Iran Update - Israel-Hamas War January 1 to May 1, 2024

Iran Update, May 1, 2024

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Amin Soltani, Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, Kelly Campa, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Several Iranian military leaders boasted on May 1 that they could strike Israel with a drone and missile attack much larger than what they launched on April 13 and thus inflict greater damage on Israel.[1] IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami suggested that Iran could have launched two or three additional waves of drones and missiles against Israel and that each successive wave would have reduced the efficacy of US and partner air defenses.[2] IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brig. Gen. Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh similarly asserted that his service used “only 20 percent of [its] strength” in the April 13 drone and missile attack.[3] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Iran modeled its April 13 attack on recent Russian attacks in Ukraine and that Iran designed its strike package to defeat Israeli air defenses, even though the United States and its partners intercepted around 99 percent of the projectiles. Iranian leaders are almost certainly studying the April 13 attack to learn lessons and understand how to defeat US and partner air defenses in the future.[4]

Several senior Iranian military officers, including Salami, separately framed the April 13 drone and missile attack as successful in that it demonstrated Iranian willingness to now attack Israel directly.[5] These statements echo similar remarks from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on April 22, during which he praised senior military commanders for their role in the attack and said that “the willpower of the Iranian nation and armed forces” matters more than how many munitions Iran launched or how many munitions hit their target.[6] These statements are also consistent with Salami and other regime officials saying in recent weeks that Iran has adopted a new policy of targeting Israel directly in retaliation for Israeli attacks on Iranian interests.[7]

Hamas asked international mediators to clarify the terms of two sections of the new Egyptian-proposed ceasefire proposal, according to an Egyptian official speaking to Israeli media.[8] Hamas requested assurances that the second stage of the deal would facilitate the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and requested clarification on the unconditional return of displaced Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip.[9] Egyptian sources speaking to a United Kingdom-based, Qatari-owned outlet said that an Israeli delegation arrived in Cairo on April 30 to discuss Hamas’ concerns and amendments to the deal.[10] The Egyptian officials expect that Hamas will deliver its final response to the deal "at the end of the week."[11]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iranian military leaders emphasized that they could hit Israel with a drone and missile attack much greater than what they launched on April 13. Iranian leaders are likely studying their April 13 attack to learn lessons and understand how to more effectively penetrate US and partner air defenses.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas is considering an Egyptian-proposed ceasefire deal and has requested clarification on some of its contents. Egyptian officials expect a Hamas response to the deal in the coming days. Hamas has not changed its maximalist demands since December 2023.
• West Bank: Jordan accused Israeli settlers of attacking a humanitarian aid convoy traveling through the West Bank to the Gaza Strip. The IDF afterward imposed a “closed military zone” where the attack occurred.
• Yemen: The United States conducted a preemptive strike targeting a Houthi uncrewed surface vessel in Yemen. The United States determined that the vessel posed an imminent threat to US forces and nearby commercial traffic.

Iran Update, April 30, 2024

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Andie Parry, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Russia and China are hosting talks to facilitate Hamas’ inclusion in the Palestinian Authority, which would result in a Hamas-influenced government in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. China hosted senior Hamas and Fatah officials in Beijing on April 26 to discuss “intra-Palestinian reconciliation” and to “strive for the early realization of Palestinian unity and reunification.”[1] Russia also facilitated Hamas-Fatah talks in February 2024 that sought to achieve “Palestinian unity.”[2] An unspecified Palestinian official told the New York Times that senior Hamas official Musa Abu Marzouk and Fatah Central Committee member Azzam al Ahmad participated in the China-hosted talks.[3]

Both the Chinese and the Russian efforts to achieve “Palestinian unity” mirrors a plan laid out by Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh on April 21 that called for a “consensus government.” Haniyeh set out a framework on April 21 for Palestinian governance that would require the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to include Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in its leadership and for Palestinian political factions to form a consensus government that unifies the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.[4] A consensus government would be influenced by Hamas and PIJ in both the West Bank and Gaza. This influence could allow both groups to help facilitate smuggling of weapons and other military supplies into the West Bank. Hamas — after gaining control over the Palestinian Authority government in the 2006 Palestinian Elections — subsequently undermined Fatah’s security forces and executed a military takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007.[5] Fatah is unlikely to agree to a reconciliation agreement with Hamas in any case, given the lack of trust between the two sides stemming from the 2007 Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip and several subsequent failed attempts at reconciliation.

Israeli political and military officials suggested that an Israeli clearing operation into Rafah could begin within the next few days. Unspecified security officials told Israeli Army Radio that the operation into Rafah will begin if Hamas does not accept the current Egyptian ceasefire proposal.[6] Other Israeli media sites circulated unsourced reports on April 29 that the IDF would begin an operation into Rafah in the next two to three days if a hostage deal is not reached.[7] An unspecified Israeli official told Agence France-Presse on April 30 that Israel would wait until May 1 for Hamas’ response to the proposal.[8] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated during a meeting with the families of hostages held in the Gaza Strip that the IDF “will enter Rafah and eliminate the Hamas battalions there — with or without a deal.”[9] A family member that attended the meeting said that they understood from Netanyahu's comments that “it is not a question of whether Rafah is or is not going to happen.”[10] Far-right minister Itamar Ben Gvir similarly said on April 30 that Netanyahu “promised [in a private meeting] that Israel would go into Rafah” and that there would not be a “reckless” ceasefire deal.[11] Ben Gvir “warned” Netanyahu of the consequences of failing to clear Rafah during the meeting.[12] Finance Minister Bezal Smotrich, a far-right ally of Ben Gvir, threatened Netanyahu on April 29 that “a government headed by you will have no right to exist” if it failed to defeat Hamas.[13]

The IDF indicated on April 30 that two divisions are ready for a ground operation into Rafah. The IDF said on April 30 that the 162nd and 98th divisions “completed combat readiness operations” and their commanders approved operational plans for future operations in the Gaza Strip.[14] Both divisions have conducted combat operations in the Gaza Strip since October 27. Israeli media claimed on April 29 that IDF armor is “lined up on the Gaza Strip border” and ready to begin the offensive into Rafah.[15] IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi approved operational plans “for the continuation of the war” — presumably including an operation into Rafah — during meetings at IDF Southern Command on April 28.[16]

Netanyahu also confirmed on April 30 that the IDF had begun the humanitarian evacuation of Rafah.[17] The IDF expanded its humanitarian zone in the southern Gaza Strip on April 28.[18] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on April 15 that Israel would evacuate Rafah before beginning clearing operations there.[19] A senior United Nations official told the Wall Street Journal that a civilian evacuation from Rafah to other parts of Gaza would take at least 10 days.[20]

Hamas is continuing to consider an Egyptian ceasefire proposal that could enact a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip of up to a year.[21] Egyptian sources told the Wall Street Journal that Hamas would need to release at least 20 living hostages before the second phase of the deal, which includes a year-long “sustained calm.”[22] Hamas delegates in Cairo reportedly said that the proposal currently fails to provide clear guarantees that Israel is serious about the second phase of the deal.[23] A senior Hamas official speaking to a UK-based, Qatari-owned outlet said that the Hamas leadership abroad and Hamas leadership in Gaza have been in communication about the ceasefire proposal and are “preparing the final response.”[24] The Hamas official noted that Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the other Palestinian factions fighting in the Gaza Strip are contributing to the response. Hamas is the leader of a 12-militia coalition that coordinates politically and militarily.[25] PIJ Deputy Secretary General Muhammad al Hindi told Hamas-affiliated Quds News on April 29 that the Palestinian factions had discussed the ceasefire and that Hamas’ demands of an Israeli withdrawal and a full ceasefire “are clear.”[26]

A BBC report published on April 29 detailed the uncoordinated and brutal way in which Iranian security personnel killed a 16-year-old girl participating in the 2022 protest wave, citing a “highly confidential” IRGC document.[27] The BBC identified the document as a report summarizing a five-hour, IRGC-held hearing on the killing of Nika Shakarami, a 16-year-old girl. The document confirmed that three members of Ansar-e Hezbollah — a semi-official, regime vigilante group — molested and killed Shakarami for participating in the Woman, Life, Freedom movement in September 2022. The report claimed that the personnel detained, abused, and killed Shakarami in their vehicle after spotting her at an anti-regime protest. IRGC Capt. Mohammad Zamani instructed the team to dump Shakarami’s deceased body on a Tehran street to avoid mounting casualties recorded at security stations. Zamani said that he had “already had deaths in [his] station, and [he did not] want the number to rise to 20.” This statement illustrates the culpability of this IRGC officer and his entire chain of command in Shakarami’s death. The regime later claimed that Shakarami killed herself.[28] The regime frequently disposed of dead protestors or delayed family access to the bodies of dead protesters during the Mahsa Amini movement.[29]

A senior former Iranian intelligence officer helped the BBC verify the authenticity of the report. The BBC offered details about how this official corroborated the document such as checking an IRGC archive by using a daily code issued to senior intelligence officers. The individual also called an Iranian government official within Iran's military apparatus to authenticate the report.[30]

This report corroborates some of CTP’s assessments made during its coverage of the Mahsa Amini movement, including that the protests caused security bandwidth constraints, exhaustion, and low morale.[31] The report cited by the BBC suggests an extraordinary level of incompetence from security personnel, including that Iranian security forces feared Shakarami and 14 other female protesters’ potential to “cause a [prison] riot.”[32] Ansar-e Hezbollah’s participation in protest suppression also suggests that the regime was facing bandwidth constraints due to the protests. The IRGC uses and works with Ansar-e Hezbollah members, although the group sometimes operates outside of the IRGC’s jurisdiction in an extra-legal capacity.[33] Ansar-e Hezbollah has previously threatened, kidnapped, and killed regime dissidents but has not played a prominent role in quashing anti-regime protests in recent years.[34] The group’s participation in suppressing the Mahsa Amini protest movement is particularly noteworthy within this context.

The BBC’s April 29 report further highlights CTP’s long-standing observation that the regime enables and empowers the killing of its citizens.[35] The IRGC document stated that Shakarami’s killing did not result in disciplinary action because the incident involved the participation of Ansar-e Hezbollah members instead of IRGC officers. The IRGC officer who oversaw the Ansar-e Hezbollah members and instructed them to dump Shakarami’s body received only a “written reprimand.”[36]

Increased instability and anti-regime militancy in eastern Iran are driving a change in the Iranian regime’s calculus and prioritization of threats along its eastern border. Jaish al Adl—a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi group—has conducted a series of attacks targeting Iranian security services in Sistan and Baluchistan Province, Iran, since December 2023, including a major complex attack on April 14.[37] The Afghan branch of the Islamic State has also conducted several major attacks in Iran since October 2022, including a double suicide vest attack targeting an event in January 2024 commemorating the death of Qassem Soleimani.[38] Iran has responded to these events by employing new capabilities and investing substantial resources to address the increasingly tenuous security environment along its eastern border. Iran used drones to target a vehicle carrying “anti-Iran militants” in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on April 25.[39] The use of a drone to target these fighters is unprecedented, suggesting that the Iranian regime is increasing the number of resources it is devoting to fighting militancy in southeastern Iran. Iran announced two days later that it would fund a $3 billion border wall along Iran’s northeastern border with Afghanistan, which presumably includes the northernmost section of Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[40] This wall is unlikely to be effective, given its length and the fact that it will not extend along the Pakistani border. The Iranian decision to devote resources towards building the wall does indicate the increasing priority Iran’s regime is giving to the security situation in southeastern Iran, however.

The regime’s recent and historical mistreatment of the Sunni Baloch population inside Sistan and Baluchistan Province has further exacerbated these security challenges. Iranian security forces violently suppressed Sunni Baloch protesters in Zahedan, Sistan, and Baluchistan province in September 2022 in an event that became known as “Bloody Friday.”[41] This mistreatment provides fertile ground for groups like Jaish al Adl to recruit fighters and benefit from tacit support, further limiting the effectiveness of the planned border wall. Jaish al Adl vowed in early October 2022 that it would retaliate against the Iranian regime for killing protesters and “enter the field with all its power.”[42] Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid severely criticized the regime during his weekly Friday Prayer sermons and led Zahedan residents in anti-regime protests on a weekly basis after the “Bloody Friday” incident.[43] The regime’s negligent development of resources and infrastructure in the province has left it critically underdeveloped, which has long fueled anti-regime sentiment and protest among the Balochi population.[44] Separatist Balochi militant organizations have long sought to separate Sistan and Baluchistan Province from Iran in response to these perceived grievances.[45]

Iran is also pursuing diplomatic measures to counteract the increasing threat on Iran’s southeastern border with Pakistan. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi discussed regional instability and other matters with various senior Pakistani officials including the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff Gen. Asim Munir on April 23-25.[46] Raisi and Munir also discussed increasing cooperation between the Iranian and Pakistani armed forces.[47] Raisi’s trip to Pakistan illustrated Iran’s diplomatic efforts to respond to a real and perceived threat change.

Key Takeaways:

• Fatah-Hamas Meeting in China: Russia and China are pursuing Hamas’ inclusion in the Palestinian Authority, which would result in a Hamas-influenced government in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Russia and China’s pursuit of “Palestinian unity” mirror a plan laid out by Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh on April 21 that called for a ”consensus government.”
• Rafah: An Israeli clearing operation into Rafah could begin within the next few days. The IDF indicated on April 30 that two divisions are ready for a ground operation into Rafah.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas is considering an Egyptian proposal that offers a year-long ceasefire if Hamas releases at least 20 hostages alive.
• Iran: Leaked IRGC documents analyzed by the BBC detailed the uncoordinated and brutal way in which Iranian security personnel abused and killed a 16-year-old girl during the 2022 protest wave. The IRGC’s subsequent cover up of the killing demonstrates that the regime is culpable for her death.
• Militancy in Southeastern Iran: Increased anti-regime militancy in eastern Iran is driving a change in how the regime prioritizes threats along its eastern border.
• Humanitarian Aid in Gaza: The US military began constructing the floating pier off the coast of the Gaza Strip some time in late April. US CENTCOM published photos of the construction on April 29.

Iran Update, April 29, 2024

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Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Kathryn Tyson, Kelly Campa, Talia Tayoun, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Hamas is considering a new Egyptian ceasefire proposal that would require Hamas to release 20 to 33 living Israeli hostages.[1] Egyptian officials reportedly sent Hamas the proposal on April 26 after Egyptian intelligence officials met with the IDF chief of staff and Shin Bet head in Egypt and Israel.[2] Hamas acknowledged that it received the proposal on April 27 and framed it as a “response” to Hamas’ maximalist demands, which have not changed since December 2023. Hamas sent Israel a reiteration of its unchanging, maximalist demands on April 13 after the previous round of negotiations.[3] A Hamas delegation reportedly arrived in Cairo on April 29 to discuss the latest Egyptian proposal. An Israeli delegation is expected to travel to Cairo to continue talks on April 30.[4]

Unspecified Israeli officials stated that the proposal contains several Israeli concessions. This proposal includes an Israeli willingness to discuss a “full return of displaced Palestinians to their homes in northern Gaza” and the withdrawal of the IDF from the Netzarim corridor that bisects the Gaza Strip.[5] The corridor is the only area in the Gaza Strip where Israeli forces are currently deployed.[6] Axios reported that the first phase of the proposal involves a ceasefire lasting one day for each hostage that Hamas releases.[7] The Israel war cabinet reportedly allowed negotiators to lower the number of hostages demanded after Hamas claimed that it does not have 40 living hostages that are elderly, female, or injured.[8] An unspecified Israeli official said that the war cabinet changed its position due to assessments “that some of the 40 hostages whose release Israel was demanding have died in Hamas captivity.”[9] The proposal also includes provisions for the potential release of “thousands” of Palestinian prisoners, according to British Foreign Secretary David Cameron.[10] The proposal also reportedly contains a second phase that prescribes a “period of sustained calm,” although what exactly that calm would entail is unclear.[11] An anonymous Hamas official told Agence France-Presse that Hamas has “no material problems with the current deal proposal” on April 28.[12]

International mediators have expressed hope that Hamas will accept the proposal. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken described Israel as being “extraordinarily generous” in the proposal and called for Hamas to “make the right decision” and “quickly” on April 29.[13] Egyptian Foreign Affairs Minister Sameh Shoukry said on April 29 that Egypt is “hopeful” about the new truce proposal.[14]

Palestinian militias threatened to target “foreign forces” deployed into or on the coast of the Gaza Strip. The secular leftist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Popular Resistance Committees—both Palestinian groups fighting alongside Hamas in the war—explicitly threatened UK forces in their statements on April 27 and 28, respectively.[15] The BBC reported on April 27 that UK troops may deploy to the Gaza Strip to assist with humanitarian aid distribution.[16] The PFLP statement called for humanitarian aid to be brought into the Gaza Strip through “official crossings” and “under Palestinian management and supervision.”[17] These statements follow Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Khalil al Hayya’s interview on April 25 during which he implied that Hamas would attack any non-Palestinian presence around the Gaza Strip “at sea or on land.”[18] At least one US Navy vessel is stationed off the coast of the Gaza Strip at the time of this writing.[19]

Iran is hosting an international trade exhibition between April 27 and May 1 as part of its effort to undermine Western sanctions by increasing Iranian exports and economic cooperation with other countries. Delegations from at least 26 countries, including Burkina Faso, North Korea, Russia, and Zimbabwe, attended the exhibition.[20] The exhibition has showcased Iranian agricultural, electrical, medical, and petrochemical products.[21] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanani emphasized on April 29 that the Iranian Industry, Mining, and Trade Ministry invited North Korea to participate in the exhibition.[22] A North Korean economic and political delegation traveled to Tehran on April 23, marking the first North Korean visit to Iran since 2019.[23] Kanani dismissed allegations that the North Korean delegation is visiting Iran to expand military cooperation with Tehran, describing these allegations as “biased speculation” and “baseless.”[24] Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber separately called for expanding economic ties and conducting trade in local currencies during meetings with the vice president of Zimbabwe and the prime minister of Burkina Faso on the sidelines of the exhibition on April 27.[25] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi previously traveled to Zimbabwe in July 2023 and signed 12 cooperation agreements, including an energy agreement, with Zimbabwean officials.[26]

Iran appears especially focused on possible arms deals with regional and extra-regional actors. Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Gharaei Ashtiani discussed military cooperation in separate meetings with his Indian and Kazakh counterparts on the sidelines of a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in Astana on April 26 and 27.[27] Ashtiani separately expressed readiness to increase cooperation with Zimbabwe while meeting Zimbabwean Vice President Constantino Chiwenga in Tehran on April 29.[28] Ashtiani, in his role as defense minister, is primarily responsible for managing arms procurement and sales and the Iranian defense industrial base. Iranian leaders have intensified their efforts in recent years to export military assets in order to generate revenue for the ill-fairing Iranian economy and increasing Iranian influence abroad.

Key Takeaways:

• Political Negotiations: Hamas is considering an Egyptian-proposed ceasefire deal that would have Hamas release 20 to 33 Israeli hostages alive. Western outlets reported the proposal involves new Israeli concessions. Hamas has not changed its maximalist position in the negotiations since December 2023.
• Iran: Delegations from Russia, North Korea, and several African countries, among others, have traveled to Tehran for an international trade exhibition. The exhibition is part of the Iranian effort to undermine Western sanctions by increasing Iranian exports and economic cooperation with other countries. Iran remains particularly focused on selling military equipment.
• Gaza Strip: The World Central Kitchen announced the resumption of its humanitarian operations in the Gaza Strip. The IDF separately announced the expansion of its humanitarian zone in the southern Gaza Strip.
• Iraq: Some Iraqi parliamentarians have backed a motion to designate the US ambassador to Iraq as a persona non grata. The parliamentarians are responding to the ambassador condemning a newly passed law that criminalizes homosexuality in Iraq.
• Syria: The Syrian regime reportedly deployed forces to Suwayda Province, as anti-regime activity has continued mounting there. Anti-regime protests have fluctuated across the province since August 2023.

Iran Update, April 28, 2024

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Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi approved operational plans “for the continuation of the war” during a visit to IDF Southern Command on April 28.[1] He discussed the plans with IDF Southern Command commander Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman and division and brigade commanders. An Israeli war correspondent said that Rafah was “on the agenda” of the meeting.[2] Israeli media claimed that Halevi approved plans “for a major operation into Rafah” during the meeting.[3]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: The IDF Chief of Staff reportedly approved plans for a major operation into Rafah during a meeting with the IDF Southern Command commander and division and brigade commanders.
• West Bank: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last information cutoff on April 27.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 27.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Palestinian militias conducted several attacks targeting the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in Beit Hanoun in the northern Gaza Strip on April 22. Hamas fighters fired sniper rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and mortars targeting Israeli forces near Beit Hanoun.[26] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the current war, mortared Israeli forces east of Beit Hanoun.[27] The IDF has conducted multiple raids targeting Palestinian militias in Beit Hanoun in recent weeks.[28] These attacks and the IDF’s raids indicate that Palestinian militia cells remain in Beit Hanoun, as CTP-ISW has previously assessed.

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on April 22. The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) directed an airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters in an unspecified area of the central Gaza Strip.[29] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades mortared Israeli forces east of Bureij in the central Gaza Strip on April 22.[30]

Unspecified Arab officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 20 that Hamas is considering removing its political leadership from Qatar.[31] Hamas denied reports on April 20 that it was moving its leadership out of Qatar.[32] Hamas leaders have lived in Doha, the capital of Qatar, since 2012.[33] Qatar has served as a mediator for ceasefire talks between Israel and Hamas during the current war. Unspecified Arab officials told the Wall Street Journal that Hamas has recently contacted at least two countries in the region, including Oman, to ask about the possibility of Hamas political leaders relocating to the two countries.[34]

The Israeli War Cabinet met on April 21 to discuss Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip and ceasefire negotiations.[35] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that members of the negotiating team were conducting “false briefings” to the media and ”seeding desperation among” hostage families, adding that these briefings harm the effort to return Israeli hostages.[36] Netanyahu also alleged during a recent security cabinet meeting that Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant was leaking information from sensitive meetings.[37]

A flotilla of ships is preparing to sail from Turkey to the Gaza Strip in an attempt to breach Israel’s naval blockade on the Gaza Strip, according to Freedom Flotilla Coalition organizers.[38] An organizer said that the flotilla would include a cargo ship carrying food, water, ambulances and medical supplies. The same organizer said that Turkish port authorities are still discussing the ships’ point of departure. The Freedom Flotilla Coalition has participated in similar missions for the Gaza Strip. Israeli naval forces raided a Turkish-dispatched coalition flotilla in 2010 in international waters in the Mediterranean Sea.[39] Israeli forces killed at least nine, mostly Turkish, pro-Palestinian activists during the raid and suffered seven Israeli soldiers wounded[40] Turkey responded to the incident by recalling its ambassador and cancelling military exercises with Israel.[41]

The World Health Organization (WHO) director general said on April 22 that WHO aid missions to hospitals in northern Gaza have been only “partly successful” due to delays at checkpoints and ongoing fighting in the Gaza Strip.[42] The director general said that humanitarian aid missions need “safe and sustained passage” into the Gaza Strip to deliver aid to people in critical condition. Palestinian militias have continued to mortar Israeli forces in the central Gaza Strip’s Netzarim Corridor. Netzarim Corridor is where Israeli forces have established forward operating bases and outposts to facilitate future raids into the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF also has checkpoints in the corridor to control the flow of aid to the north.[43]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in six locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last information cutoff on April 21.[44] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms and detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting Israeli forces in the Balata refugee camp and Silat al Dhahr refugee camp in the northern West Bank.[45] Unspecified Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces during a raid near Tubas, Hebron, and Jerusalem.[46] Palestinian media reported that unspecified Palestinian fighters detonated an IED near an Israeli settlement east of Qalqilya.[47]

Israeli media reported that violence broke out between Palestinians and Israeli settlers in Burka, east of Ramallah on April 21. Israeli media said that Palestinian and Israeli civilians threw rocks at each other and set a car and building on fire.[48] Palestinian Authority-affiliated media cited local officials who said that Israeli settlers attacked the Palestinian village of Burka from the north and the west, setting fire to a sheep barn and attempting to ignite a house.[49] Israeli media reported that that there were six casualties and that Israeli forces arrived on the scene.[50]

Two Palestinians rammed Israeli civilians with a car in Jerusalem. The suspects attempted to fire a rudimentary submachine gun at the civilians before fleeing the scene.[51] The Israeli police detained the two Palestinians, who the Israeli Police said were originally from Hebron.[52] Israeli media reported that the two have familial relations with known members of Hamas’ military wing in the West Bank.[53] Palestinian Authority-affiliated media reported that the IDF closed checkpoints northeast of Jerusalem following the attack.[54]

Israeli officials criticized US plans to block military aid to an IDF unit due to alleged human rights abuses in the West Bank. Three US sources with knowledge of the issue told Axios that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken is expected to announce that the United States will ban US military assistance or training providing for the Netzah Yehuda Battalion, which is an ultra-orthodox IDF unit that operate mostly in the West Bank.[55] Blinken is ordering an end to these provisions under the 1997 Leahy Law, which makes it illegal for the US government to fund assistance for units of foreign security forces in which there is credible information implicating a unit in the gross human rights violation.[56] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the decision targeting an IDF unit “the height of absurdity and a moral low” and said that he will act against the US plans.[57] Israeli War Cabinet member Benny Gantz told US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a phone call that the decision would be a “mistake” and “harm Israel’s international legitimacy.”[58]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 21.[59] Hezbollah fired a salvo of approximately 35 rockets at Ein Zeitim in northern Israel in response to recent Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon.[60] The IDF shot down a ”suspicious aerial vehicle” near Kiryat Shmona.[61]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant discussed Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah’s attempts to establish a presence in Syria with local IDF commanders during a visit in the Golan Heights on April 21 .[62] Gallant stated that the IDF is “actively preventing” Hezbollah and Iranian-backed militias from establishing positions along the Golan Heights-Syria border.[63] The IDF Air Force and ground forces have repeatedly targeted Iranian-backed militia positions near the Golan Heights-Syria border.[64] The IDF said on April 9 that it will not allow Hezbollah to establish a presence in southern Syria and will hold the Syrian Arab Army responsible for Hezbollah activity in Syria.[65] The IDF said on April 7 that Iranian-backed fighters have fired at least 35 rockets into the Golan Heights from southern Syria since the start of the Israel-Hamas war.[66]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Iranian media claimed on April 21 that the IRGC attacked a “secret American base” in Israel’s Negev Desert during Iran’s April 13 missile and drone attack on Israel.[67] IRGC-affiliated media claimed that the US base, named ”Position 512,” maintains radar facilities that monitor missile attacks on Israel.[68]

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi emphasized the importance of friendly relations during his first trip to Pakistan on April 22 since Iran and Pakistan exchanged cross-border strikes against each other in January 2024.[69] Raisi emphasized the strong relations and ”deep religious and historical bonds“ between Iran and Pakistan during separate meetings with the Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on April 22.[70] Iran and Pakistan signed eight memoranda of understanding (MOU) aimed at increasing cooperation in areas such as security, free trade, judicial proceedings, and the media.[71] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian separately called Raisi’s visit a ”turning point” in Iran-Pakistan relations during a phone call with his Pakistani counterpart on April 22.[72]

The Iranian regime emphasized the need to strengthen Iran’s defense capabilities following Israel’s April 18 airstrike that damaged Iranian military infrastructure. The Israeli airstrike damaged an S-300 air defense system’s TOMB STONE radar at the Eighth Shekari Artesh Air Force base northeast of Esfahan City, Esfahan Province.[73] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri chaired a meeting with the Passive Defense Organization on April 20 to discuss “maintaining and improving preparations” to confront unspecified threats.[74] The Passive Defense Organization is an Iranian regime institution responsible for defending Iran's civilian, military, cyber, and nuclear infrastructure from attacks.[75] The Iranian Parliament separately approved parts of a plan to strengthen and develop the Defense Innovation and Research Organization’s “scientific research and defense innovations.”[76] The Defense Innovation and Research Organization operates under the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry. The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned the Defense Innovation and Research Organization in August 2014 for “for engaging in or attempting to engage in activities that have materially contributed to...the proliferation of WMD."

Iran Update, April 19, 2024

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Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Israel conducted retaliatory airstrikes targeting an Artesh Air Force base in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province, Iran, on April 18 in response to Iran’s April 13 drone and missile attack targeting Israel.[1] Western and Israeli media reported that Israeli aircraft over unspecified airspace outside Iran fired at least three missiles targeting an Artesh airbase in Esfahan. The Artesh is Iran’s conventional armed forces.[2] An analyst with commercial satellite firm Hawkeye360 posted satellite imagery showing an S-300PMU2 surface-to-air missile battery position in Esfahan, adding that the strike may have damaged an S-300PMU2 surface-to-air missile battery’s target engagement radar.[3] Russia provided the S-300 to Iran in 2016.[4] Iranian state media and local Iranian social media users suggested that Israel targeted the Eighth Shekari Artesh Air Force Base.[5] One senior US official told ABC News that Israel targeted an Artesh radar site that is part of the air defense system protecting the Natanz Nuclear Complex, which is Iran’s main uranium enrichment facility approximately 170 kilometers north of Esfahan.[6] The International Atomic Energy Organization, along with Western and Iranian media, reported that Israel did not damage any of Iran’s nuclear facilities.[7]

Iranian state media and local Iranian social media users separately reported air defense activity over Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province, on April 18.[8] Iranian officials told The New York Times that Israel attempted to conduct a separate attack on unspecified targets in Tabriz.[9] IRGC-affiliated media claimed that Iranian air defense systems intercepted a “suspicious object,” which caused sounds of explosions over Tabriz. The IRGC-affiliated media outlet added that Iranian facilities in Tabriz “have not been exposed to any harm.”[10]

Iranian officials and media downplayed the severity of Israel’s April 18 airstrikes, suggesting that Iran will not respond to the strikes “forcefully” and “painfully.”[11] The regime has claimed it would respond to Israeli retaliation for the Iranian April 13 attack targeting Israel “forcefully” and “painfully” since April 16.[12] Iranian officials and media claimed that Iranian air defense systems shot down small drones over Esfahan, not missiles.[13] Senior Iranian military officials, including Artesh Commander Maj. Gen. Abdol Rahim Mousavi and Artesh Ground Forces Commander Brig. Gen. Kiomars Heydari, claimed that Iranian air defense systems intercepted “suspicious aerial objects,” which caused sounds of explosions over Esfahan.[14] Some Iranian media outlets claimed that Iran’s air defense systems shot down drones, despite Israeli reporting that Israel used long-range missiles to conduct the airstrikes.[15] Israel has previously conducted attacks inside Iran using small explosive-laden drones.[16] IRGC-affiliated media circulated videos highlighting the “secure and peaceful” atmosphere in Esfahan, including near nuclear facilities and the Eighth Shekari Artesh Air Base.[17] IRGC-affiliated media similarly claimed that Tabriz, East Azerbaijan, was “in complete calm” hours after reports of explosions near the city.[18]

The IDF Air Force likely conducted airstrikes targeting Syrian Arab Army (SAA) air defenses and other positions in Daraa Province on April 18. The Syrian Defense Ministry reported that Israel targeted air defense positions and caused “material losses” in southern Syria at 1955 ET on April 18, approximately 90 minutes before confirmation of an Israeli attack on Iran.[19] Local Syrian media reported that Israel targeted an SAA radar battalion near Qarfa, Daraa, and an SAA 112th Brigade position in Izraa City, Daraa.[20] The IDF has previously targeted SAA air defenses and positions in Daraa Province in retaliation for rockets fired into the Golan Heights.[21] Israeli media reported in 2020 that the SAA’s 1st Corps, which is responsible for areas of southern Syria near the Golan Heights, is closely affiliated with Lebanese Hezbollah.[22] The IDF has said that it will not allow Hezbollah to establish a presence in southern Syria and that the IDF will hold the SAA responsible for Hezbollah activity in Syria. [23]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Israel conducted retaliatory airstrikes targeting an Artesh Air Force base in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province, Iran, in response to Iran’s April 13 drone and missile attack targeting Israel.
• Syria: Israel likely conducted airstrikes targeting Syrian Arab Army (SAA) air defenses and other positions in Daraa Province.
• Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force struck military infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Southern Gaza Strip: US and Israeli officials held a high-level virtual meeting to discuss a possible Israeli military operation in Rafah.
• Political Negotiations: Unspecified US and Saudi officials told the Wall Street Journal that the United States is attempting to negotiate a deal in which Israel would recognize Palestinian statehood in exchange for diplomatic recognition from Saudi Arabia.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged fighters from several Palestinian militias, including Hamas and PIJ, during an operation in the Nour Shams Refugee Camp, Tulkarm.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Iraq: Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq Secretary General Mohammad al Tamimi criticized the Shia Coordination Framework for supporting Iraqi President Mohammed Shia al Sudani’s visit to Washington, DC.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Air Force struck military infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip on April 19. The 215th Artillery Brigade (162nd Division) and IDF Air Force struck rocket launchers and a weapons depot in an area in Beit Lahia from which Palestinian fighters had recently fired rockets at Ashkelon, southern Israel.[24] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) launched two rocket salvos targeting Ashkelon on April 18.[25]

Palestinian militias conducted several indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip on April 19. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, mortared Israeli vehicles southeast of the Zaytoun neighborhood in southeastern Gaza City.[26] PIJ fired rockets targeting Israeli forces and Israeli positions east and southeast of Gaza City.[27] Israeli forces are operating in southeastern Gaza City to conduct raids against Palestinian fighters and secure the Netzarim corridor, where Israeli forces have constructed a highway to support military operations in the northern Gaza Strip.[28]

The Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) killed several Palestinian fighters in an unspecified area in the central Gaza Strip on April 19.[29] The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a secular leftist Palestinian group fighting alongside Hamas in the war, fired rockets targeting Israeli forces in the east of the central Gaza Strip on April 18.[30]

The IDF Air Force struck approximately 25 military targets to support IDF ground forces operating in the Gaza Strip on April 19.[31] The targets included military buildings, observation posts, and rocket launchers.

Unspecified US and Saudi officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 18 that the United States is attempting to negotiate a deal in which Israel would recognize Palestinian statehood in exchange for diplomatic recognition of Israel from Saudi Arabia.[32] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on January 10 that normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel is still possible.[33] Saudi Arabia told the United States in February 2024 that it will not proceed with normalization with Israel “unless an independent Palestinian state is recognized.”[34] The Wall Street Journal reported that Saudi officials have privately suggested that they would normalize ties with Israel if Israel gave verbal assurances that it would engage in talks on Palestinian statehood.

The United States is offering Saudi Arabia a “more formal” defense relationship with the United States, US assistance to help Saudi Arabia acquire civil nuclear power, and Palestinian statehood as part of the deal. Unidentified US officials claimed that this part of the negotiation is in its final stages. US officials argued that Iran’s attack on Israel on April 13 should be evidence to Israel that integration with Saudi Arabia can improve its defense against Iran. The Wall Street Journal noted that the deal may aid Israel in a potential exit strategy from the Gaza Strip. Several Arab countries have said that if Israel publicly makes progress in establishing a Palestinian state, they will participate in a post-war Gaza Strip.

US and Israeli officials held a high-level virtual meeting on April 18 to discuss a possible Israeli military operation in Rafah.[35] This is the second such meeting to discuss Rafah since April 1.[36] US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan met with Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer and Israeli National Security Advisor Tzachi Hanegbi. US and Israeli officials agreed on the ”shared objective to see Hamas defeated in Rafah.”[37] US officials expressed concerns over the potential operation in Rafah, and the Israeli officials agreed to take these concerns into account and hold future discussions.[38] Unspecified US officials familiar with a similar meeting on April 1 said that Israel presented a plan to move 1.4 million civilians out of Rafah but that the Israeli plan excluded concepts for access to food, water, and other civil services.[39] US and Israeli officials also discussed Iran’s attack on Israel and new US sanctions targeting Iran during the April 18 meeting.[40]

PIJ launched a second salvo of rockets from the Gaza Strip targeting Ashkelon in southern Israel shortly after the first on April 18.[41] CTP-ISW reported the first salvo targeting Ashkelon in the April 18 update.[42]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces engaged fighters from several Palestinian militias, including Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), during an operation in the Nour Shams Refugee Camp, Tulkarm.[43] Hamas reported that fighters from its battalion in Jenin were involved in clashes in Tulkarm.[44] The IDF reported that three Israeli soldiers sustained injuries during clashes with Palestinian fighters who used small arms and improvised explosive devices (IED).[45] Palestinian sources reported that Israeli forces killed at least five Palestinians, including a senior commander in PIJ’s Tulkarm Battalion.[46]

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 18, including multiple engagements in Nour Shams refugee camp.[47] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms targeting Israeli forces near an Israeli settlement north of Hebron.[48]

The United States Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two entities on April 19 for fundraising on behalf of two violent Israeli extremists in the West Bank. [49]The groups, Mount Hebron Fund and Shlom Asiraich, established crowdfunding campaigns to raise thousands of dollars for two men whom the United States sanctioned in February 2024. The United States sanctioned the two men in February under an executive order that targeted those perpetrating violence in the West Bank.[50] The European Union separately imposed sanctions on four individuals and two entities for their connection to Israeli settler violence.[51]

The IDF responded to a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report on April 18 about the rise in Israeli settler violence in the West Bank.[52] The IDF told CNN that Israeli soldiers who fail to protect Palestinians from settler violence or take part in such attacks face disciplinary action.[53] The IDF conceded that its forces had witnessed some Israelis attacking Palestinians. HRW reported that the Israeli military has not protected Palestinians from settler violence and on some occasions participated in the attacks.[54]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 18.[55] Hezbollah targeted Israeli surveillance equipment in three attacks using unspecified weapons.

The IDF 869th Combat Intelligence Battalion (91st Division) identified Hezbollah fighters in Aita al Shaab, southern Lebanon, and directed an airstrike targeting them.[56] Hezbollah announced that one of its fighters died but did not provide further details.[57]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq Secretary General Mohammad al Tamimi criticized the Shia Coordination Framework on April 19 for supporting Iraqi President Mohammed Shia al Sudani’s visit to Washington, DC.[58] Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq reportedly has ties to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Asaib Ahl al Haq and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba.[59] Tamimi previously threatened on March 27 to resume attacks targeting US forces if Sudani did not establish a timeline for US troops to withdraw from Iraq during his visit to Washington, DC.[60] Tamimi accused unspecified leaders of the Shia Coordination Framework of becoming too concerned with politics and abandoning their efforts to remove US forces from Iraq. Tamimi also questioned their dedication to remove US forces from Iraq. Tamimi argued that Iraq cannot have a relationship with the United States while US forces remaining Iraq.[61]

An online shipping tracker confirmed that the IRGC intelligence gathering ship, the Behshad, returned to Bandar Abbas port, Hormozgan province, Iran, on April 18.[62] Bloomberg reported on April 18 that the Behshad left the Red Sea on April 4 to return to Iran.[63] The Behshad provides the Houthi movement with real-time intelligence, enabling them to target ships that have turned off transponders.[64] Western and Israeli media speculated that Israel would target the Behshad in retaliation for Iran’s April 13 drone and missile attack targeting Israel.[65]

Iran Update, April 18, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Kathryn Tyson, Amin Soltani, Ashka Jhaveri, Peter Mills, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Iran is likely engaging in a coordinated information effort to deter an Israeli strike targeting its nuclear facilities and reassure its domestic population about Iran’s ability to protect such facilities. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Nuclear Security and Protection Corps Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Haghtalab announced on April 18 that Iran will change its publicly stated “nuclear doctrine and policies” in the event of an Israeli strike targeting its nuclear facilities.[1] Haghtalab also said that the Iranian National Passive Defense Organization—one of the regime bodies responsible for defending its civilian, military, and nuclear infrastructure from attacks—has plans in place to face “any threat from” Israel.[2] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) evacuated its inspectors from Iranian nuclear facilities on April 16. The IAEA cited concerns that Israel might strike Iranian nuclear facilities in response to Iran’s April 13 drone and missile strikes targeting Israel.[3]

Most of Iran’s official state media apparatus, including media outlets controlled by the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC)—the main regime body overseeing Iranian nuclear policy—highlighted Haghtalab’s announcement.[4] This reporting suggests that officials at the highest levels of the Iranian government endorsed the announcement, including the SNSC and the Office of the Supreme Leader. Western officials and analysts have often expressed concern that a US or Israeli strike targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities would spur Iran to renew its nuclear weapons program.[5] Iran is likely seeking to exploit this long-standing concern to influence Israeli calculations. Iran is also likely seeking to exploit this concern to influence Western governments to place pressure on Israel not to strike Iran’s nuclear program. The Iranian regime has also long touted its nuclear program as a significant national achievement and probably seeks to reassure its population that it will protect its nuclear accomplishments.[6]

Iran’s attempt to deter an Israeli retaliatory strike does not mean that Iran will not pursue nuclear weapons development, however. Iranian officials have long said that Iran will not weaponize its nuclear program, citing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s 2003 fatwa outlawing nuclear weapons.[7] Haghtalab’s announcement contradicts Khamenei’s stated opposition to nuclear weapons development and marks a notable departure from previous regime rhetoric with respect to its nuclear policies. CTP-ISW previously assessed in December 2023 that Iran has pursued a series of nuclear advancements consistent with the desire for a nuclear arsenal.[8] The announcement also coincides with several senior Iranian officials, including IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami, expressing that the recent escalation cycle between Iran and Israel has significantly altered Iran’s external security calculus in an unspecified manner.[9]

Houthi leader Abdulmalik al Houthi claimed on April 18 that the Houthi attacks on commercial shipping have extended “from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean.”[10] The Houthis claimed on April 7 that they conducted two attacks targeting two commercial ships in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea.[11] CTP-ISW cannot confirm that these attacks occurred and did not observe any reporting that corroborated the Houthi claims. The Houthis have said on multiple occasions that its maritime attack campaign aims to blockade Israel to support the Palestinian people.[12] The Houthis have expressed an aspiration to expand their attacks targeting Israeli shipping in the Indian Ocean and around the Cape of Good Hope.[13] The Houthis do not yet have this capability, but such a capability would allow the Houthis to attack alternate shipping routes that bypass the Red Sea. These attacks have forced major shipping companies to avoid the Red Sea and instead go around the Cape of Good Hope, which imposes additional time delays and costs on trade between Europe and Asia.[14] Houthi attacks have had limited success in “blockading” the Israeli port of Eilat on the Red Sea. Eilat’s revenue decreased by 80% between November 2023 and December 2023.[15]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran is likely engaging in a coordinated information effort to deter an Israeli strike targeting its nuclear facilities and reassure its domestic population about Iran’s ability to protect such facilities.
• An unnamed senior US official told ABC News that Israel is unlikely to retaliate against Iran until after the Passover holiday.
• Yemen: Houthi leader Abdulmalik al Houthi claimed that the Houthi attacks on commercial shipping have extended “from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean.”
• Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force struck Palestinian fighters and military infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Central Gaza Strip: The IDF concluded a week-long operation targeting Palestinian fighters and military infrastructure near Nuseirat in the central Gaza Strip.
• Political Negotiations: Hamas Deputy Political Bureau head Musa Abu Marzouk said that Hamas will not withdraw from ceasefire negotiations or drop its maximalist demands, which include a permanent ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Iraq: The Iraqi government and private sector signed 14 memoranda of understanding (MOU), primarily in energy and finance, with US companies.

