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast, as the vehicle of Berdyansk Raion occupation administration head Oleksiy Kychyhin.⁶⁹ Russian sources claimed that the explosion did not injure Kychyhin.⁷⁰ Russian occupation authorities continue to surveil, monitor the phone communications of, and raid the homes of residents in the occupied territories due to their growing concern of partisan activity or collaboration with Ukrainian forces.⁷¹

ISW will continue to report daily observed indicators consistent with the current assessed most dangerous course of action (MDCOA): a renewed invasion of northern Ukraine possibly aimed at Kyiv.

ISW's December 15 MDCOA warning forecast about a potential Russian offensive against northern Ukraine in winter 2023 remains a worst-case scenario within the forecast cone. ISW currently assesses the risk of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as low, but possible, and the risk of Belarusian direct involvement as very low. This new section in the daily update is not in itself a forecast or assessment. It lays out the daily observed indicators we are using to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we expect to update regularly. Our assessment that the MDCOA remains unlikely has not changed. We will update this header if the assessment changes.

Observed indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

- Nothing significant to report.

Observed ambiguous indicators for MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

- Ukrainian Joint Forces Commander Serhiy Nayevev stated on January 14 that the current ratio of Ukrainian forces operating on Ukraine's northern border to Russian forces in Belarus is sufficient to stabilize the border.⁷² Nayevev added that Ukrainian reserves could redeploy in response to an increased threat from Belarus.
- Russian forces continue to deploy to Belarus. Social media footage shows that additional trainload of Russian military equipment arrived in Gomel Oblast on January 13.⁷³

Observed counter-indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

- The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 14.⁷⁴

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western

reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

¹ <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/14/mayemo-zrobyty-vse-shhob-zupynty-rashyzm-tak-samo-yak-vilnyi-svit-svogo-chasu-zupyntyv-naczysz-prezydent-ukrayiny/>;

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kxFoFrQ4rqhyTWJpzDGWqmacYY4M3TxaevNeJyvdDGBTnhs2cJYKcDecbN3pC5NI>

²

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kxFoFrQ4rqhyTWJpzDGWqmacYY4M3TxaevNeJyvdDGBTnhs2cJYKcDecbN3pC5NI>; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2023/01/14/u-dnipri-kilkist-poranyh-vnaslidok-rosijskogo-udaru-po-bagatopoverhivci-zrosla-do-majzhe-60/>

³

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kxFoFrQ4rqhyTWJpzDGWqmacYY4M3TxaevNeJyvdDGBTnhs2cJYKcDecbN3pC5NI>

⁴ <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/14/rechnyk-povitryanyh-syl-rozpoviv-z-chogo-ta-zvidky-rosiyany-jmovirno-zavdaly-udariv-po-stolydzi/>

⁵ https://russiaun dot ru/ru/news/130123_n

⁶ https://russiaun dot ru/ru/news/130123_n

⁷ <https://isw.pub/UkrWar010623> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar010523>

⁸ https://russiaun dot ru/ru/news/130123_n

⁹ <https://isw.pub/UkrWar122922> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar122822> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar122722> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar120222>

¹⁰ https://russiaun dot ru/ru/news/130123_n

¹¹ <https://isw.pub/UkrWar122722> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar122622>

¹² https://russiaun dot ru/ru/news/130123_n

¹³ https://russiaun dot ru/ru/news/130123_n

¹⁴ <https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Operations%20Assessments%20December%202014.pdf>

¹⁵ https://t.me/concordgroup_official/275

¹⁶ https://t.me/concordgroup_official/275

¹⁷ https://t.me/concordgroup_official/275

¹⁸ https://t.me/concordgroup_official/275

¹⁹ <https://t.me/wargonzo/10319>

²⁰ <https://t.me/vysokygovorit/10522>

²¹ <https://twitter.com/fdov21/status/1614055699298021376>

<https://t.me/Tsaplienko/24374>

²²

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TAzfZhApHtWxNNMv4RFvHpJapHvY8gS2nxfjkhW9AAzPPbcvaY7TRBSkGYpcdnEtI>

