Afghanistan: A Tale of Two Withdrawals

Photo Credit: Amber Clay (Pixabay)

By Col. (Ret.) Ketti Davison

Key Takeaway: The U.S. must be clear-eyed about the challenges that will likely follow the withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO from Afghanistan. The U.S. and NATO may need to fight their way out as Afghans focus on their own survival. The withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan was painful. The withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO from Afghanistan may be worse.  

After nearly two decades of combat operations and building partner capacity, the U.S. and NATO may withdraw most or all of their remaining forces in Afghanistan by November 2020.[1] The plan will face numerous challenges – ranging from Al-Qaeda and ISIS Wilayat Khorasan (ISIS-K) to mounting indicators of a potential new Afghan Civil War.[2] Critics have drawn unfavorable comparisons to the withdrawal of the U.S. from Iraq in 2011.[3] Yet the U.S. also ignores at its own peril the lessons learned from another source - the experience of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union entered Afghanistan in 1979 to prop up a failing Communist regime. After a decade of hard fighting involving hundreds of thousands of troops, it found that victory required a higher price than it was willing to pay.[4] The best it could do was not lose. Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev gave his commanders a limited amount of time to staunch the “bleeding wound” of Afghanistan when he came to power in 1985.[5] The Soviets installed Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah in 1987 to ‘Afghanize’ the conflict and attempt national reconciliation.[6] Gorbachev gave the new government two years to prepare for the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, which ultimately occurred after nine years and thousands of fatalities in 1989.[7] The U.S. will face similar challenges – and unique difficulties – with its own departure from Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan paved the way for a popular insurgency. The U.S. and NATO’s withdrawal will make room for an unpopular one. The Soviets faced a pan-national insurgency that included ethnic mujahideen groups with extensive popular support across Afghanistan.[8] Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks readily took up arms alongside Pashtuns, unified by the common enemy of the Soviet Union. They aimed their jihad at expelling what they framed as “godless” occupiers and toppling the puppet government. The CIA estimated the combined strength of the mujahideen to be 175,000 in 1989 as the Soviets left Afghanistan.[9] By contrast, the U.S. and NATO will leave behind an insurgency that is far smaller and less popular. Most Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks supported the U.S. and NATO along with many educated Pashtuns. The highest strength estimates of the Taliban range from 60,000 to 77,000.[10] Those Afghans who supported the U.S. coalesced to fight against the oppressive Taliban and support the internationally backed Government of Afghanistan. They will not willingly step aside to make political space for their enemies. Instead, they may rearm to defend their communities against the Taliban.    

Gorbachev’s public announcement of withdrawal instantly changed political dynamics in Kabul. The mere potential of a similar announcement by the U.S. is having the same effect across Afghanistan. Gorbachev announced his intent to withdraw from Afghanistan in February 1988 without consulting his client regime in Kabul.[11] Afghans on both sides immediately scrambled for power and resources.[12] Najibullah lost support from key powerbrokers despite attempts to rebrand the government and regain popular support.[13] Najibullah’s Minister of Defense Shahnawaz Tanai mounted a coup attempt in March 1990.[14] As the government began disintegrating, the mujahideen coordinated an economic blockade of Kabul even while competing over valuable terrain in other parts of Afghanistan.[15] Today, the U.S. and NATO’s rumored withdrawal has once again incentivized Afghan powerbrokers to look to their own along ethnic and geographic lines.[16] Militias are rearming and politicians are returning to their warlord roots. They will almost certainly add deserting soldiers and their arms to the ranks of their militias.

The Soviets withdrew in contact with the enemy amidst a deteriorating security environment. The U.S. and NATO will experience similar conditions. Former partners and foes alike attacked the Soviets on their way out of Afghanistan. Previous deals and ceasefires made little difference as mujahideen sought vengeance and Afghans switched sides.[17] The U.S. and Pakistan continued to arm the mujahideen, providing no relief to the Soviet Union.[18] The Soviets ultimately needed to deploy additional tanks, artillery and air support to cover their withdrawal.[19] The U.S. and NATO can similarly not count of safe passage out of Afghanistan. Abandoned friends and invigorated enemies may attack withdrawing forces on all sides. Insider ‘green-on-blue’ attacks could rise significantly.[20] The constellation of over twenty jihadist groups currently operating in Afghanistan will seek opportunities to act as well.[21]  Russia – supported by Iran and possibly Pakistan – will almost certainly repay the favor of arming jihadists as the U.S. and NATO depart Afghanistan.