Iran Update, April 17, 2024

click here to read the full report with maps

Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Peter Mills, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Ashka Jhaveri, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF reported that Israeli forces led by the Northern Brigade (Gaza Division) conducted raids targeting Hamas and PIJ sites in Beit Hanoun over the previous week.
• Central Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations across the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel, including a complex drone and anti-tank guided missile attack that injured 18 Israelis, including 14 IDF soldiers.
• Iran: A small demonstration occurred outside the Jordanian embassy in Tehran, protesting the Jordanian support in intercepting the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Iran and its Axis of Resistance have adopted a more confrontational strategy vis-a-vis Jordan in recent months.
• Senior Iranian political and military officials reiterated their threats that Iran would respond “severely” if Israel retaliates for the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel
• Syria: The Wall Street Journal reported that Iran ordered IRGC personnel to evacuate military sites across Syria in anticipation of possible Israeli strikes.
• Iraq: An adviser to the Iraqi prime minister, Subhan al Mullah Jiyad, claimed that the US-Iraqi Higher Military Commission has “set a schedule” for the withdrawal of the US-led international coalition from Iraq.
• Yemen: US CENTOM reported that it destroyed two drones in Houthi-controlled Yemen.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported on April 17 that Israeli forces led by the Northern Brigade (Gaza Division) conducted raids targeting Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) sites in Beit Hanoun over the previous week.[1] Israeli forces had collected intelligence on the sites from questioning Palestinian fighters, revealing that Hamas and PIJ used a school building for military activity as well as the civilians inside for cover from Israeli targeting. The IDF said that Israeli forces ordered civilians to vacate the building prior to the raid. The IDF detained and killed an unspecified number of Palestinian fighters in the building.

Palestinian militias conducted several attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip on April 17. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, claimed that its fighters had conducted 14 mortar and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attacks in Beit Hanoun over the previous 24 hours targeting Israeli forces in Beit Hanoun.[2] A Hamas fighter separately conducted a sniper attack targeting an Israeli soldier in Beit Hanoun.[3] The National Resistance Brigades lastly mortared Israeli forces in eastern Jabalia.[4]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on April 17.[5] The 401st and Nahal brigades (162nd Division) are operating near Wadi Gaza to kill Palestinian fighters and destroy military infrastructure. The IDF Air Force struck a Palestinian fighter squad that was using an armed drone in the central Gaza Strip.[6] The 215th Artillery Brigade and IDF Air Force cooperated to destroy several rocket launchers aimed at Israel.[7]

The IDF Air Force struck over 40 targets in the Gaza Strip on April 17, including explosively rigged buildings, observation posts, and underground military infrastructure.[8]

Palestinian sources claimed on April 17 that Israeli forces are operating in eastern Deir al Balah.[9] Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed separate RPG and anti-tank guided missile attacks targeting Israeli forces in the area.[10]

The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)—a department within the Israeli Defense Ministry—said that eight aid trucks entered the Gaza Strip from Ashdod Port in southern Israel on April 17.[11] This instance marks the first time that humanitarian aid has arrived via ship to Israel during the Israel-Hamas war.[12] The Israeli war cabinet approved the opening of the port on April 5.[13] The IDF said that trucks carry aid unloaded from the Ashdod Port into the Gaza Strip through the Kerem Shalom crossing[14]

Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh is meeting with senior Turkish officials. Haniyeh met with the Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan in Qatar on April 16.[15] Haniyeh will also meet Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara in the coming days.[16]

Palestinian fighters fired a single rocket barrage from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on April 17.[17] The Popular Resistance Committees, which is a Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, targeted an IDF base in Zikim.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 16.[18]  Three Palestinian militias—PIJ, the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and Jundullah—claimed separate attacks targeting Israeli forces around Tubas on April 16.[19] PIJ also claimed that it detonated an IED targeting an IDF bulldozer.[20] Jundallah has claimed two previous attacks in Tubas since the Israel-Hamas war began.[21] 

 Israeli forces detained six wanted Palestinians during overnight operations in the West Bank on April 17.[22] Israeli police separately detained a Palestinian man in Jerusalem on suspicion of planning to conduct a stabbing attack.[23]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on April 17.[24] One of these attacks was a complex drone and anti-tank guided missile attack that injured 18 Israelis, including 14 IDF soldiers, in Arab al Aramsha along the Israel-Lebanon border.[25] The drone that Hezbollah used bears visual similarities to an Iranian-made Adabil-2.[26] Hezbollah claimed that it targeted an IDF reconnaissance company headquarters in Arab al Aramsha.[27] The IDF reported that it conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah air defense sites near Baalbek in the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon, in retaliation for the Hezbollah drone strike in Arab al Aramsha.[28]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

A small demonstration occurred outside the Jordanian embassy in Tehran on April 16, protesting the Jordanian support in intercepting the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel.[29]  Demonstrators chanted anti-US and anti-Israeli phrases and held posters condemning Jordanian cooperation with the United States and Israel.[30] The Jordanian foreign minister said on April 14 that Jordan intercepted the projectiles because it assessed that the Iranian drones and missiles posed a genuine threat to Jordanian national security.[31] IRGC-affiliated media previously threatened Jordan if it further supported Israel.[32]

CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Iran and its Axis of Resistance have adopted a more confrontational strategy vis-a-vis Jordan in recent months.[33] The Axis of Resistance has indicated its interest in expanding its militia networks into Jordan, which would facilitate the transfer of materiel to the West Bank as well as create possible opportunities to disrupt Israeli overland trade through kingdom.[34] Iranian and Iranian-backed actors have repeatedly signaled their interest in generating these effects in recent weeks.[35] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah furthermore criticized Jordanian leaders for supporting the US and Israeli interception of the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel.[36]

Senior Iranian political and military officials reiterated on April 17 their threats that Iran would respond “severely” if Israel retaliates for the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel.[37] IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brig. Gen. Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh, who is primarily responsible for Iranian drone and missile operations, told reporters that Iran would strike Israel again if it responds to the April 13 Iranian attack.[38] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi similarly stated that Iran would confront Israel “fiercely and severely” if Israel conducts even the “smallest attack” on Iranian territory.[39] Artesh Commander Maj. Gen. Abdol Rahim Mousavi lastly emphasized that the Iranian armed forces are in a constant state of readiness.[40]

The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on April 17 that Iran ordered IRGC personnel to evacuate military sites across Syria in anticipation of possible Israeli strikes.[41] This report follows several local Syrian reports claiming that IRGC leadership issued evacuation orders to Iranian-backed militias in Deir ez Zor Province.[42] WSJ reported that Iran also advised Lebanese Hezbollah forces in Syria to take ”precautionary measures” ahead of potential Israeli targeting. Unspecified Syrian security officials told WSJ that Hezbollah accordingly reduced its senior officer presence in Syria and transferred personnel away from military sites. The officials also claimed that Hezbollah recently expanded its force presence along the Israel-Syria border to collect intelligence ahead of possible Israeli strikes.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah published a statement criticizing Saudi Arabia on April 17 amid rising tensions between the Axis of Resistance and the kingdom.[43] Kataib Hezbollah accused Saudi Arabia of supporting the US agenda in the Middle East. This statement comes as Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have criticized the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for providing Israel land access to the Persian Gulf.[44] It also comes as Saudi Arabia supported the United States and Israel in intercepting the Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel on April 17.[45]

An adviser to the Iraqi prime minister, Subhan al Mullah Jiyad, claimed on April 17 that the US-Iraqi Higher Military Commission has “set a schedule” for the withdrawal of the US-led international coalition from Iraq.[46] Jiyad did not provide details about the timeline for a withdrawal. The Higher Military Commission, which is comprised of US and Iraqi military officials, began talks about the status of the US-led international coalition in Iraq in late January 2024.[47] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia and political figures have repeatedly called on Sudani to set a timeline for removing US and international coalition forces from Iraq.[48] Sudani traveled to Washington, DC, on April 15, in part to discuss with US officials ending the US-led international coalition’s mission in Iraq and transitioning to a “comprehensive” bilateral relationship with the United States.[49]

US CENTOM reported that it destroyed two drones in Houthi-controlled Yemen on April 16.[50] Houthi-controlled media claimed on April 16 that the United States and United Kingdom conducted two airstrikes targeting unspecified sites in Bajil District, Hudaydah Governorate.[51]

Iran Update, April 16, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Annika Ganzeveld, Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Kathryn Tyson, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Washington Post reported on April 15 that 17 Iranian officials visited a Russian air defense system factory in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in March 2023.[1] The factory produces S-400 air defense missiles and mobile launchers, among other military equipment.[2] The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned the company that owns the factory — NPP Start — in June 2022 for supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[3] Unspecified intelligence officials told the Washington Post that Russia is “advancing” an agreement with Iran to supply Iran with Su-35 fighter jets.[4] Iran has long sought, but not yet received, Su-35s in return for supplying Russia with drones. US and Middle Eastern intelligence officials assessed that delayed Iranian payments to Russia may be hindering Iran’s acquisition of the fighter jets.[5] Russia previously provided Iran with at least two Yak-130 combat trainer aircraft in September 2023, which Iranian media framed as a “necessary prelude” for the acquisition of Su-35s.[6]

Senior Iranian officials emphasized that Iran would strike Israel again “faster and stronger” if Israel retaliated to Iran's April 13 missile and drone attack. Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani stated that Iran would respond against Israel within a “few seconds” of an Israeli attack.[7] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi emphasized in separate phone calls to several foreign leaders, including his Qatari and Russian counterparts, that Iran would respond “more fiercely, widely and painfully” if Israel retaliates against Iran.[8] The spokesperson of Iran’s Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee claimed that Iran is “ready to use weapons that [it] has not used before” during an interview with Lebanese Hezbollah-controlled media on April 16.[9]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: The Washington Post reported that 17 Iranian officials visited a Russian air defense system factory in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in March 2023.
• Senior Iranian officials emphasized that Iran would strike Israel again "faster and stronger" if Israel retaliates to Iran's April 13 missile and drone attack.
• Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian sources reported that Israeli forces are operating around Beit Hanoun.
• Political Negotiations: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that Hamas rejected the most recent ceasefire agreement because it thought the April 13 Iranian attack on Israel would lead to a regional conflict.
• West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in at least three locations across the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel, including a one-way drone attack targeting an Iron Dome battery.
• Iraq: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani continued his official visit to Washington, DC.
• Yemen: Houthi President Mahdi al Mashaat congratulated Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi for the April 13 Iranian attack targeting Israel during a phone call.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Palestinian sources reported on April 16 that Israeli forces are operating around Beit Hanoun. Several local Palestinian sources reported that Israeli armored vehicles entered Beit Hanoun and areas east of Jabalia. The sources reported that Israeli forces ordered civilians in Beit Hanoun and areas east of Jabalia to leave.[10] One report noted that Israeli forces are conducting an unspecified military operation in the area.[11] The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, mortared Israeli forces in eastern Jabalia on April 15.[12]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have not issued official evacuation orders for the area as of the time of writing. CTP-ISW assessed on March 25 that a small number of Palestinian fighters have likely infiltrated Beit Hanoun.[13] The ability of Palestinian militias to continue to operate in the northern Gaza Strip is consistent with the infiltration of fighters into the area and Hamas’ efforts to reassert its governing authority following the drawdown of Israeli forces.

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued operations near Nuseirat in the central Gaza Strip on April 16.[14] Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters and destroyed military infrastructure. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired rockets targeting an Israeli command and control node in southwestern Gaza City on April 15.[15] The Israeli defense minister said in February 2024 that the IDF has not defeated all four Hamas battalions in the central Gaza Strip and that it intends to dismantle the two remaining battalions.[16] CTP-ISW previously observed that Palestinian militias, including Hamas, have likely used a rear area in the central Gaza Strip to conduct attacks since mid-December that have targeted Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip.[17] Palestinian militias have also likely been able to infiltrate from the central strip into previously cleared areas of southern Gaza City. The IDF has conducted multiple raids in southern Gaza City since it decreased its force presence in the northern Gaza Strip in early 2024.[18]

The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)—a department within the Israeli Defense Ministry—said that 126 aid trucks entered the northern Gaza Strip on April 16.[19] Israeli media reported that the delivery was part of IDF-COGAT efforts to increase aid deliveries into the Gaza Strip and especially into the northern Gaza Strip.[20] The initiatives include opening two bakeries and working on the Bani Suheil water pipeline, according to Israeli media.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that Hamas rejected the most recent ceasefire agreement because it thought the April 13 Iranian attack on Israel would lead to a regional conflict.[21] Two attendees of a meeting between Blinken and American Jewish leaders told Axios about the substance of Blinken’s comments at the meeting. Hamas rejected the US-proposed ceasefire and hostage-for-prisoner exchange deal on April 13 hours before the Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel.[22] Hamas has since demanded new concessions from Israel in its counteroffer, according to one Israeli official.[23] The official said that Hamas sought to release fewer Israeli hostages in addition to asking for a higher ratio of hostage-for-prisoners and for Israel to release more Palestinian prisoners held under a life sentence.

Palestinian fighters fired two rockets from the northern Gaza Strip into southern Israel on April 16.[24] An Israeli military correspondent reported that both rockets struck open areas, causing no casualties or damage.[25]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in at least three locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 15. The IDF reported on April 16 that Israeli forces detained 23 wanted Palestinians during overnight operations in the West Bank.[26] Palestinian Mujahideen Movement fighters detonated an IED targeting Israeli forces in al Askar refugee camp. The militia separately targeted Israeli forces advancing into Nablus with unspecified munitions.[27] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades shot at Israeli forces operating in Jenin.[28]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah launched one-way attack drones targeting an Iron Dome battery near Beit Hilal.[29] Hezbollah has only claimed four attacks targeting Israeli Iron Dome batteries during the Israel-Hamas war.[30] LH previously claimed a drone attack targeting an Israeli Iron Dome battery on April 13 hours before the Iranian attack against Israel.[31] The IDF confirmed that two one-way attack drones entered Israeli airspace and exploded near Beit Hilal.[32] Israeli Army Radio reported that the drone attack injured three people and caused significant damage to unspecified ”property.”[33]

Hezbollah conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on April 16, including the one-way drone attack targeting the Iron Dome battery.[34]

The IDF killed two Hezbollah commanders in southern Lebanon on April 16.[35] The IDF Air Force killed the commander of the Radwan Unit’s rocket and missile unit in Hezbollah’s Western Sector, Mohammed Hossein Metzafa Shouri.[36] The IDF added that Shouri oversaw the planning and execution of “many” rocket and missile attacks from southern Lebanon into Israeli territory. The IDF also killed a commander from Hezbollah’s “Coastal Sector,” Esmail Yousef Baz.[37] Baz held a rank equivalent to a brigadier general and served as a “senior” Hezbollah military official. Baz was responsible for directing rocket and anti-tank guided missile attacks into northern Israel.[38] Hezbollah acknowledged Baz’s death.[39]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian spoke with several of his foreign minister counterparts and representatives from various international organizations in separate phone calls on April 15 and 16.[40] Abdollahian spoke separately with the foreign ministers of China, Oman, Indonesia, and Malaysia, among others. Abdollahian held additional separate phone calls with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Secretary General and the Organization of Islamic States Secretary General on April 16.[41] Abdollahian claimed in his separate calls with the Indonesian foreign minister and Omani foreign minister that Israel is responsible for tension and instability in the region.[42] The foreign ministers of Malaysia, Austria, and the United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres urged restraint from all parties involved.[43]

An anti-regime outlet posted a video of the Iranian military transporting drones, tanks, and other assorted military equipment in Tehran on April 16.[44] This is likely in preparation for the annual Artesh Day parade, which is held on April 18.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani continued his official visit to Washington, DC on April 16. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin expressed support for transitioning to an “enduring bilateral security relationship” with Iraq during a meeting with Sudani on April 15.[45] Sudani has emphasized during 2024 that he seeks to end the US-led international coalition’s presence in Iraq and transition to a “comprehensive” bilateral relationship with the United States.[46] Sudani also claimed that Iraqi Security Forces are “at a high level of readiness” and are prepared to ensure security and stability in Iraq.[47] Iraqi security forces still face significant deficiencies in fire support, intelligence, and logistics that would impede their ability to eliminate ISIS and other domestic threats alone.[48] Austin also stated that Iraqi Defense Minister Thabet Mohammad al Abbasi requested “the pricing and availability” of US counter-drone systems on April 13.[49] Militias in the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces—a security service that exists outside of the Defense Ministry—have repeatedly launched drones targeting US troops in Iraq. Sudani separately met with a delegation from the US defense company General Dynamics on April 16 to discuss developing Iraqi tanks and other armor.[50] General Dynamics Land Systems builds US M1 Abrams tanks, and Iraq operates Abrams tanks.

Sudani also held separate meetings with US Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo and US Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas on April 16.[51] Sudani and Adeyemo discussed “rehabilitating” Iraqi banks to meet international standards.[52] The United States has worked with Iraq in recent years to “improve the compliance procedures of Iraqi banks” to align Iraqi banks with international standards and “prevent terrorists, criminals, and corrupt and other illicit actors from accessing both the Iraqi and international financial systems.”[53] The US Treasury Department identified the Iraqi al Huda Bank as a “conduit for terrorist financing” and imposed sanctions on the bank’s owner in late January 2024.[54]

Houthi President Mahdi al Mashaat congratulated Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi for the April 13 Iranian attack targeting Israel during a phone call on April 16.[55] Mashaat reaffirmed Yemen’s support for the Iranian attack. The Houthis also took part in the Iranian attack on April 13 by firing missiles and drones from Yemen targeting Israel.[56] Mashaat expressed an interest in “expanding and strengthening relations” with Iran in “various fields.”[57] Raisi praised Houthi attacks against Israel and international shipping in the Red Sea. Raisi said that these Houthi attacks demonstrate Yemen’s “resistance” and support for Palestinians.[58] 

Houthi-controlled media claimed on April 16 that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted two airstrikes targeting unspecified sites in Bajil District, Hudaydah Governorate, western Yemen.[59] The United States and the United Kingdom have not confirmed any airstrikes in Yemen at this time of writing.

Iran Update, April 15, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Kathryn Tyson, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Peter Mills, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Israeli officials have emphasized the need to respond to the Iranian drone and missile attack but have not specified how or when they will do so.[1] An unnamed US official told Axios that Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin in a phone call on April 15 that Israel has “no choice” but to respond to the Iranian attack.[2] Gallant stated that Israel will not allow ballistic missiles to be launched against its territory without a response. An unnamed Israeli official told NBC News that Israel’s response may be “imminent” following an Israeli war cabinet meeting on April 15. The official added that any Israeli response will be coordinated with the United States.[3]

Western and Israeli officials have maintained that the Iranian drone and missile attack into Israel on April 13 was meant to impose a severe cost on Israel—rather than the attack being symbolic and meant to fail.[4] US National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby stated on April 15 that Iran sought to cause “extensive damage inside Israel” but failed due to US, Israeli, and partner efforts to intercept the Iranian projectiles.[5] Kirby’s remarks are consistent with other unnamed senior Biden administration officials telling Western media that Iran intended for the attack to cause “significant damage” and be “highly destructive.”[6] Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi similarly emphasized that Iran intended to harm the “strategic capabilities” of Israel but was unsuccessful during a statement at IDF Nevatim airbase on April 15.[7]

These statements from Western and Israeli officials are consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that the Iranian drone and missile attack was meant to penetrate Israeli air defenses and enable missile impacts inside Israel, thus causing greater damage than the attack actually did. The attack was designed to succeed—not to fail. The strike package was modeled on those that Russia has used repeatedly against Ukraine to great effect.[8]

Three unnamed US officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 14 that roughly 50 percent of the ballistic missiles that Iran fired at Israel either failed to launch or crashed before reaching their target.[9] US officials stated that Iran launched between 115 and 130 ballistic missiles at Israel in its attack.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Israeli officials have emphasized the need to respond to the Iranian drone and missile attack but have not specified how or when they will do so.
• Western and Israeli officials have maintained that the Iranian drone and missile attack into Israel was meant to impose a severe cost on Israel.
• Three unnamed US officials stated that roughly 50 percent of the ballistic missiles that Iran fired at Israel either failed to launch or crashed before reaching their target.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas demanded several new concessions from Israel in its counteroffer to the US-proposed ceasefire agreement.
• West Bank: Israeli settlers conducted a shooting attack and killed two Palestinians in Aqraba, which is near Nablus.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least six attacks around the Israel-Lebanon border.
• Iraq: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani traveled to Washington, DC, to discuss bilateral US-Iraqi relations.
• Yemen: US CENTCOM stated that the Houthis launched an anti-ship ballistic missile toward the Gulf of Aden but did not damage any vessels.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF Nahal Brigade continued to conduct clearing operations at the seam of the northern and central Gaza Strip on April 15 to secure Israeli-built highway Route 749 and other nearby Israeli military sites.[10] The IDF has dubbed this zone the Netzarim corridor. The Nahal Brigade killed 15 Palestinian fighters around the corridor over the past day.[11]

The IDF activated two reserve brigades on April 14 for combat operations in the Gaza Strip.[12] An Israeli Army Radio journalist reported on April 15 that the IDF 2nd Carmeli Brigade and 679th Armored Brigade will deploy to secure the Netzarim corridor and the temporary US-built pier in the central Gaza Strip.[13] The two brigades will replace elements of the 162nd Division in the Gaza Strip, enabling the division to conduct raids in other parts of the Gaza Strip.[14]

Israeli forces continued to conduct raids around Nuseirat in the central Gaza Strip on April 15.[15] Elements of the IDF 162nd Division, including the Nahal and 401st brigades, are operating in the area to kill Palestinian fighters and destroy military infrastructure.[16] The IDF Nahal Brigade destroyed buildings and military infrastructure used by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in the central Gaza Strip. The brigade also directed airstrikes targeting Palestinian fighters and seized weapons. PIJ mortared an IDF headquarters near the University of Palestine, north of Wadi Gaza, on April 14.[17]

Three Palestinian militias targeted Israeli forces in eastern Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip on April 15. Israeli forces continue to operate there, along the Israel-Gaza Strip border, to clear a one-kilometer buffer zone. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, reported that its fighters mortared Israeli armor east of Jabalia cemetery.[18] PIJ and the Palestinian Mujahedeen movement posted videos of their fighters targeting Israeli forces with heavy mounted machine guns in eastern Jabalia on April 15.[19] CTP-ISW cannot verify when the groups recorded the footage.

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson reiterated on April 15 that Palestinians cannot return to the northern Gaza Strip, calling the area “a dangerous combat zone.”[20] The IDF asked Gazans to remain in humanitarian zones and shelters in the southern Gaza Strip.[21] The statement marks the spokesperson’s second such appeal in two days, indicating that migration to the north remains a problem for the IDF.[22]Hamas has made the return of Gazans to the north a consistent demand in the ceasefire negotiations.[23]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant held a meeting on April 15 to identify "necessary civilian operations" to accomplish before an IDF clearing operation into Rafah. The minister focused on the need to evacuate civilians from Rafah and increase food and medical supply transfers into the Gaza Strip.[24] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on April 8 that he had set a date for the clearing operation into Rafah.[25]

Hamas demanded several new concessions from Israel in its counteroffer to the US-proposed ceasefire agreement, according to one Israeli official.[26] Hamas rejected the US-proposed ceasefire and hostage-for-prisoner exchange deal on April 13 hours before the Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel.[27] The Israeli source claimed that Hamas sought to release only 20 Israeli hostages for a six-week ceasefire—half of the hostages reportedly proposed by the United States.[28] Hamas also reportedly asked for a higher ratio of hostage-for-prisoners and for more life-sentenced Palestinian prisoners to be released.[29] A recent Western report indicated that the US-proposal had a ratio of one Israel hostage for 17.5 Palestinian prisoners [30] White House spokesperson John Kirby said on April 15 that the United States believes that its proposal is still possible and that he is unaware of another proposal.”[31]

Palestinian fighters did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on April 15.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in Nablus on April 14 and 15.[32] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms and detonated IEDs targeting Israeli forces there.[33]

Israeli settlers conducted a shooting attack and killed two Palestinians in Aqraba, which is near Nablus, on April 15, according to Israeli media.[34] The IDF said that the attack followed a violent confrontation between a Jewish shepherd and Palestinian in the area.[35] The IDF said that Israeli forces responded to the scene and tried to diffuse the conflict after the shooting.[36] The IDF and Israeli police are investigating the incident.[37] Israeli media has reported an uptick in settler attacks in the West Bank following the murder of an Israeli boy near the Malachi Hashalom settlement on April 12.[38]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least six attacks around the Israel-Lebanon border since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 14.[39] The IDF said that an explosion injured four IDF soldiers in the “border area” of northern Israel on April 15.[40] Hezbollah said that it detonated “explosive devices” targeting IDF members in Tal Ismail, Lebanon, as they crossed the border into Lebanon.[41]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani met with US President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Washington, D.C., on April 15 to discuss bilateral US–Iraqi relations.[42] Sudani stated during his meeting with Biden that he aimed to discuss a “360-degree strategic partnership” and transition from a “military security-based relationship to a comprehensive economic, political, environmental, educational, and security partnership according to the Strategic Framework Agreement”.[43] CTP–ISW has previously assessed that Sudani is attempting to retain some US force presence in Iraq, but this policy places Sudani at odds with Iranian-backed groups which demand a full US withdrawal from Iraq.[44]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—threatened on April 12 to renew its attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq if there is a bilateral agreement between the United States and Iraq that permits US forces to remain.[45]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah congratulated Iran for its recent drone and missile attack on Israel and framed the attack as a success for penetrating Israeli air defense systems.[46] Western media reported that four out of the 100+ ballistic missiles launched by Iran penetrated Israeli air defenses and hit an IDF airbase in southern Israel.[47] Israeli media reported that the airbase suffered minimal damage.[48] Kataib Hezbollah also said that “the shame would haunt the rulers of Jordan” for supporting the US and Israeli effort to intercept Iranian projectiles.[49]

The IDF announced the interception of two drones approaching Israel. The IDF Navy intercepted a drone approaching near Eilat from the Red Sea on April 14.[50] The IDF separately reported on April 15 that it intercepted a drone approaching Israeli territory “from the east.”[51] Neither Iran nor an Iranian-backed group have claimed either attack at the time of this writing.

US CENTCOM stated that the Houthis launched an anti-ship ballistic missile toward the Gulf of Aden on April 13 but did not damage any vessels.[52] US CENTCOM destroyed four Houthi drones in Taiz Governorate on April 14 following the Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile attack.[53]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian held phone calls with several of his foreign counterparts on April 14 and 15. Abdollahian spoke with the foreign ministers of Egypt, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom, among others. Abdollahian claimed that the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel was “legitimate self-defense” under Article 51 on the UN charter.[54] Abdollahian reiterated that, if Israel responds, the next Iranian attack would be “immediate, stronger, and more extensive.“[55] The foreign ministers of Egypt, Germany, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom separately emphasized the need for regional de-escalation in their phone calls with Abdollahian.

The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) resumed enforcing mandatory veiling throughout Tehran on April 13. LEC Tehran Provincial Unit Commander Brig. Gen. Abbas Ali Mohammadian announced that his forces would begin penalizing unveiled women on April 13.[56] Iranian social media users have correspondingly reported a sharp uptick in morality and veiling enforcement throughout Tehran City since then.[57] This enforcement involves arrests, fines, and verbal warnings.[58] Some users have reported similar enforcement activity in other cities, such as Karaj, Mashhad, and Yazd.[59] The Iranian regime reduced the number of morality patrols following the killing of Mahsa Amini in September 2022, although it did not entirely stop policing unveiled women in the months following her death.[60] Iranian social media users additionally noted an increased security presence in some Tehran universities in recent days, with some female dormitories reportedly requiring facial recognition technology for entry.[61] The full resumption of enforcing modesty standards in Tehran follows Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s call for mandatory veiling on April 3.[62]

Resumed veiling enforcement could exacerbate already existing anti-regime sentiments in Iran, especially amid deteriorating economic conditions and the ongoing escalation with Israel. One reformist-affiliated Iranian outlet wrote that the LEC risked submerging the country into a “state of crisis” following the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel and compared the increased security presence in Tehran to an “invasion.”[63]

The Iranian rial separately reached a record low of 670,500 to one US dollar on April 12.[64]

Iran Update, April 14, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Peter Mills, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

For additional CTP-ISW analysis of the April 13 Iranian Strike Targeting Israel, please see Iran’s Attempt to Hit Israel with a Russian-Style Strike Package Failed...for Now by Brian Carter and Frederick W. Kagan

Senior Iranian military and political officials praised the alleged success of the April 13 Iranian attack against Israel and simultaneously warned the United States that Iran would target US bases in the region if the US supported an Israeli response.[1] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Maj. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri warned that, if the United States supports any Israeli response to its attack, Iran will target US bases in the region.[2] Bagheri further specified that Iran intended to target the IDF Air Force Nevatim airbase in the Negev desert and the IDF intelligence center in Mt. Hermon during the attack against Israel. Iranian missiles caused limited damage to the Nevatim airbase, and the base remains operational.[3] There are no reports of any damage to the intelligence center in northern Israel. The IRGC issued a warning to the United States not to get involved in a response to the Iranian operation.[4] Artesh Commander Maj. Gen Abdol Rahim Mousavi stated that, if the United States uses any of its regional bases to support Israel, then Iran will consider the US bases legitimate targets and retaliate accordingly.[5] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi stated that, if Israel responds to the Iranian operation, Iran will retaliate with greater severity than its April 13 attack.[6] Raisi emphasized that Israel’s supporters, presumably meaning the United States, should ”appreciate” the ”responsible and propionate” nature of the Iranian April 13 operation.

A senior Iranian military official asserted on April 14 that Iran has adopted a new policy to target Israel directly from Iranian territory due to the “success” of the Iranian attack on Israel.[7] IRGC Commander Maj. Gen Hossein Salami stated that Iran has adopted a new “equation” for confronting Israel following the “success” of the attack, which Iran dubbed the “True Promise” operation.[8] Salami warned that, should Israel attack Iran or Iranian targets abroad, Iran will retaliate by launching attacks targeting Israel directly from Iranian territory.[9] This would represent a significant shift in Iranian policy, where historically Iran has relied on proxy and partners to launch attacks targeting Israel rather than conducting the attacks itself.

Israel and its partners are discussing possible responses to the Iranian attack on Israel. Israeli President Isaac Herzog said that the Iranian attack was “like a declaration of war” but emphasized that Israelis “are not war seekers.”[10] Israeli War Cabinet member Benny Gantz stated that Israel would respond to the attack at a time of its choosing.[11] Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Israel Katz stated, “We said that, if Iran attacks Israel, Israel will attack Iran – that is still valid.”[12] US President Joe Biden told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the night of April 13 in a phone call that the United States will not participate in an offensive response to Iran’s attack.[13] Leaders from the Group of 7 nations (G7) convened on April 14 to coordinate a “diplomatic response” to Iran’s attack, according to the White House.[14] An unspecified Biden administration official said that the G7 leaders discussed the possibility of recognizing the IRGC as a terrorist organization, which the United States did in 2019.[15]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Senior Iranian military and political officials praised the alleged success of the April 13 Iranian attack against Israel and simultaneously warned the United States that Iran would target US bases in the region if the US supported an Israeli response.
• A senior Iranian military official asserted that Iran has adopted a new policy to target Israel directly from Iranian territory due to the “success” of the Iranian attack on Israel.
• Israel and its partners are discussing possible responses to the Iranian attack on Israel.
• Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to clearing operations in Nuseirat along Wadi Gaza.
• Political Negotiations: Hamas rejected a US-proposed ceasefire and hostage-for-prisoner exchange deal.
• West Bank: A Palestinian militia claimed three shooting attacks in and around the West Bank in retaliation for recent settler violence.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel during and after the Iranian attack on Israel.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Israeli forces continued to clearing operations in Nuseirat along Wadi Gaza on April 14. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 401st Brigade combat engineers built two bridges for Israeli tanks to cross Wadi Gaza, a natural separation between the north and south of the Gaza Strip.[16] Elements of the IDF 162nd Division, including the Nahal and 401st brigades, are operating in the area to kill Palestinian fighters and destroy military infrastructure.[17][18] Israeli forces destroyed rocket launch sites in the central Gaza Strip that several Palestinian militias used .[19] Palestinian fighters had prepared to launch the rockets into Israel. Israeli forces have killed dozens of Palestinian fighters in close-range engagements over the past several days of operations in the Nuseirat area.[20]

Palestinian fighters claimed a single attack targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip on April 14. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, reported that its fighters mortared Israeli forces north of Nuseirat.[21]

Hamas rejected a US-proposed ceasefire and hostage-for-prisoner exchange deal on April 13.[22] The proposal would have reportedly established a six-week ceasefire in exchange for the release of 40 Israeli hostages held by Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip.[23] Mediators presented Hamas with the US proposal on April 7.[24] Hamas reiterated in its rejection that the group would only accept a ceasefire proposal that includes a permanent ceasefire, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the entire Gaza Strip, the return of the displaced Palestinians, an increase in the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, and the start of reconstruction efforts.[25] [26] The Israeli Prime Minister's Office confirmed that Hamas rejected the ceasefire proposal on April 14 and said that the proposal ”included the most significant flexibility on Israel's part” since the beginning of negotiations.[27]

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson reiterated on April 14 that Palestinians cannot return to the northern Gaza Strip, calling the area “a war zone.”.[28] The spokesperson specified that Palestinian civilians should not try to migrate to the northern Gaza Strip on the Salah al Din or al Rashid roads despite ”rumors” the IDF is allowing civilians to return.[29] Local Palestinian sources posted footage of crowds of Palestinians civilians walking to the northern Gaza Strip on al Rashid Road on April 14 as a munition exploded on near the road.[30] Israeli military correspondents previously hypothesized that the recent IDF withdrawal from the southern Gaza Strip would enable displaced Palestinians in Rafah to migrate to parts of Khan Younis and the central Gaza Strip.[31] [32]

Several Palestinian political factions, including Hamas, issued supportive statements of Iran’s April 13 attack on Israel. The groups called the Iranian attack a “natural” and “justified” response to the April 1 Israeli airstrike that targeted Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials in Damascus.[33] The Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestinian, a secular leftist Palestinian group fighting alongside Hamas in the war, called the Iranian attack an “important turning point“ in the war.[34]

Palestinian fighters did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on April 14.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed three shooting attacks on April 13 in and around the West Bank in retaliation for recent settler violence. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades targeted an Israeli military checkpoint, an Israeli settlement near Tulkarm, and an Israeli town on the border with the West Bank..[35] An Israeli Army Radio West Bank correspondent posted a flyer signed by 11 West Bank Rabbis in response to the death of a 14-year-old boy who was murdered near the Malachi HaShalom settlement on April 12.[36] The flyer called on Israelis to strengthen and grow settlements across the West Bank in response to the boy’s death. Palestinian media claimed that Israeli settlers have targeted Palestinians in Auja, Huwwara, Jalazoun refugee camp, Kafr Shuba, and Nabe Ghazzal since CTP-ISW’s last data cut off on April 13.[37] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify these reports.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel during and after the Iranian attack on Israel on April 13.[38]

Iran Update, April 13, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps 

Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, Ashka Jhaveri, Brian Carter, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 7:00 pm ET

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force launched a large-scale drone and missile attack from Iranian territory that targeted Israel from Iranian territory on April 13.[1] This marks the first time Iran has targeted Israel directly from Iranian territory.[2] Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesperson Brig. Gen. Daniel Hagari confirmed that Iran launched drones and then missiles from Iranian territory toward Israel.[3] The IRGC announced the start of operation “True Promise” at approximately 15:30 EST on April 13.[4] The Iranian Supreme National Security Council approved the attack and the IRGC Aerospace Force conducted the attack under the supervision of the Armed Forces General Staff. The IRGC launched hundreds of drones toward Israel, including Shahed-136 one-way attack drones.[5] The attack included at least three attack waves over the course of several hours.[6] Israeli media reported that the IRGC launched its operation from Kermanshah city, Kermanshah Province, and Dokuh, Hormozgan Province, in western Iran.[7]

The United States, United Kingdom, Israel, and Jordan began intercepting drones and missiles outside of Israeli airspace between 1700 and 1800 ET, according to Israeli media and several unspecified sources speaking to Israeli media.[8] IDF spokesperson Hagari said in a press briefing that Iran launched over 200 drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles.[9] Flight radar reported that the airspace over Iran, Israel, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon is closed.[10] The Iranian Permanent Mission to the United Nations posted on X (Twitter) that the operation was launched in response to the April 1 Israeli airstrike targeting IRGC officials in Damascus. The Iranian Permanent Mission wrote that the Iranian “True Promise” operation “can be deemed concluded” at 1800 ET.[11]

Members of Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” appear to have conducted attacks targeting Israel simultaneously with Iran’s first wave of attacks. Lebanese Hezbollah claimed it fired “dozens” of Katyusha rockets targeting an Israeli missile and artillery base in the Golan Heights at 1800 ET.[12] The Houthis posted two promotional videos about destroying Israel during Iran’s wave of drone attacks, but has not claimed any attack at the time of writing.[13] The Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq (True Promise Corps) congratulated the Islamic Resistance in Iraq on April 13 for participating in the attack targeting Israel.[14] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has not claimed an attack at the time of writing. The Iranian-backed Badr Organization posted a graphic celebrating Iran’s attack on Israel stating that “we are among the criminals taking revenge” suggesting that the militia may have supported the attack on Israel in an unspecified capacity.[15]

The Israeli war cabinet convened on April 13 in Tel Aviv and remains in session.[16] Israel immediately took certain preventative measures after the first wave of drones were launched. Israel closed its airspace.[17] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) evacuated several bases, deployed aircraft, and raised air defense readiness.[18] The IDF instructed residents along its northern border in the Golan Heights, Eilat, Dimona, and Nevatim (Negev region) to remain close to shelters.[19]

Iran warned Israel’s partners, particularly the United States and Jordan, not to intervene in Iran’s attack against Israel. Supreme National Security Council-affiliated media warned the United States against intervening in Iran’s attack, claiming that Iran has prepared ballistic missile platforms to target “several US bases in the region.”[20] The Iranian Permanent Mission to the UN similarly warned the United States to “stay away” from the conflict between Iran and Israel.[21] The United States and the United Kingdom have intercepted over 100 drones outside of Israeli airspace at the time of this writing.[22] IRGC-affiliated media separately warned Jordan that it will be Iran’s “next target” if it participates in an Israeli response to Iran’s attack.[23] Iranian Defense Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Ashtiani warned that Iran will give a “decisive response” to any country that allows Israel to use its airspace or territory to conduct a counterattack against Iran.[24] Israeli media reported that Jordanian aircraft shot down Iranian drones headed toward Israel over northern and central Jordan.[25]

The composition of the ongoing Iranian attack on Israel is similar to the composition of Russian strikes have repeatedly targeted Ukraine. These Russian strikes have attempted to determine the optimal package to penetrate Western air and missile defenses. Russia has experimented with combinations of ballistic and cruise missiles alongside Iranian drones in Ukraine.[26] Iran’s use of drones and missiles shows how Iran is learning from the Russians to develop increasingly dangerous and effective strike packages against Israel. Iran has also used the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea to refine Iranian drone tactics by testing US Navy air defenses.[27] The ongoing Iranian attacks provide Iran opportunities to evaluate the effectiveness of different strike packages to understand how they can evade and overwhelm US air and maritime defenses more effectively.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy seized a Portuguese-flagged, Israeli-linked commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz on April 13, likely as part of its campaign to impose an unofficial blockade on Israel.[28] IRGC-controlled media published a video of IRGC Navy forces repelling from a helicopter onto the MSC Aries.[29] The Zodiac Maritime, a shipping company owned by Israeli billionaire Eyal Ofer, owns the MSC Aries and chartered the vessel to the Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC).[30] The MSC confirmed that the MSC Aries, which was en route from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to India, was “boarded by Iranian authorities” and “diverted from her itinerary towards Iran.”[31] IRGC-controlled media emphasized that the seizure of the MSC Aries “has nothing to do with Iran’s retaliatory measure” against Israel for the April 1 Israeli airstrike that killed seven IRGC officials in Damascus.[32]

The IRGC Navy’s seizure of the MSC Aries comes amid increased Iranian threats to the UAE. IRGC Navy Commander Rear Adm. Ali Reza Tangsiri recently claimed that Israel’s presence in the UAE threatens Iran and reiterated the long-standing Iranian threat to close the Strait of Hormuz during an interview with Lebanese Hezbollah-controlled media on April 9.[33] Israel has increasingly relied on an overland trade route that connects Haifa to Dubai via Jordan and Saudi Arabia to compensate for reduced trade activity at the Port of Eilat due to the Houthis’ anti-shipping campaign.[34] Tehran and its regional allies have threatened to disrupt the Israeli ground connection to the Persian Gulf. Iranian state media and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have criticized the UAE for allowing Israel to conduct trade through its territory.[35] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have specifically called for the dismantlement of Israel’s “land bridge” through Jordan.[36] The IRGC Navy may have specifically targeted the Aries MSC to increase pressure on the UAE to sever economic ties with Israel.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran launched a large-scale drone and missile attack from Iranian territory that targeted Israel from Iranian territory.
• The IRGC Navy seized a Portuguese-flagged, Israeli-linked commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz, likely as part of its campaign to impose an unofficial blockade on Israel
• Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters in Beit Hanoun.
• West Bank: The IDF announced that it found the body of the missing 14-year-old Israeli boy in the West Bank near Malachi HaShalom. Israeli media is widely reporting that Israeli settlers committed acts of violence in at least eight Palestinian towns in the northern West Bank after the IDF found the missing boy’s body.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least 12 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Air Force conducted an airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters in Beit Hanoun on April 13. The IDF Northern Brigade (Gaza Division) located the Palestinian fighters using a drone.[37] The IDF Northern Brigade most recently conducted a raid in Shujaiya neighborhood of Gaza City, south of Beit Hanoun.[38] CTP-ISW assessed on March 25 that a small number of Palestinian fighters have likely infiltrated Beit Hanoun.[39] The IDF reported that Israeli forces killed a Hamas company commander for the Beit Hanoun area during clashes with Hamas fighters in the area on April 4.[40] Palestinian militias continued ability to operate in the northern Gaza Strip is consistent with the assessed infiltration of fighters into the area and Hamas’ intentions to reassert its governing authority following Israeli withdrawals.

