

Iraq Situation Report: June 30 - July 01, 2015

1 On June 30, the Interior Ministry (MoI) Suqur [Falcons] Intelligence Cell directed an Iraqi airstrike against an ISIS position in Qa'im in western Anbar, killing 20 ISIS members and destroying Suicide Vests (SVESTs) and a VBIED. Also on July 1, DoD announced one airstrike "near Qa'im."



2 On June 30, the Baghdadi sub-district director stated that 16th Iraqi Army (IA) Division members recaptured Jubba sub-district, north of Baghdadi sub-district, with support from tribal fighters, IA Aviation, and the U.S.-led Coalition. Between June 30 and July 1, DoD announced four airstrikes "near Baghdadi."



3 Between June 30 and July 1 DoD announced two airstrikes targeting ISIS vehicles "near Walid."



4 On July 1, the MoI stated that IA Aviation conducted two airstrikes on a house used by ISIS in eastern Habaniya, east of Ramadi, killing 10 ISIS fighters. In addition, the FP command stated that clashes took place between ISIS and an ISF tank contingent in Habaniya, killing 13 ISIS members. However, the statement did not specify where in Habaniya the clash took place. DoD announced one airstrike "near Habaniya."



5 On June 30, a "Popular Mobilization" commander stated that "Popular Mobilization" fighters clashed with ISIS on the outskirts of Garma, killing 13 ISIS militants and destroying one VBIED. On July 1, the "Combat Media Cell", a newly formed official media channel run by the government, stated that the 1st Rapid Intervention Division (RID) regained control of al-Hitawin mini-dam, south of Fallujah. On June 30, DoD reported one airstrike "near Fallujah" that destroyed an ISIS tunnel system.



6 On June 29 Diyala provincial council and Iraqiyat Diyala bloc member, Ammar al-Juburi stated that his political party, Iraqiyat Diyala, will conditionally participate in the Diyala government as a result of ongoing negotiations with the National Alliance in Diyala. The Sunni Iraqiyat Diyala bloc previously boycotted the provincial government following the election of Muthanna al-Tamimi, a member of the Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi'a militia Badr Organization, as the Diyala governor on May 26. Juburi stated that Iraqiyat Diyala's conditional participation in the government will allow for its inclusion in security decisions, the granting of "rightful positions" in the provincial government to bloc members, and the return of Sunni IDPs to their homes. Juburi highlighted that the boycott of his bloc is ongoing and that the decision was in coordination with Diyala Hawiyatuna bloc in the CoR.

7 On June 29, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) stated that it "completely cleared" Baiji. The Baiji mayor stated that IA, Iraqi Police (IP), and the "Popular Mobilization" recaptured south and central Baiji and were advancing toward Baiji Refinery and had arrived at Albu Juwari, north of Baiji. On June 30, Federal Police (FP) commander Maj. Gen. Raed Shakir Jawdat claimed that Baiji was liberated by "our armed forces" and Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) Deputy Chairman Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis stated that "security forces will begin operations to cleanse Baiji Refinery of [ISIS]." On July 1, the Iraqi government "Combat Media Cell" announced that a joint ISF and "Popular Mobilization" operation retook the housing complex but did not specify whether the complex was inside Baiji district or on the district outskirts. The liberation of Baiji remains unconfirmed. Meanwhile an SVBIED targeted an IA tank near the Riyashiyah gas station south of Baiji, injuring the tank's crew.



8 On July 1, an anonymous security source stated that Awakening fighters in the Sherwin area east of Mansouriyah, north of Muqadiyah, repelled an ISIS attack on an Awakening checkpoint, killing three ISIS fighters and forcing the others to retreat to Hamrin, northwest of Muqadiyah.



9 On July 1, a MoI source stated that "Popular Mobilization" and an IA force were involved in an altercation that escalated to the use of weapons in the majority Sunni Zaidan village in Abu Ghraib district, west of Baghdad. The fighting killed four IA soldiers and wounded five others, while three "Popular Mobilization" fighters were also killed and six others were wounded. No additional details were given. The mayor of Abu Ghraib denied that the clash took place.



- Major Cities
- SVBIED
- ★ Major Clash
- Iraqi Shi'a militias
- Unknown Gunmen
- ✈️ Iraqi Airstrikes
- ISF
- Anti-ISIS Iraqi Sunni Tribes
- ✈️ Airstrikes
- Coalition
- ISIS

Content: Sinan Adnan, Theodore Bell, Patrick Martin, and ISW Iraq Team
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Various Iraqi Shi'a militias along with the Federal Police (FP) and elite units from the ISF appear to have made advances against ISIS in Baiji. However, it remains unclear to what extent these forces have pushed ISIS back. ISIS retains freedom of maneuver in the deserts east and west of Baiji, and counter-attacks by ISIS are likely. Notably, Iraqi forces have not announced the liberation of Seneya, an ISIS stronghold connected to the desert west of Baiji, and the area remains a potential support zone for future attacks. In Diyala province, ISIS gunmen launched a small but significant attack in the agricultural area of Mansouriyah, north of Muqadiyah, an area that has suffered little to no ISIS activity since January 2015, when it was recaptured in a militia-led operation. It is also important to watch for future attacks by ISIS in this area, in particular to observe whether an offensive would divert ISF and militia resources from other fronts such as Salah ad-Din and Anbar back to Diyala, the primary support zone of the Badr Organization, which is currently leading operations in southwestern Salah ad-Din. Meanwhile, Iraqi Sunni leaders in Diyala appear to be negotiating with the pan-Shi'a National Alliance to return to the local government. This development follows their recent boycott of the provincial council in a gesture of their disapproval at the appointment of a senior Badr Organization official as the governor. If the participants in the ongoing negotiations are not representative of all Iraqi Sunnis in the council, these talks could lead to the fracture of the Sunni bloc in Diyala and further degrade Sunni political influence in the province. Ultimately, however, Sunni demands to fill effective positions in the local government will likely remain unanswered given the Badr Organization's consolidation of power over the local government and security institutions of Diyala Province.