The well-equipped Afghan Armed Forces built by the Soviets ultimately could not endure without their support. It is unlikely that the outcome will be better for the weaker force created by the U.S. and NATO. The Soviet Union left behind an Afghan Armed Forces consisting of over 100,000 soldiers equipped with heavy weapons, aircraft, and enough supplies fight for at least another year.[22] It also left behind hundreds of advisors to support this force.[23] This military initially fought capably but ultimately collapsed after massive defections by 1992.[24] Many Afghan soldiers deserted as soon as the Soviets left their areas. Looters stripped (often within hours) the bases transferred from the Soviets. The situation may be worse when the U.S. and NATO leave Afghanistan. The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) lack both the operational reach and offensive mindset to conduct independent combat operations.[25] It has been plagued with ghost rolls, low morale, and desertion since its inception.[26] Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s effort to crack down on non-existent soldiers placed on rosters to skim salaries caused security force numbers to fall by 42,000.[27] A small stay-behind advisory group is unlikely to hold these forces together, even if the U.S. was willing to provide one. The ANDSF that the U.S. and NATO worked so hard to build may simply fade away, taking their weapons with them. 

The Soviet Union left behind a functioning central government staffed with competent bureaucrats. The U.S. and NATO may leave behind no government at all. Najibullah’s government lasted years longer than predicted by most observers after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1989.[28] This unexpected resilience is often attributed military and economic assistance from the Soviets. The Soviets continued to provide Najibullah with up to $300 million per month.[29] When this funding ceased with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Najibullah buckled in 1992. Today, many analysts have stressed of the importance of continued economic assistance to Afghanistan in the wake of a withdrawal by the U.S. and NATO.[30] However, it takes a functioning central government to administer a budget. The current Afghan Government is not as capable as that left behind by the Soviets. Additionally, the reported terms of ongoing talks between the U.S. and the Taliban suggest that the U.S. may accept the formation of a new interim Government of Afghanistan. Any such hastily established government would suffer from a lack of legitimacy and organizational structure. The Taliban cannot solve this problem. Years of decapitation strikes and life in exile has weakened the governance ability of the Taliban.[31] The Taliban, already suffering from multiple splinter groups, may devolve further as the departure of foreign forces removes the incentive for militants to remain aligned with the organization. Neither an interim Government of Afghanistan nor the returning Taliban will be effective enough to ensure funding to the ANDSF or impose order across Afghanistan. Both are likely to fragment, leaving chaos to reign.

The Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan fueled a brain drain of the 1990s. The U.S. and NATO’s withdrawal is bound to drive a similar flight. Thousands of Afghans who worked with the Soviet Union and Najibullah fled in 1992.[32] The mujahideen besieged key urban centers while the countryside reverted to warlordism. Kabul ran short of food, requiring an air bridge established by the Soviet Union. Today, civil order and humanitarian concerns will likewise take a back seat as factions settle scores violently and publicly. Afghanistan will witness an exodus of asylum seekers as soon as the U.S. and NATO announce their withdrawal. Tragically, it appears unlikely that the West will welcome those Afghans who stood by them in Afghanistan. Afghan women in particular are likely to suffer brutal reprisals from the Taliban and other jihadists.

The Soviet Union’s departure sparked a struggle for power among the victors. Afghanistan will likely see a similar power vacuum after the withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO. The mujahideen fractured quickly after the withdrawal of the Soviets.[33] Hizb-e Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar refused to participate in the new government and laid siege to Kabul. Junbesh leader Abdul Rashid Dostum and Jamiat-e Islami leader Ahmad Shah Massoud joined forces to defend the capital against Hekmatyar. Meanwhile, Dostum fell into conflict with both Jalaluddin Haqqani over the proper role of the mujahideen in the Government of Afghanistan and Atta Mohammad Noor over control of Northern Afghanistan.[34] The disputes ultimately escalated into a bloody civil war that enabled the emergence of the Taliban in 1995. These former mujahideen leaders still hold the power to foment division today. Hekmatyar, Dostum, Atta, the Haqqanis, and other warlords retain positions of power and access to arms. The Taliban today are also no more cohesive than the mujahideen forerunners. It will also face a larger threat in victory than the mujahideen did in 1989. ISIS-K remains embedded in Afghanistan despite the combined firepower of the U.S and NATO, Afghan Government, and the Taliban. Hardline Taliban may flock to its ranks.[35] Unchallenged, ISIS-K could rise even faster than the Taliban in the 1990s.

Afghanistan’s current conditions are worse than those under which the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, even if the insurgency is weaker. No actors share a compelling vision for the future of Afghanistan. No faction is strong enough to exert full control over the country. There are no limits on the cross-border flow of arms and fighters into and out of Afghanistan. From the wreckage of the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan came the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and 9/11. As great powers reorient and abandon Afghans to their fate, a new jihadist storm might brew unchecked in the historical ‘graveyard of empires’.