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations outside Nuseirat along Wadi Gaza on April 13. Elements of the IDF 162nd Division, including the Nahal and 401st brigades, are operating in the area to kill Palestinian fighters and destroy military infrastructure.[41] Israeli forces destroyed a Hamas weapons storage facility and confiscated military equipment belonging to the group during clearing operations.[42] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on April 12 shows flattened terrain in Zahra, north of Nuseirat, indicating that Israeli bulldozers and/or heavy vehicles are operating in the area.

Several Palestinian militias claimed attacks targeting Israeli forces near Nuseirat on April 13. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, reported that its fighters conducted five attacks north of Nuseirat during the past two days, which included firing a rocket-propelled grenade at an IDF tank.[43] The Popular Resistance Committees, which is a Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters conducted separate mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces and a military position north of Nuseirat, respectively.[44]

The IDF Air Force struck over 30 targets in the Gaza Strip on April 13, including anti-tank equipment.[45]

PIJ and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) conducted a combined rocket attack from the Gaza Strip targeting Sderot in southern Israel on April 12.[46] The IDF said that it intercepted three rockets.[47] Israeli artillery targeted the launch site of the attack in the Gaza Strip. The IDF Air Force struck three rocket launchers in the Gaza Strip that contained about 20 rockets ready to be launched into central Israel.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

The IDF announced on April 13 that it found the body of the missing 14-year-old Israeli boy in the West Bank near Malachi HaShalom.[48] The IDF reported that unspecified persons killed the boy with a blade and that the investigation is ongoing.[49] The IDF initially began searching for the boy with Israeli settlers on April 12 near the Israeli settlement of Malachi HaShalom.[50] Israeli and Palestinian media reported violence occurred in al Mughayir, a Palestinian town west of Malachi HaShalom, during the search on April 12. The IDF reported that there were “violent disturbances” in al Mughayir but that the Israeli forces entered the town and removed the Israeli settlers from the area.[51] Palestinian Authority-affiliated media confirmed that at least one Palestinian civilian died during the violence.[52] Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF is preparing for widespread riots and “disturbances” across the West Bank in response to the boy’s death[53][54]

Israeli media is widely reporting that Israeli settlers committed acts of violence on April 13 in at least eight Palestinian towns in the northern West Bank after the IDF found the missing boy’s body. The IDF reported that participants in clashes between Israelis and Palestinians in several areas of the West Bank threw stones and fired weapons.[55] Israeli Army Radio reported that Israeli settlers rioted and committed acts of violence in al Mughayir, Dumas, Abu Falah, Beit Furik, and Kosra.[56] The Jerusalem Post cited unspecified Israeli, Arab, and US media who reported that Israeli settlers also targeted Deir Dibwan, Sinjil, and Beitin.[57] Israeli media and local reports reported that Israeli settlers set fire to cars and Palestinian homes.[58] There were also reports of casualties during the violence. The Palestinian Red Crescent reported that three Palestinians were wounded in al Mughayr.[59] Israeli media reported that Israeli settlers fired small arms, killing a Palestinian in al Mughayir.[60] Israeli Army Radio reported that Israeli settlers shot and injured three Palestinians.[61]

Senior Israeli cabinet officials appeared to call on Israeli settlers to return home in an attempt to restore order. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called on Israeli citizens to allow Israeli forces to operate “unhindered.”[62] Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant added that “revenge” will make it difficult for Israeli forces to pursue the boy’s killers.[63] Gallant and Israeli War Cabinet Minister Benny Gantz urged the Israeli settlers not to take the law “into [their] own hands.”[64] The IDF reported later on April 13 that clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians had ended.[65]

Palestinian militias called for a general mobilization of fighters and Palestinian civilians in response to settler violence that occurred in the West Bank on April 12 and 13. Hamas called on Palestinian militias and civilians in the West Bank to take up arms and escalate “resistance activity” against Israeli forces and settlers.[66] Hamas also called on the Palestinian Authority to exercise its authority to protect Palestinians in the West Bank.[67] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade announced a general mobilization of all of its fighters in Tulkarm to retaliate against the settler violence at al Mughayir.[68] The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine posted a statement calling for the formation of a “popular protection committee” in all Palestinian towns in the West Bank to “confront” settler “crimes” and to “thwart their malicious goals.”[69]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 12 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 11.[70] Hezbollah fired one-way attack drones targeting an Iron Dome site near Kfar Blum.[71] The IDF confirmed that a drone fell in the Kfar Blum area.[72] Hezbollah claimed that the Israelis are using the site as an alternative to one at Kfar Blum after a Hezbollah attack targeting the Iron Dome batteries there in January 2024.[73] CTP-ISW cannot corroborate the claim.

Iran Update, April 12, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps 

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Kathryn Tyson, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—an umbrella organization of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—threatened on April 12 to renew its attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq.[1] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq rejected any bilateral agreement between the United States and Iraq that permits US forces to remain in Iraq. The group threatened to “torment [the United States] with fire” if US forces are not removed from Iraq.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani will meet with US President Joe Biden in Washington, DC, on April 15 to discuss the trajectory of US-Iraqi relations under the Strategic Framework Agreement.[2] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq’s threat follows Sudani’s article in Foreign Affairs on April 11 in which he articulated his intent to expand US and Iraqi cooperation beyond security and military affairs to include economic, agricultural, industrial, technological, and energy cooperation.[3] Sudani’s articulated policy is currently at odds with the demands set by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which include the full withdrawal of US forces.

CTP-ISW previously warned that some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may regard Sudani’s visit to Washington as a decisive moment and could decide to resume attacks targeting US forces if the visit does not result in tangible steps toward removing US forces from Iraq.[4] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has paused attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria since February 2024, when the United States killed a senior Kataib Hezbollah commander in Baghdad.[5] The pause in attacks coincided with the start of negotiations between Washington and Baghdad over the status of the US-led international coalition in Iraq.[6] Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais Khazali suggested on April 10 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could resume attacking US forces if Sudani’s upcoming visit to Washington, DC fails to force the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.[7]

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—an umbrella organization of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias— threatened to renew its attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq.
• Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF killed multiple Hamas personnel affiliated with Hamas’ governance structures and military organizations in Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip.
• The IDF continued an operation on the outskirts of Nuseirat along Wadi Gaza.
• West Bank: Israeli forces killed senior Hamas commander Muhammad Omar Daraghmeh in Tubas on April 12.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Iran: US CENTCOM Commander Gen. Michael Kurilla continued to meet with Israeli officials in Israel to discuss preparations for a possible Iranian attack targeting Israel.
• Yemen: US CENTCOM intercepted a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile over the Red Sea.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed multiple Hamas personnel affiliated with Hamas’ governance structures and military organizations on April 11 in Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike that killed the head of Hamas’ internal security in Jabalia, Radwan Muhammad Abdallah Radwan.[8] Palestinian media reported that Radwan was the director of a police station and that he coordinated aid distribution.[9] The IDF said that Radwan was also a member of Hamas’ military wing and directed other Palestinian fighters to take over humanitarian aid trucks in the area.[10] The IDF also killed another senior official in Hamas’ internal security operations in Jabalia and another fighter in an unspecified Hamas battalion in Jabalia.[11]

Hamas remains determined to reconstitute itself militarily and reassert its authority in the Gaza Strip. Hamas has made attempts to coopt and undermine possible alternatives to its rule, facilitate trade, and rehabilitate its local police in the northern Gaza Strip.[12] The IDF is conducting operations in the northern Gaza Strip to disrupt Hamas' attempts to reconstitute its governing authority.[13] Israel has previously targeted members of Hamas’ police and internal security apparatus. The Civil Police and the Hamas-controlled Interior Ministry’s Internal Security Forces in Gaza both employ fighters from the Hamas military wing.[14]

The IDF continued an operation on the outskirts of Nuseirat along Wadi Gaza on April 12. Elements of the IDF 162nd Division, including the Nahal and 401st Brigades, killed Palestinian fighters and destroyed military infrastructure.[15] Israeli forces raided a school in Zahra, north of Nuseirat. The IDF discovered weapons and a residence at this location. The IDF reported that Hamas fighters were staying at the residence.[16] The IDF 215th Artillery Brigade supported ground operations in the central Gaza Strip.[17]

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed that its fighters detonated a minefield and used an explosively formed penetrator to target Israeli armor in a complex attack at a military position north of Nuseirat.[18] Palestinian militias, including PIJ and Hamas, claimed several attacks targeting Israeli forces in Zahra in mid-March 2024.[19] The militias may have infiltrated into Zahra and other areas of southern Gaza City from areas of the central Gaza Strip that the IDF has not yet cleared. The militias also likely reactivated dormant cells after the Israelis decreased the number of IDF troops in the northern Strip in late December.

The IDF Air Force struck more than 60 targets in the Gaza Strip on April 12, including underground military infrastructure.[20]

A humanitarian aid convoy entered the northern Gaza Strip on April 12 through a new crossing.[21] The convoy underwent security checks at the Kerem Shalom crossing before entering the Gaza Strip. The aid delivery was coordinated by the IDF and the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)—a department within the Israeli Defense Ministry—“as part of efforts to enhance the humanitarian aid corridors to the Gaza Strip in general, and to the north in particular.”[22] The IDF said on April 11 that Israel approved the construction of another border crossing into the northern Gaza Strip as part of Israeli efforts to boost aid.[23] 

The American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA) charity resumed aid operations in the Gaza Strip on April 11.[24] ANERA temporarily paused operations following the death of an ANERA staff member and the Israeli strike that killed seven World Central Kitchen (WCK) aid workers on April 1.[25] ANERA said that Israeli authorities informed them during a meeting that “certain measures would be taken to protect humanitarian aid workers in the Gaza Strip.”[26] Israeli military officials met with several international aid organizations on April 10 to discuss the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.[27]

The United States Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated three entities on April 12 affiliated with Hamas’ offensive cyber and drone operations.[28] The European Union simultaneously imposed sanctions targeting Hamas.[29] These designations are part of broader US efforts to disrupt Hamas’ ability to conduct future attacks.

OFAC sanctioned the following individuals:

• Hamas’ military wing spokesperson Hudhayfa Samir Abdallah al Kahlut (al Kahlut) also known as “Abu Ubaida”
• William Abu Shanab (Abu Shanab)
• Baraa Hasan Farhat (Farhat)
• Khalil Muhammad Azzam (Azzam)

A bipartisan group of US House of Representatives members is introducing legislation to sanction the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) for their role in the October 7 attacks.[30] The PRC is a Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war. The group has claimed multiple attacks targeting Israeli forces and Israel during IDF ground operations.[31] Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA) stated that the militia has “flown under the radar and avoided real consequences for their horrific crimes.”[32] The legislation also requires the US Department of State to issue a report on whether to designate the PRC and the West Bank-based Lion’s Den group as terrorist organizations.[33]

Palestinian fighters did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on April 12.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in two locations in the northern West Bank on April 12.[34]  The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired “light weapons” and detonated improvised explosive devices in two separate attacks targeting Israeli forces around Tubas and Qalqilya.[35] Israeli forces detained five wanted individuals in overnight operations across the West Bank.[36]

Israeli forces killed senior Hamas commander Muhammad Omar Daraghmeh in Tubas on April 12.[37] The IDF reported that Daraghmeh shot at Israeli forces who returned fire and killed him. The IDF said that Daraghmeh was a “central Hamas operative” and “promoted” militia activity in the region.[38] Israeli forces killed Daraghmeh’s predecessor “about a month and a half ago,” according to Israeli Army Radio.[39] Hamas confirmed Daraghmeh’s death.[40] Palestinian Authority-affiliated media reported that Israeli forces killed another Palestinian fighter during fighting in al Faraa refugee camp during the raid.[41]

The IDF announced on April 12 that it launched a search and rescue operation for a 14-year-old boy near the Malachi Shalom settlement.[42] Israeli media reported that the IDF air, ground, and special operations forces launched a search and rescue operation with Israeli settlers from Malachi Shalom to find the boy who went missing while herding sheep.[43] The settlers volunteered to assist the IDF. The exact cause of the boy’s disappearance is still unknown.[44]

Israeli and Palestinian media reported violence occurred in al Mughayir, west of Malachi Shalom. Local footage confirms these reports.[45] The IDF confirmed that there were “violent disturbances” in al Mughayir but that the IDF entered the town and removed the Israeli citizens from the town.[46] Israeli and Palestinian media also reported Israeli and Palestinian casualties.[47] Palestinian Authority-affiliated media confirmed that at least one Palestinian civilian died during the violence.[48] The details of these events are unclear. CTP-ISW will provide additional details as information becomes available.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 11.[49]

Hezbollah fired approximately 40 rockets targeting Israeli “artillery positions” in al Zaoura in the Golan Heights on April 12.[50] The IDF said that it intercepted some rockets and that the rest of the rockets fell in open areas.[51]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Gen. Michael Kurilla continued to meet with Israeli officials in Israel on April 12 to discuss preparations for a possible Iranian attack targeting Israel.[52] Kurilla met with Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi to discuss US and Israeli preparations ahead of a potential Iranian attack against Israel.[53] Kurilla also met with other senior Israeli military officials, including IDF spokesperson Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari, on April 11.[54] Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened that they will retaliate against Israel in response to the Israeli airstrike that killed several senior IRGC officers in Damascus on April 1.[55]

Kurilla’s visit to Israel coincides with heightened US military readiness and warnings of an “imminent” Iranian attack targeting Israel. US media and US government officials said on April 12 that the United States is moving additional assets into the region, including air defenses to protect US forces in Iraq and Syria, in preparation for the “viable threat” of an Iranian attack on Israel.[56] The Wall Street Journal reported that the additional assets include two US Navy destroyers.[57] Unspecified US officials also warned that the US and Israel are expecting a “major Iranian attack” using “more than 100 drones and dozens of missiles” on “southern or northern Israel” as early as April 12 or 13.[58] US officials similarly told Western media on April 10 and 11 that an Iranian drone and missile attack targeting Israel was "imminent.”[59]

The present nature of the information space makes it difficult to forecast when precisely Iran might launch a retaliatory strike targeting Israel, if Iran attacks Israel at all. Western estimations of when Iran will conduct an attack have varied and could be subject to change. The likelihood that Iran is spreading disinformation surrounding its strike increases the difficulty of forecasting the timing of the retaliation.[60]

President Ebrahim Raisi and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari discussed recent tensions between Iran and Pakistan during a phone call on April 11.[61] Raisi is scheduled to travel to Pakistan on April 22.[62] He warned that “hegemonic world powers”—a standard Iranian reference to the United States and the West—are attempting to create divisions between Tehran and Islamabad. He also stressed the need for Muslims to reject Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS. Raisi also called for information sharing between Pakistan and Iran to “overcome security challenges.”[63] A series of attacks in southeastern Iran since December 2023 by Salafi-jihadi groups operating along the Iran-Pakistan border has strained relations between Pakistan and Iran. Pakistan designated the Zainabiyoun Brigade–an Iran-backed Pakistani Shia militia operating in Syria–as a terrorist organization on April 11.[64] Iran and Pakistan also exchanged missile and drone strikes in January 2024 after Iran targeted anti-regime militants inside Pakistan.[65]

US CENTCOM intercepted a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile over the Red Sea on April 11.[66] CENTCOM said that the missile was launched from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen and did not cause any damage to US, coalition, or commercial ships.

Iran Update, April 11, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Alexandra Braverman, Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Peter Mills, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Iran appears to be exploiting the uncertainty surrounding its reported “imminent” attack against Israel to stoke psychological terror in Israel. Western media reported on April 10 that Iran could launch drone and missile strikes into Israel imminently in retaliation for the IDF recently killing several senior IRGC officers in Damascus.[1] Iranian state media posted on X (Twitter) later on April 10 that the Iranian defense minister announced the closure of the airspace around Tehran for a military exercise.[2] Iranian regime-affiliated channels then began circulating posts suggesting that an Iranian attack into Israel would soon occur.[3] The coincidence of these posts led to extensive public speculation that Iran would launch an attack into Israel while the airspace around Tehran was closed. Iranian state media shortly thereafter retracted the claims of Iranian airspace being closed and denied that the Iranian defense minister made any related announcement.[4] The publication and retraction of these reports is bizarre, especially given that the Iranian defense minister should have no role in the maintenance of Iranian airspace. Iranian military and political officials have boasted in recent days that the impending nature of their attack is itself damaging to Israel, suggesting that the media reports may have been part of a sophisticated information operation.[5] Stoking terror in Israel is consistent with CTP-ISW’s previous observation that Iranian leaders want the Israel-Hamas war to catalyze migration away from Israel and thereby erode the long-term viability of the Jewish state.[6]

The present nature of the information space makes it difficult to forecast when precisely Iran might launch a retaliatory strike into Israel if at all. Western estimations of when Iran will conduct an attack have varied and could be subject to change. The likelihood that Iran is spreading disinformation surrounding its strike exacerbates the issue further.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant clarified on April 10 that Israel’s war aim in the Gaza Strip is to prevent Hamas from conducting another October 7-style attack into Israel again.[7] Gallant said that preventing another October 7-style attack is what Israeli leaders mean when saying that they seek to destroy Hamas as a military organization. Gallant added that the IDF has already destroyed four of Hamas’ five brigades and that Israeli forces are currently contending with “hotspots” of militia activity across the Gaza Strip.[8] The remaining brigade that Israeli leaders say that they have not yet destroyed is in Rafah.

Israeli operations have likely degraded Hamas in the Gaza Strip severely, rendering Hamas unable to restore its military wing to pre-October 7 levels in the short term. Gallant described Hamas’ military force as comparable to an “organized commando division” prior to the war. Israel has since then destroyed a large quantity of Hamas’ military infrastructure and weapons as well as killed thousands of fighters in the Gaza Strip thus far. Hamas fighters are currently operating as small squad- and platoon-sized cells instead of the well-organized structure they had prior to the war. Hamas will thus require extensive resources and time to rebuild their military force.

Hamas remains determined to reconstitute itself militarily and reassert its authority in the Gaza Strip, however. Hamas is already trying to coopt and undermine possible alternatives to its rule, which is evident by the reported Hamas attack targeting a head of a local clan in March 2024.[9] Hamas is also attempting to facilitate trade and rehabilitate local police in the northern Gaza Strip, which are parts of Hamas’ larger effort to restore control over the civilian population.[10] Gallant acknowledged that Israel must empower a local alternative to Hamas in a post-war scenario.[11]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran appears to be exploiting the uncertainty surrounding its reported “imminent” attack against Israel to stoke psychological terror in Israel.
• Gaza Strip: Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant clarified that Israel’s war aim in the Gaza Strip is to prevent Hamas from conducting another October 7-style attack into Israel again.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in Tulkarm in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least three attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Iraq: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani wrote an article for Foreign Affairs reiterating his intention to end the US-led international coalition’s presence in Iraq and transition to a “comprehensive” bilateral relationship with the United States.
• Yemen: US CENTCOM confirmed that it intercepted three Houthi drones over the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced on April 11 that it had conducted a raid in Shujaiya in the northern Gaza Strip in recent days.[12] The IDF Northern Brigade (Gaza Division) has conducted “targeted activities” in the area recently, including killing Palestinian fighters and destroying military infrastructure, such as a Hamas training base

Palestinian militias conducted several attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip on April 11. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, mortared Israeli vehicles south of Gaza City.[13] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) separately said that it conducted a sniper attack targeting an Israeli soldier in al Taqa, east of Gaza City.[14]

The IDF announced on April 11 that it conducted an operation targeting Hamas outside Nuseirat in the central Gaza Strip. The IDF Nahal Brigade and 401st Brigade led the operation around Nuseirat.[15] The IDF Air Force coordinated with the 215th Artillery Brigade (162nd Division) and directed airstrikes targeting dozens of Palestinian fighters and military infrastructure before Israeli ground forces entered the area.[16] The Nahal Brigade identified a fighter emerging from a tunnel, and the IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike targeting the fighter as they approached Israeli forces.[17] The IDF Navy separately conducted several strikes targeting Palestinian fighters along the central Gaza Strip coast.[18]

The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC) conducted a combined mortar attack targeting Israeli forces north of Nuseirat refugee camp on April 11.[19] PFLP-GC is a Palestinian faction based primarily in Syria.[20] The faction receives support from Iran and has cooperated with other elements of the Axis of Resistance.[21] This event marks the second known instance of the PFLP-GC attacking the IDF in the Gaza Strip since the Israel-Hamas war began.[22]

The IDF and Shin Bet killed a Hamas fighter who was responsible for financing Hamas military activities in Rafah, on April 11.[23] The IDF said that the fighter transferred hundreds of thousands of dollars to Hamas in December 2023 for its operations in Rafah.[24]

Israeli media reported on April 11 that an IDF Southern Command colonel approved the airstrike that killed three sons of Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in the northern Gaza Strip on April 10.[25] Israeli media reported that senior Israeli officials, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, were not aware of the strike before it occurred.[26] Israeli media reported that the IDF targeted Haniyeh’s sons over their involvement in holding Israeli hostages.[27] The reports are consistent with the IDF reporting on April 10 that Haniyeh’s sons were Hamas fighters.[28] Unspecified Israeli officials told Israeli media that IDF leaders believed that Israel is not close to a ceasefire deal with Hamas and that the strike would not affect hostage negotiations.[29]

The IDF said on April 11 that Israel is increasing the delivery of aid into the Gaza Strip, particularly to the northern part.[30] Israeli Defense Minister Gallant said that these efforts are part of the next Israeli phase of humanitarian efforts and include opening new crossings into the Gaza Strip, boosting aid deliveries from Jordan, establishing a joint command to coordinate military operations and aid efforts, and other projects, such as the establishment of a temporary floating pier.[31] IDF spokesperson Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari said that Israel approved the construction of another border crossing into the northern Gaza Strip and the opening of the Port of Ashdod to enable more aid flow.[32] Hagari's comments are consistent with an Israeli Army Radio report on April 10 that Israel would construct a new crossing instead of opening the Erez crossing.[33] Hagari also said that the IDF is establishing field hospitals and other kinds of infrastructure as well as providing food, water, and shelter in the central Gaza Stirp.[34] The IDF said on March 13 that it plans to move civilians from Rafah to “humanitarian enclaves” in the central Gaza Strip before any Israeli clearing operation into Rafah.[35] Israel expects the number of trucks entering the Gaza Strip to increase gradually from 350 to 500 per day.[36] The UN Security Council said in a statement on April 11 that it acknowledged the Israeli efforts to facilitate more aid into the Gaza Strip “but stressed that more should be done to bring the required relief given the scale of needs in Gaza.”[37]

Israeli military officials met with several international aid organizations on April 10 to discuss the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.[38] The IDF Southern Command Commander Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman and Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)—a department within the Israeli Defense Ministry—Maj. Gen. Ghassan Alyan met with representatives from UN agencies, the Red Cross, and USAID, among others.[39] Israeli officials presented their upcoming plans for increasing the pace of aid transfers into the strip. Israeli Army Radio noted that the meeting followed the Israeli strike that killed seven World Central Kitchen (WCK) aid workers on April 1.[40] Some aid organizations have suspended operations in the Gaza Strip following the WCK attack, citing concerns of a lack of protection for civilians.[41] The IDF spokesperson said on April 11 that the IDF is implementing lessons learned from WCK attack.[42]

Unspecified Palestinian fighters conducted an indirect fire attack from the central Gaza Strip into Israel on April 11.[43] Israeli Army Radio reported that four munitions fell short inside the Gaza Strip. No Palestinian militia has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in Tulkarm in the West Bank on April 11.[44] The IDF reported on April 11 that Israeli forces arrested six wanted individuals across the West Bank.[45] The IDF seized small arms during these operations. Israeli forces separately arrested an individual in Hebron on suspicion of them planning to conduct a stabbing attack.[46]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least three attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 10.[47]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani wrote an article for Foreign Affairs on April 11 reiterating his intention to end the US-led international coalition’s presence in Iraq and transition to a “comprehensive” bilateral relationship with the United States.[48] Sudani likely published the article as part of his preparations for his official visit to Washington, DC, on April 15. Sudani said that US and Iraqi military officials agreed to end the US-led international coalition’s presence in Iraq “in a gradual and orderly manner on an agreed timeline,” although he did not provide details on this timeline.[49] Sudani argued that the US-Iraqi relationship should extend beyond military and security cooperation to include economic, energy, and technological cooperation.[50] US and Iraqi officials began talks about the status of the US-led international coalition in late January 2024.[51] The latest round of talks occurred on April 8 under the chairmanship of US CENTCOM Commander Gen. Michael Erik Kurilla and Iraqi Armed Forces General Staff Chief Gen. Abdel Emir Rashid Yarallah.[52]

US CENTCOM confirmed that it intercepted three Houthi drones over the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea on April 10. The Houthis claimed on April 10 that they conducted several attacks targeting commercial and military vessels in the Gulf of Aden.[53]

US CENTCOM preemptively struck eight Houthi drones in Houthi-controlled Yemen on April 10.[54] CENTCOM assessed that the drones presented an imminent danger to commercial and military vessels in the region. Houthi-affiliated media separately claimed that the United States conducted airstrikes near Hudaydah on April 10.[55]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Gen. Michael Erik Kurilla traveled to Israel on April 11 to coordinate preparations for a possible Iranian and/or Iranian-backed attack into Israel. Kurilla met with senior Israeli military officials, including IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari.[56] Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened that they will retaliate for Israel killing several senior IRGC officers in Damascus on April 1.[57]

Iran Update, April 10, 2024

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Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Kathryn Tyson, Peter Mills, Ashka Jhaveri, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Bloomberg reported on April 10 that Iran or its proxies may conduct missile or drone strikes targeting military and government facilities in Israel in the coming days in response to the April 1 Israeli airstrike that killed seven IRGC officials in Damascus.[1] Sources familiar with US and Israeli intelligence told Bloomberg that Iran or its proxies might use high-precision missiles in the strikes. One of the sources said that it is “a matter of when, not if” Iran will respond to the April 1 airstrike. Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz warned on April 10 that Israel would attack Iran if “Iran attacks [Israel] from its own territory.”[2] IRGC-affiliated media dismissed Katz’s warning, claiming that Israel seeks to deter Iran from responding to the April 1 airstrike and warning that Iran must respond.[3]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—will not conduct attacks targeting US forces in Iraq as part of Iran’s response to the April 1 airstrike, according to two “knowledgeable sources” who spoke to a UK-based Saudi outlet on April 10.[4] A “Shia source” told the outlet that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders have had “intensive contacts” with Iranian officials since April 1 and that the two sides have agreed to “continue the calm” in Iraq.[5] Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Chief of Staff and senior Kataib Hezbollah official Abdul Aziz (Abu Fadak) al Mohammadawi visited Tehran for Iran's annual, anti-Israel holiday, Quds Day, on April 5.[6] Iranian officials and media previously attributed the April 1 Israeli airstrike to the United States, claiming that the United States gave Israel the “green light” to conduct the strike.[7] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has not claimed an attack targeting US forces in Iraq since early February 2024.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant implicitly warned Iran on April 10 against launching an attack on Israel in response to the April 1 Israeli airstrike that killed seven IRGC officials in Damascus.[8] Gallant said that Israel knows how to respond with “decisive offensive action” targeting any actor in the Middle East that attacks Israel.[9] Gallant’s comments are consistent with warnings from other Israeli officials who have emphasized Israel’s preparation for an Iranian attack and a strong Israeli response to an Iranian attack.[10] Unnamed US, Israeli, and other unspecified Western officials told the Washington Post on April 4 that they expected Iran to retaliate with drones or missile attacks against Israeli targets that would be ”calibrated to avoid an even bigger response from Israel.”[11]

Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali hinted on April 10 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could resume attacking US forces if Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s upcoming visit to Washington, DC, fails to facilitate the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.[12] Sudani will travel to Washington on April 15, in part to discuss the status of the US-led international coalition in Iraq with US officials.[13] Khazali said that the “success” of Sudani’s upcoming visit to Washington, DC, will depend on whether his visit facilitates the removal of “all foreign forces” from Iraq.[14] Khazali warned that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would force US forces to leave Iraq “if diplomatic efforts fail,” which could be an implicit threat to use military force to expel US forces.[15] Khazali may also be referring to political efforts to expel US forces.[16] Iranian-backed political actors have attempted in recent months to pass a law calling for the removal of US forces from Iraq and requiring Sudani to detail how his administration would end the US military presence in Iraq.[17]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and political actors have been conducting a political and military campaign in recent months to try to expel the United States from Iraq.[18] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted over 190 attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 and February 2024. These militias suspended their attacks targeting US forces in February 2024 following a one-way drone attack that killed three US servicemembers in northeastern Jordan.[19] The pause in attacks also coincided with the start of negotiations between Washington and Baghdad about the status of the US-led international coalition in Iraq.[20] Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders have warned since the negotiations began that “[their] patience will not last long.”[21] The militias may regard Sudani’s visit to Washington as a decisive moment and could decide to resume conducting attacks targeting US forces if the visit does not result in tangible steps toward removing US forces from Iraq, such as the creation of a timetable for their withdrawal.

Iran and its Axis of Resistance have been engaged in a coordinated campaign to economically isolate Israel by encouraging Muslim nations during the Israel-Hamas war to sever economic relations with Israel. Many senior Iranian leaders have repeatedly urged Muslim nations during the Israel-Hamas war to cut off political and economic relations with Israel.[22] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called it “treason” for any Muslim country to aid Israel and urged all Muslim nations to cut off economic relations with Israel “at least temporarily” during his speech for Eid al Fitr speech on April 10.[23]

Some Muslim countries have heeded this call, including Turkey. Turkey announced on April 9 that it would immediately restrict the export of 54 key products to Israel in response to Israel’s reported denial of Turkish aid efforts and the Israeli refusal to implement the UNSC ceasefire resolution from March 24.[24] President Ebrahim Raisi stated that Muslim countries cutting off economic relations with Israel is the “most effective deterrent power” during a phone call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on April 10.[25] President Erdogan stated that Israel is more isolated today than ever before.[26] Malaysia banned Israeli-owned and –linked shipping from its ports in December 2023 in “response to Israel’s actions...against the Palestinian people.” The Houthi supreme leader “praised” Malaysia’s position, calling the economic pressure on Israel one way to support the Palestinian cause.[27]

Iran and its Axis of Resistance have also implicitly and explicitly threatened the UAE and Jordan for cooperating with Israel. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei claimed during his April 10 Eid al Fitr speech that Israel “enters [Islamic] countries” for ulterior motives rather than for the benefit of the host country.[28] Senior Iranian military leaders and its regional allies have recently criticized the UAE for allowing Israel to conduct trade in its territory.[29] IRGC Navy Commander Rear Adm. Ali Reza Tangsiri claimed on April 9 that Israel is present in the UAE under the pretext of “economic work” but actually engages in security and military activities there that threaten Iran.[30] Tangsiri issued this statement in an interview with Lebanese Hezbollah-controlled media, likely to pressure the UAE to sever ties with Israel.[31] These statements may also refer to the overland trade route Israel is using to offset its losses caused by the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Israel’s overland ground trade routes have taken on new importance after trade decreased at the Port of Eilat.[32] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias also threatened to “cut” Israel’s “land bridge” through Jordan.[33] These militias would probably use missile and drone attacks to generate this effect, given their lack of political influence in Jordan.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Bloomberg reported that Iran or its proxies may conduct missile or drone strikes targeting military and government facilities in Israel in the coming days in response to the April 1 Israeli airstrike that killed seven IRGC officials in Damascus.
• Iran and its Axis of Resistance have been engaged in a coordinated campaign to economically isolate Israel by encouraging Muslim nations to sever economic relations with Israel throughout the Israel-Hamas War.
• Iraq: Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali hinted that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could resume attacking US forces if Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s upcoming visit to Washington, DC, fails to facilitate the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.
• Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike that killed three sons of Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Political Negotiations: Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh said that Israel would not get more concessions in the negotiations from Hamas after an IDF strike in the Gaza Strip killed three of his children.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in Tulkarm in the West Bank during Israeli operations there.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least two attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Syria: The IDF said that it struck a Syrian Arab Army (SAA) site that was operated by Lebanese Hezbollah in southern Syria.
• Yemen: US CENTCOM reported that it intercepted a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile in the Gulf of Aden. CENTCOM assessed that the Houthi attack was likely targeting the US-flagged and owned commercial vessel the MV Yorktown.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Palestinian militias conducted several indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip on April 10. Hamas and the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement conducted a joint mortar attack targeting Israeli forces in southwest Gaza City.[34] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement is a Palestinian faction aligned with Hamas that has expressed close ties with Iran. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Air Force struck a launch site from which Palestinian fighters had targeted Israeli forces in Shujaiya with indirect fire. Hamas claimed a mortar attack targeting Israeli forces in Shujaiya on April 9.[35]

The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement claimed that it fired a man-portable air defense system targeting an Israeli fighter jet in western Gaza City.[36]

The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike on April 10 that killed three sons of Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in the northern Gaza Strip.[37] The IDF reported that Haniyeh’s sons were Hamas fighters en route from al Shati camp to conduct an attack in the central Gaza Strip when Israel killed them.[38] The IDF said that one of the sons was a squad leader and the other two sons were fighters in Hamas’ military wing. The presence of Hamas fighters in al Shati camp is consistent with the infiltration of Palestinian fighters into areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces have conducted several clearing operations. It is notable that Haniyeh‘s sons—three Hamas fighters—were using al Shati camp as a rear base to conduct attacks further south, given that Israeli forces re-cleared areas of al Shati in early February 2024.

Several regional leaders, including Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, called Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh to offer their condolences following the Israeli airstrike that targeted three of Haniyeh’s sons.[39]

The IDF Nahal Brigade continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on April 10.[40] The Nahal Brigade killed a squad of Palestinian fighters in close quarters combat.[41] The Nahal Brigade is operating around the border of the central and northern strip to secure the Israeli highway and bases nearby.[42] The IDF reported on April 10 that the Nahal Brigade is conducting targeted operations and raids near the Israeli highway, which the IDF has dubbed the “Netzarim corridor.” Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in the area and destroyed military infrastructure, including tunnel shafts. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades conducted a mortar attack targeting an IDF command site near the Netzarim corridor.[43]

The IDF Air Force conducted several airstrikes targeting Palestinian military infrastructure in the Gaza Strip on April 10.[44] The IDF destroyed military sites, launch sites, and tunnel shafts.[45] The IDF Air Force also targeted a Palestinian fighter squad that threatened Israeli forces.[46]

Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh said on April 10 that Israel would not get more concessions in the negotiations from Hamas after an IDF strike in the Gaza Strip killed three of his children.[47] Haniyeh also stated that Israeli leaders “are delusional if they think that by killing my sons we will change our positions.”[48] Hamas said on April 8 that the latest ceasefire proposal does not meet its demands but that it is still reviewing the proposal.[49]

Senior US officials continued to discuss a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. US President Joe Biden expressed support for an immediate six-to-eight-week ceasefire in the Gaza Strip during an interview published on April 9 but recorded last week.[50] Biden also called Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's actions in Gaza Strip “a mistake” in reference to the IDF airstrike that mistakenly killed seven aid workers from the World Central Kitchen on April 1.[51] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on April 9 that negotiators are waiting on Hamas to make a decision and that “the world is watching to see what [Hamas] will do.”[52]

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on April 10 that Israel would not open the Erez crossing with the northern Gaza Strip for aid transports.[53] The Israeli War Cabinet approved on April 5 the imminent reopening of the crossing, which has been closed since the beginning of the war.[54] The correspondent said that Israel is concerned that protesters could block the crossing and prevent the shipment of aid into the Strip, as they have at other crossings.[55] Israel will instead establish a new border crossing in a “less central location” in the northern Gaza Strip to facilitate the transfer of aid.[56]

Palestinian fighters did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on April 10.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in Tulkarm in the West Bank during Israeli operations there on April 9.[57]

Israeli forces detained nine wanted individuals across the West Bank during overnight operations on April 10.[58] Israeli forces detained three wanted individuals and confiscated small arms in Qalandiya near Ramallah and detained six other individuals in Tulkarm.[59] Israeli forces also seized weapons and money near Hebron.[60]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least two attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 9.[61]

The IDF said that it struck a Syrian Arab Army (SAA) site that was operated by Lebanese Hezbollah in southern Syria on April 9.[62] An Israeli journalist reported that the IDF has claimed two prior strikes targeting Hezbollah in southern Syria on February 3 and March 12.[63] Israeli media reported in 2020 that the SAA’s 1st Corps, which is responsible for areas of southern Syria near the Golan Heights, is closely affiliated with Hezbollah.[64] The IDF did not specify whether it used artillery or aircraft to target the SAA position.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it launched two drones targeting an oil terminal in Haifa, Israel on April 10.[65] CTP-ISW cannot verify this attack claim. Israeli officials and media have not commented on the attack at the time of this writing.

Six unnamed Iranian officials and diplomats told Reuters on April 10 that Iran has provided the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) with Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over the past few months.[66] An unspecified senior Sudanese army source told Reuters that the Iranian UAVs have helped the SAF “turn the tide of the war” by halting the progress of the Rapid Support Force (RSF) and regaining territorial control in areas surrounding the capital. A Netherlands-based independent Sudanese media outlet stated that the drones have been “decisive” in tactical engagements, allowing the SAF to track, isolate and destroy RSF fighters in the capital.[67] Western media previously reported in January 2024 that Iran had supplied the SAF with Mohajer-6 multirole drones.[68] An unspecified regional source close to Iran’s political elites told Reuters that Iran’s Qeshm Fars Air has transported Mohajer and Ababil drones to Sudan several times since the end of 2023 .[69] The Mohajer-6 has a range of 200-2,000 km and uses Almas guided anti-tank missiles and Ghaem guided glide bombs.[70] The Ababil drones have a range of 120-480 km and use Almas guided anti-tank missiles and Ghaem guided glided bombs.[71] Reuters did not specify which type of Ababil drones Iran supplied to Sudan. Iran has reportedly supplied drones to Sudan since at least 2019.[72]

The Washington Post reported on April 10 that Iran is rapidly accumulating enriched uranium at its Fordow enrichment facility outside of Qom.[73] The Washington Post reported that unspecified inspectors have witnessed increased activity at the Fordow facility after the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018. The report also said that the Fordow facility is producing highly enriched uranium at a faster rate than ever before, even though Iran recently sought to dilute some of its highly enriched uranium.[74] Iran previously claimed that the near-weapons grade uranium discovered at the Fordow enrichment facility in January 2023 was due to an unintended fluctuation in enrichment levels.[75] The IAEA assessed that the information Iran provided to the IAEA was “not inconsistent” with Iran’s explanation that the near-weapons grade uranium was caused by an unintended fluctuation in enrichment levels.

US CENTCOM reported on April 9 that it intercepted a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile in the Gulf of Aden. CENTCOM assessed that the Houthi attack was likely targeting the US-flagged and owned commercial vessel the MV Yorktown.[76] The Houthis claimed on April 10 that they conducted two attacks targeting US-flagged vessels, including the Yorktown and an unspecified US warship.[77] The Houthis also claimed two attacks targeting two “Israeli” commercial vessels named the MSC Gina and the MSC Darwin.[78] CENTCOM reported on April 9 that there were no injuries or damage to commercial or military vessels.[79] UK Maritime Trade Operations reported that there were no security alerts from April 9 and 10.[80] 

Houthi-affiliated media claimed that the United States conducted airstrikes near Hudaydah on April 10.[81] 

Iran Update, April 9, 2024

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Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Peter Mills, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

IRGC Navy Commander Rear Adm. Ali Reza Tangsiri implicitly threatened the United Arab Emirates (UAE) during an interview with Lebanese Hezbollah-controlled media on April 9, likely to pressure the UAE to sever ties with Israel.[1] Tangsiri issued a series of threatening messages, all of which appear aimed at the UAE, during the interview. Tangsiri reiterated the long-standing Iranian threat to close the Strait of Hormuz and furthermore suggested that Israel is cooperating with the UAE against Iran. Tangsiri claimed that Israel is present in the UAE under the pretext of “economic work” but actually engages in security and military activities there that threaten Iran.[2] Tangsiri’s decision to conduct the interview with an Arabic-language outlet further suggests that he intended to message to an Arabic-speaking audience.