²³ <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2023>

²⁴

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TAzfZhApHtWxNNMv4RFvHpJapHvY8gS2nxfjkhW9AAzPPbcvaY7TRBSkGYpcdnEtI>

²⁵ <https://t.me/kommunist/14928> ; <https://t.me/rybar/42693> ; <https://t.me/kommunist/14936> ;

https://t.me/miroshnik_r/10190

26

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TAzfZhApHtWxNNMv4RFvHpJapHvY8gS2nxfjkhW9AAzPPbcvaY7TRBSkGYpcdnEtl>

²⁷ <https://t.me/wargonzo/10319>

²⁸ <https://t.me/wargonzo/10319>

²⁹ https://t.me/mod_russia/23415

³⁰ https://t.me/boris_rozhin/75394

³¹ <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2023>

³² <https://suspilne dot media/358704-bitva-za-donbas-trivae-rosia-moze-rozpocati-nastup-z-okupovanih-teritorij-pivdna-ta-shodu-325-den-vijni-onlajn/>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NiBfb425klk> ; <https://youtu.be/Zx-yO73bXMk> ; https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/6281 ;

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kXFoFrQ4rqhyTWJpzDGWqmakcYY4M3TxaevNeJyvDGbTnhS2cJYKcDecbN3pC5NI> ;

³³ https://t.me/robert_magyar/336

³⁴ https://t.me/robert_magyar/336;

https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1614215221434011654?s=20&t=QQQnU0Ea59nPVUXTMbeNEw

³⁵ <https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1614304257787990019> ;

<https://twitter.com/Arvelleg1/status/1614316205036261378>

³⁶ <https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1614025019419656192>

37

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TAzfZhApHtWxNNMv4RFvHpJapHvY8gS2nxfjkhW9AAzPPbcvaY7TRBSkGYpcdnEtl>

³⁸ <https://t.me/rosgvardia67/16057> ;

39

<https://www.facebook.com/DPSUkraine/posts/pfbid02SsxUNRxp2wLF7MatfuK8EHZ7eWMEiJ9NmA2HLR5ph3yrPpiMDeW5f1zakSkofaxul>

⁴⁰ <https://t.me/wargonzo/10319>

⁴¹ <https://t.me/wargonzo/10319>

42

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TAzfZhApHtWxNNMv4RFvHpJapHvY8gS2nxfjkhW9AAzPPbcvaY7TRBSkGYpcdnEtl>

⁴³ <https://t.me/wargonzo/10319> ; <https://t.me/rybar/42693> ;

<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2023>

⁴⁴ <https://t.me/wargonzo/10319>

45

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46

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<https://t.me/andriyshTime/5926>

⁴⁸ https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/293; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/294
⁴⁹ <https://t.me/readovkanews/50671>
⁵⁰ <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TAzfZhApHtWxNNMv4RFvHpJapHvY8gS2nxfjkhW9AAzPPbcvaY7TRBSkGYpcdnEtl>; <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=861137398481481>; <https://t.me/rybar/42693>;
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<https://t.me/hueviyherson/32870>; <https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/4036>; <https://t.me/rybar/42693>; <https://t.me/rybar/42693>;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/10319>; <https://t.me/rybar/42693>; <https://t.me/vilkul/2573>; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/2174
⁵¹ https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/1189
⁵² https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/1189
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⁵⁴ <https://t.me/vrogov/7112>
⁵⁵ <https://twitter.com/Faytuks/status/1614231216483610624>; <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/kyiv-tries-to-rally-west-before-500-000-russians-go-to-front-ppflp39w0>
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https://t.me/ostorozhno_moskva/3224
⁵⁹ https://t.me/grey_zone/16647
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⁶⁷ https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/292
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