Tangsiri’s comments are part of a larger Iranian effort to impose an unofficial blockade on Israel. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has urged regional states to cut trade ties with Israel and institute a blockade in response to the Israel-Hamas war. The Houthis have conducted over 40 attacks targeting commercial vessels in the Red Sea since November 2023, as part of this Iranian-led call effort, causing maritime traffic through the Red Sea to decline by approximately 50 percent since January 2024.[3] Israel has increasingly relied on overland trade with the Gulf States in recent months to compensate for reduced trade activity at the Port of Eilat due to the Houthis’ anti-shipping campaign.[4] Tehran and its regional allies have focused in more recent weeks on disrupting the Israeli ground connection to the Arabian Peninsula. Iranian state media and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias recently criticized the UAE for allowing Israel to conduct trade through its territory.[5] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have, moreover, called for the dismantlement of Israel’s “land bridge” through Jordan, as CTP-ISW previously noted.[6]

Tangsiri separately endorsed the strategy of “strategic patience” in response to the April 1 Israeli airstrike that killed seven IRGC officials in Damascus. “Strategic patience” is a long-standing Iranian regime policy that involves not immediately conducting a major response to Israeli attacks. Tangsiri claimed that Iran will “strike [Israel] hard at the right time,” but emphasized that Iran will not act “emotionally” or “hastily.”[7] Tangsiri added that “it is not the case that [Iran] will not give a response.”[8] Numerous senior Iranian military officials, including Armed Forces General Staff Chief Maj. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri and Supreme Leader Military Affairs Adviser Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi, have similarly stated in recent days that Iran will respond to the April 1 airstrike “at the right time.”[9]

US, Israeli, and Iranian officials told the New York Times that Iran is operating a smuggling network through Jordan to arm Palestinian fighters in the West Bank.[10] The Iranian officials described this effort as meant to ”foment unrest against Israel.” They added that Tehran is not trying to arm any particular Palestinian militias and is using Bedouin smuggling networks in Jordan and Iranian-backed militias in Syria to facilitate the transfer of materiel into the West Bank. US and Israeli officials said that the Iranian-backed networks are specifically involved in moving small arms, anti-tank missiles, and rocket-propelled grenades. Iran’s smuggling network in Jordan could enable already motivated militias in the West Bank to attacks on Israeli targets.

The Iranian effort to build its capabilities and networks in the West Bank is part of a larger effort to encircle Israel militarily. IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami presented in August 2022 the clearest articulation yet from an Iranian official on how they plan to destroy Israel, and he placed special emphasis on growing anti-Israel militancy around the West Bank[11] Afshon Ostovar, a well-know analyst on Iran, suggested to the New York Times that Iran may be focusing on arming the West Bank because it anticipates having more limited access to militias in the Gaza Strip in the future.[12] Tehran has sought to develop the capabilities and infrastructure of its militia network in the West Bank in recent years, but the Israel-Hamas war has highlighted the shortcomings of its networks there.[13]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: IRGC Navy Commander Rear Adm. Ali Reza Tangsiri implicitly threatened the United Arab Emirates (UAE) during an interview with Lebanese Hezbollah-controlled media, likely to pressure the UAE to sever ties with Israel.
• Tangsiri separately endorsed the strategy of “strategic patience” in response to the April 1 Israeli airstrike that killed seven IRGC officials in Damascus.
• West Bank: US, Israeli, and Iranian officials told the New York Times that Iran is operating a smuggling network through Jordan to arm Palestinian fighters in the West Bank.
• The Iranian effort to build its capabilities and networks in the West Bank is part of a larger effort to encircle Israel militarily.
• Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias conducted several indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Central Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force killed the Maghazi mayor, whom Israel says was a member in Hamas’ military wing in the central Gaza Strip.
• Political Negotiations: Hamas said on April 8 that the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal does not meet its demands.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Syria: The IDF and local Syrian sources reported that unspecified Iranian-backed militants launched a rocket from Syria targeting the Yonatan region of the Golan Heights.
• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted five attacks into Israel using “appropriate weapons” over the previous 72 hours.
• Iran: Jaish al Adl—a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia group—conducted an attack killing at least five Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officers in Sib and Soran county, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.
• Yemen: US CENTCOM reported that it targeted Houthi air defense systems in Houthi-controlled Yemen. CENTCOM separately intercepted a Houthi drone over the Red Sea.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Palestinian militias conducted several indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip on April 9. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed that it mortared an Israeli command site southwest of Gaza City.[14] Hamas separately claimed that it mortared Israeli forces near Shujaiya neighborhood in eastern Gaza City as well as an Israeli command site near where the IDF is constructing a highway in southern Gaza City.[15]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on April 9. The Nahal Brigade killed and directed an airstrike targeting several Palestinian fighters.[16] The Nahal Brigade is operating around the border of the central and northern strip to secure the Israeli highway and bases nearby.

The IDF Air Force conducted several airstrikes targeting Palestinian military infrastructure in the Gaza Strip on April 9.[17] The IDF destroyed the site from which PIJ launched rockets into southern Israel on April 8.[18] The IDF separately conducted an airstrike in Khan Younis, killing a Palestinian fighter, who was involved in the October 7 attack.[19]

The IDF Air Force killed the Maghazi mayor, whom Israel says was a member in Hamas’ military wing in the central Gaza Strip on April 8.[20] The IDF said that the mayor, Hatem Saleh al Ghamri, was part of Hamas’ Emergency Committees, which is responsible for maintaining public order and civil control.[21] Ghamri was also reportedly a fighter in Hamas’ Maghazi Battalion.[22] CNN reported that Hamas condemned the strike and said that Ghamri was the mayor of the Maghazi refugee camp.[23] The IDF previously killed five members of Hamas’ Emergency Committees in Rafah in March 2024.[24]

Israeli media close to the IDF reported on April 9 that the Israeli forces withdrawn from Khan Younis will prepare for fighting in other areas and carry out large, unspecified humanitarian operations.[25] The IDF withdrew most of its forces from the Gaza Strip on April 7, including the IDF 98th Division, which had been operating around Khan Younis for four months.[26] The report noted that Israeli forces are preparing for fighting in Rafah, among other unspecified places.[27]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on April 8 that Israel has not yet set a date for a clearing operation into Rafah, according to an unidentified source with direct knowledge.[28] Gallant’s comments follow Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu saying that Israel has set a date for the offensive.[29] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that Israel has not informed the United States on the date of the operation.[30]

Hamas said on April 8 that the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal does not meet its demands.[31] The group is currently reviewing the proposal and will soon inform international mediators of its response. The Wall Street Journal, citing officials' part of the negotiations, reported that Israel and Hamas still disagree over key aspects of a deal, including the return of displaced Palestinians to the northern Gaza Strip, the identities of Palestinian prisoners set to be released under the deal, and the future of Israeli military operations in the strip.[32] The officials noted that Hamas has demanded the free movement of displaced Palestinians to the north, while Israel has rejected the unconditional return of Palestinians there. Unspecified Egyptian officials reported that Israel wants to inspect Palestinians moving from the south to the north to stop potential Hamas fighters from returning alongside civilians.[33] CTP-ISW previously reported how Hamas could use the return of civilians to the north to bring its own fighters back to the area amid Hamas attempts to reassert its authority there.[34]

Israel reported that it has increased the amount of aid moving into the Gaza Strip.[35] The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)—a department within the Israeli Defense Ministry—announced that Israel has expanded the scope of aid and doubled the daily number of civilian trucks that can move through the Kerem Shalom crossing.[36] COGAT claimed that UN aid agencies are not using the full capacity of the Kerem Shalom route.[37] Israel said 468 trucks entered the Gaza Strip on April 9, which is the highest rate since the war began.[38] The United Nations reports much lower numbers, noting that many trucks are only half full because of Israeli inspection rules.[39] US State Departments spokesperson Matthew Miller said on April 8 that the high number of trucks entering the Gaza Strip “represents a significant improvement, but it is important not just that we see the daily number continue to grow, but that it be sustained over time.”[40]

Palestinian fighters did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on April 9.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 8.[41] Israeli forces detained nine wanted Palestinians, including one Hamas member, in the West Bank during the operations there.[42] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade fired small arms and detonated improvised explosive devices in two separate attacks targeting Israeli forces around Nablus and Tulkarm.[43] Israeli forces separately engaged Palestinian fighters in Jayyus, east of Qalqilya.[44]

A PIJ cell in Jenin claimed a shooting attack on April 9 targeting Gan Ner, which is in northern Israel near the border with the West Bank.[45]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 8.[46] Hezbollah fighters launched a one-way attack drone targeting an Israeli counter-drone electronic jamming device south of Kiryat Shmona.[47]

The IDF and local Syrian sources reported that unspecified Iranian-backed militants launched a rocket from Syria targeting the Yonatan region of the Golan Heights on April 8.[48] Israeli forces targeted the launch site in Daraa Province with artillery fire.[49] The IDF also said that it conducted strikes on Syrian Arab Army infrastructure in Mahaja region, Daraa Province, in a separate attack.[50]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed on April 8 that it conducted five attacks into Israel using “appropriate weapons” over the previous 72 hours.[51] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed that its targets included the Ashkelon oil terminal and the Hatzerim airbase near Beer Sheva, among other unspecified ”vital targets.” CTP-ISW cannot verify these attacks. Western analysts reported that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq used Paveh cruise missiles in most of the attacks, according to footage that the group published.[52] The IDF intercepted a drone that entered Israeli airspace from the east and was headed toward Eilat on April 8.[53]

US Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski met with Iraqi National Security Adviser Qasim al Araji ahead of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s visit to Washington, DC, on April 15.[54] Romanowski stated that the United States and Iraq are moving toward a “bilateral security agreement.” Iraqi officials previously stated that Sudani’s visit to Washington will focus on the status of the US-led international coalition in Iraq and the “transition to a comprehensive partnership."[55] Washington and Baghdad began talks to evaluate the status of the US-led international coalition in Iraq in late January 2024.[56] US and Iraqi officials held the latest round of Higher Military Commission talks on April 8.[57]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian warned that the “coming days will be difficult days for Israel” during a joint press conference with his Syrian counterpart, Faisal Mekdad, on

 April 8.[58] Abdollahian reiterated that the United States should be held responsible for the Israeli airstrike that killed several senior IRGC officers in Syria on April 1. Abdollahian emphasized that Syria is at the ”frontline” of the Axis of Resistance. Abdollahian’s comments follow several senior Iranian military officials suggesting that they will carefully calibrate Iran’s response.[59]

US CENTCOM reported that it targeted Houthi air defense systems in Houthi-controlled Yemen on April 8. CENTCOM separately intercepted a Houthi drone over the Red Sea on April 8.[60]

CENTCOM reported that the Houthis have launched five anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the UK-owned, Italian-operated commercial vessel MV Hope Island.[61]

Jaish al Adl—a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia group—conducted an attack on April 9 killing at least five Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officers in Sib and Soran county, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[62] Jaish al Adl claimed that it “completely destroyed” three LEC vehicles during the attack.[63] There has been a significant uptick in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since December 2023. Jaish al Adl most recently conducted a series of unprecedently complex and sophisticated attacks targeting Iranian security forces in Sistan and Baluchistan on April 4.[64] The uptick in Jaish al Adl attacks, and the complexity of the April 4 attack, illustrate the increasingly precarious state of Iranian internal security, especially in Sistan and Baluchistan province.

Iran Update, April 8, 2024

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Andie Parry, Amin Soltani, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, Peter Mills, Christian Engfer, Tor Lansing, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Senior Iranian military officials have continued to suggest that they will carefully calibrate Iran’s response to Israel’s killing of senior IRGC commanders in Syria. This careful approach aims to avoid a direct war with Israel. Iranian Armed Forces Chief of the General Staff Major General Mohammad Bagheri said on April 6 that Iran will strike Israel “at the right time” during a commemoration ceremony for the IRGC officers killed in the likely Israeli airstrike on April 1[1] The Military Affairs Adviser to the Iranian Supreme Leader Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi separately said during a similar commemoration ceremony on April 7 that Iran “must wait for the right time” to deliver its response.[2] Several senior Iranian clerics close to the Office of the Supreme Leader endorsed “strategic patience”—a long-standing regime policy that involves not immediately conducting a major response to Israeli attacks—in their weekly sermons on April 5.[3] Such comments support CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran seeks to avoid a direct military confrontation against the United States and Israel. Strategic patience does not exclude an eventual Iranian retaliation, however.[4]

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on April 8 warned that Iran will retaliate for the April 1 Israeli airstrike, illustrating the possibility of an eventual response to the attack.[5] Nasrallah’s made these comments during a Hezbollah ceremony for IRGC commander Mohammed Reza Zahedi in Beirut. Nasrallah said that Iran has a ”natural right” to retaliate against the airstrike because it represented ”an attack on Iranian territory.”[6] Nasrallah added that the United States and Israel recognize that an Iranian response to the attack is ”inevitably coming.”[7] Zahedi spearheaded Iranian engagement with Hezbollah and most recently commanded the IRGC Quds Force unit responsible for overseeing operations in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and the Palestinian Territories.[8] Zahedi was the only non-Lebanese member of Hezbollah’s Shura Council, which is led by Nasrallah and serves as the groups’ central decision-making authority.[9]

Arabic-language media outlet Jadeh Iran reported on April 7 and 8 that Iran has conditioned its potential response to the April 1 Israeli strike on a ceasefire in Gaza. Arabic-language outlet Jadeh Iran reported on April 7 and 8 that Iran informed the United States that it would not retaliate against Israel for the April 1 strike if the United States could secure a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip between Israel and Hamas, citing “an anonymous Arab diplomatic source.”[10] Jadeh Iran is an outlet founded by an al Jazeera journalist. An Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry official told Kuwait-based newspaper Al Jarida on April 8 that the Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry told the United States that Iran would not respond to the April 1 Israeli airstrike if there was ”a ceasefire in Gaza.”[11] The US State Department spokesperson denied these reports on April 8.[12] The Jadeh Iran reporting coincides with claims from Western media and Israeli officials that Israel and Hamas negotiators had made ”significant progress” in negotiations or reached a “critical point“ during on going negotiations in Cairo.[13]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian is engaging in political coordination with Iranian partners and Oman following the April 1 Israeli airstrike that targeted Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials in Damascus. Abdollahian traveled to Muscat, Oman, on April 7 to meet with his Omani counterpart, Sayyid Badr al Busaidi, and chief Houthi negotiator and senior official Mohammad Abdul Salam.[14] An “anonymous Arab diplomatic source” telling Arabic-language outlet Jadeh Iran on April 7 that Iran would refrain from retaliating against Israel for the April 1 airstrike if Israel and Hamas reach a ceasefire.[15] It is not clear whether the diplomatic source told Jadeh Iran about this Iranian position before or after Abdollahian’s meeting with Busaidi. Oman has historically served as an intermediary and messenger between Iran and the United States, including by facilitating nuclear negotiations between the two countries. Oman also serves as an intermediary between the Gulf States and the United States and the Houthis. Abdollahian separately thanked the Houthis for supporting Iran following the April 1 airstrike and claimed that Israel used “American-made aircraft and missiles” in the airstrike during his meeting with Abdul Salam.[16]

Abdollahian also traveled to Damascus, Syria, on April 8 and met with Syrian President Bashar al Assad and Foreign Affairs Minister Faisal Mekdad.[17] Abdollahian claimed that the United States is directly responsible for Israel’s “crimes and actions” and that Iran’s response to the April 1 airstrike will be “decisive” during his meeting with Assad.[18] Assad called for strengthening the Axis of Resistance “as much as possible” in response to the Israeli airstrike.[19] Abdollahian visited a Syrian Foreign Affairs Ministry employee who was injured in the airstrike and inaugurated a new Iranian consular building in Damascus with Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Faisal Mekdad.[20]

Israel and Hamas are considering a new US-proposed ceasefire and hostage exchange deal. The deal would reportedly establish a six-week ceasefire in exchange for the release of 40 Israeli hostages held by Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip.[21] Israel would release at least 700 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the hostages.[22] Hamas must submit a list of 40 living hostages to mediators, which has reportedly been a sticking point in negotiations, including the most recent talks on April 7.[23] The new proposal reportedly calls for Israel to make additional concessions on the return of displaced Palestinian civilians to the northern Gaza Strip by allowing Palestinians to return to the northern Gaza Strip at a more rapid pace than the Israelis had previously proposed.[24] Israel submitted a ceasefire proposal on April 2 that reportedly allowed for the gradual return of 60,000 displaced Palestinians to unspecified zones of the northern Gaza Strip at a rate of 2,000 per day.[25] Hamas rejected the April 2 proposal.[26]

Israeli officials and mediating countries have acknowledged the potential for a ceasefire deal, while anonymous Hamas sources have expressed skepticism about a ceasefire deal.[27] Hamas said on April 7 that its negotiating delegation arrived in Cairo for talks with mediators but that it would adhere to its previous demands regarding a permanent ceasefire and the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip.[28] An anonymous Hamas official said on April 8 that there was ”no progress” on April 7.[29] White House National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby confirmed on April 8 that Hamas has received the proposal and will be waiting for Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar’s response over the next several days.[30] The Israeli security cabinet is scheduled to discuss the proposal on April 9.[31] The Israeli foreign minister said on April 8 that negotiations had ”reached a critical point” for the first time since the previous ceasefire deal in November 2023.[32] Egyptian and Qatari sources have also issued optimistic statements on the status of negotiations.[33]

An Israeli source told an Israel Army Radio correspondent that the IDF hopes Hamas will agree to the ceasefire so that Palestinian civilians sheltering in Rafah can migrate north before an Israeli clearing operation into Rafah at the end of the six-week ceasefire.[34] Unspecified Israeli sources claimed that the IDF withdrawal from the southern Gaza Strip will enable displaced Palestinians in Rafah to migrate to parts of Khan Younis and the central Gaza Strip.[35] Israel and aid organizations have not yet constructed encampments in the southern and central Gaza Strip to which Gazans could migrate, however. Western media and local sources published images of destruction in Khan Younis after the IDF withdrawal.[36]

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Palestinian militias resumed launching rockets from Khan Younis shortly after the IDF’s withdrawal on April 7.[37] Several Israeli brigades were involved in clearing operations in Khan Younis throughout February and March, likely reducing the ability of Palestinian fighters to launch rockets from the southern Gaza Strip. The Israeli military correspondent said that Palestinian militias launched six rockets into Israel from Khan Younis on April 7 and 8, compared to the five rockets that the groups launched from Khan Younis in all of February and March.[38] The IDF said that Palestinian fighters fired three rockets on April 7 that fell in empty areas of Israel from Khan Younis.[39] The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes on the rocket launch sites and additional militia infrastructure near the site.[40]

IDF Southern Command has directed airstrikes targeting Hamas rocket launch sites in the al Mawasi humanitarian area west of Khan Younis City over the past several days.[41] The IDF said that it ensured civilians evacuated from the area before conducting the airstrikes.

Key Takeaways: 

• Iran: Senior Iranian military officials have continued to suggest that they will carefully calibrate Iran’s response to Israel’s killing of senior IRGC commanders in Syria. This careful approach aims to avoid a direct war with Israel. This approach does not exclude an eventual Iranian retaliation, however.
• Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on April 8 warned that Iran will retaliate for the April 1 Israeli airstrike, illustrating the possibility of an eventual response to the attack.
• Arabic-language media outlet Jadeh Iran reported on April 7 and 8 that Iran has conditioned its potential response to the April 1 Israeli strike on a ceasefire in Gaza.
• Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian is engaging in political coordination with Iranian partners and Oman following the April 1 Israeli airstrike that targeted Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials in Damascus.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: Israel and Hamas are considering a new US-proposed ceasefire and hostage exchange deal. Israeli officials and mediating countries have acknowledged the potential for a ceasefire deal, while anonymous Hamas sources have expressed skepticism about a ceasefire deal.
• Gaza Strip: An Israeli source told an Israel Army Radio correspondent that the IDF hopes Hamas will agree to the ceasefire so that Palestinian civilians sheltering in Rafah can migrate north before an Israeli clearing operation into Rafah at the end of the six-week ceasefire.
• An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Palestinian militias resumed launching rockets from Khan Younis shortly after the IDF’s withdrawal on April 7.
• Several Israeli brigades were involved in clearing operations in Khan Younis throughout February and March, likely reducing the ability of Palestinian fighters to launch rockets from the southern Gaza Strip.
• Lebanon: The IDF Air Force killed a senior official and commander in Hezbollah’s Radwan unit and two other Hezbollah fighters in an airstrike in southern Lebanon on April 8.
• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted three drone attacks targeting Israeli military bases since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 7. Israeli officials and media have not commented on the claimed attacks at the time of this writing. CTP-ISW cannot verify the Islamic Resistance in Iraq’s attack claims.

Iran Update, April 7, 2024

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Andie Parry, Peter Mills, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Israel withdrew most of its forces from the Gaza Strip on April 7. Israeli officials and media sources have framed the withdrawals as part of their preparations for conducting a clearing operation into Rafah. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant announced on April 7 that Israeli “forces came out” of the Gaza Strip “and are preparing for future missions” into Rafah.[1] Israeli military correspondents similarly interpreted the withdrawal as part of an IDF effort to reconstitute ahead of advancing into Rafah.[2] Israeli media close to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) clarified that the IDF 98th Division withdrew from the southern Gaza Strip on April 7.[3] Israeli brigades and units operating under the command of the 98th Division were previously the only Israeli forces remaining in the southern Gaza Strip. Palestinian sources posted images of areas in which the 98th Division recently operated, suggesting that Israeli forces had withdrawn from those areas.[4]

Hamas and other Palestinian militias will likely try to exploit the Israeli withdrawal to reconstitute militarily and reassert Hamas' governing authority around Khan Younis. Israeli officials and media sources have framed the withdrawals as part of their transition toward a raid-based model around Khan Younis—similar to what the IDF has done in the northern Gaza Strip since December 2023.[5] Israeli military correspondents asserted that the IDF has destroyed Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade and will accordingly transition to conducting raids to target the remaining militia forces and infrastructure there.[6] Hamas conducted a multi-stage attack that killed four Israeli soldiers in Khan Younis on April 6, however, demonstrating that Hamas retains some combat effectiveness there.[7] CTP-ISW has reported extensively on how Hamas and other Palestinian militias have exploited the withdrawal of Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip to infiltrate and rebuild their networks there.[8] The IDF has redeployed to several areas in the northern Gaza Strip in recent months to re-clear those areas of Palestinian fighters and militia infrastructure.[9] Hamas and the other Palestinian militias will likely see an opportunity to pursue similar effects around Khan Younis following the Israeli withdrawal there.

Unspecified Israeli sources claimed that the IDF withdrawal from the southern Gaza Strip will enable displaced Palestinians in Rafah to migrate to parts of Khan Younis and the central Gaza Strip.[10] The migration of Palestinians from Rafah to other parts of the Gaza Strip would facilitate an Israeli clearing operation into Rafah, according to Israeli military correspondents.[11] Israel and aid organizations have not yet constructed encampments in the southern and central Gaza Strip to which Gazans could migrate. Israeli media indicated that the construction of such encampments was part of the IDF humanitarian plan.[12]

The withdrawal of the IDF 98th Division means that the Nahal Brigade is the only remaining Israeli unit in the Gaza Strip.[13] The Nahal Brigade operates around the border of the central and northern Strip to secure Israeli-built highway Route 749, which bisects the northern and southern Gaza Strip and three nearby forward operating bases for future raids and operations in the Gaza Strip.[14] The role of the Nahal Brigade in securing the divide between the central and northern Gaza Strip is consistent with the IDF’s full transition to a raid-based model. Israeli military correspondents have reported that the IDF uses the road to quickly launch raids into the Gaza Strip, such as the al Shifa Hospital operation that the IDF chief of staff called a “great achievement” for leading to the capture and death of many senior Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters on March 30.[15]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Israel withdrew most of its forces from the Gaza Strip. Israeli officials and media sources have framed the withdrawals as part of their preparations for conducting a clearing operation into Rafah. Hamas and other Palestinian militias will likely try to exploit the Israeli withdrawal to reconstitute militarily and reassert Hamas governing authority around Khan Younis.
• West Bank: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed that it conducted a drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Eilat, Israel.
• Yemen: The Houthis claimed that they conducted five drone and missile attacks targeting civilian and military vessels over the previous 72 hours.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF 89th Commando Forces (98th Division) cleared al Amal neighborhood, western Khan Younis, before withdrawing on April 7. The 89th Commando forces located over 100 militia sites during operations in al Amal.[16] Israeli forces detonated and destroyed a 900-meter tunnel equipped with living rooms and weapons stores.[17] The IDF conducted raids to seize weapons and kill Palestinian fighters, including a Hamas squad commander.[18]

Palestinian fighters conducted two indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on April 7. PIJ targeted towns in southern Israel with a five-rocket barrage shortly after all Israeli forces withdrew from the southern Gaza Strip.[19] An Israeli military correspondent said that the Iron Dome intercepted all the rockets.[20] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement separately targeted the IDF Gaza Division headquarters in Reim, southern Israel.[21]

The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine mortared Israeli armor near the Israel-Gaza Strip border northeast of Qarara on April 7.[22] Palestinian militias did not claim additional attacks targeting Israeli forces on April 7, likely due to the IDF withdrawal from the southern Gaza Strip and a lack of target availability.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 6.[23]

A Palestinian fighter fired upon an Israeli bus and wounded two individuals, including an IDF soldier, near Nabi Elias on April 7.[24]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 6.[25]

The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah air defense systems in Baalbek, Lebanon, after Hezbollah intercepted an IDF drone over southern Lebanon on April 6.[26]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted a drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Eilat, Israel, on April 6.[27] Israel media reported on April 7 that “hostile aircraft intrusion sirens” went off in Eilat.[28] The IDF later announced that these sirens were a “false alarm.”[29]

The Houthis claimed on April 7 that they conducted five drone and missile attacks targeting civilian and military vessels over the previous 72 hours.[30] The Houthis claimed that they conducted anti-ship missile attacks targeting a Marshall Islands-flagged “British ship” in the Red Sea and two Panamanian-flagged “Israeli ships” in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.[31]

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that international coalition forces intercepted a missile and that a second missile fell into the water near a vessel approximately 60 nautical miles southwest of Hudaydah, Yemen, on April 6.[32] US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed that a coalition vessel engaged and destroyed an anti-ship missile on April 6.[33] UKMTO separately reported that a missile impacted the water near a vessel approximately 59 nautical miles southwest of Aden, Yemen, on April 6.[34]

The Houthis also claimed that they conducted two drone attacks targeting unspecified US “military frigates” in the Red Sea.[35] CENTCOM announced that it intercepted a Houthi drone over the Red Sea on April 6.[36]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) destroyed a mobile, surface-to-air missile in Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen on April 6.[37]

Iran Update, April 6, 2024

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Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

CTP-ISW will publish abbreviated updates on April 6 and 7, 2024. Detailed coverage will resume Monday, April 8, 2024.

Key Takeaways:

• Central Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters have claimed several attacks targeting Israeli forces near Deir al Balah in the central Gaza Strip in recent days.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Hamas claimed to conduct a multi-stage attack targeting Israeli forces in eastern Khan Younis.
• Political Negotiations: A senior US official said that US President Joe Biden sent letters to the Egyptian president and Qatari emir, asking them to pressure Hamas to agree to a six-week ceasefire agreement.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least five locations in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed two drone attacks targeting an unspecified military facility in the Golan Heights and an oil refinery in Haifa, Israel.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Palestinian fighters have claimed several attacks targeting Israeli forces near Deir al Balah in the central Gaza Strip in recent days.[1] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed on April 6 that its forces returned from the front lines east of Deir al Balah and reported attacking an Israeli tank with an explosively formed penetrator.[2] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah, separately mortared Israeli forces near Deir al Balah.[3] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on April 5 shows flattened terrain southeast of Deir al Balah, indicating that Israeli bulldozers and/or bulldozers are operating in the area.

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in al Amal neighborhood in western Khan Younis on April 6.[4] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Givati Brigade (162nd Division) destroyed a weapons depot and found over 40 improvised explosive devices and other explosives in al Amal.[5] Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in close combat and destroyed a four-man Palestinian squad in one attack.[6]

Hamas claimed that it conducted three attacks targeting Israeli forces in al Amal after Hamas fighters returned from the front lines.[7] Hamas fighters fired anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), tandem-charge anti-tank rockets, and detonated a mine targeting Israeli forces.

Hamas claimed to conduct a multi-stage attack targeting Israeli forces in eastern Khan Younis on April 6.[8] Hamas fighters targeted three IDF tanks with anti-tank RPGs in al Zana. Hamas fighters then claimed that they prevented an Israeli quick reaction force from responding to the situation by detonating a minefield that they set prior to the attack. Hamas later claimed that its fighters targeted Israeli forces that responded to the attack.[9] The IDF has not commented on the attack at the time of this writing.

The IDF Air Force killed a senior official in Hamas’ internal security apparatus in Khan Younis, who was also responsible for managing some militia activity.[10] The IDF said that the figure was the deputy head of internal security and responsible for significant attacks against Israel targets. Hamas controls several internal security forces, including the Civil Police.[11]

The IDF reported on April 6 that Israeli forces rescued the body of a hostage during an overnight operation in Khan Younis.[12] The Israeli Army Radio reported that that PIJ killed the hostage, named Elad Katzir, in January 2024.[13] The IDF 89th Commando Brigade (98th Division), with support from Shin Bet and Military Intelligence, returned the body to Israel. Israeli authorities say that Palestinian militias still hold around 133 hostages and that 99 of them are believed to still be alive.[14]

A CNN team in Israel reported on April 6 hearing gunfire and explosions near the Erez crossing connecting Israel with the northern Gaza Strip.[15] These reports come immediately after Israel decided to reopen the crossing, which has been closed since the war began, to facilitate humanitarian aid.[16] The IDF moved the CNN team to another unspecified location after hearing the gunfire and explosions. The Israeli War Cabinet approved on April 5 the reopening of its Erez crossing, which has been closed since the beginning of the war.[17]

A senior US official said that US President Joe Biden sent letters to the Egyptian president and Qatari emir on April 4, asking them to pressure Hamas to agree to a six-week ceasefire agreement.[18] Biden ”urged them to secure commitments from Hamas to agree to and abide by a deal," the US official said. Israeli media reported that a senior Hamas delegation led by Ismail Haniyeh is expected to travel to Cairo on April 7 for further negotiations.[19] Senior Hamas sources said that the group still insists on a full ceasefire before they release any hostages.[20]

US, Israeli, and Egyptian officials told the Wall Street Journal that the Biden administration is pressing Israel to allow a limited number of displaced Palestinians to return to the northern Gaza Strip as part of the current round of ceasefire talks.[21] Unspecified Arab mediators stated that     Israel is open to permitting 2,000 people per day—mainly women and children—to return to the northern Gaza Strip. Israel would reportedly allow a maximum of 60,000 Palestinians to return to the northern Gaza Strip as part of the deal, representing an Israeli concession.[22] Israel sent an “updated” ceasefire proposal to the mediators and Hamas on April 2, which Hamas later rejected.[23]

Palestinian fighters did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on April 6.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least five locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 5.[24]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on April 6.[25]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed two drone attacks targeting an unspecified military facility in the Golan Heights and an oil refinery in Haifa on April 5.[26] 

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Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Tor Lansing, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Some clerics close to the Office of the Supreme Leader suggested that Tehran will calibrate its response to Israel killing senior IRGC commanders in Syria in order to avoid a direct war with Israel.1] Several Friday prayer leaders endorsed ”strategic patience”—a long-standing regime policy that involves not conducting a full response to Israeli attacks immediately—in their weekly sermon on April 5.[2] The Office of the Supreme Leader issues guidance to Friday prayer leaders for the content of their sermons, which suggests that their promotions of strategic patience are part of a broader messaging effort from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[3] Khamenei previously ordered his military commanders to exercise strategic patience following an Israeli airstrike that killed senior IRGC Quds Force officer Brig. Gen. Razi Mousavi in Syria in December 2023, according to The New York Times.[4] The public endorsements of a calibrated retaliation on April 5 are consistent with recent Western reporting.[5] Two unspecified Iranian officials told Reuters on April 4 that the immediate Iranian response would be “limited and aimed at deterrence.”[6] Such reports support CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran seeks to avoid a direct military confrontation against the United States and Israel.[7]

Tehran is also signaling that it wants to avoid involving the United States in its retaliation against Israel. An official in Raisi’s Presidential office claimed that Iran has warned the United States to “step aside, so you don’t get hit,” suggesting that Iran seeks to retaliate against Israeli targets.[8] Western media has similarly suggested that Iran will target Israel directly, moreover. An unnamed US, Israeli, and other unspecified Western officials told the Washington Post that they expected Iran to retaliate with drones or missile attacks on Israeli targets that would be ”calibrated to avoid an even bigger response from Israel.”[9] CBS separately reported that US intelligence indicates that Iran’s response will include ”a swarm of Shahed loitering drones and cruise missiles,” likely before the end of Ramadan on April 10.[10] Israel has reportedly evacuated several of its diplomatic facilities around the region in anticipation of a possible Iranian retaliation, although the Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry has denied such reports.[11]

Kataib Seyyed al Shuhada (KSS) Secretary General Abu Alaa al Walai threatened on April 5 to increase attacks targeting Israel if the IDF conducts a clearing operation into Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip.[12] Walai’s statement suggests that KSS may be at least one of the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that has conducted attacks into Israel in recent weeks. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has conducted regular attacks into Israel since pausing its near-daily attacks on US forces in February 2024. Walai also called for Arab and Islamic countries to sever all diplomatic ties with Israel and stop all normalization efforts.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iranian officials have signaled that they want to avoid involving the United States in their retaliation against Israel for killing senior IRGC commanders in Syria.
• Iraq: An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leader threatened to increase attacks into Israel if the IDF conducted a clearing operation into Rafah.
• Gaza Strip: Israeli leaders approved a series of measures to increase the volume of humanitarian aid entering the Gaza Strip.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Yemen: US CENTCOM conducted a preemptive strike targeting a Houthi-operated, anti-ship missile in Yemen.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations around Khan Younis on April 5.[13] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 7th Brigade (36th Division), which has been operating in eastern Khan Younis, directed artillery to destroy a house that Palestinian fighters had rigged to explode.[14] The IDF Air Force similarly destroyed over 30 explosively rigged buildings across the Gaza Strip in support of Israeli infantry operations.[15] These reports are consistent with the fact that Hamas and other Palestinian militias have claimed house-borne IED attacks throughout the war.[16] The IDF Givati Brigade located grenades and IEDs while re-clearing al Amal neighborhood in western Khan Younis.[17]

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) reported that it mortared Israeli forces in central Khan Younis.[18] The group claimed that the attack supported the al Qassem Brigades, which is Hamas’ military wing, in some unspecified fashion. PIJ has been aligned with Hamas throughout the war.

Israel approved on April 5 a series of measures to increase the humanitarian aid entering the Gaza Strip. The Israeli War Cabinet approved the reopening of its Erez crossing with the northern Gaza Strip, which has been closed since the beginning of the war.[19] The Israeli War Cabinet separately approved the use of the Port of Ashdod in Israel to facilitate the movement of aid into the Gaza Strip. Israeli officials told CNN that the crossing and port would open on April 7.[20]

Israel released on April 5 its internal inquiry into the IDF strikes that killed seven World Central Kitchen aid workers in the central Gaza Strip.[21] The investigation found that the strike on three vehicles was conducted in “serious violation” of its rules and operating procedures. Israel dismissed several officers who bore responsibility for the attack. The World Central Kitchen called on April 4 for the creation of an independent commission to investigate the killings of its staff.[22] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated he is reviewing the report and that the United States will discuss its conclusions “in the days to come.”[23]

Axios reported on April 5, citing unspecified sources, that the US, Israeli, and Egyptian intelligence chiefs and Qatari prime minister will meet in Cairo in the coming days in an effort to secure the release of Hamas-held hostages in the Gaza Strip.[24] The meeting follows US President Joe Biden urging Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during a phone call on April 4 "to empower his negotiators to conclude a deal without delay to bring the hostages home." Israel and Hamas have been negotiating a proposal that includes a six-week ceasefire and the release of 40 hostages in return for approximately 700 Palestinian prisoners. A senior Hamas official said on April 4 that the latest round of negotiations in Cairo did not yield progress.[25] CNN reported on April 5, citing an unspecified diplomatic official, that Hamas believes “that Israeli proposal includes nothing new, so they see no need to change their proposal.”[26] The Israeli proposal did not accept Hamas's demands for the unrestricted return of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip and the withdrawal of Israeli forces.[27]

The Israeli Justice Ministry is investigating a cyberattack claimed by the group, “Anonymous for Justice,” that breached its servers.[28] The group claimed on April 4 that it had taken over 300 gigabytes of data and that it would continue attacking Israel until the war ends.[29]

Palestinian fighters have conducted at least three indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 4.[30] PIJ fired rockets targeting Ashkelon, Sderot, and Nir Aam in southern Israel on April 4, meaning that Palestinian militias conducted six total that day.[31]

The IDF reported on April 5 that its 215th Artillery Brigade attacked the launch sites from which Palestinian fighters launched rockets into southern Israel [32] The IDF Air Force also struck targets in the area, including rocket launchers and a tunnel shaft. Palestinian militias have launched most of their indirect fire attacks into Israel from the northern and central Gaza Strip since January 2024. [33]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on April 4.[35] The IDF said that it conducted raids in six locations and detained thirteen wanted Palestinians across the West Bank.[36] The IDF reported that Palestinian fighters threw an IED at Israeli forces in Tulkarm.[37] PIJ and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades engaged Israeli forces in the Nour Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm.[38] Israeli forces also encountered armed Palestinian fighters in Fahma, southwest of Jenin, where the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed an attack.[39] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades also claimed an attack in Kafr Rai, which neighbors Fahma.[40]

Unspecified actors shot from Jordan at an IDF vehicle near the Israel-Jordan border on April 5.[41] The IDF said that the suspects did not cross the border fence and that there were no Israeli casualties.

PIJ military spokesperson for the West Bank Abu Ahmed published a statement to celebrate Quds Day on April 5.[42] Ahmed said that PIJ fighters in the West Bank are “preparing” for an unspecified event and that Israeli forces are not expecting “what awaits” them.[43] Ahmed also affirmed PIJ’s support for the Axis of Resistance leadership in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.[44]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 4.[45]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

US CENTCOM conducted a preemptive strike targeting an anti-ship missile in Houthi-controlled Yemen on April 4.[46] CENTCOM reported that the missile presented an imminent threat to US Navy, coalition, and merchant ships in the region.

Senior Iranian and Axis of Resistance leaders gave speeches for their annual, anti-Israel Quds Day celebration on April 5.[47] Quds Day is an Iranian-established celebration that occurs on the last Friday of Ramadan.[48] Senior Iranian military and political leaders repeated their standard anti-Israel rhetoric and boasted that Israel has failed to achieve its objectives in the Israel-Hamas war.[49] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Secretary General Ziad al Nakhalah and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Chief of Staff Abdul Aziz al Mohammadawi visited Tehran for the holiday commemorations.[50] Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General separately gave a televised speech for the holiday and affirmed that Iran will retaliate against Israel for killing senior IRGC officers in Syria on April 1.[51]

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi will reportedly meet with Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif in Islamabad in the near future, likely to discuss the recent Jaish al Adl attack in Iran.[52] A Jaish al Adl—a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia—conducted unprecedentedly complex and sophisticated attacks targeting Iranian security forces in multiple locations in southeastern Iran on April 4.[53] At least 11 Iranian security personnel and 18 Jaish al Adl militants died during the attacks, which lasted over 13 hours.[54] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the attacks risked straining the Iranian relationship with Pakistan, which Iran has long accused of harboring Jaish al Adl militants.[55]

The Iranian rial depreciated to a record low of 640,000 to one US dollar on April 4.[56]

Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Maj. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri met with Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on March 29. Bagheri praised Hamas’ October 7 attack and reemphasized the Iranian regime’s commitment to supporting the Palestinian cause, describing the latter as one of Tehran’s “main objectives.” Bagheri separately claimed that Israel would have already “collapsed” without support from the United States.[1] Haniyeh separately met with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian on March 26, President Ebrahim Raisi on March 27, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf on March 28.[2]

The meeting between Bagheri and Haniyeh is particularly noteworthy considering Bagheri’s role within the regime. Bagheri holds the most senior military role in Iran and is responsible for military policy and strategic guidance to the Iranian armed forces. CTP-ISW assessed on March 28 that several senior Axis of Resistance officials have traveled to Tehran in recent weeks likely in part to coordinate their reaction to a possible, major Israeli operation into southern Lebanon.[3]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Maj. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri met with Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.
• Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued operating in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias claimed 11 attacks targeting Israeli forces in al Amal and al Qarara after several weeks of only a few claimed attacks around Khan Younis.
• West Bank: Israeli forces detained a PIJ fighter in the Nour Shams refugee camp near Tulkarm.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The IDF Air Force killed the deputy commander of Hezbollah’s missile and rocket unit in an airstrike in al Bazouriyeh in southern Lebanon.
• Iraq: Iraqi Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee member Yasser Iskandar suggested that Iraq should acquire Russian military aircraft instead of US aircraft.
• Syria: Israel was likely responsible for a series of airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed positions in Aleppo Province, Syria.
• Yemen: US Central Command intercepted four Houthi drones that were “aimed at a coalition vessel and a US warship” in the Red Sea.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Israeli forces continued operating in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 29.[4] The IDF 162nd Division located militia infrastructure and unspecified weapons near the hospital.[5] Israeli forces also engaged Palestinian fighters in the area.[6]

Palestinian fighters continued their usual rate of attacks targeting Israeli forces in southern Gaza City. Palestinian fighters have conducted over 80 attacks targeting Israeli forces in and around al Shifa Hospital since Israeli forces returned to the area on March 18. Hamas fighters targeted an Israeli tank with an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) in Tal al Hawa, south of al Shifa Hospital, on March 29.[7] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades mortared Israeli forces operating near al Shifa Hospital in separate and combined attacks on March 29.[8] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, also claimed that its fighters targeted Israeli armor with rocket-propelled grenades near al Shifa Hospital on March 28.[9]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on March 29. Israeli aircraft struck a cell of Palestinian fighters near the Nahal Brigade.[10] The Nahal Brigade separately destroyed rockets aimed at Israel.[11]  

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in al Amal and al Qarara neighborhoods of Khan Younis on March 29. The IDF 98th Division targeted Palestinian fighters and militia infrastructure in al Qarara, northern Khan Younis, on March 29.[12] The IDF 89th Commando Brigade killed a Palestinian fighter in a house during a raid and located military equipment in al Amal.[13] The IDF 7th Brigade destroyed militia infrastructure, located weapons, including grenades and explosives, and targeted a cell of Palestinian fighters with tank fire in al Amal. The Givati Brigade separately destroyed a weapons warehouse in al Amal. The IDF launched a second clearing operation in al Amal on March [14][15]

Palestinian militias claimed 11 attacks targeting Israeli forces in al Amal and al Qarara since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on March 28 after several weeks of only a few claimed attacks around Khan Younis.[16] Palestinian militia attack claims in the southern Gaza Strip outnumbered attacks in the northern Gaza Strip on March 29 for the first time since March 14. Several Palestinian militias prefaced their attack claims on March 29 by reporting that their fighters returned from the front lines to give accounts of clashes.[17] This preface suggests that Palestinian fighters may have been regularly targeting Israeli forces in Khan Younis over the past weeks but were unable to communicate attacks to their media arms and/or higher headquarters. CTP-ISW has previously reported on a similar phenomenon with Palestinian fighters in the northern Gaza Strip. Israeli forces operating in Khan Younis have consistently reported clashes with Palestinian fighters in al Amal over the past week, despite the low level of Palestinian claims, further suggesting that the Palestinian attack claims in Khan Younis are delayed and that the militias retain some degree of combat effectiveness around Khan Younis.[18]

Palestinian militias claimed a series of high-impact attacks in Khan Younis on March 29. Hamas fighters fired a thermobaric rocket at Israeli forces inside a multi-story building near Nasser Hospital, leading to a large explosion captured on video.[19] The IDF and Israeli media indicated that an Egoz special operations forces (SOF) soldier died and that 16 other Israeli soldiers were injured—some seriously—by the Hamas attack.[20] PIJ said that its fighters ambushed six Israeli SOF members in the Qarara area on March 29, claiming to kill and wound the entire squad.[21] The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, separately claimed that its fighters detonated an improvised explosive device targeting an Israeli personnel carrier in Qarara.[22]

US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Charles Brown Jr. said on March 28 that Israel has committed to help protect US troops who are traveling to the eastern Mediterranean Sea to build and operate a temporary pier meant to transport humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip.[23] Brown added that the United States has its own ”capability and capacity to protect” its forces. The US Department of Defense (DOD) confirmed that ”there will be no US boots on the ground” when it announced the project on March 8.[24] US service members could be in range of some Palestinian weapons systems even if stationed offshore, however. A DOD spokesperson confirmed on March 26 that six US ships are “on their way” to the eastern Mediterranean Sea as part of the effort to construct a temporary pier.[25]

The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)—a department within the Israeli Defense Ministry—said that nine aid trucks entered the northern Gaza Strip on March 29.[26] The trucks entered through the Gate 96 crossing, which Israel reportedly opened in early March 2024.[27] COGAT said that 47 aid trucks have entered Gate 96 since early March.[28]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu purchased 40,000 tents to house displaced Palestinians in the Gaza Strip in preparation for Israel’s clearing operation into Rafah, according to Israeli media.[29] These reports did not specify where the 40,000 tents will be erected in the Gaza Strip beyond “clear places.“[30] Netanyahu approved plans for a clearing operation into Rafah on March 15.[31]

PIJ and the DLFP fired a rocket barrage from the Gaza Strip targeting a southern Israeli town on March 29.[32]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 28.[33]

Israeli forces detained a PIJ fighter in the Nour Shams refugee camp near Tulkarm on March 29. The IDF said that the fighter planned small arms attacks against Israeli forces and prepared explosive devices to be used to target the IDF and Israeli civilians.[34]

Israeli forces detained five other wanted individuals and confiscated weapons in operations across the West Bank on March 29.[35]

Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa formed a new cabinet on March 28 amid calls for the Palestinian Authority (PA) to reform itself.[36] PA President Mahmoud Abbas appointed Mohammad Mustafa as prime minister on March 14.[37] US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said that the presence of ministers in the cabinet who were born in the Gaza Strip demonstrates that the cabinet intends to be “fully representative of the Palestinian people.”[38] The United States has pushed for the PA to contribute to rebuilding the Gaza Strip after the Israel-Hamas war. An unspecified US government official told Reuters in December 2023 that aides to US President Joe Biden have urged Israeli leaders to drop their opposition to the PA so that it can take a leading role in the post-war Gaza Strip.[39]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 28.[40]

The IDF Air Force killed the deputy commander of Hezbollah’s missile and rocket unit in an airstrike in al Bazouriyeh in southern Lebanon on March 29.[41] The IDF said that Ali Abdel Hassam Naim was a “senior expert” and a “leader in the field of rockets.”[42] The IDF added that Naim specialized in “heavy rockets” and had planned rocket attacks into Israel.[43] Hezbollah acknowledged Naim’s death on March 29.[44] Israeli Defense Minister Gallant said that the IDF will increase attacks targeting Hezbollah following the airstrike.[45] Gallant said that Israel is becoming “offensive rather than defensive” and said that Israel will strike “any place” where Hezbollah is present.

IDF Northern Command Commander Maj. Gen. Ori Gordin met with local Israeli government authorities on March 29 to discuss the IDF’s readiness in northern Israel.[46] Gordin said that the IDF will continue to strike Hezbollah and that the recent IDF Northern Command training exercises will increase readiness in the region.[47]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Iraqi Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee member Yasser Iskandar suggested that Iraq should acquire Russian military aircraft instead of US aircraft during an interview with Iraqi state media on March 29.[48] Iskandar claimed that the Iraqi Air Force spends 200 million dollars annually to maintain its F-16 fighter jets and that the cost of maintaining Russian aircraft would be “much less.”[49] Iskandar stated that Western sanctions on Moscow makes it difficult for Iraq to pay for Russian aircraft but that Iraq is open to developing “air power and air defense” capabilities with “many friends and allies.”[50] Iskandar previously claimed in early March 2024 that the United States has prevented Iraq from developing its air defense capabilities.[51]

Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev has similarly advertised the affordability of Russian military equipment in recent years. Kutrashev claimed that “the main things our Iraqi friends do not like are the price and maintenance costs of American weapons, which are four times more expensive than Russian weapons,” during an interview with Russian state media in December 2022.[52] Kutrashev further claimed that “the Iraqis like Russian and Soviet weapons” but that the West is trying to "hinder the expansion of military-technical cooperation between Moscow and Baghdad.”[53]

CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia may be setting conditions to try to supplant the United States in anticipation of the United States reducing its military presence there.[54] Kutrashev has met with at least six Iraqi officials, including senior security leaders, since January 2024.[55] Kutrashev has served as Russia’s ambassador to Iraq since April 2021 and has also worked in the Russian embassy in Syria.[56]

The Iraqi electricity minister and the head of the National Iranian Gas Company extended Iran and Iraq’s gas export contract by five years on March 27.[57] The contract stipulates that Iran will export up to 50 million cubic meters of natural gas to Iraq per day.[58] Iraq started importing Iranian natural gas in 2017 to fuel power plants near Baghdad and Basra and has since then relied on Iranian natural gas and electricity exports to produce approximately a quarter of its electricity.[59]

Israel was likely responsible for a series of airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed positions in Aleppo Province, Syria, on March 28. Syrian media claimed that the strikes targeted air defense facilities in Safira and a Lebanese Hezbollah weapons warehouse in Jabreen, which is near the Aleppo International Airport.[60] Reuters reported that strikes killed 33 Syrians and five Hezbollah fighters, including one local field commander, citing unspecified security sources, marking the highest death toll of such a strike in Syria since the Israel-Hamas war began.[61] The Syrian Defense Ministry confirmed the airstrikes and claimed that they resulted in civilian casualties, although CTP-ISW cannot corroborate this assertion.[62]

These airstrikes are part of an Israeli air campaign to disrupt the transfer of Iranian military materiel to its proxies and partners in the Levant, especially Hezbollah. Israel has conducted at least seven other strikes targeting Iranian- and Hezbollah-affiliated targets in Syria in March 2024, which marks a notable increase from an average of 1.6 Israeli strikes per month between December 2023 and February 2024.[63] The IDF said in February 2024 that it had conducted a series of airstrikes in Syria since the start of the Israel-Hamas war to interdict Iranian weapons shipments to Hezbollah via Syria.[64] Israel has previously targeted Safira—a location linked to missile and chemical weapons development —in May 2023 and 2020 respectively.[65]

The Iranian regime held a funeral ceremony for killed IRGC Quds Force and Basij Member Behrouz Vahedi in Karaj, Alborz Province, on March 29. Vahedi died in a likely Israeli airstrike in Deir Ez Zor Province, Syria, on March 25.[66] Israeli and Syrian media claimed that the strikes caused around 30 casualties, including among members of the IRGC Quds Force, Lebanese Hezbollah, and unspecified Iranian-backed militia commanders in eastern Syria.[67] IRGC Quds Force Commander Brig. Gen. Esmail Ghaani and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative to Alborz Province attended the funeral procession.[68]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) intercepted four Houthi drones that were “aimed at a coalition vessel and a US warship” in the Red Sea on March 28.[69]

The Iranian Embassy in Moscow hosted on March 28 a discussion on the anti-Israel Quds Day holiday that the Iranian regime promotes annually.[70] The Iranian regime uses Quds Day, which is on April 5 this year, to broadcast the strength and unity of its Axis of Resistance.[71] Iranian state media reported that Russian Special Presidential Representative for the Middle East and Africa Mikhail Bogdanov attended the event.[72] Afghan, Algerian, Azerbaijani, Bangladeshi, Iraqi, Lebanese, Palestinian, Sudanese, and Syrian diplomats also attended.[73] The event—and the regime’s promotion of the Quds holiday in recent days—is consistent with CTP-ISW's longstanding assessment that Iran is trying to exploit the Israel-Hamas war to try to isolate Israel internationally.[74]

Click here to read the full report with maps

Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Peter Mills, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

CORRECTION: CTP-ISW inaccurately reported on March 23 that the IDF had concluded its operation at al Shifa Hospital. This operation is still ongoing, and the IDF did not report on March 23 that the operation had al Shifa had ended.

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) engaged Palestinian militias north of Gaza City, including in Beit Hanoun.
• Israeli forces continued operations near al Shifa Hospital, Gaza City, on March 24. CTP-ISW inaccurately reported on March 23 that the IDF had concluded its operation at al Shifa Hospital. This operation is still ongoing, and the IDF did not report on March 23 that the operation had al Shifa had ended.
• Southern Gaza Strip: The IDF launched a second clearing operation in al Amal, western Khan Younis, on March 24.
• Lebanon: The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a Hezbollah “weapons workshop” in Baalbek, the Bekaa Valley, on March 23 following a Hezbollah attack targeting an Israeli air defense site in northern Israel.
• West Bank: Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in at least nine locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 23.
• Yemen: The Houthis launched five anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the Panamanian-flagged, Chinese-owned, and Chinese-operated oil tanker Huang Pu in the Red Sea on March 23.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) engaged Palestinian militias north of Gaza City. Local Palestinian sources reported that Israeli armor entered eastern Beit Hanoun on March 23.[1] The IDF acknowledged on March 24 that its forces are operating in Beit Hanoun, saying that the IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike on a target in Beit Hanoun that “posed a threat to the forces operating in the area.”[2] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, targeted Israeli armor with a rocket-propelled grenade east of Beit Hanoun on March 23.[3] The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, reported its fighters detonated an improvised explosive device targeting Israeli armor in al Shati Camp, northern Gaza City on March 23.[4]

Israeli forces continued operations near al Shifa Hospital, Gaza City, on March 24.[5] The IDF said that it confirmed 480 of the 800 detainees it detained at al Shifa Hospital are linked to Palestinian Islamic Jihad or Hamas.[6] The IDF 401st Brigade (162nd Division) and Israeli special operations forces seized weapons, destroyed militia infrastructure, and engaged Palestinian fighters in the al Shifa Hospital area over the past 24 hours.[7] Palestinian militias conducted at least nine attacks targeting Israeli armor and infantry near al Shifa Hospital.[8] Hamas targeted three Israeli tanks with explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) and rocket-propelled grenades south of al Shifa Hospital on March 23.[9]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued clearing operations in the central and northern Gaza Strip on March 24. The Nahal Brigade raided a drone manufacturing site belonging to the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC), a Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, in the central Gaza Strip and killed Palestinian fighters guarding the site.[10] The DFLP targeted Israeli armor south of Deir al Balah with rocket-propelled grenades.[11]

The IDF launched a second clearing operation in al Amal, western Khan Younis, on March 24. The IDF previously operated in al Amal in February and early March 2024 before shifting ground operations to northern Khan Younis.[12] The IDF said that the IDF and Shin Bet redeployed to al Amal based on intelligence that Palestinian militias were using civilian infrastructure there for military purposes.[13] The IDF said that the clearing operations will continue to dismantle militia infrastructure and target remaining Palestinian fighters.[14] The IDF Air Force conducted approximately 40 airstrikes on militia targets to assist the IDF 89th Commando Brigade, Givati Brigade, and the 7th Brigade’s maneuver into al Amal.[15] Local Palestinian sources reported that the IDF isolated al Nasser Hospital and al Amal Hospital in northern al Amal on the early morning of March 24.[16] The IDF issued a statement that called on Hamas to ”stop using hospitals and other civilian facilities as a shield.”[17] Palestinian Islamic Jihad said that its fighters targeted Israeli armor with rocket-propelled grenades, anti-tank guided missiles, and small arms in the al Amal area on March 24.[18]

The IDF 7th Brigade and Kfir Brigade continued clearing operations in Qarara, northern Khan Younis, on March 24.[19] The brigades killed Palestinian fighters near the Israel-Gaza Strip border and targeted a meeting site for Hamas fighters in Qarara.[20] Israeli forces seized weapons caches and an IDF helicopter struck a tunnel shaft in Qarara.[21] Palestinian militias did not claim attacks targeting Israeli forces in Qarara on March 24.

Palestinian militias did not conduct indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 24.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in at least nine locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 23.[22]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 23.[23]

The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a Hezbollah “weapons workshop” in Baalbek, the Bekaa Valley, on March 23 following a Hezbollah attack targeting an Israeli air defense site in northern Israel.[24] This is the fourth time that the IDF has conducted airstrikes in the Bekaa Valley since October 7.[25] The Bekaa Valley is an area that contains significant Hezbollah military infrastructure including training centers, weapons storage sites, and ballistic missile production facilities.[26] Hezbollah claimed that it launched more than 60 rockets targeting IDF headquarters and training grounds in the Golan Heights after the IDF airstrike in Baalbek.[27] Israeli media separately reported that a likely IDF airstrike killed an unspecified Syrian individual in Souairi in the Bekaa Valley on March 24.[28]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting the Israeli Defense Ministry on March 23.[29] Israeli officials have not commented on the claimed attack at the time of writing. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also vowed to “escalate” its attacks during the month of Ramadan, which began on March 10 and ends on April 9.[30]

The Houthis launched five anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the Panamanian-flagged, Chinese-owned, and Chinese-operated oil tanker Huang Pu in the Red Sea on March 23.[31] The attack caused a fire on the Huang Pu, which the crew quickly extinguished. The Houthis targeted the Huang Pu despite earlier Houthi claims that the group would provide safe passage to Chinese and Russian ships transiting the Red Sea.[32] The Houthis mistakenly launched an anti-ship ballistic missile targeting a tanker south of Yemen carrying Russian oil in early January 2024.[33]

US forces engaged six Houthi drones over the southern Red Sea on March 23.[34] Five of the drones crashed into the Red Sea while the sixth drone flew back into Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen. CENTCOM assessed that the drones presented an imminent threat to US, coalition, and commercial vessels in the Red Sea.[35]

Iran Update, March 23, 2024

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Johanna Moore, Peter Mills, and Brian Carter

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Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) concluded a weeklong operation in and around al Shifa Hospital on March 23.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters during a raid targeting an unspecified “wanted individual” in Tulkarm in the West Bank on March 22.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 22.
• Yemen: CENTCOM reported that the Houthis launched four anti-ship ballistic missiles into the Red Sea but added that the Houthi attacks did not damage any military or commercial vessels.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) concluded a weeklong operation in and around al Shifa Hospital on March 23.[1] The 401st Brigade (162nd Division) and Israeli special operations forces cleared areas surrounding al Shifa Hospital and arrested fighters who had returned to the hospital.[2] The 401st Brigade raided nearby buildings and seized weapons.[3] The IDF also established an evacuation route for civilians to leave the hospital compound.[4] Israeli forces killed approximately 170 fighters and detained approximately 800 suspects during the operation, which began on March 18.[5]

Palestinian fighters continued to attack Israeli forces that were conducting clearing operations around al Shifa Hospital on March 23.[6]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on March 23.[7] The IDF reported that the Nahal Brigade engaged in “intense fighting” in unspecified areas of the central Gaza Strip and killed 15 Palestinian fighters. The Nahal Brigade also directed an airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters barricaded in a building.

The 7th Brigade (36th Division) continued clearing operations in Qarara, Khan Younis Governorate, on March 23.[8] The IDF Air Force struck two Palestinian fighters moving toward their forces and targeted a "military building" that belonged to a Hamas fighter in Qarara.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters during a raid targeting an unspecified “wanted individual” in Tulkarm in the West Bank on March 22.[9] Palestinian media separately reported that unspecified Palestinian militia fighters fired small arms targeting an IDF checkpoint near Jenin on March 23.[10]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 22.[11]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

US CENTCOM conducted preemptive strikes targeting four Houthi drones and three underground storage facilities in Houthi-controlled Yemen on March 22.[12]

CENTCOM reported separately that the Houthis launched four anti-ship ballistic missiles into the Red Sea but added that the Houthi attacks did not damage any military or commercial vessels.[13]

Iran Update, March 21, 2024

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Andie Parry, Peter Mills, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, Alexandra Braverman, and Brian Carter

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Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and other Palestinian militias cooperating against Israel have likely established at least one cell in Jenin to target Israeli civilian areas outside of the West Bank. Israeli forces killed a Palestinian man from Jenin carrying a weapon and “ready-to-use explosive device” in Zeita, along the West Bank-Israel barrier, on March 11.[1] The IDF said that the man was en route to conduct a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv.[2] A PIJ commander in Jenin organized the attack.[3] PIJ probably received assistance from other Palestinian militias, given PIJ’s role in the Hornets’ Nest operations room and Jenin’s importance as a hub for militia activity. The Hornets’ Nest is a combined operations room that is based in Jenin and led by PIJ, Hamas, and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade.[4] The IDF conducted a “brigade operation” in Jenin on March 13 following the attempted March 11 attack and arrested seven “wanted persons” and captured three improvised explosive devices.[5] The IDF Air Force killed the Palestinian commanders responsible for planning the March 11 attack in a March 20 airstrike that killed several fighters the IDF said were ”attempting to insert a hazard into the heart of Israel.”[6]

The March 20 airstrike likely failed to destroy the Palestinian militia cell responsible for the manufacture, planning, and execution of the attempted March 11 attack. Suicide attacks require a significant logistical tail to manufacture and deploy suicide bombers.[7] These logistical assets include bombmaking facilities, safehouses, and an area in which to mentally prepare the would-be suicide bomber.[8] A single airstrike eliminating leaders of this cell will not cause the cell’s more important assets, such as bombmakers or recruiters, to cease operations. The airstrike may, however, cause a temporary pause or slowdown in operations as the cell reorganizes itself.

Palestinian militias in the West Bank almost certainly maintain additional cells focused on attacking Israel proper. Israeli border police detained a Palestinian man in Jericho on March 21 that Israeli police alleged planned to conduct a suicide bombing attack against an unspecified target.[9] The logistical tail required to manufacture and deploy suicide bombers indicates that this Jericho attack and other unclaimed attempted attacks are not isolated events or attacks by independent individuals.

Palestinian militia presence in Jenin and other West Bank cities along the barrier wall—such as Tulkarm—offer geographic advantages for Palestinian militias that the groups could use to launch attacks into Israel proper. Jenin is only 5km south of the West Bank-Israel barrier, and Tulkarm is immediately adjacent to the Israeli town of Bat Hafer. The IDF “brigade operation” in Tulkarm on March 21 is notable in this context (see West Bank for more on this operation).[10] The IDF’s ability to disrupt militia attacks into Israel proper and eliminate would-be suicide bombers does demonstrate the difficulties faced by Palestinian militias in conducting these attacks, however. Israeli media reported on March 19 that the IDF had established a unit of engineering and intelligence personnel to locate “offensive tunnels” in the West Bank.[11] The report added that the IDF established the unit after residents in Bat Hafer reported hearing “digging noises” under their homes.[12] Both Jenin and Tulkarm have been hotspots of militia activity before and during the current war.[13] The IDF discovered a tunnel under Jenin refugee camp in July 2023 that Palestinian militias were using to transport weapons and hide fighters.[14] The development of tunnels that could cross under the West Bank-Israel barrier points to the threat posed by militias operating near the barrier wall.

Israeli forces continued to conduct an operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 21. Israeli special operations forces and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 401st Brigade (162nd Division) killed approximately 50 Palestinian fighters and located ammunition depots near the hospital over the last 24 hours.[15] IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari stated on March 21 that Palestinian fighters remain barricaded in the al Shifa Hospital emergency room and that the Israeli forces are focused on evacuating civilians from the area before clearing the full hospital.[16] The IDF said on March 20 that its forces evacuated 3,700 Gazans to the southern Gaza Strip through a checkpoint near the hospital, detaining 300 of the 3,700 evacuees as suspected fighters.[17] Local Palestinian sources said Israeli forces had evacuated all of Rimal neighborhood, where al Shifa hospital is located.[18] IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said on March 20 that the IDF would continue operations at al Shifa Hospital ”for a few more days.”[19]

Halevi said that Hamas returned to al Shifa hospital and turned it into a command-and-control center as part of Hamas’ efforts to rebuild its governance in the northern Gaza Strip.[20] Local sources also reported Israeli forces raided local government buildings in Rimal neighborhood.[21] Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip aim to destroy both Hamas’ military capabilities and government infrastructure.[22]

Israeli forces detained several high-level Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters at al Shifa Hospital. The IDF spokesperson said on March 21 that Israeli forces detained 600 people, including 358 PIJ and Hamas fighters, since the raid began.[23] The IDF said "very significant" senior Hamas commanders are among those captured but that the IDF would not disclose their identities due to ongoing questioning.[24] Israel said that included among the detainees were Hamas officials responsible for facilitating attacks in the West Bank.[25] The IDF said many PIJ fighters surrendered to Israeli forces as the IDF entered al Shifa hospital.[26] Israeli forces detained PIJ’s Shujaiya Battalion commander, the deputy commander of PIJ's Northern Gaza Brigade, and the PIJ northern Gaza tunnel commander in al Shifa Hospital.[27] Israeli forces also detained two PIJ fighters responsible for intelligence and military communications.[28] IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said during his visit to the hospital on March 20 that the raid at al Shifa Hospital is targeting senior Palestinian militia leaders.[29] Halevi added that the IDF operations are causing “severe damage to Hamas, dismantling Hamas, killing the military leadership, [and damaging] the civilian [Hamas] leadership.”[30]

Four Palestinian militias conducted at least 11 attacks targeting Israeli ground forces near al Shifa Hospital on March 21.[31] The four Palestinian militias reported that their fighters engaged Israeli forces near al Shifa Hospital with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades. Three militias also mortared Israeli forces at the hospital.[32]

Key Takeaways:

• West Bank: Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and other Palestinian militias cooperating against Israel have likely established at least one cell in Jenin to target Israeli civilian areas outside of the West Bank.
• A March 20 IDF airstrike targeting PIJ fighters coordinating a suicide attack cell in Jenin likely failed to destroy this cell, which was responsible for the manufacture, planning, and execution of an attempted March 11 suicide attack.
• Palestinian militias in the West Bank almost certainly maintain additional cells focused on attacking Israel proper.
• Palestinian militia presence in Jenin and other West Bank cities along the barrier wall—such as Tulkarm—offer geographic advantages for Palestinian militias that the groups could use to launch attacks into Israel proper.
• Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct an operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 21. Israeli forces detained several high-level Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters at al Shifa Hospital.
• Iraq: Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Ala al Walai described Israeli maritime ports and airports as “legitimate targets” on March 21.
• Iran: The US Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three procurement networks across four different countries on March 20 for supporting Iran’s ballistic missile, nuclear, and defense programs.

Iran Update, March 20, 2024

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Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

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Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi said during a meeting with unspecified leaders in Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” in Tehran on March 20 that the current pause in attacks on US forces does not mark the end of efforts to expel US forces from Iraq. [1] Hamidawi said that he and the unspecified leaders discussed challenges and the timing of “resistance” activity.[2]  He argued that “the politicized and the weak” must be prevented from interfering in this effort.[3] Hamidawi was likely referring to Iraqi Sunni political parties that Iranian-affiliated Iraqi Shia parties have accused of blocking attempts to remove US forces from Iraq.[4]

Israeli forces continued to conduct an operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 20. Israeli special operations forces and the Israel Defense Forces 401st Brigade (162nd Division) killed approximately 90 Palestinian fighters and located weapons in the hospital area on March 20.[5] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF has apprehended about 350 suspected Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters in the hospital since the operation began.[6] Israeli forces detained PIJ Political Bureau member Khaled al Batsh during the operation.[7] The IDF noted that several Hamas battalion commanders were at the hospital but added that Gaza City Brigade Commander Izz al Din al Haddad was not present and is still at-large. Haddad is responsible for some of Hamas’ reconstitution efforts.[8]

The Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF assessed that Hamas may have tried in recent months to rebuild the underground tunnel system under al Shifa Hospital.[9] The report clarified that Hamas could not hide weapons in the rebuilt tunnels and its fighters were unable to use the tunnels to exfiltrate from the hospital area. Israeli forces initially expanded clearing operations to al Shifa Hospital in November 2023.[10] An Israeli think tank analyst told the RAND Corporation in 2016 that during previous operations the IDF found that the Gaza Strip’s sandy soil means that tunnels are difficult to rebuild.[11] Hamas and PIJ’s decision to use al Shifa to launch and direct operations after Israel’s initial clearing operations illustrates that Hamas will resume operations in areas without an Israeli presence, however.

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq: Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi said during a meeting with unspecified leaders in Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” in Tehran that the current pause in attacks on US forces does not mark the end of efforts to expel US forces from Iraq.
• Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct an operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City.
• Negotiations: Hamas’ senior representative to Lebanon Osama Hamdan said on March 20 that Israel responded negatively to Hamas’ ceasefire proposal.
• West Bank: The IDF Air Force killed four Palestinian fighters, including two low-level PIJ leaders, in a drone strike in the Jenin refugee camp.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The IDF said that it has degraded Hezbollah’s ability to transfer weapons since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war.
• Yemen: The Houthi supreme leader said on March 15 that the Houthis intend to target international shipping transiting the Indian Ocean and around the Cape of Good Hope. This statement is likely aspirational given the current maximum range of Houthi weapon systems, which is roughly 2,200km.
• Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei acknowledged the Iranian government’s shortcomings in “controlling inflation” and economic production during his Nowruz speech.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The IDF 215th Artillery Brigade (162nd Division) directed an airstrike targeting six Palestinian fighters in Jabalia on March 20.[12] Israeli forces previously struck Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) infrastructure in Jabalia on March 6 after Palestinian fighters launched rockets into Israel from Jabalia.[13]

Palestinian militias continued attempts to disrupt Israeli ground operations in Gaza City on March 20. Several militias reported that their fighters engaged Israeli forces near al Shifa Hospital with small arms.[14] Hamas published footage of its fighters targeting Israeli armor south of al Shifa Hospital with RPGs.[15] Palestinian sources reported engagements between Palestinian fighters and Israeli forces west of al Shifa Hospital.[16]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Qarara, northern Khan Younis, on March 20. The IDF 7th Brigade (36th Division) killed two Palestinian fighters in the area and attacked military infrastructure.[17] Hamas fighters targeted Israeli infantrymen breaching a tunnel in Qarara by rigging the tunnel entrance to explode.[18] PIJ fighters also mortared Israeli forces in Qarara.[19] Israeli forces have been operating in  Qarara since March 3.[20]

The IDF Air Force killed five senior members of Hamas’ Emergency Committees in Rafah.[21] Israeli media reported that the Emergency Committees are Hamas organizations that are responsible for maintaining public order and civil control.[22] The IDF reported that the five members killed in this strike helped Hamas maintain Hamas control on the ground.[23] They worked to preserve Hamas’ organizational structure in humanitarian areas and were responsible for all Hamas activities including contact with Hamas fighters. The IDF killed the chair of the committees in Rafah last week.[24]

The White House requested that an Israeli delegation visit Washington next week to discuss alternatives to an Israeli ground operation in Rafah.[25] Two unspecified US officials told Axios on March 20 that one alternative is to delay a military operation in Rafah and instead focus on stabilizing the humanitarian situation in the northern Gaza Strip.[26] Another alternative is to focus first on securing the Egyptian side of the Egypt-Gaza Strip border as part of a combined US-Egyptian-Israeli plan. Israel confirmed that it will send a delegation to Washington.[27] The New York Times reported on March 19 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that an Israeli ground operation into Rafah is necessary because there is “no way” to destroy Hamas’ local battalions without one.[28]

The Associated Press reported on March 20 the new Palestinian prime minister would appoint a “non-partisan, technocratic government” supported by the international community and the Palestinian people. The Associated Press cited a mission statement written by incoming Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa.[29] Mustafa added that the Palestinian Authority (PA) aims to hold presidential and parliamentary elections. He did not give a timetable and added that the timetable would depend on “realities on the ground” in Gaza, the West Bank, and east Jerusalem. PA President Mahmoud Abbas appointed Mustafa as the new prime minister on March 14.[30]

Hamas’ senior representative to Lebanon Osama Hamdan said on March 20 that Israel responded negatively to Hamas’ ceasefire proposal.[31] Hamas submitted a ceasefire proposal and a hostage-for-prisoner exchange to international mediators on March 14.[32] The proposal includes a ceasefire, calls for Israel to release Palestinian prisoners, an increase in the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, a return of displaced Palestinians, and a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Strip.

Israeli media reported on March 14 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant disagreed over the issue of humanitarian aid distribution in the Gaza Strip.[33] Gallant said that Fatah must be involved in distribution while Netanyahu said he is “not ready to hear about the PA.”[34] Israeli media reported on March 15 that Gallant said that the best option Israel has for the future leader in the Gaza Strip will be local Palestinians who are affiliated with the PA.[35]

Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh said on March 20 that Israeli attacks targeting police officers in the Gaza Strip are harming Israel's ability to achieve a ceasefire.[36] Hamas controls several internal security forces, including the Civil Police.[37]

Israel detected Palestinian indirect fire targeting Sderot, southern Israel, on March 19.[38] No Palestinian militia has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of writing. Israeli forces responded to the attack by conducting an airstrike targeting a Hamas tunnel shaft near the fire‘s point of origin.[39]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in at least three locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 19.[40]  Hamas reported on March 20 that its fighters conducted additional small arms attacks targeting Israeli forces and settlements in unspecified areas of the West Bank during an unspecified time frame.[41] Hamas called for Palestinians in the West Bank and Jerusalem to escalate against Israel.[42]

The IDF Air Force killed four Palestinian fighters, including two low-level PIJ leaders, in a drone strike in the Jenin refugee camp on March 20.[43]  The IDF said that one of the PIJ fighters was a senior PIJ member who killed an Israeli civilian in a small arms attack targeting an Israeli settlement in May 2023. The strike also killed a local PIJ commander in Jenin.[44] The IDF said that the two other unspecified fighters killed in the strike directed an attempted suicide vest attack into Israel on March 11. The two fighters also directed an attack in which Palestinian fighters detonated an improvised explosive device targeting Israeli forces in Homesh, near Jerusalem, on March 8.[45] Palestinians in Jenin held a funeral service for the fighters on March 20.[46]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 19.[47]

The IDF said on March 20 that it has degraded Hezbollah’s ability to transfer weapons since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war.[48] The IDF added that it has targeted Hezbollah’s weapons production facilities since the beginning of the war. The IDF noted that these facilities are in civilian areas in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and in Lebanese cities.

An Israeli airstrike killed an Amal Movement leader in al Ghandouriya in southern Lebanon on March 20.[49] The Amal Movement released a statement mourning the official on the same day.[50]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a drone attack targeting Ben Gurion Airport near Tel Aviv, Israel, on March 19.[51] Israel has not commented on the attack at the time of writing. Ben Gurion Airport did not report any significant flight delays on March 19, suggesting that the drone attack either did not pose a threat to the airport or did not occur.[52] The Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General said on March 20 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias must continue their support of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.[53] Kataib Hezbollah is part of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which began a ”second phase of operations” in March 2024 that is defined by drone and missile attacks targeting Israeli airports and seaports. The Israeli government does not acknowledge many of these attacks claimed by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, and some of these attacks likely did not occur.

A French military helicopter operating in the Red Sea under European-led Operation Aspides intercepted a Houthi drone over the Red Sea on March 20.[54] European Council coalition members have shot down eight drones and ”repelled“ three other drones since they launched Operation Aspides on February 19.[55] Aspides is the European defensive naval coalition operating in the Red Sea.[56]  The French military said that the drone was “threatening civilian maritime traffic.”[57]  The European coalition said that its vessels have ”closely protected” 35 merchant vessels in Red Sea.[58]

The Houthi supreme leader said on March 15 that the Houthis intend to target international shipping transiting the Indian Ocean and around the Cape of Good Hope.[59] This statement is likely aspirational given the current maximum range of Houthi weapon systems, which is roughly 2,200km.[60] Houthi military spokesperson Yahye Saree said that the expanded operation would target all Israel-associated commercial vessels traveling around the Cape of Good Hope.[61] The Houthi’s maximum weapon range is 2,200km, which encompasses only some parts of the shipping routes toward the Cape of Good Hope and Indian Ocean, suggesting that the supreme leader's statement is largely aspirational.[62] Vessel traffic through the Red Sea has declined by approximately 50% since January 2024 due to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.[63] The Cape of Good Hope has seen a 74% increase in traffic compared to 2023 after Houthi attacks forced ships to re-route from the Red Sea and Suez Canal.[64] The Houthis have not conducted an attack outside the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden since the announcement on March 15. Iran did target a vessel 200km off the Indian coast in the Indian Ocean on December 23.[65]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei acknowledged the Iranian government’s shortcomings in “controlling inflation” and economic production during his Nowruz speech on March 20.[66] Khamenei announced “controlling inflation and” economic production as Iran’s new year’s slogan at the beginning of the last Persian calendar year in March 2023.[67] Khamenei stated on March 20, 2024 that the state of inflation and economic production in Iran is “relatively far from what we wanted.”[68] Khamenei said in a separate Nowruz message on March 20, 2024 that Iranians should not expect the regime to address “big issues” such as inflation and production growth “within a year.”[69] Khamenei also described the economy as Iran’s “main weakness” and announced a new slogan, “a leap in [economic] production with [the] people’s participation,” for the upcoming Persian calendar year.[70]

Iran’s inflation rate is approximately 44 percent, according to Iranian media.[71] The actual inflation rate is likely higher given Iranian officials and media’s tendency to fabricate economic statistics, however. Western and diaspora media recently reported that many Iranians refrained this year from buying goods that they normally would for Nowruz, such as new clothes and sweets, due to high prices.[72]

Iran Update, March 19, 2024

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Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Iran is likely concerned that Armenia’s deteriorating relations with Russia and outreach to the West could increase NATO’s presence along its northern border. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi discussed the security situation in the Caucasus with Russian President Vladimir Putin in a phone call on March 19.[1] Raisi told Putin that Iran is “ready to maintain stability” and protect Iran’s strategic interests in the Caucasus.[2] Iran’s interests in the Caucasus include keeping overland trade routes open, preventing Israel from using Azerbaijan’s territory to operate against Iran, and preempting the spread of separatist sentiments among Iran’s Azeri minority.[3] Russian readouts of Raisi and Putin’s phone call notably did not mention that the pair discussed the Caucasus.[4]

Iranian leaders previously expressed concern that the United States and NATO would exploit the Russian focus on Ukraine to increase Western influence in the Caucasus. Iranian Supreme Leader Foreign Policy Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati, for example, warned Russia in July 2023 to not “neglect” the Caucasus because “ill-intending parties…would attack the interests of Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran.”[5] Velayati also claimed that Turkey aspires to create a “pan-Turkic” belt stretching from Istanbul to Xinjiang that would “surround Iran from the north and Russia from the south” and “spread NATO’s influence in the region.”[6]

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government has pursued closer ties with NATO and Western countries in recent months. The Armenian and French defense ministers signed an arms contract in late February 2024.[7] Armenia’s foreign minister discussed normalizing ties with Turkey during a meeting with Turkey’s foreign minister in Antalya, Turkey, on March 1.[8] Pashinyan separately stated that Armenia seeks to “continue and develop the existing political dialogue and expand our partnership with [NATO] and some of its members” during a meeting with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in Yerevan on March 19.[9]

Raisi and Putin’s phone call on March 19 comes amid a deterioration in Russo-Armenian relations after Russia failed to support Armenia during Azerbaijan’s two-day offensive targeting Nagorno Karabakh in September 2023. Azerbaijan seized Nagorno Karabakh—an enclave in Azerbaijan previously home to a large Armenian population—during a two-day military offensive in September 2023.[10] Armenia began seeking external security assistance from parties other than Russia—Armenia's traditional security partner—after the offensive, claiming that Russia had failed to help Armenia defend Nagorno Karabakh against Azerbaijan.[11] Armenia’s relations with Russia have further worsened in recent weeks. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced in late February 2024 that Armenia “froze” its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).[12] The CSTO is a Russian-led security organization that, like NATO, requires member states to come to one another’s assistance if a member state is attacked.[13] Pashinyan later stated that the CSTO “creates a threat” to Armenia’s “security and territorial integrity.”[14] Pashinyan also called on Russia to remove its border guards from Armenia’s international airport in Yerevan in early March 2024.[15]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued its raid at al Shifa Hospital on March 19.[16] The IDF reported on March 18 that it had intelligence that senior Hamas officials were using the area to conduct and direct attacks in the Gaza Strip.[17]  The IDF 162nd Division and Shin Bet led the raid targeting al Shifa Hospital and killed over 50 Palestinian fighters and detained 300 suspects during the operation.[18] The IDF detained Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas rocketry and intelligence personnel. Israeli forces also seized ammunition near the hospital.  Palestinian militias, including Hamas, targeted Israeli forces operating at al Shifa Hospital at least six times.[19]

Hamas' infiltration into the al Shifa Hospital area after Israel’s initial clearing operation highlights Hamas’ efforts to reestablish itself in the northern Gaza Strip. Hamas fighters conducted at least four attacks targeting Israeli forces in the al Shifa area on March 18 and 19, indicating Hamas retains some fighting forces near the hospital.[20] The large number of suspects that Israeli forces detained at al Shifa hospital also indicates the success of Hamas and its allies in rebuilding their fighting strength in the north.[21] Israeli forces initially expanded clearing operations to al Shifa Hospital in November 2023, targeting a Hamas tunnel network underneath the hospital.[22] Israeli forces began to decrease their presence in the northern Gaza Strip in December 2023, citing the degradation of Hamas forces in the area.[23] Hamas has sought to reconstitute militarily and rebuild its governing authority in the northern Gaza Strip after the Israeli drawdown. Israeli Army Radio reported in January 2024 that the Israeli military establishment assesses that Hamas is trying to restore its control over the civilian population in the northern Gaza Strip partly by rehabilitating local, Hamas-controlled police there.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• The Caucasus: Iran is likely concerned that Armenia’s deteriorating relations with Russia and outreach to the West could increase NATO’s presence along its northern border. Iranian leaders previously expressed concern that the United States and NATO would exploit Russia’s focus on its invasion of Ukraine to increase their influence in the Caucasus.
• Iranian Supreme Leader Foreign Policy Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati, for example, warned Russia in July 2023 to not “neglect” the Caucasus because “ill-intending parties…would attack the interests of Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
• Velayati also claimed that Turkey aspires to create a “pan-Turkic” belt that would “surround Iran from the north” and “spread NATO’s influence in the region.”
• Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued its raid at al Shifa Hospital on March 19. Hamas' infiltration into the al Shifa Hospital area after Israel’s initial clearing operation highlights Hamas’ efforts to reestablish itself in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Southern Gaza Strip: IDF Egoz and Maglan special operations forces concluded clearing operations in Hamad, northern Khan Younis, on March 19.
• West Bank: Israeli media said on March 19 that the IDF has established a unit of engineers and intelligence personnel to locate “offensive” tunnels in the West Bank. The unit has not discovered any offensive tunnels in the West Bank at the time of this writing, according to Israeli media.
• Lebanese Hezbollah in Syria: Israel likely conducted multiple airstrikes targeting Hezbollah facilities in southern Syria.
• Lebanese Hezbollah in the Region: Senior Hezbollah official Wafiq Safa traveled to the UAE on March 19 to negotiate the release of Lebanese detainees suspected of having ties to Hezbollah, according to Lebanese media.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

See topline text for additional details on the al Shifa Hospital raid.

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on March 19.[25] Nahal Brigade forces killed several Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip.[26] The IDF Nahal Brigade has been operating in the area between the northern and central Gaza Strip for two weeks.[27] The IDF has been constructing a highway in this area, which the IDF has dubbed the “Netzarim corridor.”[28] Palestinian militias continued to target Israeli forces in the Netzarim area with rocket and mortar fire.[29] Palestinian groups also fired rockets at Israeli armor and infantry in the eastern Central Governorate.[30]

The IDF Egoz and Maglan special operations forces (SOF) concluded clearing operations in Hamad, northern Khan Younis, on March 19.[31] Hamas-affiliated media said that Israeli forces departed Hamad on March 19.[32] Israeli forces expanded clearing operations into Hamad on March 3.[33] Israeli SOF raided a building used by a Hamas battalion deputy commander and killed over 100 Palestinian fighters during the two-week operation in Hamad.[34]

The IDF 7th Brigade (36th Division) continued clearing operations in Qarara, northern Khan Younis, on March 19.[35] The 7th Brigade targeted Palestinian fighters and militia infrastructure in Qarara on March 19, including a building that Palestinian fighters used to fire anti-tank guided missiles at Israeli forces on March 17.[36]

Israeli forces are continuing to target Hamas police officers in the Gaza Strip. The IDF has warned that all members of “the Hamas apparatus,” including Hamas police officers, are legitimate targets.[37] Hamas controls several internal security forces, including the Civil Police.[38] The Israeli Air Force killed the Hamas police director in the Nuseirat camp, Mahmoud al Bayoumi, on March 19.[39] An airstrike targeted his police vehicle.[40]  An Israeli airstrike also killed a Hamas police lieutenant colonel in Jabalia on March 19.[41] Hamas-affiliated media said that the police officer facilitated aid deliveries to Jabalia Camp.[42]  Hamas police officers, as well as Gazan clans and political factions, have provided escorts for aid convoys through the Gaza Strip.[43] Israel has sought to organize alternative security escorts for the shipments, including by using international private security contractors.[44]  Israeli forces killed Faiq al Mabhouh, who is a senior official in the Hamas-run Interior Ministry, during their operation in al Shifa Hospital on March 18.[45]

Mossad Director David Barnea, who is the lead Israeli official responsible for ceasefire and hostage negotiations, departed Qatar after one day of indirect ceasefire talks in Qatar, according to the Qatari Foreign Ministry spokesperson.[46] Lower-level negotiating teams remain in Qatar.[47]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters at least nine times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 18.[48] An al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fighter fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in Gush Etzion, south of Bethlehem.[49] The fighter injured two Israeli Shin Bet officers before Israeli security forces killed him.[50] Israeli media reported that the fighter was from Jenin.[51]

Israeli media said on March 19 that the IDF has established a unit of engineers and intelligence personnel to locate “offensive” tunnels in the West Bank.[52] The IDF reportedly established the unit after residents in Bat Hefer, which is across the Israel-West Bank border from Tulkarm, heard digging noises near their homes. The unit has not discovered any offensive tunnels in the West Bank at the time of writing, according to Israeli media. An unspecified security official said that the unit is aware that “terrorist organizations [in the West Bank] are trying to mimic some of the combat methods in Gaza” and that these organizations use underground facilities for weapons storage.[53] The unit has located approximately five shafts in the Jenin refugee camp and Nour Shams refugee camp, but Israeli media said that the shafts did not lead to tunnels without elaborating further upon the nature of the shafts.[54] The IDF discovered one tunnel dozens of meters long in Jenin refugee camp in July 2023 that connected an apartment to a mosque, however.[55]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 18.[56]

The IDF established a specialized brigade on March 19 to defend two areas in northern Israel from attacks from Syria and Lebanon.[57] The IDF created the new Mountain Brigade to “defend the Mount Dov and Mount Hermon sectors.” The brigade will replace the Hermon Brigade, which presumably operated in the same area. The IDF did not explain whether the Hermon Brigade would relocate or merge with the Mountain Brigade. The new Mountain Brigade will specialize in combat in mountainous terrain and will begin operating in the next several weeks.

Senior Hezbollah official Wafiq Safa traveled to the UAE on March 19 to negotiate the release of Lebanese detainees suspected of having ties to Hezbollah, according to Lebanese media.[58] The UAE has previously detained dozens of Lebanese nationals over suspected ties to Hezbollah.[59] Safa is the head of Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Unit.[60] This unit is responsible for coordination with Lebanese state entities, including political parties, Lebanese armed forces elements, and other state institutions. The unit is also responsible for bribing Lebanese officials to secure their assistance in covering up and enabling Hezbollah’s criminal activity.[61] The United States sanctioned Safa in July 2019 for serving as the head of Hezbollah’s security apparatus and using Lebanese ports and border crossings to smuggle weapons and transfer funds for Hezbollah.[62] Safa is also the Hezbollah official responsible for engaging the international community and Lebanon’s security forces, according to the US Treasury Department.[63]

Israel likely conducted multiple airstrikes targeting Lebanese Hezbollah facilities in southern Syria on March 18. The Syrian Defense Ministry said on March 19 that Syrian air defense systems intercepted at least one Israeli missile and that several other missiles struck unspecified military targets in the Damascus countryside.[64] Unspecified Syrian sources told Reuters that the strikes targeted Hezbollah ammunition depots near Yabroud in the Qalamoun Mountains north of Damascus.[65] An unspecified Western intelligence source said that the airstrike on March 18 also targeted “Hezbollah infrastructure” in Qutayfah, which is also north of Damascus.[66] Unspecified Syrian sources and ”regional intelligence” claimed that Israel has increased its rate of strikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Syria.[67] Yabroud and Qutayfah are located on main roads used by Iran and Iranian-affiliated militias to transport weapons and personnel through southern Syria and into Lebanon.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi met with Syrian President Bashar al Assad and Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Faisal Mekdad in Damascus on March 19.[68] Grossi and Mekdad discussed “the factors that hinder cooperation” between the IAEA and Syria.[69] Emirati media previously reported that Grossi would likely discuss the suspected nuclear reactor in eastern Syria that Israel destroyed in an airstrike in 2007.[70] The Syrian regime has denied that the site Israel struck in 2007 was a secret nuclear facility.[71] The IAEA concluded in 2011 that the site was “very likely” a nuclear reactor. Grossi said on March 19 that he visited Syria to “reignite high-level dialogue between the IAEA and Syria.”[72]

IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri warned that Iran would retaliate if “foreigners” seize Iranian oil tankers anywhere in the world during a speech for the anniversary of the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry on March 18.[73]  Tangsiri is probably implicitly warning the United States. Iran has previously seized US commercial vessels in response to US seizures of Iranian vessels.[74] These US seizures aim to enforce sanctions on Iran.

Iranian Oil Minister Javad Owji discussed bilateral cooperation and the oil market in a telephone call with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak on March 19.[75] The ministers discussed the development of unspecified oil and gas field projects. Iran previously signed memoranda of understanding (MoU) with Russian oil companies to develop oil and gas fields, invest in the energy sector, and construct liquefied natural gas plants.[76] The two sides have not moved forward with these MoUs by converting them into contracts.

Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri reached an agreement to secure gubernatorial positions for their respective political parties.[77] Maliki will nominate State of Law Coalition member Wadah al Tamimi as governor of Diyala Province and Ameri will nominate Fatah Alliance member Abbas al Zamili as governor of Qadisiyyah Province.[78] Zamili served as a member of the Qadisiyyah provincial council and as the head of the Badr Organization’s Shura Council in Qadisiyyah between 2016 and 2017.[79]

The Houthis claimed a missile attack targeting the Marshall Islands–flagged, Greek-operated MADO tanker in an unspecified area of the Red Sea.[80] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations has not confirmed this attack on the MADO at the time of writing. The UKMTO previously reported two attacks on the MADO on March 15 and March 16, respectively.[81]

The Houthis claimed a missile attack targeting Eilat, southern Israel, on March 19. The IDF said on March 18 that a “suspicious aerial target” crossed into Israeli territory from the Red Sea and fell into an open area north of Eilat.[82]

US CENTCOM conducted multiple preemptive strikes targeting Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen on March 18.[83] CENTCOM said that it destroyed seven anti-ship missiles, three Houthi attack drones, and three weapons storage containers. Houthi-affiliated media previously reported on March 18 that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted 10 airstrikes targeting two Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen.[84]

Iran Update, March 18, 2024

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Israeli forces conducted a "high-precision operation" at al Shifa Hospital on March 18 based on intelligence that Hamas was using it for militant activity.[1] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported that they had intelligence that senior Hamas officials were using the area to conduct and direct attacks in the Gaza Strip.[2] Israeli ground forces advanced to the hospital with bulldozers and tanks and detained more than 200 Palestinians.[3] Palestinian militias, including Hamas, engaged Israeli forces around al Shifa Hospital during the operation.[4]

Israeli forces killed Faiq al Mabhouh, who is a senior official in the Hamas-run Interior Ministry, during the operation.[5] The IDF said that Mabhouh was the head of Hamas’ “Operations Directorate of the Internal Security Service,” while Hamas said that he was the “director of central operations of the Palestinian Police in Gaza.”[6] The Civil Police and the Interior Ministry‘s Internal Security Forces both employ fighters from the Hamas military wing.[7] The IDF has warned that all members of “the Hamas apparatus,” including Hamas police officers, are legitimate targets during IDF operations in the Gaza Strip.[8] Mabhouh’s brother, Mahmoud Mabhouh, was a prominent figure in Hamas’ military wing, and Israel likely killed him in 2010.[9]

Hamas infiltration into the al Shifa Hospital area after Israel’s initial clearing operation highlights Hamas’ efforts to reestablish itself in the northern Gaza Strip. Israeli forces initially expanded clearing operations to al Shifa Hospital in November 2023, targeting a Hamas tunnel network underneath the hospital.[10] Hamas has sought to reconstitute militarily and rebuild its governing authority in the northern Gaza Strip since Israeli forces reduced their presence there in December 2023. Israeli Army Radio reported in January 2024 that the Israeli military establishment believes that Hamas is trying to restore its control over the civilian population in the northern Gaza Strip partly by rehabilitating local police there.[11]

Syrian Defense Minister Ali Mahmoud Abbas traveled to Tehran on March 16 to discuss military cooperation with senior Iranian officials. Abbas met with Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Gharaei Ashtiani, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Brig. Gen. Ali Akbar Ahmadian, and Armed Forces General Staff Chief Maj. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri from March 17 to 18.[12]

Abbas may have discussed Iran transferring air defense systems to Syria during his meetings. Abbas discussed recent Israeli airstrikes in Syria and how to counter them, among other issues. Iranian leaders have sought in recent years to build an integrated air defense network in Syria that could repel Israeli airstrikes and thereby help Iran entrench itself militarily in Syria.[13] The meetings with Ashtiani and Bagheri are particularly noteworthy in this context. Ashtiani, as defense minister, is primarily responsible for managing arms procurement and sales as well as the Iranian defense industrial base. Bagheri has previously pursued expanding air defense cooperation with Syria.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Israeli forces conducted a "high-precision operation" at al Shifa Hospital based on intelligence that Hamas was using it for militant activity.
• Syria: Syrian Defense Minister Ali Mahmoud Abbas traveled to Tehran to discuss military cooperation with senior Iranian officials.
• West Bank: Israeli police have conducted training exercises in recent weeks to prepare for possible Palestinian militia attacks into Israeli settlements in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a one-way drone attack targeting an unspecified Israeli airbase in the Golan Heights.
• Yemen: Houthi-affiliated media claimed that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted 10 airstrikes targeting two Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen.

Iran Update, March 17, 2024

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Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, and Brian Carter

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Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) conducted clearing operations in the northern and central Gaza Strip on March 17.
• West Bank: The IDF arrested seven wanted individuals across the West Bank on March 17. The IDF also confiscated materials needed for manufacturing improvised explosive devices during an operation in Hebron.
• Northern Israel: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 16.
• The Red Sea: The Houthis likely fired at least one unspecified missile targeting the Marshall Islands-flagged LPG tanker MADO in the Gulf of Aden on March 16. This incident marks the second time the Houthis have targeted this vessel in two days.
• Syria: The Israeli Air Force likely conducted air strikes targeting a Hezbollah ammunitions depot and other Syrian army positions along the Damascus-Homs highway on March 17.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.|

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 162nd Division and combat engineers demolished a 2.5-kilometer-long tunnel in the northern Gaza Strip during the week of March 10.[1] The IDF called the tunnel the “longest underground route” in the northern Gaza Strip that it has discovered during the war. The tunnel network allowed Hamas units to move between the northern and southern Gaza Strip.[2]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) conducted clearing operations in the northern and central Gaza Strip on March 17.[3] The Nahal Brigade killed 18 Palestinian fighters operating near IDF positions using airstrikes, tank fire, and sniper fire.[4] The IDF Nahal Brigade has been operating in the area between the northern and central Gaza Strip for two weeks.[5] The IDF has been constructing a highway in this area, which the IDF has dubbed the “Netzarim corridor.”[6] This corridor divides the northern and southern parts of the Gaza Strip. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, mortared Israeli forces at the ”Netzarim site” near the Israeli-built road.[7] Palestinian militias also claimed rocket and small arms attacks near the corridor.[8] Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, mortared Israeli positions in the eastern part of the Gaza Strip‘s Central governorate in three separate attacks.[9]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis on March 17. The IDF said that the IDF Givati Brigade (162nd Division) is still conducting clearing operations in Hamad.[10] The IDF 7th Brigade (36th Division) fought Palestinian fighters and seized weapons in Khan Younis.[11] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades also engaged Israeli forces operating in Khan Younis.[12]

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) mortared Israeli forces at Nahal Oz, which is close to the Israel-Gaza Strip border, on March 17.[13] The PFLP is a secular, leftist Palestinian group fighting alongside Hamas in the war.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in at least two locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 16.[14]

The IDF arrested seven wanted individuals across the West Bank on March 17.[15] The IDF confiscated materials needed for manufacturing improvised explosive devices during an operation in Hebron.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 16.[16] The IDF reported that it shot down a “suspicious aerial target” over Acre on March 16.[17] The IDF often uses this language to refer to suspected drones

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that US forces destroyed five naval attack drones and one aerial drone in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on March 16.[18] CENTCOM assessed that these weapons presented an “imminent threat” to commercial vessels and US Navy ships in the Red Sea.[19] Houthi-controlled and pro-Axis of Resistance media claimed that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted airstrikes in al Durayhimi, Hudaydah governorate and in al Taiziyah, Taiz governorate, on March 16.[20]

CENTCOM also reported that the Houthis launched two drones toward the Red Sea on March 16.[21] CENTCOM intercepted one of the drones. CENTCOM assessed that the second drone likely crashed into the Red Sea.[22] Neither drone caused any casualties aboard or damage to nearby vessels.

The Houthis likely fired at least one unspecified missile targeting the Marshall Islands-flagged tanker MADO in the Gulf of Aden on March 16.[23] UK Maritime Trade Operations reported that an unspecified actor fired at least one missile targeting the MADO. This incident marks the second time the Houthis have targeted this vessel in two days. The UKMTO previously reported that an explosion occurred near the MADO in the Red Sea approximately 65 nautical miles west of Hudaydah on March 15.[24]

The Israeli Air Force likely conducted air strikes targeting a Hezbollah ammunitions depot and other Syrian army positions along the Damascus-Homs highway on March 17.[25] The Syrian Defense Ministry said that the strikes targeted several sites in southern Syria, damaging property and injuring one Syrian soldier.[26] Israeli Army Radio reported that the strikes targeted Syrian army positions and Hezbollah ammunition depots.[27] A Syria-focused analyst noted that the area has a large Hezbollah presence.[28] CTP-ISW has previously reported that the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) may have previously used this highway as a weapons transportation route.[29] The airstrikes caused significant secondary explosions, potentially confirming that the strike targeted an ammunitions

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The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Hamas reportedly killed the head of a local clan in Gaza City on March 13 likely as part of Hamas’ effort to reassert its authority in the northern Gaza Strip.[1] Hamas targeted the head and other members of the armed Dughmush clan amid local accusations that the clan stole humanitarian aid and cooperated with Israel.[2] The clan responded to the killing by vowing to retaliate and declaring Hamas members and positions as “legitimate target[s].”[3] Hamas denied reports that its forces killed the clan members.[4]

Hamas has sought to reconstitute militarily and rebuild its governing authority in the northern Gaza Strip since Israeli forces reduced their presence there in December 2023. CTP-ISW has reported extensively on how Hamas fighters have infiltrated areas in the northern strip that Israeli forces previously cleared. Israeli Army Radio reported in January 2024 that the Israeli military establishment believes that Hamas is trying to restore its control over the civilian population in the northern Gaza Strip partly by rehabilitating local police there.[5] The Civil Police and the Hamas-controlled Interior Ministry‘s Internal Security Forces both employ fighters from the Hamas military wing.[6] The killing of the members of the Dughmush clan further demonstrates that Hamas fighters remain present in at least some areas of the northern strip.

Hamas may be targeting political opposition as part of its effort to consolidate its power in the northern Gaza Strip. An Israeli academic reported that Hamas killed the Dughmush members after they expressed readiness to be part of a new administration in the Gaza Strip.[7] Tension between Hamas and the Dughmush clan is not unprecedented, as they have periodically clashed since Hamas took power in the Gaza Strip in 2007. The clan reportedly has affiliations with Salafi-jihadi groups as well as organized crime and arms trading in the Gaza Strip. Hamas reportedly warned Palestinians against cooperating with Israel earlier this week and that Hamas would treat those who did with “an iron fist.”[8] Hamas has a long history of violently suppressing political opposition in the Gaza Strip.[9]

Hamas’ killing of the Dughmush clan members risks further eroding the security situation there as humanitarian aid enters the northern Gaza Strip. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on March 13 that “criminal gangs” and “ordinary civilians” are resorting to looting humanitarian aid.[10] He warned that lawlessness, insecurity, and desperation remain hurdles to delivering aid to Gazans. Intercommunal violence within the Gaza Strip between Hamas and clans, such as the Dughmush, could further threaten the secure delivery of aid into the area. These challenges could become particularly acute if Hamas and its rivals compete with one another to control the flow of aid in the strip. Israel is currently deciding whether to open a crossing directly into the northern Gaza Strip based on as assessment of how securely the convoys can reach civilians.[11]

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: Hamas reportedly killed the head of a local clan in Gaza City likely as part of Hamas’ effort to reassert its authority in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in several sectors of Khan Younis.
• Political Developments: Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas appointed the current chairman of the Palestinian Investment Fund, Mohammad Mustafa, as the new PA prime minister. Abbas tasked him with forming a new government that will seek to rebuild the Gaza Strip after the war.
• Yemen: The Houthi movement launched an anti-ship ballistic missile targeting an unspecified vessel in the Red Sea. US CENTCOM reported that US forces destroyed four drones and a surface-to-air missile in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.
• Iraq: Head of the Iraqi National Masses Party Ahmed Abdullah al Jubouri nominated Badr Mahmoud al Fahal for governor of Salah ad Din Province.
• West Bank: Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least five times in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.

Iran Update, March 13, 2024

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Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Peter Mills, Alexandra Braverman, Ashka Jhaveri, and Brian Carter

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Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli media reported that the IDF Navy fired at two suspected Palestinian fighters in scuba gear approaching the border between the northern Gaza Strip and Israel.
• Southern Gaza Strip: The IDF 98th Division expanded clearing operations in the northern and eastern Khan Younis.
• Political Negotiations: Saudi state-affiliated media claimed that Hamas agreed to a modified US ceasefire proposal on March 12, which Hamas later denied.
• Iran: Iranian Defense Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Ashtiani claimed on March 13 that Iranian defense exports have increased by five times since 2022.
• Yemen: The Houthi movement launched a close-range ballistic missile targeting the USS Laboon in the Red Sea.
• West Bank: IDF Army Radio reported that the IDF completed a brigade-sized operation in Jenin.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting an official in Hamas’ military wing, Hadi Ali Mustafa, near Tyre, Lebanon.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli media reported on March 13 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Navy fired at two suspected Palestinian fighters in scuba gear approaching the border between the northern Gaza Strip and Israel.[1] CTP-ISW has not recorded Palestinian fighters attempting to infiltrate into Israel from the Gaza Strip since early November 2023.[2] An IDF Navy helicopter destroyed an unspecified Palestinian vessel near Gaza City on March 11.[3]

The presence of Palestinian fighters and infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip demonstrates that Palestinian militias retain some capacity to operate there, despite Israeli clearing operations. Israeli forces began clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip in late October 2023 and began withdrawing from the area in early 2024.[4] International governments and non-government organizations are beginning to build temporary infrastructure on the coast of the northern Gaza Strip to enable the distribution of aid from the sea.[5]

Israeli forces continued to operate in the central and northern Gaza Strip on March 13. The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) directed airstrikes targeting a Palestinian fighter entering a Hamas-affiliated building in the central Gaza Strip.[6] The IDF 143rd Division conducted several airstrikes targeting Palestinian militia infrastructure in Deir al Balah, including tunnel shafts and anti-tank guided missile positions.[7] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and is aligned with Hamas in the war, claimed the only attack targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip on March 13. Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fighters mortared Israeli forces in southern Zaytoun in this attack.[8]

The IDF killed a Hamas commander in the Hamas “operations department”  at a UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) food distribution center in Rafah on March 13. The IDF assessed that the commanders’ death will “significantly harm the functioning” of Hamas’ forces in Rafah.[9] The IDF said that the commander, Muhammad Abu Hasna, directed Hamas forces engaged with Israeli forces elsewhere in the Strip from an intelligence command center in Rafah.[10]  The IDF reported that Abu Hasna had seized humanitarian aid equipment and distributing it to Hamas fighters.[11]

The IDF 98th Division expanded clearing operations in the northern and eastern Khan Younis on March 13.[12] The IDF 89th Commando Brigade detained several Palestinian militia fighters, including a Hamas Nukhba commander in Hamad.[13]  The IDF Egoz Unit (89th Commando Brigade) airstrikes and indirect fire targeting seven Palestinian fighters barricaded in a building in Hamad.[14] The IDF Maglan Unit (89th Commando Brigade) seized weapons in Hamad.[15] Palestinian militias did not claim attacks targeting Israeli forces in Khan Younis on March 13.

Saudi state-affiliated media claimed that Hamas agreed to a modified US ceasefire proposal on March 12, which Hamas later denied..[16] Saudi state-affiliated media cited an unspecified ”senior Hamas official” who said that Hamas representatives would travel to Cairo in the coming days to discuss final details and the modified proposal’s implementation.[17] Hamas denied the report and implored the media to “ensure accuracy and credibility in reporting the news and not to manipulate the feelings of [the Palestinian] people.”[18] Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh issued five maximalist demands for a hostage-for-prisoner exchange on March 10 and stated that the Hamas leadership would reject any agreement that called for a temporary ceasefire.[19] The United States' proposal directly conflicts with Haniyeh’s recent demands because it does not explicitly call for a path to a lasting ceasefire.[20]

The IDF announced that it conducted a pilot shipment to supply aid directly to the northern Gaza Strip.[21] Israel inspected six World Food Program aid trucks at the Kerem Shalom crossing before allowing the trucks to enter the northern Gaza Strip via "Crossing 96.“[22] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson said that the Israeli political establishment would decide whether to open ”Crossing 96” based on the results of the pilot shipment.[23] The trucks reached southern Gaza City without incident.[24] Israeli officials have expressed concern that Hamas is seizing aid from convoys in the Gaza Strip.[25] CTP-ISW reported that the Israeli War Cabinet approved a measure allowing the direct flow of humanitarian aid into northern Gaza Strip on February 25.[26]

Palestinian militias did not conduct indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 13.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least 14 times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 12.[27] Nine of the clashes occurred in Jenin.[28] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and PIJ separately claimed small arms fire targeting IDF positions near Tulkarm on March 13.[29]

IDF Army Radio reported that the IDF completed a brigade-sized operation in Jenin on March 13.[30] The IDF killed two Palestinian fighters and destroyed planted IEDs during the operation.[31] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and PIJ detonated IEDs and fired small arms at Israeli forces conducting operations in Jenin on March 12.[32]  

An individual stabbed and wounded an IDF soldier and an Israeli guard near Bethlehem on March 13.[33] No group has claimed the attack, and the IDF did not specify whether the attacker was affiliated with an armed group. Hamas celebrated the stabbing attack and reiterated its call for Palestinians march towards the al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.[34]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 12.[35] Hezbollah claimed that it fired unspecified weapons targeting an Israeli drone and "forced it to retreat” to Israeli territory on March 13.[36] The IDF has not commented on the incident at the time of writing. Hezbollah has claimed three attacks targeting Israeli drones since March 11.[37] Hezbollah shot down an Israeli drone on February 26.[38]

The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting an official in Hamas’ military wing, Hadi Ali Mustafa, near Tyre, Lebanon, on March 13.[39] Mustafa reported to a close aide to Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Saleh Arouri, who Israel killed in Beirut on January 2.[40] The IDF stated that Mustafa was involved in “directing terror cells in Lebanon” and that Mustafa supported terror attacks targeting Israelis and Jews around the world.[41] Hamas’ military wing acknowledged Mustafa’s death on March 13.[42]

The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting two Syrian Arab Army (SAA) military sites operated by Lebanese Hezbollah in southern Syria on March 12.[43] The IDF stated that it will not allow Hezbollah to establish itself along Syria’s border with the Israel-controlled Golan Heights and that the IDF will hold the SAA responsible for Hezbollah activity in Syria.[44] Local Syrian sources reported that the Israeli strikes targeted Hezbollah positions in Tal Ahmar and Ain al Nouriyah, Quneitra Province, Syria, near the Israel-controlled Golan Heights.[45] Israeli media reported in 2020 that the SAA’s 1st Corps, which is responsible for areas of southern Syria near the Golan Heights, is closely affiliated with Hezbollah.[46]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iranian Defense Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Ashtiani claimed on March 13 that Iranian defense exports have increased by five times since 2022.[47] Iran uses its defense exports to expand its military influence abroad and to generate revenue for the Iranian economy.[48] Ashtiani separately stated that Iran seeks to develop greater defense cooperation with Armenia, Qatar, Russia, and Turkey.[49] Ashtiani recently held separate meetings with the Qatari and Armenian defense ministers in Doha on March 4 and in Tehran on March 6, respectively.[50] Ashtiani attended the Doha International Maritime Defense Exhibition and Conference during his visit to Qatar.[51] Iran displayed its drones, anti-ship cruise missiles, and air defense systems, among other military equipment, in the exhibition. Iran has also reportedly supplied drones to Armenia since at least July 2023.[52]

The Houthi movement launched a close-range ballistic missile targeting the USS Laboon in the Red Sea on March 12 .[53] US CENTCOM reported that the missile did not impact the ship or cause any damage or injuries.

CENTCOM reported on March 12 that a US and coalition vessel intercepted two drones launched from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.[54]

Houthi-controlled media claimed that the United States and United Kingdom conducted three airstrikes targeting Hudaydah International Airport on March 13.[55]

Iran Update, March 12, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Elizabeth Volynsky-Lauzon, Anne McGill, Kathryn Tyson, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

Key Takeaways:

• Northern and Central Gaza Strip: The IDF 162nd Division continued to operate in the northern and central Gaza Strip.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias continued to conduct a deliberate defense of Hamad neighborhood, northern Khan Younis.
• Political Negotiations: The Qatari foreign affairs minister said that Israel and Hamas are “nowhere near a deal” regarding a ceasefire deal and prisoner-for-hostage exchange.
• IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani alluded to the need for Hamas to “negotiate firmly” in the ceasefire negotiations, possibly indicating support for Hamas’ maximalist position.
• West Bank: IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani claimed that the Israeli fear of Palestinian operations in the West Bank “reached its peak” in the current Persian calendar year (March 2023-March 2024) during an interview with Iranian state media.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah launched over 100 rockets targeting Israeli forces in the Golan Heights.
• The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah military infrastructure in Beqaa and Baalbek Governorates.
• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting Ben Gurion Airport in Lod, Israel.
• Iraq and Syria: The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) assessed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will “almost certainly” resume attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria
• Yemen: The Houthi movement launched two anti-ship missiles on March 11 that targeted a Singaporean-owned, Liberian-flagged merchant vessel in the Red Sea.
• US CENTCOM confirmed that it conducted preemptive strikes targeting 18 Houthi anti-ship missiles and an unmanned underwater vessel in Houthi-controlled Yemen.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 162nd Division continued to operate in the northern and central Gaza Strip on March 12.[1] The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) located and destroyed rocket launchers that Palestinian fighters previously used to launch rockets into Israel.[2] Israeli forces directed an airstrike in the area targeting Palestinian fighters who had launched two rockets at them.[3]

A Palestinian activist separately reported sounds of clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters south of Gaza City on March 12.[4]

Palestinian militias continued to conduct a deliberate defense of Hamad neighborhood, northern Khan Younis, on March 12. Three IDF brigades have been clearing Hamad of Palestinian fighters and military infrastructure since March 3.[5] The IDF had intelligence that Palestinian fighters retreated from other areas in Khan Younis to hide in Hamad.[6] Israeli forces directed airstrikes to kill Palestinian cells and located weapons in buildings during clearing operations on March 12.[7] Four Palestinian militias claimed attacks targeting Israeli forces in Hamad using mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and other unspecified explosive devices.[8]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in other sectors of northern Khan Younis on March 12. The IDF Bislamach Brigade have killed over 100 Palestinian fighters by sniper fire, mortar and shell fire, and airstrikes over the past two weeks in Qarara, northern Khan Younis, and in eastern Khan Younis.[9] Israeli forces located infrastructure, weapons, combat equipment, and a drone launcher.[10] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters detonated an explosively-rigged tunnel and a house-borne improvised explosive device (HBIED) targeting Israeli forces in Qarara.[11] The Wall Street Journal published a map of the tunnel network in the Gaza Strip from 2014, which does not include any tunnels in Qarara.[12] The New York Times reported in January 2023 that the IDF now believes that there are more tunnels underneath the Gaza Strip than previously thought.[13]

The Qatari Foreign Affairs Minister said on March 12 that Israel and Hamas are “nowhere near a deal” regarding a ceasefire deal and prisoner-for-hostage exchange.[14] The minister also noted that Qatar is engaged in a “constructive” dialogue with Israel and Hamas. CIA Director William Burns said on March 12 that a potential ceasefire deal “is still a possibility” despite the difficult process of negotiations.[15] Hamas’ maximalist demands for a permanent ceasefire, return of displaced people, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces, and sufficient humanitarian aid do not align with Israeli plans to continue clearing operations in the Gaza Strip until Hamas is defeated.

Israeli media reported that Senior Hamas Political Bureau official Mohammad Nazzal told al Jazeera that ceasefire negotiations are ongoing.[16] Nazzal said that the talks ”had reached an impasse“ but that international mediators are continuing their work. He also accused Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of impeding progress on negotiations and affirmed that there will be no deal until Israel agrees to Hamas’ terms.

IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani alluded to the need for Hamas to “negotiate firmly” in the ceasefire negotiations, possibly indicating support for the maximalist position that Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh presented on March 10.[17]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant put forth the head of the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) General Intelligence Service, Majed Faraj, as a candidate to temporarily manage civilian life in the Gaza Strip.[18] Faraj is a member of Fatah‘s Revolutionary Council and considered a possible successor to PA President Mahmoud Abbas.[19] Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has consistently opposed the PA’s involvement in governing the Gaza Strip.[20] However, his post-war plan does not explicitly rule out the role for the PA.[21] Israel previously discussed turning to former PA security official Mohammad Dahlan for governance in the Gaza Strip.[22] Dahlan said in a November 2023 interview with Time that he would not participate in a future Palestinian government but that he would help rebuild the Palestinian political system.[23]

Israel reported that a Palestinian fighter launched mortars from the southern Gaza Strip into Israel on March 12.[24] Palestinian militias have not claimed the attack at the time of this writing. Israeli forces monitored the source of fire and directed an airstrike to target the perpetrator. The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting military infrastructure in the strip in retaliation for the attack.[25]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least five times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 11.[26] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades detonated an IED in the Psagot settlement on March 11.[27] An unspecified individual separately attempted to stab an Israeli civilian in Givat Ronen.[28]

Israeli forces detained 10 wanted individuals during operations across the West Bank on March 12.[29] The IDF said that Israeli forces detained PIJ fighter Mehdi Fayyad, who has conducted previous attacks on Israeli forces, according to the IDF.[30] Israeli forces also located four lathes for manufacturing weapons in Urif village south of Nablus.[31]

IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani claimed that the Israeli fear of Palestinian operations in the West Bank “reached its peak” in the current Persian calendar year (March 2023-March 2024) during an interview with Iranian state media on March 12.[32]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least 14 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 11.[33] Hezbollah launched over 100 rockets targeting Israeli forces in the Golan Heights.[34] This attack was one of the largest Hezbollah has conducted since the war began.

The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah military infrastructure in Beqaa and Baalbek Governorates, Lebanon, on March 11 and March 12, respectively.[35] The Baalbek Governorate is approximately 100 km north of the Israel-Lebanon border.[36] The IDF said that the strikes were in response to Hezbollah’s attacks targeting northern Israel. The IDF separately published a summary of its air campaign in Lebanon and Syria over the past five months.[37] The IDF reported that its attacks in northern Lebanon “harm Hezbollah’s air and ground capabilities as well as its top command.”

An unspecified Lebanese Hezbollah parliamentary source said that the group is “prepared for any expansion of hostilities” with Israel in a statement to al Araby on March 12.[38] The source said that “Hezbollah will not be silent about the Israeli attacks.” Hezbollah launched at least 60 rockets targeting an IDF site in the Golan Heights on February 26 in retaliation for the IDF’s only other airstrike near Baalbek.[39]

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah met with a delegation of Hamas officials in Beirut, Lebanon, on March 12.[40] Hamas’ Deputy Political Bureau leader for the Gaza Strip Khalil al Hayya led discussions on Hamas’ operations in the Gaza Strip as well as on the Israel-Hamas negotiations. Nasrallah and the Hamas delegation discussed the developments in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank as well as the ”multiple support fronts,” likely referring to the Iranian-backed attacks from Iraq, Syria, and Yemen targeting Israel.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul Amir al Shammari discussed “security and training” cooperation with Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev in Baghdad on March 12, possibly as part of a Russian effort to supplant the United States as a security guarantor in Iraq.[41] Kutrashev has met with at least six Iraqi officials, including senior security leaders, since January 2024.[42] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia may be setting conditions to try to supplant the United States in anticipation of the United States reducing its military presence there.[43] Kutrashev previously told Russian media in January 2024 that Russia seeks to expand its “presence” in Iraq and “invest additional resources in areas related to security.”[44] The Iraqi Interior Ministry, which is largely controlled by the Iranian-backed Badr Organization, is responsible for domestic law enforcement and oversees the Federal Police.[45] Shammari is affiliated with the Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties—and previously served as the deputy commander of the Joint Operations Command for Iraq.[46]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting Ben Gurion Airport in Lod, Israel, on March 11.[47] The group described the attack as part of its “second phase of operations” to support Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.[48] CTP-ISW previously reported that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq appears to have refocused its attacks to target primarily Israel rather than US forces for the moment.[49] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has not attacked US forces since February 4 but has claimed 10 attacks targeting Israel during this same period.[50] It is unclear, however, how many of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq’s attacks targeting Israel have succeeded.

The Jordanian armed forces reportedly intercepted the Islamic Resistance in Iraq’s drone after it entered Jordanian airspace from Syria.[51] A Jordanian security official stated on March 12 that the Jordanian armed forces had located drone fragments near the city of Irbid near the Jordan-Syria border.[52]

Iraqi National Security Adviser Qasim al Araji claimed that ending the US-led international coalition mission in Iraq will not affect NATO’s mission in Iraq during a meeting with the Dutch, German, Italian, and NATO mission ambassadors to Iraq on March 11.[53] Washington and Baghdad began talks to evaluate the status of the US-led international coalition in Iraq in late January 2024.[54] Araji called for greater cooperation between the NATO Mission in Iraq and the Iraqi defense and interior ministries.[55] An Iraqi Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee member separately claimed on March 12 that the NATO Mission in Iraq does not present “a threat to Iraq’s security and stability” like the US-led international coalition allegedly does.[56]

The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) assessed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will “almost certainly” resume attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria.[57] The ODNI published its findings in the 2024 Annual Threat Assessment on March 11. These militias suspended their attacks targeting US forces following a one-way drone attack that killed three US servicemembers in northeastern Jordan in late January 2024.[58] IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Baghdad after the attack and instructed the militias to pause their attacks. Numerous Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have signaled in recent weeks that they will resume conducting attacks targeting US forces in the region.[59] The ODNI’s assessment is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are using US support for Israel in the current war as an excuse to attack US forces. The militias’ actual objective of these attacks is to advance Iran’s long-standing effort to erode US influence in the Middle East.[60] Iran and its Axis of Resistance will almost certainly continue their decades-long effort to expel US forces from the Middle East regardless of whether there is a ceasefire agreement in the Israel-Hamas war.

The ODNI assessed in its annual report on March 11 that Iran is not currently pursuing nuclear weapons.[61] The DNI stated specifically that Iran is not conducting the “key nuclear weapons-development activities” for a testable nuclear explosive. The DNI also stated that Iran will likely pursue further nuclear advancements to “build negotiating leverage” and in response to “additional sanctions, attacks, or censure against its nuclear program.”

Iran has continued to expand its nuclear program since 2021. Iran has produced enriched uranium metal at its uranium conversion facility in Esfahan.[62] Enriched uranium metal can be used to develop the core for nuclear weapons.[63] Iran has also stockpiled several significant quantities (or bombs’ worth) of highly enriched uranium, which it can use in a nuclear weapon.[64] Iran has additionally amassed a large stockpile of low-enriched uranium, which it can enrich to higher levels in a short period of time given its current enrichment capacity.[65] The graph below illustrates Iran’s current uranium stockpile, the number of significant quantities therein, and how quickly it can enrich those stockpiles to weapons-grade uranium:

The Houthi movement launched two anti-ship missiles on March 11 that targeted a Singaporean-owned, Liberian-flagged merchant vessel in the Red Sea.[66] US CENTCOM confirmed that the missiles did not impact the merchant vessel, Pinocchio.[67] The Houthi military spokesperson falsely claimed that the vessel is an “American ship.” The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations reported an explosion near a vessel in the Red Sea on March 11.[68]

The Houthi military spokesperson said on March 11 that the group will escalate its military operations during Ramadan, which he called the “month of Jihad.”[69] The spokesperson was presumably referring to Houthi attacks targeting international shipping and Israel. Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi previously alluded to an expansion of attacks on March 7.[70]

US CENTCOM confirmed that it conducted preemptive strikes targeting 18 Houthi anti-ship missiles and an unmanned underwater vessel in Houthi-controlled Yemen on March 11.[71] CTP-ISW previously reported the preemptive strikes impacted around Ras Issa, al Urj, and Jabanah in Hudaydah Governorate on March 11.[72]

Western media reported on March 12 that the European Union is prepared to impose “new and significant measures” against Iran in response to reports that Iran may transfer ballistic missiles to Russia.[73] Reuters reported that EU leaders expressed concern in a draft conclusion for their upcoming March 21-22 summit that “Iran may transfer ballistic missiles and related technology to Russia.” Reuters also reported that the European Union in the draft text called on unspecified third parties to cease “providing material support to Russia” and that the European Union “is prepared to respond swiftly. . . with new and significant measures against Iran,” including further sanctions.

Iranian sources told Reuters on February 21 that Iran provided hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to Russia in early January 2024.[74] The Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson said on February 21 that Ukraine does not possess any information confirming that Iran has transferred missiles to Russia.[75] The US National Security Council spokesperson similarly said on February 22 that the United States has yet to confirm that Iran has transferred missiles to Russia.[76]

The United States and Bahrain jointly sanctioned several Iran-based individuals on March 12 for supporting the Iranian-backed al Ashtar Brigades.[77] The US Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) noted that the sanctions are meant to demonstrate “the critical role that the Iranian regime plays in providing support to Al-Ashtar Brigades.” OFAC and Bahrain sanctioned the following Iran-based individuals:

• Hussein Ahmad Abdallah Ahmad Hussein Al Dammami for facilitating “lethal aid” into Bahrain to support the al Ashtar Brigades
• Al Ashtar Brigades member Ali Abdulnabi Ahmed Ebrahim M Alshofa for facilitating “lethal aid”
• Al Ashtar Brigades member Hasan Ahmed Radhi Husain Sarhan for “plotting terrorist operations” in Bahrain
• Al Ashtar Brigades financier Isa Saleh Isa Mohamed Salman for involvement in money transfers

The al Ashtar Brigades is an Iranian-backed Shia militant group operating in Bahrain.[78] The US State Department previously designated the al Ashtar Brigades as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in 2018.[79]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reiterated on March 12 his call for Muslim countries to cut political and economic ties with Israel.[80] Khamenei also reiterated his calls for Muslim countries to help Palestinians. Khamenei has repeatedly called on Muslim states to impose an international embargo on Israel since the Israel-Hamas war began.[81] Khamenei further expressed his desire for the Axis of Resistance to destroy the Israeli state.

Iran Update, March 11, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Andie Parry, Amin Soltani, Peter Mills, Kathryn Tyson, Anne McGill, Karolina Hird, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters mortared Israeli forces in Gaza City at least four times.
• Central Gaza Strip: The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting Hamas’ military deputy commander, Marwan Issa, in Nuseirat.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in northern Khan Younis.
• Political Negotiations: Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh presented Hamas’ comprehensive demands in ceasefire and hostage negotiations in a speech marking the start of Ramadan.
• West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least eight times.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Syria: Iranian officials expressed their displeasure with the Syrian Bashar al Assad regime’s failure to implement its economic agreements with Iran.
• Yemen: Houthi-affiliated media reported that the United States and United Kingdom conducted airstrikes targeting three locations in Yemen.
• Iran: Russia, China, and Iran will hold the joint Maritime Security Belt-2024 naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman between March 11-15.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters mortared Israeli forces in Gaza City at least four times since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 10. The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement fired mortars targeting Israeli forces east of Beit Hanoun on March 10.[1] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah, separately claimed mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun neighborhood.[2] PIJ also claimed a mortar attack targeting IDF troops south of Gaza City.[3] The IDF reported that its Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) killed 15 Palestinian fighters south of Gaza City.[4]

An IDF Navy helicopter destroyed an unspecified Palestinian vessel near Gaza City on March 11.[5]

The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting Hamas’ military deputy commander, Marwan Issa, in Nuseirat on March 11. Israeli media reported that Issa was in an underground tunnel in Nuseirat.[6] The IDF did not confirm whether the airstrike killed Issa.[7] The airstrike killed five Palestinians and wounded ten more.[8] Israeli journalists described Issa as the third most senior official in Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[9] Issa worked closely with Hamas’ leader for the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, and the head of Hamas’ military, Mohammad Deif, to plan the October 7 attack.[10]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in northern Khan Younis on March 11. The IDF 89th Commando Brigade detained Palestinian fighters and seized weapons and other military equipment in apartment buildings in Hamad.[11] Palestinian fighters fired an anti-tank guided missile at IDF Givati Brigade soldiers in Hamad, after which IDF Maglan Unit soldiers identified and killed the fighters.[12] The Egoz Unit (89th Commando Brigade) clashed with Palestinian fighters in Hamad.[13] The IDF 7th Armored Brigade raided tunnels and weapon assembly sites in Hamad to find explosives, intelligence materials, and small arms.[14] The 7th Brigade has detained dozens of Palestinian fighters, who tried to escape with evacuating civilians since the beginning of Israeli operations in Hamad.[15] The IDF Bislamach Brigade separately targeted Palestinian fighters with aerial, sniper, and tank fire in Qarara on March 11.[16]

Palestinian militias claimed only one attack targeting Israeli forces around Khan Younis on March 11. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, targeted Israeli armor with an IED in Hamad.[17]

Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh presented Hamas’ comprehensive demands in ceasefire and hostage negotiations in a speech marking the start of Ramadan on March 10. Haniyeh presented five maximalist demands for a hostage-for-prisoner exchange. Haniyeh proposed a comprehensive ceasefire, the complete withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip, the complete and unconditional return of displaced Gazans, and the resolution of humanitarian issues, including relief, shelter, and reconstruction, and ending restrictions on the movement of people and goods out of the Gaza Strip.[18] Haniyeh said that the Hamas leadership would reject any agreement that does not meet these demands. Haniyeh’s framework is consistent with Hamas’ public demands over the past week.[19] Hamas’ unwillingness to negotiate on these issues is corroborated by statements from Israeli negotiators.[20] Some of the demands, particularly the permanent ceasefire and a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces, remain an obstacle in the ongoing negotiations.

Haniyeh also laid out a proposal for a post-war unified Palestinian government that would include Hamas. Haniyeh called for elections to form a temporary national consensus government until legislative and presidential elections and a Palestinian National Council can be held.[21] Haniyeh presented a vision of an independent Palestinian state comprised of the Gaza Strip and West Bank with the right of return and self-determination.[22] Several Palestinian factions, including Hamas, met in Moscow on February 29 to discuss the formation of a new Palestinian government.[23] Hamas claimed that the talks were constructive, but Fatah leaders were less optimistic, expressing concerns of an international boycott against any government that includes Hamas.[24] Fatah currently leads the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.

Haniyeh also called for Palestinians to “protect Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque” during Ramadan from any Israeli “conspiracies” to restrict access to these areas.[25] Haniyeh’s statement mirrors his and other Hamas leaders’ rhetoric to “storm” and “march to” al Aqsa Mosque during Ramadan over the past several weeks.[26] Haniyeh rejected the Israeli claim that Palestinian militia groups do not want a ceasefire during Ramadan because they intend to use popular anger to “revolutionize the West Bank.”[27]

Palestinian militias did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 11.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least eight times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 10.[28] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed that it detonated IEDs and fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in Tulkarm and Nablus on March 10.[29]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant stated on March 11 that Iran is actively attempting to orchestrate terror attacks by smuggling weapons into the West Bank.[30] Gallant also said that Israel must prepare for an ”increase in terror” during Ramadan, which began on March 10. Israel has repeatedly thwarted attempts to smuggle Iranian-made weapons from Jordan into Israel and the West Bank over the past year.[31]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 10.[32] Hezbollah claimed that it launched four drones targeting Israeli forces at the Kila barracks in the Golan Heights.[33] The IDF said that it detected two drone, which landed in open areas.[34]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The secretary of the Iranian Supreme Free Trade Zones Council said on March 6 that Iran, Iraq, and Syria are continuing talks to establish a trilateral free trade zone.[35] The secretary noted that the joint free trade zone would facilitate Iranian access to the Mediterranean Sea. Iran and Syria resumed negotiations over the establishment of a joint free trade zone after Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to Syria in May 2023.[36] The Supreme Free Trade Zones Council secretary said at the time that negotiations had entered a “technical and implementation stage.”[37] CTP-ISW previously assessed that a free trade zone through Iran, Iraq, and Syria would allow Iran to move materials across borders without oversight that would normally enforce sanctions on trade with Iran and Syria.[38]

Iranian officials expressed their displeasure with the Syrian Bashar al Assad regime’s failure to implement its economic agreements with Iran. A senior Iranian member of the Iran-Syria Commerce Chamber said on March 3 that Syria has not fulfilled its part of trade agreements with Iran despite “several meetings” and called on Syria to pay “special attention.”[39] The Iranian Trade Development director general for West Asia similarly noted on March 3 that Iranian exports to Syria declined in 2023.[40] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Syrian President Bashar al Assad signed 15 economic cooperations agreement in May 2023, covering banking, communications technology, energy, reconstruction, and transportation.[41]

Houthi-affiliated media reported that the United States and United Kingdom conducted airstrikes targeting three locations in Yemen on March 11.[42] The strikes reportedly occurred around Ras Issa, al Urj, and Jabanah in Hudaydah Governorate. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom have confirmed the strikes as the time of this writing.

Russia, China, and Iran will hold the joint Maritime Security Belt-2024 naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman between March 11-15.[43] Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestia reported on March 11 that a detachment ships of Russia’s Pacific Fleet, including the Varyag Slava-class cruiser, arrived at Iran’s Chabahar Port to participate in Maritime Security Belt-2024 alongside Iranian and Chinese naval detachments.[44] The exercise, which was first held in 2019, is intended to practice safe combined naval maneuvers to ensure safe maritime economic activity.[45] The Russian Marshal Shaposhnikov Udaloy-class destroyer; the Chinese Ürümqi destroyer, Linyi frigate, Dongpinghu replenishment ship; and 10 unnamed Iranian ships, boats, and supply vessels and three naval helicopters are taking part in the exercise.[46] Representatives of Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Oman, India, and South Africa will observe the exercise.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei awarded the Order of Fath medal (otherwise known as the Victory Medal) to IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami and Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi on March 10.[47] Khamenei awarded Salami and Mousavi for “improving the defense, combat, and deterrence power” of the Iranian armed forces, according to Khamenei‘s website.[48] Notable recipients of this aware include former IRGC Quds Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani, former IRGC Commander Major General Mohmmad Ali Jafari, IRGC Deputy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi, and former Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani.[49]

Western media reported on March 11 that Iran increased its export of liquefied petroleum gas by 28 percent in 2023.[50] Bloomberg noted that Iran has now become the largest Middle Eastern exporter of liquified petroleum gas, largely driven by increased production in the South Pars gas field and a greater shipping capacity between Iran and China. Iranian oil production similarly increased to an all-time high of three million barrels per day in late 2023.[51] Iran exported most of that crude to China. The National Iranian Oil Company chief executive said on March 11 that 2.5 billion barrels were added to Iran’s natural gas and crude oil reserves in 2023.[52]

The Iranian deputy foreign affairs minister for policy met with the Armenian deputy foreign affairs minister in Tehran on March 11.[53] The two officials discussed the Israel-Hamas war, economic cooperation, and regional security in the Caucasus. The Iranian official warned against foreign interference in the Caucasus, referring to the long-held Iranian assertion that Israel and Turkey are expanding their geopolitical influence there via Azerbaijan.[54] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Defense Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Gharaei Ashtiani similarly warned against extra-regional interference in the Caucasus during their separate meetings with Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan in Tehran on March 6 and 7.[55] The Iranian regime has historically accused Baku of allowing Israel to use Azerbaijani territory to launch operations against Iran.[56] Iran has provided security assistance, including drone sales, to Armenia previously as part of its effort to push back against Azerbaijan.[57]

The Iranian foreign affairs minister’s senior adviser met with the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry’s Middle East and North Africa development director in Tehran on March 11.[58] The two officials discussed the Israel-Hamas war and called for the continuation of political processes to end conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. The Iranian official warned that continued American and British strikes targeting Houthi military capabilities would “disrupt peace efforts” in Yemen. Iranian and Russian officials have engaged in political coordination vis-a-vis the Israel-Hamas war since at least October 26, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[59]

The Iranian parliament has likely approved a controversial veiling bill, although it is unclear if the regime will implement it. An Iranian newspaper reported on March 9 that Parliament approved legislation that would use facial recognition technology to fine unveiled women. This report is consistent with an Iranian parliamentarian’s March 8 claim that Parliament had approved such legislation.[60] The Guardian Council—a regime body that can overrule parliamentary legislation—has rejected prior iterations of Parliament’s hijab bill, however, making it unclear if the recent veiling bill will reach implementation.[61] Discussions surrounding mandatory veiling legislation coincide with social media reports of increased tensions between unveiled Iranian women and hardline clerics in recent days.[62]

Iran Update, March 10, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Andie Parry, Peter Mills, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

CTP-ISW will publish abbreviated updates on March 9 and 10, 2024. Detailed coverage will resume Monday, March 11, 2024

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters targeted Israeli forces operating in southern Gaza City.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in northern Khan Younis.
• US Operations: The US Army sent a vessel to the Mediterranean Sea with the first load of equipment to establish a humanitarian port off the Gaza Strip.
• West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least three times in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least 13 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters targeted Israeli forces operating in southern Gaza City on March 10. Palestinian militias reported that their fighters fired mortars and small arms targeting Israeli forces in the Tal al Hawa and Zaytoun neighborhoods, south of Gaza City.[1] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement targeted Israeli forces southeast of Gaza City with short-range rockets.[2] The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) has continued to operate in “central” Gaza, likely referring to the areas south of Gaza City in which Palestinian militias continue to claim attacks.[3] Israeli forces are also operating south of Gaza City to demolish structures along a new road that splits the Gaza Strip between the north and south.[4]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in northern Khan Younis on March 10. The IDF Givati Brigade (162nd Division) raided Hamas infrastructure used during the October 7 attack and seized mortars, an explosively formed penetrator (EFP), and small arms in eastern Hamad.[5] The Givati Brigade killed and detained Palestinian fighters in the area.[6] The IDF 89th Commando Brigade continued fighting in Hamad in close-range clashes and detained two Hamas fighters who surrendered to the IDF.[7] The IDF Egoz unit directed an airstrike on a Palestinian fighter responsible for the death of an Israeli soldier in the southern Gaza Strip on March 8.[8] The IDF Bislamach Brigade continued to target Palestinian fighters in Qarara.[9]

Palestinian militias continued trying to defend against the IDF around Khan Younis on March 10. Hamas fighters detonated a building in Bani Suheila that Israeli forces had rigged to explode.[10] Hamas claimed the house explosion killed and wounded Israeli forces, but the IDF did not acknowledge casualties from the attack at the time of this writing. This attack bears similarities to a Hamas attack that killed 21 Israeli soldiers as the soldiers rigged a building to detonate in the Central Gaza Strip in January 2024.[11] Hamas fighters also targeted Israeli dismounted infantry operating in tunnels in Bani Suheila.[12] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, reported that its fighters fired mortars and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting Israeli forces in Hamad and generally west of Khan Younis City.[13]

Israeli forces are targeting Hamas nodes involved in attacks outside of the Gaza Strip. Israeli journalists reported that the IDF conducted a strike in eastern Rafah on March 10 targeting a Hamas official who was responsible for directing attacks in the West Bank.[14] Israeli forces, separately, arrested a cell of Arab Israelis from Sakhnin that was planning an attack on Israelis in coordination with Hamas officials in the Gaza Strip.[15] Hamas instructed the Sakhnin cell to construct improvised explosive devices.[16] Shin Bet said that that Hamas is still attempting to stoke tensions outside of the Gaza Strip during Ramadan.[17]

US CENTCOM announced on March 9 that a US Army logistics support vessel departed from Virginia to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea with the first load of equipment to establish a temporary pier to deliver humanitarian supplies to the Gaza Strip.[18] US President Biden announced the temporary pier initiative on March 7 during his State of the Union address.[19] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that the US plan to provide aid to the Gaza Strip via a temporary port will “advance the collapse of Hamas’s rule.”[20] Gallant also acknowledged that Cyprus, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel would be involved in the maritime corridor.[21]

Palestinian militias did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 10.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least three times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 9.[22]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 13 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 9.[23]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

There is no significant activity to report.

Iran Update, March 9, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters defended against Israeli raids in several sectors of the northern Gaza Strip.
• Central Gaza Strip: The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in northern Khan Younis.
• Political Negotiations: Israeli Mossad Chief Dadi Barnea told CIA Director Bill Burns that Hamas is not interested in a ceasefire deal and is intent to “burn the area” during Ramadan.
• West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least five times in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Israel: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted two drone attacks targeting Israeli military and civilian infrastructure in Haifa and in the Golan Heights.
• Yemen: The Houthis fired naval missiles at Singapore-flagged, owned, and operated vessel M/V Propel Fortune in the Gulf of Aden.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters defended against Israeli raids in several sectors of the northern Gaza Strip on March 9. An Israel Defense Forces (IDF) unit in the Combat Intelligence Collection Corps identified several Palestinian fighters operating near Israeli forces in Beit Hanoun and directed an airstrike targeting them.[1] Israeli forces have been conducting an operation in Beit Hanoun to reclear the area of Palestinian fighters and locate military infrastructure for the past week.[2] Palestinian militias reported that their fighters fired mortars and rockets targeting Israeli forces in eastern Jabalia and Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City.[3] Palestinian fighters also clashed with Israeli forces in Zaytoun neighborhood.[4]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on March 9. Israeli forces killed approximately 10 Palestinian fighters.[5] The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting areas in the central strip from where Palestinian fighters have launched rockets targeting Sderot in southern Israel.[6] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) published footage of its fighters mortaring Israeli forces east of the central Gaza Strip.[7]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in northern Khan Younis on March 9. The IDF Givati Brigade (162nd Division) raided military infrastructure in Hamad neighborhood, northwestern Khan Younis, detained Palestinian militia fighters, and located improvised explosive devices (IED) in the area.[8] The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, claimed that its fighters detonated a bomb in Hamad.[9] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, reported that its fighters fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting Israeli forces in Hamad.[10] The IDF Bislamach Brigade clashed with Palestinian fighters in Qarara.[11] Israeli armor, dismounted infantry, and engineering elements destroyed military infrastructure in Qarara, where Hamas’ Qarara Battalion (Khan Younis Brigade) remains combat effective.[12]

Israeli Mossad Chief David Barnea told CIA Director Bill Burns that Hamas is not interested in a ceasefire deal and is intent to “burn the area” during Ramadan.[13] Barnea and Burns met in Jordan to discuss the state of ceasefire negotiations on March 8.[14] Barnea said that Hamas is “entrenched in its position,” possibly referencing Hamas’ repeated demands for a permanent ceasefire, return of displaced people, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces, and sufficient humanitarian aid.[15] The spokesperson for Hamas’ military wing called for the month of Ramadan to be an escalation of the ”flood of Al Aqsa,” referring to the October 7 attack.[16] Ramadan is expected to begin around March 10.

Three US and Israeli officials told Axios on March 9 that United States and international mediators are intensifying their efforts to reach a hostage deal and temporary ceasefire.[17]

Palestinian militias did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 9.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least five times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 8.[18]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 8.[19]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted two drone attacks targeting Israeli military and civilian infrastructure in Haifa and in the Golan Heights on March 8.[20] The group fired drones targeting an oil refinery in Haifa and an IDF base in the Golan Heights. Israeli officials have not commented on the attack at the time of writing.

US CENTCOM conducted preemptive strikes targeting two Houthi mobile anti-ship missiles in Houthi-controlled Yemen on March 8.[21]

The Houthis separately fired naval missiles at Singapore-flagged, owned, and operated vessel M/V Propel Fortune in the Gulf of Aden on March 8.[22] CENTCOM and UK Maritime Trade Operations confirmed that the missiles did not impact the ship.[23]

The Houthis claimed that they launched 37 one-way attack drones targeting US warships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden from Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory on March 9.[24] CENTCOM reported that US Navy and coalition aircraft and ships intercepted at least 28 drones.[25] CENTCOM reported that the Houthi drones did not damage any US coalition or commercial vessels.

Iran Update, March 8, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Ahmad Omid Arman, Alexandra Braverman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The United States will construct a temporary pier on the coast of the Gaza Strip to facilitate the arrival and distribution of humanitarian aid. US President Joe Biden said during the State of the Union address on March 7 that he ordered the US military to lead an “emergency mission” to establish the pier.[1] Biden stressed that US servicemembers would not operate on the ground in the Gaza Strip. The United States will conduct a Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS). A JLOTS involves creating a floating pier for ship-to-shore operations.[2] The Pentagon press secretary said that the pier will be able to receive two million meals per day.[3] The secretary also noted that the pier facilities could take two months to become fully operational and will require up to 1,000 US military personnel to complete it.[4] Biden told reporters on March 8 that Israel would secure the temporary pier.[5] Thousands of Palestinians have surrounded aid shipments in the past, which underscores the need for security to ensure the fair, safe, and organized distribution of aid.[6]

The European Union announced on March 8 that it is planning to open an emergency maritime aid corridor from Cyprus to the Gaza Strip sometime between March 8 and 10 as part of a joint effort with its allies, including the United States.[7] The EU and the Cypriot Government said that all the efforts to open a maritime corridor will be “closely coordinated with Israel.”[8] The Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesperson welcomed the maritime corridor plan, noting that the aid must go through "security checks...in accordance with Israeli standards."[9] An anonymous Israeli official said that under the latest plan, UAE-donated aid would first go to Cyprus. Unspecified authorities would then inspect the aid before ships transport it to the Gaza Strip coast.[10]

CENTCOM commander Gen. Michael Kurilla said that US forces have not deterred the Houthis during a Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on March 7.[11] Kurilla added that in his estimation, the United States will need to impose a "cost” on Iran to stop the Houthis from continuing attacks.[12] Kurilla highlighted the importance of targeting Iran’s ability to resupply the Houthis.

Kurilla also said that US airstrikes on February 2 and February 7 deterred Iran or its proxies and partners from continuing attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria. Kurilla reported that there has not been an attack on US forces in Iraq or Syria in 32 days.[13] US forces struck 85 Iranian-backed targets in Iraq and Syria on February 2 and killed a senior Kataib Hezbollah commander in Baghdad on February 7 who was responsible for the deaths of US servicemembers. Kurilla emphasized that deterrence is temporary.[14] Iranian-backed militias have conducted attacks targeting US service members prior to October 7. Iranian-backed militias in Iraq can resume attacks at a time, place, and for reasons of their choosing, as CTP-ISW has previously noted.[15] ran has continued to send arms and funds to its militias despite the pause in attacks.

Kurilla also said that Iran continues to support Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, and armed groups in the West Bank.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: The United States will construct a temporary pier on the coast of the Gaza Strip to facilitate the arrival and distribution of humanitarian aid.
• The European Union announced that it is planning to open an emergency maritime aid corridor from Cyprus to the Gaza Strip sometime between March 8 and 10 as part of a joint effort with its allies, including the United States.
• US Military Operations in the Middle East: CENTCOM commander Gen. Michael Kurilla said that US forces have not deterred the Houthis during a Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing. Kurilla also said that US airstrikes on February 2 and February 7 deterred Iran or its proxies and partners from continuing attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria. Kurilla emphasized that deterrence is temporary.
• Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces conducted a clearing operation to reclear Beit Hanoun in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Iran: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war with Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Badr al Busaidi.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Israeli news reported that the IDF ordered Brig. Gen. Moshe Tamir to draft plans for a possible Israeli ground operation into southern Lebanon.
• Yemen: US CENTCOM intercepted three drones that the Houthis launched toward the Gulf of Aden.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted a clearing operation to reclear Beit Hanoun in the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF Kfir Brigade’s Netzah Yuhda Battalion (143rd Division) operated in Beit Hanoun during the last week, engaging Palestinian fighters and destroying military infrastructure, including tunnel shafts.[16] The Kfir Brigade previously operated in the Gaza Strip but withdrew in January 2024.[17] The IDF said on December 18, 2023, that it had destroyed Hamas’ Beit Hanoun Battalion after conducting a nearly two-month-long clearing operation in the area.[18] Hamas exploited Israeli withdrawals in late December 2023 to infiltrate areas that Israeli forces had previously cleared and reconstitute some of its militia units. CTP-ISW has observed Palestinian fighters active in Beit Hanoun four times in March. CTP-ISW only observed Palestinian fighter activity once in February.[19] Palestinian fighters in Beit Hanoun have operated a drone near Israeli forces, attempted to establish a reconnaissance position, and shot at Israeli forces since February.[20]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on March 8.[21] Israeli forces killed 15 Palestinian fighters with sniper fire, tanks, and airstrikes.

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in some areas of northern Khan Younis on March 8. Three IDF brigades engaged Palestinian fighters in Hamad neighborhood, northwestern Khan Younis.[22] Palestinian fighters have been conducting a deliberate defense of Hamad since Israeli forces advanced into the neighborhood on March 3.[23] The IDF had intelligence that Palestinian fighters retreated from other areas in Khan Younis to hide in Hamad.[24] Palestinian fighters claimed most of their attacks in the Gaza Strip on March 8 in Hamad.[25] The IDF Bislamach Brigade continued offensive operations in Qarara, northern Khan Younis, and located tunnel shafts.[26] Hamas’ Qarara Battalion, which is in the Khan Younis Brigade, remains combat effective.[27]

Israeli media reported on March 8 that Israeli officials have discussed arming civilians in the Gaza Strip to provide security for aid convoys.[28] Local police are refusing to provide security for the convoys because of Israeli airstrikes targeting members of Hamas’ police force. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu postponed a decision on arming civilians. The United States has warned Israel that a “total breakdown of law and order” is exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in the strip.[29] The absence of a local security force contributes to this issue.[30]

A Palestinian journalist reported on March 8 that local tribal committees in the Gaza Strip agreed to ensure the safe passage of aid trucks in eastern Rafah after “local authorities” requested them to do so.[31] These ”local authorities“ are very likely Hamas. Hamas relies on its local police system to maintain social control. The IDF has targeted Hamas’ police and internal security apparatus to disrupt Hamas’ attempts to rebuild its governing authority in the Strip.[32] The Civil Police and the Hamas-controlled Interior Ministry's Internal Security Forces in the Gaza Strip both employ fighters from the Hamas military wing.[33]

Palestinian fighters have conducted one indirect fire attack from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on March 7.[34] PIJ claimed responsibility for the rocket attack.[35] The IDF 215th Artillery Brigade (162nd Division), which has been targeting Palestinian militia positions and assets in the northern Gaza Strip, shelled the areas from which Palestinian fighters fired rockets targeting southern Israel on March 7.[36] The IDF destroyed a weapons depot, tunnels, and a rocket launcher.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least four times across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on March 7.[37] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades conducted a complex attack targeting Israeli forces near Homesh, south of Jenin.[38] Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fighters first fired at an IDF outpost. The fighters then ambushed IDF reinforcements responding to the attack with small arms and rudimentary improvised explosive devices. A complex attack uses more than one type of weapon, such as IEDs and direct-fire weapons, to target opposing forces.

Hamas claimed that attacks targeting Israeli forces and Israeli settlers in the West Bank will intensify during Ramadan.[39]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 7.[40] Hezbollah claimed six total attacks.[41] The IDF said it intercepted a Hezbollah one-way attack drone that entered Israeli airspace on March 7.[42]

Israeli news reported that the IDF ordered Brig. Gen. Moshe Tamir to draft plans for a possible Israeli ground operation into southern Lebanon.[43] Israeli forces will reportedly use multiple entry points during a ground operation and seek to push Hezbollah forces 10 kilometers north of the Israel-Lebanon border. An operation that only pushes Hezbollah forces 10 kilometers from the Israeli border does not reach the Litani River. UNSC Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Lebanon War, stipulates that Hezbollah cannot maintain military positions south of the Litani River.[44] Tamir formerly served as the commander of the Golani Brigade (36th Division) and drafted the IDF’s clearing operation plans for the Gaza Strip.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war with Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Badr al Busaidi in a telephone call on March 8.[45] Abdollahian and Busaidi discussed the need for Muslim countries to pressure Israel to end the war. Abdollahian accused the United States of acting in “bad faith” during negotiations aimed at lifting unspecified sanctions on Iran. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi said in September 2023 that Oman would facilitate future nuclear negotiations between Iran and the West.[46]

US CENTCOM intercepted three drones that the Houthis launched toward the Gulf of Aden on March 7.[47] CENTCOM confirmed that its forces separately conducted preemptive strikes targeting four mobile anti-ship cruise missiles and one drone in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on March 7. Houthi-affiliated media confirmed that the strikes on March 7 struck areas in Hudaydah.[48]

Iran Update, March 7, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Amin Soltani, Andie Parry, Peter Mills, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Ahmad Omid Arman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Western media reported on March 7 that the United States will establish a temporary port in the Gaza Strip to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid.[1] US President Joe Biden is expected to announce the project during his State of the Union address on March 7. White House officials disclosed that the United States plans to build a temporary port off the coast of the Gaza Strip before moving the structure closer to shore. Western reporting noted that the project would require up to thousands of US service members stationed off the Mediterranean coast. Palestinian militias have previously condemned US humanitarian efforts in the Gaza Strip as insufficient and creating chaos.[2] CTP-ISW will follow up with additional details on the proposed temporary port in future updates.

Iranian military and security leaders are increasingly discussing the need to expand the Iranian military presence around the Red Sea and Mediterranean Sea. Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi—a senior military adviser to the Iranian supreme leader—stated on March 6 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy and Aerospace Force should “focus” on the Red Sea and Mediterranean Sea.[3] Safavi described the Mediterranean Sea as part of Iran’s strategic depth and that Tehran must accordingly “increase [its] strategic depth [by] 5,000 kilometers,” which would extend to the Strait of Gibraltar.[4] Safavi’s remarks come after IRGC Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi threatened in December 2023 that Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” could someday disrupt maritime traffic in the Mediterranean Sea and around the Strait of Gibraltar.[5] The Iranian desire to develop a military presence, especially a naval one, around the Mediterranean Sea and its periphery is not entirely new, as senior military officials have discussed the idea since at least 2016.[6]

The remarks from Safavi and Naghdi are noteworthy, nevertheless, given recent Iranian efforts in the area. Western media reported on March 3 that Iran requested Sudanese permission to establish a permanent naval base on the Red Sea, which would support Iranian out-of-area naval operations and attacks on international shipping.[7] Separately, Israel was likely responsible for an airstrike that killed an IRGC Navy colonel around the coastal city of Baniyas, Syria, on March 1.[8] An Israeli social media account observed that the naval officer may have worked on coastal missile defenses and/or electronic warfare.[9]

Iran would probably use an expanding military presence around the Red Sea and Mediterranean Sea to threaten commercial traffic, as Iran has long done so around the Persian Gulf and is currently supporting Houthi attacks on global commerce. Iran has invested in recent years in building surface vessels that are capable of hosting fast attack craft, drones, helicopters, and missiles. These vessels would not likely survive conventional engagements against the US Navy or other modern militaries—but they are optimized for the sort of commerce raiding that has long been a feature of Iranian regional strategy.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—appears to have refocused its attacks to target primarily Israel rather than US forces for the moment. The group has claimed four attacks targeting Israel in the first week of March, compared to three attacks targeting Israel in the month of February.[10] The group has contrastingly not claimed any attacks targeting US forces since February 4.[11] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq described its three most recent attacks as part of the “second phase of operations to . . . support our people in Gaza.”[12] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders have praised the Islamic Resistance in Iraq attack targeting Kiryat Shmona Airport on March 6 as the beginning of this second phase, which involves targeting Israeli airports and ports.[13] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq released a statement on March 6 stating that it means to expel US forces from Iraq and support Palestinian militias by continuing attacks targeting Israel until there is a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[14]

• The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed three drone attacks targeting industrial and military locations inside Israel on March 5–7.[15] The IDF reported on March 4 that it intercepted a drone entering from Syria.[16] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed three attacks in February 2023 targeting unspecified Israeli targets near Eilat, the Golan Heights, and the Dead Sea.[17]
• Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Alaa al Walai called for a second phase of attacks targeting Israel on January 23.[18] Walai specifically called for targeting Israel’s ports. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed on March 3 that the group launched drones targeting the Haifa port.[19] Israeli journalists reported that the IDF intercepted a drone near Haifa on February 29.[20]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed on March 7 that it launched drones targeting an IDF military airport near Safed, Israel.[21] The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) separately claimed on March 7 that it intercepted a drone that resembles drones previously launched by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.[22] A Syrian social media account stated that the intercepted drone was an Iranian-made Shahed-101 and speculated that the SAA could have intercepted the drone by mistake.[23]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Western media reported that the United States will establish a temporary port in the Gaza Strip to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid.
• Iran: Iranian military and security leaders are increasingly discussing the need to expand the Iranian military presence around the Red Sea and Mediterranean Sea.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq appears to have refocused its attacks to target primarily Israel rather than US forces for the moment.
• West Bank: Unidentified Palestinian fighters detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device targeting Israeli forces around Tubas.
• Iraq: Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki said that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias must refrain attacking US forces so that Baghdad can negotiate a timeline for the US withdrawal.
• Yemen: Houthi-affiliated media claimed that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted two airstrikes targeting Hudaydah.

Iran Update, March 6, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Amin Soltani, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Peter Mills, Marcus Mildenberger, Christian Engfer, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

IRGC Quds Force Commander Brig. Gen. Esmail Ghaani said on March 6 that Iran’s proxies and partners have taken a more “offensive stance” in the Israel-Hamas war, which frames the war in terms consistent with Iran’s regional military doctrine.[1] Ghaani issued this statement during a speech to the Assembly of Experts. Iran and the Axis aim to seize the operational initiative to dictate the tempo and terms of action in conflict and force Iran’s adversaries to react constantly.[2] IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami said in 2022 that Palestinian militias needed to focus on successive offensive ground operations into Israel instead of defensive, static wars using their rocket systems.[3] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Hamas’ decision to conduct a ground attack into Israel on October 7 may have been based on what Salami outlined in August 2022.[4]

The Houthis launched anti-ship missiles on March 6 that targeted a Greek-operated Barbados-flagged bulk-carrier in the Gulf of Aden and damaged the ship, killing two crewmembers and injuring at least six more.[5] The Houthi attack on March 6 forced the crew to abandon ship.[6] The crew was made up of south and southeast Asian nationals. The bulk-carrier, True Confidence, was carrying steel products and trucks from China to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.[7]

The March 6 attack is the first that has caused fatalities since the Houthis began attacking civilian ships in the Red Sea in November 2023. The Houthi attacks prior to March 6 were not calibrated to avoid casualties, however. These attacks—using drones, ballistic, and cruise missiles—risk the death of civilian crewmembers in every instance. A Houthi attack on February 18 that targeted the MV Rubymar caused the crew to abandon ship on February 18 and resulted in the sinking of the vessel on March 3.[8]

Houthi-affiliated media claimed that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted two airstrikes targeting Hudaydah International Airport on March 6.[9]

Palestinian militias claimed most of their attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip in southern Gaza City on March 6. Palestinian fighters used RPGs, sniper rifles, and mortars to target Israeli forces in Zaytoun neighborhood of Gaza City.[10] PIJ fighters mortared an IDF combat outpost south of Gaza City.[11] The IDF concluded a two-week long operation in Zaytoun on March 2 to re-clear Hamas fighters there.[12] Ongoing Palestinian attacks in the area suggest that Israeli forces did not fully clear Zaytoun and that Palestinian militias in southern Gaza City likely retain some capacity to fight.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran and the Israel-Hamas War: IRGC Quds Force Commander Brig. Gen. Esmail Ghaani said on March 6 that Iran’s proxies and partners have taken a more “offensive stance” in the Israel-Hamas war, which frames the war in terms consistent with Iran’s regional military doctrine.
• Iran and the Axis aim to seize the operational initiative to dictate the tempo and terms of action in conflict and force Iran’s adversaries to react constantly.
• IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami said in 2022 that Palestinian militias needed to focus on successive offensive ground operations into Israel instead of defensive, static wars using their rocket systems.
• Yemen: The Houthis launched anti-ship missiles on March 6 that targeted a Greek-operated Barbados-flagged bulk-carrier in the Gulf of Aden and damaged the ship, killing two crewmembers and injuring at least six more.
• Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias claimed most of their attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip in southern Gaza City on March 6.
• Negotiations: Hamas said on March 6 that it will continue ceasefire negotiations and claimed that it has “shown flexibility” in the talks. Egyptian officials with knowledge of the talks told the Wall Street Journal on March 6 that Egyptian intelligence chief Abbas Kamal prevented Hamas from walking away from negotiations.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The IDF conducted several airstrikes targeting Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) infrastructure and personnel in the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF Air Force killed two Palestinian fighters in Beit Hanoun who had fled to an unspecified “military location.”[13] The IDF also killed two Palestinian fighters involved in the October 7, 2023, attack and three commanders in Hamas’ elite Nukhba forces.[14] The IDF also struck Hamas and PIJ infrastructure in Jabalia, where Palestinian fighters had launched rockets into Israel within the last week.[15] The IDF struck apartments where Palestinian fighters stored weapons, as well as other weapons depots, rocket launchers, and tunnels.[16] Palestinian Mujahideen Movement fighters also targeted an Israeli tank with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) east of Jabalia on March 6.[17]

The IDF reported on March 6 that it killed the Hamas’ commander who oversaw rocket fire from the central Gaza Strip into Israel.[18] The IDF reported that the leader, Amar Atiya Darwish Aladani, was a military commander in Hamas for the past several decades and directed attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Strip and into Israel during the current war. Aladani also played a significant role in planning the October 7, 2023, attack, according to the IDF.

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in northern Khan Younis on March 6. The IDF 89th Commando Brigade (98th Division) raided buildings in the Hamad neighborhood that Hamas fighters had used previously. The 89th Commando Brigade captured several Palestinian fighters, including a commander from a Hamas sniper cell.[19] Israeli forces detained approximately 250 PIJ and Hamas fighters in the neighborhood.[20] The Bislamach Brigade demolished buildings and clashed with Palestinian fighters in Qarara.[21] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, fired at two Israeli soldiers in Qarara.[22] A Palestinian activist reported clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters in Hamad and Qarara.[23]

Hamas said on March 6 that it will continue ceasefire negotiations and claimed that it has “shown flexibility” in the talks.[24] Hamas reiterated its demands for a permanent ceasefire, the return of displaced people, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces, and sufficient humanitarian aid.[25] Hamas has consistently held its position on a permanent ceasefire.[26] Some of these elements, particularly the permanent ceasefire and a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces, are an obstacle in the ongoing negotiations.

Egyptian officials with knowledge of the talks told the Wall Street Journal on March 6 that Egyptian intelligence chief Abbas Kamal prevented Hamas from walking away from negotiations.[27]

Hamas’ proposal for a ceasefire includes the release of high-level Palestinian prisoners, according to Jordanian media.[28] The prisoners include a ”top“ Hamas “bombmaker” and the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The PFLP is a secular leftist Palestinian faction fighting with Hamas in the war. Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip are operating in a loose coalition and have aligned their stances in ceasefire negotiations.[29] Hamas has previously demanded the release of other high-level prisoners, including members of its elite Nukhba force.[30]

Parts of the Gaza Strip are experiencing a near-total telecommunications disruption. NetBlocks reported on March 5 that the disruption is particularly serious in the southern Gaza Strip.[31]

Palestinian militias did not claim any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 6.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least three times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on March 5.[32] The IDF detained 17 Palestinians in the West Bank overnight.[33]

Palestinian youth demonstrated in Qalandiya refugee camp north of Jerusalem against several countries for the temporary suspension of funding for the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East’s operations.[34]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 5.[35]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq —a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias— claimed it launched drones targeting Kiryat Shmona airport on March 6.[36]  The group separately claimed it launched drones targeting the Haifa power station near the airport on March 5.[37] The IDF has not acknowledged either attack. CTP-ISW cannot confirm that these attacks took place. 

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iraqi President Abdel Latif al Rashid met with Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev on March 6 to discuss Russian investment in Iraq and strengthening bilateral relations.[38] Russian and Iraqi officials have discussed Russian investment in Iraq in a series of meetings since January 2024, including several meetings focused on security cooperation.[39] CTP-ISW assessed on February 20 that Russia may be setting conditions to supplant the United States as a security partner in Iraq in anticipation of the United States possibly reducing its military presence there.[40]

Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki met with US Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski and US Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iran and Iraq Affairs Victoria Taylor on March 6.[41] Maliki said that the Iraqi government is eager to implement the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement after the International Coalition’s mission in Iraq ends.[42] The United States and Iraq have held a series of ”working group” meetings since January 2024 to discuss the International Coalition’s mission in Iraq and present an assessment of the capabilities of Iraqi Security Forces and of the threat posed by ISIS.[43] These meetings are a precursor to negotiations that Iraq seeks to use to transition from a multilateral security relationship between Iraq and the International Coalition to unspecified bilateral relationships between Iraq and individual coalition member countries.[44]

A Houthi official confirmed the group’s close ties with Iran.[45] He said that Iran provided technology and military expertise that enhanced the Houthis’ military and intelligence operations.[46] He reiterated prior Houthi claims that the group will stop attacking ships transiting through the Red Sea when there is a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. .[47] The Houthis conducted attacks targeting international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden prior to the Israel-Hamas War. The group could conduct attacks targeting international shipping in the future at minimal cost for reasons of its own choosing, even if a ceasefire is secured.

Jordanian border guards shelled unspecified targets inside Syria near the border with Jordan on March 6.[48] A local Syrian outlet reported that the Jordanian border guards targeted several farms outside Nassib, Daraa Governorate, on the Syria-Jordan border, without providing additional details.

The shelling is likely part of increasing Jordanian operations against smuggling networks in southwestern Syria. Jordanian forces have clashed with Iranian-backed smugglers along the Jordan-Syria border four other times since December 2023, including once on February 7.[49] The Jordanian Royal Air Force has also struck Iranian-backed drug smugglers three times since December 2023.[50] Western media reported in January that Western and Jordanian officials said that Lebanese Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed groups are driving the increase in drug smuggling into Jordan.[51] The Syrian regime, Lebanese Hezbollah, and other Iranian-backed militias mass produce Captagon in Syria and smuggle it through Jordan to the Gulf Arab states. This smuggling and distribution cartel generates billions of dollars in revenue for Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[52]

Israel likely conducted a drone strike targeting Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) assets in eastern Syria on March 6. Syrian opposition media reported that a drone strike targeted an IRGC military vehicle in Mayadin, Deir ez Zor Governorate.[53] One Syrian outlet reported that the strike injured two IRGC personnel.[54] The UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that the strike killed three Iranian-backed militia members.[55] This outlet sometimes incorrectly reports casualty counts and other events and information.[56] The IDF Air Force has increased its strikes into Syria since December 2023 to disrupt the IRGC Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah’s efforts to bring personnel and weapons into Lebanon from Syria.[57] Previous strikes killed several IRGC officers in Syria since December 2023, including an IRGC Navy officer on March 1.[58]

Iranian state media claimed that Iran offloaded crude oil from the Marshall Islands-flagged Advantage Sweet on March 6.[59] Iranian media claimed on March 6 that Iran offloaded the oil in response to longstanding American and European oil sanctions.[60] The Artesh Navy seized the Advantage Sweet in the Gulf of Oman in April 2023 as the vessel was transporting oil from the UAE to the United States.[61] American oil company Chevron chartered the Advantage Sweet at the time of the seizure.[62] Iran initially seized the Advantage Sweet in retaliation for US sanctions enforcements efforts, which included confiscating and unloading Iranian oil from the Suez Rajan.[63]

The Iranian Defense Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Ashtiani met with the Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan in Tehran on March 6.[64] Ashtiani said that countries in the region should be responsible for the security of the Caucasus region.Ashtiani was likely alluding to Iran’s belief that its adversaries outside the Caucasus, specifically the United States and Israel, are seeking to exploit conflict in the Caucasus to “undermine the security of the entire region.“[65] The Iranian regime has also historically accused Baku of allowing Israel to use Azerbaijani territory to launch operations against Iran, as CTP-ISW has reported on numerous occasions.[66]

Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, Peter Mills, Rachel Friedman, Ahmad Omid Arman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Iranian hardline factions are expected to retain their majority in parliament.[1] The majority of Tehran province’s 14 confirmed candidates were hardliners.[2] Incumbent hardline Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf was re-elected to parliament for Tehran province.[3] Parliamentarians will vote for the next parliament speaker after run-off elections conclude in late April or early May.[4] Forty-five candidates will compete in the run-off election.[5]

Iran’s March 1 Parliament elections had the lowest voter turnout of any election in the history of the Islamic Republic.[6] Approximately 25 million Iranians out of 61 million eligible voters voted for 290 candidates for Parliament and 88 candidates for the Assembly of Experts.[7] The Assembly of Experts is the body responsible for choosing the supreme leader’s successor. Iranian Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi reported an official voter turnout of 41%.[8] This figure is likely inflated, given the Iranian regime’s historical tendency to exaggerate voter turnout.[9] Iran reported a 43% voter turnout in its 2020 parliamentary election.[10]

US President Joe Biden warned on March 5 that without a ceasefire “the situation in Jerusalem will become very dangerous during Ramadan.”[11] Biden said that Hamas is the impediment to a ceasefire deal, not Israel.

Hamas’ senior representative to Lebanon Osama Hamdan confirmed that Hamas negotiators gave Qatari and Egyptian officials a response to the Paris ceasefire proposal “over the past two days” but that the group is prepared to continue fighting.[12] Hamdan stated that Hamas affirmed its conditions for a ceasefire, which are the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, the return of the displaced civilians to the northern Gaza Strip, and the supply of adequate aid, relief, and reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. Hamdan continued to blame the Israeli prime minister for the lack of a ceasefire. A Hamas Telegram channel posted on March 5 an undated quote from another senior Hamas leader that reiterated that the group would not discuss a hostage-for-prisoner exchange before a ceasefire, the total Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, reconstruction of the Strip, and the return of displaced persons to their homes.[13] Israeli media reported on March 4 that Hamas recently asked for Israel to release more of its high-level prisoners as part of the ceasefire agreement.[14] Western and Israeli media previously reported during the week of January 31 that Hamas demanded the release of its elite Nukhba special forces and Palestinian political faction leaders.[15] The Nukhba forces took part in the October 7 attacks.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant met US envoy Amos Hochstein on March 5 and warned that Hezbollah attacks are pushing Israel towards “a decision point regarding military action in Lebanon.”[16] Gallant reiterated that Israel is committed to political efforts to reach an agreement to resolve the ongoing hostilities along the Israel-Lebanon border. Gallant issued a similar warning on February 7 that the Israeli government could invade Lebanon in response to continuing Hezbollah attacks.[17]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Elections: Iranian hardline factions are expected to retain their majority in parliament. Iran’s March 1 Parliament elections had the lowest voter turnout of any election in the history of the Islamic Republic.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: US President Joe Biden warned on March 5 that without a ceasefire “the situation in Jerusalem will become very dangerous during Ramadan.” Biden said that Hamas is the impediment to a ceasefire deal, not Israel.
• Senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan stated that Hamas affirmed its conditions for a ceasefire, which are the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, the return of the displaced civilians to the northern Gaza Strip, and the supply of adequate aid, relief, and reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.
• Lebanon: Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant met US envoy Amos Hochstein on March 5 and warned that Hezbollah attacks are pushing Israel towards “a decision point regarding military action in Lebanon.” Gallant reiterated that Israel is committed to political efforts to reach an agreement to resolve the ongoing hostilities along the Israel-Lebanon border.
• Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias claimed an anomalously low number of attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip on March 5. CTP-ISW is considering two factors to explain the sharp decrease in attack claims.
• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s transition to the third phase of its ground operation has decreased the number of targets Hamas and its allies can attack during a given period. There are currently fewer Israeli forces deep in northern Gaza and thus fewer targets for the militias to attack.
• Palestinian militias may be experiencing communications difficulties.

Iran Update, March 4, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Ashka Jhaveri, Amin Soltani, Peter Mills, Andie Parry, Liam Karr, Marcus Mildenberger, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Iran reportedly requested Sudanese permission to establish a permanent naval base on the Red Sea coast, which would support Iranian out-of-area naval operations and attacks on international shipping. The Wall Street Journal reported the Iranian request on March 3, citing a senior Sudanese intelligence official.[1] Ahmad Hasan Mohamed—an intelligence adviser to the Sudanese military leader—said that Iran offered “a helicopter-carrying warship” in exchange for Sudan allowing Iran to establish the base. Mohamed stated that Iran wanted the base to gather intelligence on maritime traffic around the Suez Canal and Israel and to station warships at the base. The Wall Street Journal report is consistent with Iranian leaders advocating for building a naval base along the east African coast in recent years.[2] Mohamed added that Sudan rejected the Iranian request. Both the Iranian and Sudanese foreign affairs ministries have refuted the Wall Street Journal report.[3] The report follows Sudanese Armed Forces-affiliated Foreign Affairs Minister Ali al Sadiq Ali traveling to Tehran and meeting with senior Iranian officials in early February.[4]

The Iranian request to establish a naval base in Sudan is part of growing military cooperation between the two countries. Western media previously reported in January that Iran had recently supplied the Sudanese Armed Forces with Mohajer-6 multirole drones.[5] The Iranian effort to establish a naval base likely reflects how Tehran views its defense exports as a means of facilitating the expansion of its overall military influence abroad.

Iran may be attempting to compete with other rival Gulf Arab states in Sudan. The United Arab Emirates is the main backer of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) owing to various ties between the RSF head (Hemedti) and the emirates.[6] Abu Dhabi has invested in Sudan as part of its larger strategic effort to expand its influence along the Red Sea with friendly states and client ports.[7] The United Arab Emirates has funded and supplied the RSF with weapons and used neighboring Chad as a logistics hub for these efforts.[8]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran reportedly requested Sudanese permission to establish a permanent naval base on the Red Sea coast, which would support Iranian out-of-area naval operations and attacks on international shipping.
• Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters defended against Israeli clearing operations in the northern and central Gaza Strip.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued conducting clearing operations around northern Khan Younis.
• Negotiations: Hamas reportedly made the return of civilians to the northern Gaza Strip a priority in ceasefire negotiations with Israel.
• Iraq: Former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi discussed unspecified bilateral cooperation with US Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski and other US officials.
• Yemen: The Houthis launched anti-ship missiles that damaged the Liberian-flagged MSC Sky II commercial vessel in the Gulf of Aden. The Houthi military spokesperson claimed that the group launched an unspecified number of anti-ship ballistic missiles and drones targeting US warships in the Red Sea.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• West Bank: Israeli media reported that Shin Bet arrested four “ISIS-inspired” Palestinians who planned to attack the IDF near Hebron.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters defended against Israeli clearing operations in the northern and central Gaza Strip on March 4. Hamas published footage of its fighters firing mortars and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting Israeli forces advancing in Tal al Hawa neighborhood, southern Gaza City.[9] Hamas fighters also fired an anti-tank RPG targeting Israeli armor south of Tal al Hawa on March 4.[10] These attacks follow the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) concluding a two-week-long operation to reclear Zaytoun neighborhood in southeastern Gaza City of Hamas fighters.[11] Several other Palestinian militias attacked Israeli forces and military equipment across the northern Gaza Strip, including in eastern Jabalia.[12]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) killed 15 Palestinian fighters using aerial, sniper, and tank fire in the central Gaza Strip.[13] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, mortared Israeli armor in the central Gaza Strip.[14]

Israeli forces continued conducting clearing operations around northern Khan Younis on March 4. The IDF published details of an operation its forces conducted in the last few days in Hamad neighborhood in northwestern Khan Younis, which the IDF had not entered until March 3.[15] Two IDF brigades surrounded the neighborhood before Israeli special operations forces (SOF) raided the area. Israeli forces found weapons storage facilities and other unspecified infrastructure belonging to senior Hamas officials. An IDF intelligence assessment concluded that Palestinian fighters retreated from other areas in Khan Younis to hide in Hamad. Israeli forces detained about 80 Palestinians, including members of Hamas and PIJ, in Hamad.[16] The IDF Bislamach Brigade continued clearing operations in the Qarara area in northern Khan Younis, where Hamas’ local battalion remains combat effective.[17]

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in several other sectors of Khan Younis on March 4. Hamas fighters returned from areas of fighting in al Amal neighborhood in western Khan Younis and reported attacks targeting Israeli armor and personnel.[18] Hamas fighters also captured two IDF drones in the area through unspecified means.[19] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades reported that its fighters clashed with Israeli forces in eastern Khan Younis.[20] The militia also mortared Israeli vehicles near Hamad.[21]

Hamas reportedly made the return of civilians to the northern Gaza Strip a priority in ceasefire negotiations with Israel.[22] An Israeli official and an unidentified source familiar with the matter told Axios that Egyptian and Qatari mediators conveyed Hamas' readiness to reduce the number of Palestinian prisoners whom Israel would release as part of a possible ceasefire agreement. The mediators added, however, that Hamas would instead require the IDF to allow civilians to return to the northern Gaza Strip and that Israel allow more aid into the area. Israeli negotiators were “surprised [by] how important the issue is to Hamas.”[23] Hamas presented the issue of Palestinians returning to the north as a humanitarian one. Axios reported that Israel is concerned that Hamas could rebuild itself as a governing body if Palestinians are allowed to return to the north, which would undermine the Israeli war objective of destroying Hamas. Over one million Palestinians living in the northern Gaza Strip have been displaced due to Israeli military operations.

Hamas could use the return of civilians to the north to bring its own fighters back into the area. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Hamas is trying to reconstitute its military capabilities and rebuild its governance system in the northern Gaza Strip. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported in early February that Palestinian fighters are hiding among civilians in humanitarian shelters to evade capture and facilitate infiltration in the northern Gaza Strip.[24] Israeli forces have identified Palestinian fighters attempting to hide among civilians to disguise their movement elsewhere in the Gaza Strip as well.[25] Hamas retains a command structure in the northern Gaza Strip that is attempting to reconstitute Hamas cells.[26] The IDF has explicitly conducted operations to prevent Hamas fighters from infiltrating Gaza City from the southern Gaza Strip.[27]

An Israeli Arab journalist reported on March 4 that unspecified Palestinian clans in the Gaza Strip have pledged their allegiance to the Palestinian Authority (PA).[28] The clans rejected Israel’s post-war plan for administering the Gaza Strip, which the PA has itself criticized as well.[29] The journalist claimed that the PA urged these clans not to engage the IDF, including with regard to facilitating the distribution of humanitarian aid.[30]

This reported alignment follows the PA and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) indicating that they may reform themselves and are trying to unify Palestinian factions, including Hamas. PA Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh announced his cabinet’s resignation in late February amid calls for leadership changes within the PA.[31] The PLO separately attended an intra-Palestinian meeting in Moscow on February 29 to discuss the formation of a new Palestinian government.[32]

Palestinian militias conducted two indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip targeting southern Israel on March 4.[33] The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) identified PIJ fighters that fired rockets from the central Gaza Strip targeting towns in southern Israel on March 2.[34] Israeli forces directed an airstrike targeting the PIJ fighters.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in four locations across the West Bank on March 4.[35] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed IED and small arms attacks targeting Israeli forces near Tubas, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, and Ramallah.[36] Hamas and PIJ claimed attacks targeting Israeli forces in Tubas on March 4 as well.[37]

Israeli media reported on March 4 that Shin Bet arrested four “ISIS-inspired” Palestinians who planned to attack the IDF near Hebron.[38] Shin Bet reported that the four individuals assembled 100 IEDs and received training from ISIS cells abroad. ISIS previously called for attacks targeting Israel in January 2020 and October 2023.[39] ISIS also claimed two terror attacks targeting Israeli civilians in March 2022.[40]

The IDF Army Radio reported that unspecified senior Israeli officials warned that a possible escalation in violence in the West Bank during Ramadan could halt IDF operations in Gaza Strip.[41] The unspecified source said that a violent escalation could force the IDF to transfer forces from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 3. Hezbollah claimed that it detonated IEDs and fired artillery to repel Israeli forces attempting to enter Lebanon at two locations along the Israel-Lebanon border on March 4.[42] CTP-ISW cannot verify that the incident occurred. The IDF has not acknowledged any incident. An unspecified Iranian-backed militia group separately launched anti-tank missiles that killed a foreign farm worker and wounded seven others in Margaliot, Israel.[43]

Israel conducted airstrikes targeting the Hezbollah-affiliated Islamic Health Organization Civil Defense in southern Lebanon following the attack in Margaliot.[44] Hezbollah acknowledged that members of the civil defense organization died in the airstrike.[45]

Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem warned the IDF against “expanding the campaign into Lebanon” on March 4.[46] Qassem stated that Israel ”will find itself facing an upgraded version of the 2006 war” if Israeli forces enter Lebanon.[47]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi discussed unspecified bilateral cooperation with US Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski and other US officials on March 4.[48] Halbousi previously met with Romanowski on February 22 to discuss the US military presence in Iraq and the status of the US-led coalition mission to defeat ISIS.[49] Halbousi has previously indicated opposition to the Iranian-backed effort to expel US forces from Iraq.[50]

The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court removed Halbousi from his role as parliamentary speaker in November 2023 on charges of abusing power and violating his oath of office.[51] Halbousi claimed that the ruling was unconstitutional and meant to create political divisions within society.[52] Halbousi‘s expulsion from Parliament may have removed an obstacle for Iranian-backed actors to advance anti-US legislation and resolutions as CTP-ISW previously reported.[53]

The Houthis launched anti-ship missiles that damaged the Liberian-flagged MSC Sky II commercial vessel in the Gulf of Aden on March 4.[54] The UK Maritime Trade Operations Authority reported that one of two missiles impacted Sky II and set fire to the ship.[55] The crew later brought the fire under control, and the Sky II proceeded under its own power to its next port of call.[56]

The Houthi military spokesperson claimed that the group launched an unspecified number of anti-ship ballistic missiles and drones targeting US warships in the Red Sea on March 4.[57] Houthi-affiliated media claimed that the United States and United Kingdom conducted three airstrikes in northern Yemen on March 4.[58] US CENTCOM has not claimed any airstrikes or acknowledged the Houthi’s claimed attack on US warships at the time of this writing.

The Iranian defense minister discussed the Israel-Hamas war with his Qatari counterpart in Doha on March 4.[59] The Iranian defense minister is there to attend the 8th Doha International Maritime Defense Exhibition and Conference. The Iranian foreign affairs minister recently discussed a potential Israel-Hamas ceasefire, an exchange of prisoners, and the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip with the Qatari prime minister on March 1.[60]

The Iranian judiciary executed an alleged Israeli Mossad-affiliated individual on March 3 for allegedly aiding Israeli sabotage of Iranian defense ministry facilities in January 2023.[61] The Iranian judiciary accused the individual of transporting Israeli drones into Iran for the purpose of striking Defense Ministry facilities in Esfahan.[62] The Esfahan provincial chief justice claimed that Intelligence and Security Ministry and IRGC Intelligence Organization agents apprehended the individual.[63] Israel conducted a one-way drone attack on a military munitions factory near Esfahan City, Esfahan Province on January 28, 2023.[64] The Defense Ministry reportedly uses the targeted facility to produce ballistic missiles and drones.[65]

Iran Update, March 3, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Peter Mills, Amin Soltani, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) concluded a two-week long operation in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City on March 3. The continued Palestinian militia attacks demonstrate that Israeli forces have not fully cleared Zaytoun and Palestinian militias in southern Gaza City likely retain some capacity to fight despite the official end of the re-clearing effort.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces expanded clearing operations in Khan Younis on March 3.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas responded to the most recent ceasefire proposal with demands for a permanent ceasefire and increased humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip.
• Northern Israel: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting a chemical plant at the Haifa Port on March 1.
• Red Sea: Italian destroyer Caio Duilio intercepted an unspecified drone flying towards the ship in the Red Sea on March 2.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) concluded a two-week long operation in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City on March 3.[1] Israel launched the operation on February 20 to re-clear Hamas fighters from Zaytoun.[2] Palestinian militias sustained a high attack rate targeting Israeli forces throughout the operation and likely infiltrated the area from uncleared areas in the central Gaza Strip.[3] The IDF reported on March 3 that its 162nd Division killed over 100 fighters and destroyed Hamas- and Palestinian Islamic Jihad-affiliated military sites.[4]

Palestinian fighters continued to attack Israeli forces in Zaytoun on March 3. The continued Palestinian militia attacks demonstrate that Israeli forces have not fully cleared Zaytoun and Palestinian militias in southern Gaza City likely retain some capacity to fight despite the official end of the re-clearing effort.[5] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, claimed several attacks targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun and south of the neighborhood using rocket-propelled grenades and mortars.[6]

Palestinian Mujahideen Movement fighters fired an anti-tank rocket targeting an Israeli tank east of Jabalia.[7]

Israeli forces expanded clearing operations in Khan Younis on March 3.[8] The IDF Air Force conducted a wave of airstrikes as part of shaping efforts to enable ground maneuvers.[9] Local footage and reports confirmed that the IDF expanded operations to a pocket of uncleared area in Qarara in northern Khan Younis and Hamad neighborhood in northwestern Khan Younis.[10] Hamas’ Qarara Battalion in the Khan Younis Brigade remains combat effective.[11] Palestinian journalists reported that the IDF set up a checkpoint in Hamad neighborhood and told civilians to evacuate to the Mawasi humanitarian zone or Deir al Balah.[12]

Hamas responded to the most recent ceasefire proposal with demands for a permanent ceasefire and increased humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip. This is consistent with Hamas’ prior demands during ceasefire negotiations. International mediators have been waiting on a response from Hamas regarding the February 23 framework that included a six-week pause in fighting and the release of 400 Israeli-held Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Hamas releasing 40 Israeli hostages.[13] Israel has reportedly accepted the proposal.[14] An Israeli official told Israeli media on March 3 that Israel received an answer from Hamas about the framework. The official said that Hamas did not in its answer address Israel’s demand to receive information on the status of the hostages it holds in the Gaza Strip and how many Palestinian prisoners Israel must release for every hostage freed.[15] A senior Hamas official told an unspecified Qatari newspaper that Hamas "will not provide any details about the abductees it is holding without significant relief [for]...the residents of Gaza and the application of a comprehensive ceasefire."[16]

A “highly placed” diplomatic source told CNN that Hamas would not agree to any hostage deal without Israel agreeing “to [a] permanent ceasefire or at least a path to a ceasefire,” an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and allowing Gazan civilians to reenter the northern Strip.[17] Hamas is also demanding a certain amount of aid reach the southern and northern strip before agreeing to a deal. The source assessed that it is unlikely they will reach a deal in the next 48 hours.

A Hamas delegation arrived in Cairo on March 3 for ceasefire talks that US and Egyptian negotiators are also expected to attend.[18] An unspecified senior Hamas source confirmed to CNN that the delegation arrived. The official refused to confirm any details about the groups’ position, noting that what is being reported is “speculation and leaks.” It is unclear what parts of Hamas’ reported position the official was referring to. Israeli negotiators were initially expected to attend the talks in Cairo. However, unspecified Israeli officials stated on March 3 that Israel would not send a delegation to Cairo after Hamas reiterated its demands for a permanent ceasefire.[19]

Two US sources told Axios that US President Joe Biden urged Qatari and Egyptian leaders to “get a deal” from Hamas before the start of Ramadan.[20] Biden spoke with the leaders on February 29 to discuss ceasefire negotiations. Ramadan is expected to begin on March 10. Israeli officials, including War Cabinet member Benny Gantz, have warned that Israeli forces will begin clearing operations in Rafah at the start of Ramadan if Hamas does not release the remaining Israeli hostages the group holds.[21]

Palestinian fighters conducted three indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on March 3.[22]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in six locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 2.[23]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 2.[24]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq — a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias — claimed a drone attack targeting a chemical plant at the Haifa Port on March 1.[25] The group announced the attack on March 3. The IDF did not report a drone attack on Haifa on March 1, but an Israeli journalist reported that the IDF did shoot down a “suspicious aerial target” over the city on February 29.[26] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq last attacked Israel on February 12 in the Golan Heights.[27] The group has not claimed an attack on US forces since February 4 but has continued attacks targeting Israel.[28]

Italian destroyer Caio Duilio intercepted an unspecified drone flying towards the ship in the Red Sea on March 2.[29]

Iran Update, March 2, 2024

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Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to operate in the northern and central Gaza Strip on March 2. Hamas targeted Israeli forces in Zaytoun with rocket-propelled grenades and explosively-formed penetrators.
• Southern Gaza Strip: The IDF 89th Commando Brigade (98th Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis.
• Humanitarian Aid: The United States airdropped humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip for the first time on March 2.
• Yemen: US CENTCOM conducted a preemptive strike targeting a surface-to-air missile that Houthi fighters had prepared to launch from Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory into the Red Sea.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to operate in the northern and central Gaza Strip on March 2. The IDF 215th Artillery Brigade (162nd Division) directed an airstrike targeting three Palestinian fighters in western Gaza City’s Rimal neighborhood.[1] Israeli forces concluded a clearing operation to reduce Hamas fighters and infrastructure in neighborhoods including Rimal on February 15.[2] The IDF joint special operations multidimensional unit and Nahal Brigade killed several fighters in the central Gaza Strip on March 2.[3] The Nahal Brigade has been operating in Zaytoun as part of the IDF’s clearing operation there, which began on February 20.

Hamas fighters in southeastern Zaytoun resumed contact with their headquarters and reported several attacks targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun.[4] The fighters detonated explosively-formed penetrators and fired anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at Israeli armor in the area.[5]

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement claimed to shoot down an IDF reconnaissance drone over Beit Lahia.[6]

The IDF 89th Commando Brigade (98th Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis.[7] Israeli forces found small arms during a raid targeting a building owned by Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The IDF 7th Brigade directed a series of airstrikes that killed eight Palestinian fighters in Khan Younis, including one who was carrying a suspected IED.[8]

Hamas fighters detonated a house-borne improvised explosive device (HBIED) targeting seven Israeli soldiers in northern Khan Younis on March 2.[9] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, reported that its fighters conducted several attacks using mortars and RPGs in Khan Younis City.[10]

The United States airdropped humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip for the first time on March 2.[11] US Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Jordanian Air Force delivered 38,000 meals along the coastline of the Gaza Strip. US President Joe Biden said on March 1 that the "aid flowing to Gaza is nowhere [near] enough.”[12] An unspecified US official told Axios that he expected more airdrops to take place in the coming days.[13]

A senior US official told reporters that there needs to be a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip to allow for the large-scale delivery of aid.[14] Israel has reportedly agreed to a framework that would release up to 400 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for 40 Israeli hostages and a six-week truce.[15]

Palestinian militias have conducted at least two rocket attack from the Gaza Strip targeting southern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on March 1. PIJ fired rockets targeting Ashkelon and other unspecified towns in southern Israel on March 1.[16] The IDF Air Force targeted two areas in the northern Gaza Strip from which Palestinian fighters had previously fired rockets targeting Israel on March 1.[17] PIJ fired another rocket salvo targeting Hatzerim in southern Israel on March 2.[18]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in two locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 1.[19]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 1.[20]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

US CENTCOM conducted a preemptive strike targeting a surface-to-air missile that Houthi fighters had prepared to launch from Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory into the Red Sea.[21] Houthi fighters also launched an anti-ship ballistic missile from Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory into the Red Sea on March 1. CENTCOM reported that the Houthi attack did not damage any vessels.

Iran Update, March 1, 2024

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Annika Ganzeveld, Ashka Jhaveri, Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, Tor Lansing, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

Iran held separate elections for Parliament and the Assembly of Experts on March 1.[1] These elections will likely preserve and possibly even reinforce hardliner influence in the Iranian regime. Parliament is the primary legislative body in the Iranian regime, though it is a relatively weak institution in the Iranian political landscape. One of Parliament’s most important roles is selecting a parliament speaker, who will serve ex officio on more prominent regime policymaking bodies, such as the Supreme National Security Council, Supreme Economic Coordination Council, and Supreme Cultural Revolution Council. Iranian parliamentarians serve four-year teams. Hardline political factions currently dominate Parliament and will likely continue doing so after the votes are counted. The Assembly of Experts is an Iranian regime entity constitutionally responsible for monitoring the supreme leader and selecting his successor.[2] Assembly members serve eight-year terms and are almost exclusively senior Shia clerics. 

The Iranian regime is continuing to engineer national elections to consolidate hardline influence in the political establishment. The Guardian Council—a regime body responsible for supervising elections and vetting candidates—barred many moderate and reformist candidates from competing in the March 1 Assembly of Experts and parliamentary elections.[3] The Guardian Council barred former moderate President Hassan Rouhani from running for reelection to the Assembly of Experts, for example.[4] The Guardian Council previously disqualified 80 percent of candidates in the 2016 Assembly of Experts elections and 49 percent of candidates in the 2020 parliamentary elections.[5] The Guardian Council often disqualifies moderate and reformist figures to guarantee hardliner victories in these races. The Guardian Council spokesperson claimed on February 28 that the council had disqualified only 25 percent of parliamentary candidates for the most recent vote, although it is unclear how accurate this number is.[6] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei personally approves directly or indirectly the members of the 12-person Guardian Council, suggesting that the council operates with the backing of the supreme leader.

Voter turnout appeared to hit a record low, likely reflecting the population’s growing disillusionment with the regime. Initial reports indicate that voter participation was around 27 percent nationally and 12 percent in Tehran on March 1.[7] A voter turnout of approximately 30 percent would mark a record low for public participation in parliamentary elections since the Iranian revolution. Voter participation in parliamentary elections previously reached a record low of 42.5 percent in 2020. Voter participation in the presidential election in 2021 similarly hit a record low of 48.8 percent.[8] These recent numbers are particularly striking given that electoral participation has historically been high in Iran over the past few decades.[9] Regime officials have repeatedly called on the population to participate in the elections, likely reflecting concerns about low voter turnout amid calls for boycotting the elections.[10]

This year’s Assembly of Experts election is uniquely significant, as it could very well oversee the succession of Iran’s next supreme leader. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is currently 84 years old and will be 92 by the time of the next Assembly of Experts election in 2032. This cohort of the Assembly of Experts will at least formally choose Khamenei’s successor if he dies or otherwise leaves his post before then.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran held separate elections for Parliament and the Assembly of Experts. These elections will likely preserve and possibly even reinforce hardliner influence in the Iranian regime. Voter turnout appeared to hit a record low, likely reflecting the population’s growing disillusionment with the regime. This year’s Assembly of Experts election is uniquely significant, as it could very well oversee the succession of Iran’s next supreme leader.
• Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias defended against Israeli operations in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western and eastern Khan Younis.
• Political Negotiations: An unspecified senior Israeli official reported that Israel will not continue ceasefire negotiations until Hamas provides information on the status of the hostages it holds in the Gaza Strip.
• West Bank: Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in 13 locations across the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Syria: Israel was likely responsible for an airstrike that killed an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy officer in Baniyas, Syria.
• Yemen: US CENTCOM intercepted a drone over the Red Sea and conducted two preemptive strikes targeting six mobile, anti-ship cruise missiles in Houthi-controlled Yemen.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias defended against Israeli operations in the northern Gaza Strip on March 1. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched a new, “division-wide” clearing operation in the Zaytoun neighborhood in eastern Gaza City on February 20.[11] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) published footage on March 1 of its fighters clashing with Israeli forces in Zaytoun.[12] The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division), which has been operating in Zaytoun, killed a Palestinian cell with mortar fire and small arms during clearing operations.[13] The Popular Resistance Committees (PRC), a Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, reported that it fired rockets targeting Israeli military positions in the northern Gaza Strip. The PRC’s attack was in response to the humanitarian aid convoy incident on February 28.[14]

The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, reported that its fighters clashed with Israeli forces east of Jabalia refugee camp.[15] Palestinian Mujahideen Movement fighters similarly fired an unspecified guided munition at an IDF tank east of Jabalia.[16] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement is a Palestinian faction aligned with Hamas and has expressed close ties with Iran.[17]

PIJ and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades mortared Israeli personnel near the Erez border crossing with Israel.[18]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western and eastern Khan Younis on March 1. Israeli forces expanded clearing operations to “new areas” east and west of Khan Younis on February 21.[19] The IDF 7th Brigade (36th Division) raided the homes of senior Hamas officials in western Khan Younis and located a weapons depot.[20] The IDF Givati Brigade (162nd Division) has been operating in eastern Khan Younis neighborhoods for the past week, approximately two kilometers from the border with Israel.[21]

Palestinian fighters defended against Israeli operations in several sectors of Khan Younis on March 1. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades clashed with Israeli forces in al Qarara north of Khan Younis.[22] The militia also reported that its fighters in western Khan Younis fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and mortars targeting Israeli forces.[23]

Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, described high casualties among Palestinian civilians as a means to add international pressure on Israel should the IDF proceed with clearing operations in Rafah.[24] Sinwar’s comments reflect Hamas’ tendency to view civilian casualties as a tool to pressure Israel. The Wall Street Journal reported on February 29 that senior Hamas officials in Doha met in early February 2023 amid concerns that Hamas’ military wing in the Gaza Strip was taking heavy losses.[25] Sinwar delivered a message to the leaders claiming that the military wing is doing fine and is ready for an Israeli offensive into Rafah. Sinwar’s comments regarding civilian casualties are reflective of a broader Hamas mindset. A member of Hamas’ Political Bureau indicated two weeks after the October 7, 2023, attacks that the group was prepared to accept heavy losses for the attack—possibly even including high civilian casualties in the Gaza Strip—in support of Hamas’ effort to destroy the Israeli state.[26] There are over a million displaced Palestinian civilians currently in Rafah.[27]

An unspecified senior Israeli official reported that Israel will not continue ceasefire negotiations until Hamas provides information on the status of the hostages it holds in the Gaza Strip.[28] The official said that Qatari and Egyptian mediators failed to provide details from Hamas on the status of hostages.[29] Israel also wants Hamas to offer a ”serious response” on the number of Palestinian prisoners Israel would release under a deal.[30] Israel previously refused to further engage in hostage talks because Hamas demanded that Israel release thousands of Palestinian prisoners as part of the deal.[31] Israel has reportedly agreed since then to a framework that would release up to 400 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for 40 Israeli hostages and a six-week truce.[32] Israel is waiting to see whether the United States’ pressure on mediators and US President Joe Biden’s recent talks with Egyptian and Qatari officials will prompt Hamas to meet Israeli demands.[33]

Hamas claimed on March 1 that seven hostages died due to Israeli airstrikes in the Gaza Strip.[34] Hamas and other Palestinian militias holding hostages in the strip have repeatedly made this claim throughout the war.[35]

Hamas and Fatah agreed to continue meeting with each other after attending talks in Moscow.[36] Several Palestinian factions met in Moscow on February 29 to discuss the formation of a new Palestinian government. Hamas’ political wing published a statement signed by the “Factions that met in Moscow” saying that the talks between several Palestinian factions had been constructive.[37] Fatah emphasized the need for unity among Palestinian factions given the current war in the Gaza Strip after the meeting.[38]

Palestinian militias did not claim any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 1. The IDF Air Force targeted an area in the northern Gaza Strip from which Palestinian fighters previously fired rockets targeting Israel on February 29.[39] The PRC claimed the rocket attack.[40]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in 13 locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 29.[41] Local PIJ battalions claimed to have clashed with Israeli forces seven times around Jaba and Jenin.[42] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades clashed with Israeli forces around Hebron, Jenin, and Tulkarm.[43]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 29.[44]

The IDF is continuing to increase its combat readiness around northern Israel. Former IDF spokesperson Avi Benayahu stated that Israeli forces are conducting training meant to simulate combat against Hezbollah around the Israel-Lebanon border.[45]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Israel was likely responsible for an airstrike that killed an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy officer in Baniyas, Syria, on March 1.[46] Syrian media reported that the officer, Colonel Reza Zarei, had connections to Hamas.[47] Syrian media also reported that the airstrike killed three other individuals, two of whom were members of Lebanese Hezbollah.[48] Iranian state media reported that Zarei was assigned to the IRGC’s 1st Naval District, which is responsible for the Strait of Hormuz.[49]

It is unclear what Zarei was doing in Syria, although his deployment to Syria reflects the greater role that the IRGC services other than the Quds Force have assumed in Iran’s regional activities in recent years. The IRGC deployed its regular ground units, for instance, to fight in the Syrian civil war on behalf of Bashar al Assad, as CTP-ISW has assessed extensively.[50] The IRGC Navy and Aerospace Force have similarly increased their operations in Syria in recent years.[51] The Quds Force remains the lead Iranian entity for managing and supporting the so-called “Axis of Resistance” and conducting extraterritorial operations. But the Quds Force also appears to increasingly share part of that mission with other elements of the Iranian security apparatus.[52]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war during phone calls with his Turkish counterpart and the Qatari prime minister on February 29 and March 1, respectively. Abdollahian emphasized the need for cooperation among Islamic countries to end the war.[53] Abdollahian discussed a potential ceasefire, an exchange of prisoners, and the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip with the Qatari prime minister.[54]

US CENTCOM intercepted a drone over the Red Sea and conducted two preemptive strikes targeting six mobile, anti-ship cruise missiles in Houthi-controlled Yemen on February 29.[55] CENTCOM reported that the drone and cruise missiles presented imminent threats to merchant and US naval vessels in the region.

Iran Update, February 23, 2024

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Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Kathryn Tyson, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST 

The Houthis claimed that Saudi Arabia and the United States conducted combined airstrikes in Houthi-controlled territory on February 23, likely to pressure Saudi Arabia to exert its influence on the United States to decrease US strikes targeting Houthi military assets.[1] A Houthi-controlled media outlet claimed that the alleged US-Saudi strikes hit unspecified targets in Amran, Marib, Saada, Hajjah, Taiz, Dhamar, Sanaa, Bayda, and Hudaydah provinces. The Houthi outlet also claimed that the strikes resulted in civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure. A Saudi strike on Houthi-controlled territory would constitute a violation of the Yemeni ceasefire that went into effect in April 2022.[2] Saudi Arabia seeks to maintain its truce with the Houthis and has discouraged US attacks against the Houthis during the current escalation in the Red Sea.[3] CTP-ISW has not recorded any indications that Saudi Arabia conducted an airstrike into Houthi-controlled territory on February 23. Saudi Arabia, the Yemeni government, and the Houthis have maintained the ceasefire past its official expiration in October 2022.[4]

The Houthis are "fortifying” missile launch sites according to individuals “with knowledge of the situation” cited by Bloomberg on February 22, which will enable the Houthis to continue offensive attacks on military and civilian vessels in the Red Sea.[5] The sources claimed the Houthis are “fortifying” missile launch positions in the mountains and increasing one-way surface naval attack drone and one-way subsurface naval attack drone tests. This is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment on February 22 that Iran and the Houthis are likely using their attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden to test and refine their approach to striking naval targets.[6] Houthi attacks provide Iran and the Houthis opportunities to evaluate the effectiveness of different strike packages to understand how they can evade and overwhelm US air and maritime defenses more effectively. The Houthi effort to better defend its launch sites enables to Houthis to continue offensive operations—namely, cruise and ballistic missile fire—that test US defense capabilities.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted six preemptive strikes targeting Houthi one-way attack drones and mobile anti-ship ballistic missiles and intercepted three one-way attack drones since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on February 22.[7] CENTCOM stated that it intercepted two mobile anti-ship cruise missiles and conducted four preemptive strikes targeting “Iranian-backed Houthi [drones]” on February 22. CENTCOM intercepted three one-way attack drones operating near commercial vessels in the Red Sea on February 23.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proposed a post-war plan for the Gaza Strip.[8] The proposal is the first time Netanyahu has presented a written position on his post-war plans. A senior aid to Netanyahu said the goal of the plan was to present principles that would get the “broadest consensus possible.”[9] Israeli media reported that Israel will continue its military operations in the Gaza Strip with the aim of destroying the military capabilities and governance infrastructure of Hamas and PIJ, securing the return of hostages, and preventing further threats from the Gaza Strip.[10]

The proposal covers long-term plans related to security, governance, and reconstruction. The IDF will maintain “operational freedom” in the Gaza Strip and establish a buffer zone along the Israeli border under the proposal.[11] Israel will also control the Gaza-Egypt border and monitor demilitarization efforts in the Gaza Strip. Unspecified "local elements with management experience" will be responsible for civilian management and public order in the strip.[12] Axios reported that the plan does not rule out a role for the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip, although it does not specifically mention the PA either.[13] Lastly, the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip will only be possible after the completion of the demilitarization process and the beginning of a “de-radicalization process.”[14]

Key Takeaways:

• Yemen: The Houthis claimed that Saudi Arabia and the United States conducted combined airstrikes in Houthi-controlled territory on February 23, likely to pressure Saudi Arabia to exert its influence on the United States to decrease US strikes targeting Houthi military assets.
• Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias continued to disrupt Israeli operations in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis.
• Political Negotiations: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proposed a post-war plan for the Gaza Strip.
• Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh completed a three-day trip to Cairo to discuss a hostage deal.
• Iran: US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby said on February 23 that the United States has not yet confirmed that Iran transferred ballistic missiles to Russia.
• The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two Iranian and Iran-linked entities on February 23 for facilitating the transfer of Iranian drones to Russia

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias continued to disrupt Israeli operations in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City on February 23. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters ambushed Israeli armor in Zaytoun using unspecified munitions.[15] Hamas published footage on February 23 that shows its fighters firing mortars and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun.[16] Several other Hamas-aligned militias clashed with Israeli forces in Zaytoun.[17] [18] Israeli forces located weapons and military equipment in the area.

The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed several Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip on February 23.[19] PIJ fighters mortared Israeli forces east of the central Gaza Strip.[20]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis on February 23. The 89th Commando Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division) continued to direct airstrikes, ambush Palestinian fighters with sniper fire, and clash with Palestinian fighters in western Khan Younis.[21] Israeli forces raided military infrastructure and located improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other weapons. The IDF Air Force destroyed a weapons depot in western Khan Younis.[22] PIJ and Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine fighters detonated explosive devices in two separate attacks targeting Israeli forces in al Amal neighborhood in western Khan Younis.[23] The DFLP is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war.

Palestinian militias clashed with Israeli forces in eastern Khan Younis on February 23. PIJ fighters detonated an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) targeting Israeli engineers in an ambush in eastern Khan Younis.[24] The militia also reported that its fighters fired a tandem-charge anti-tank rocket targeting Israeli forces in the same area.[25]

The IDF Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) launched an attack targeting Palestinian fighters and military infrastructure in an unspecified area of Khan Younis.[26] The IDF Air Force struck Palestinian militia sniper positions and weapons storage facilities prior to the attack.[27]

Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh completed a three-day trip to Cairo to discuss a hostage deal.[28] An unspecified Hamas official reported on February 23 that Hamas did not offer a new proposal to Egyptian mediators.[29] Hamas is waiting to see what US, Egyptian, and Qatari mediators can accomplish during talks in Paris, according to the Hamas official. The same official said that Israeli negotiators arrived in Paris on February 23.[30]

Palestinian militias did not conduct indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on February 23.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least six times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 22.[31] Israeli forces conducted a drone strike that killed a PIJ commander in Jenin.[32]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 22.[33]

Israel conducted an airstrike that killed a senior Lebanese Hezbollah member in the group’s elite Radwan Force in southern Lebanon on February 22.[34] Israeli and Lebanese sources reported that the Hezbollah member specialized in operating anti-tank systems and that he had operated in Shebaa Farms during the Israeli-Hamas war.[35]

The Israeli Navy concluded a week-long military exercise in northern Israel on February 23.[36] The Israeli Navy held drills to simulate countering drones, conducting aerial rescue operations, and refueling vessels.[37] Israeli media reported that Israel’s naval exercises are preparations for a potential war with Hezbollah.[38] Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz said on February 23 that Israel will not wait ”much longer for a diplomatic solution in the north.”[39]

Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz said on February 22 that Iran accelerated the pace of its weapon shipments to Lebanese Hezbollah after the beginning of the Israel-Hamas War.[40] Katz said in a letter to the UN Security Council that Iran’s shipments included ”components for air defense systems, drones, and several different missiles.“[41] The IDF Air Force said on February 3 and 19 that it has struck many Iranian, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Syrian targets in Syria since the start of the Israel-Hamas war.[42]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby said on February 23 that the United States has not yet confirmed that Iran transferred ballistic missiles to Russia.[43] Kirby added that the United States plans to impose additional sanctions on Iran for its support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine and that the United States is “prepared to go further” if Iran supplies ballistic missiles to Russia. Kirby noted that Iran seeks a significant amount of Russian military equipment in return for its material support to Russia. Iranian sources told Reuters on February 21 that Iran provided hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia in early January.[44]

The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two Iranian and Iran-linked entities on February 23 for facilitating the transfer of Iranian drones to Russia.[45] OFAC designated the following Iranian and Iran-linked entities: 

• The Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry for helping to finance and produce Iranian drones at the Alabuga facility in Tatarstan, Russia.
• The Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry-affiliated and UAE-based Generation Trading FZE for facilitating the sale of Iranian drone samples, parts, and ground stations that enable the Russian production of Iranian drones at the Alabuga facility.

Iran’s arms sales to Russia are part of Iran’s efforts to generate revenue to support its deteriorating economy.[46] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could seek to acquire cash from Russia in return for supplying Russia with missiles.[47] The Prana Network hacker group published documents on February 4 alleging that Russia is paying Iran roughly $4.5 billion per year to import the Iranian Shahed series drones.[48]

Iran Update, February 16, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Alexandra Braverman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces continued targeting Hamas commanders and fighters in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces found medications belonging to Hamas-held hostages and weapons in Nasser Hospital in western Khan Younis.
• West Bank: A Palestinian resident of east Jerusalem conducted a shooting attack in Kiryat Malachi on February 16, injuring four and killing two.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The Israel Defense Forces conducted a training exercise to increase the combat readiness of forces stationed on Israel’s northern border.
• Iraq: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani met with the commander of NATO Allied Joint Force Command Naples to discuss NATO’s Mission Iraq.
• Yemen: The Houthis likely conducted a missile attack targeting an unspecified Panama-flagged commercial vessel in the Red Sea.
• Iran: Two unspecified Western officials and an IRGC-affiliated individual told the New York Times that Israel was responsible for the February 14 explosions on natural gas pipelines in central Iran.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip. 

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued targeting Hamas commanders and fighters in the northern Gaza Strip on February 16. The IDF 215th Artillery Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed an aide to the Sabra Battalion commander in Hamas’ Gaza City Brigade.[1] Israeli forces killed the previous Sabra Battalion commander in November 2023.[2] Hamas has likely replaced the Sabra commander since his death as part of its effort to reconstitute itself militarily in the northern Gaza Strip. Israeli aircraft struck a vehicle and killed three Hamas fighters in the northern Gaza Strip.[3]

Palestinian militias conducted two indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip.[4] CTP-ISW cannot determine the point of origin at this time.

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip on February 16. The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed several Palestinian fighters, and the IDF Air Force targeted a Palestinian fighter squad near Israeli ground forces.[5]

Israeli forces found medications belonging to Hamas-held hostages and weapons in Nasser Hospital in western Khan Younis on February 16.[6] Israeli special operations forces began operating in Nasser Hospital on February 15 after receiving “credible intelligence” that Hamas-held hostages were in the hospital.[7] Israeli forces detained 20 fighters who participated in the October 7, 2023, attack as well as dozens of suspects for questioning.[8] The IDF Maglan Unit (assigned to the 98th Division) found mortars, grenades, and weapons belonging to Hamas in the hospital area.[9] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, claimed attacks targeting Israeli forces in the vicinity of Nasser Hospital for the third consecutive day.[10]

The IDF reported on February 16 that it has been causing “significant damage” to Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade.[11] Israeli forces killed several Palestinian fighters, raided military targets, and disarmed an improvised explosive device (IED) in Khan Younis.[12] Several Palestinian militias attempted to defend against Israeli clearing operations, primarily in eastern Khan Younis, on February 16.[13] Israeli forces began conducting clearing operations in Khan Younis in early December 2023.[14]

Israel withdrew the IDF 646th Paratroopers Brigade from Khan Younis on February 15.[15] Only Israeli regular units remain in the Gaza Strip.[16]

Hamas policemen shot and killed a child, who was attempting to take food from a humanitarian aid truck in Rafah.[17] Riots erupted in the border area between Rafah and Egypt in response to the incident. The child’s family issued a statement holding Hamas responsible.[18] Israeli media reported that an unnamed Hamas official on the border denied the incident, saying that “there is no truth in what is being spread in the media and social networks.”[19]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that Israel will not evacuate Palestinian civilians from Rafah to Egypt.[20] Gallant reported that Israel is “thoroughly planning future operations in Rafah” but did not offer more details.[21] Egypt has repeatedly raised concerns that an Israeli operation into the southern Gaza Strip will cause a flood of Palestinian refugees into Egypt and has even taken to reinforcing its border with the strip.[22]

US President Joe Biden reiterated to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Israel must have a plan for ensuring the safety of civilians in Rafah before proceeding with a military operation.[23] An Israeli official reported that the conversation lasted 40 minutes. Israel has not publicly outlined a plan for how it would evacuate civilians from Rafah in the event of a military operation there.

Israeli President Isaac Herzog “secretly” met with Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammad Bin Abdulrahman al Thani to discuss the release of Hamas-held hostages in the Gaza Strip, according to two sources familiar with the meeting.[24] The two met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu declined to send an Israeli delegation to Cairo for follow-up talks on February 14 due to Hamas’ demand that thousands of Palestinian prisoners be released as part of the deal.[25] An Israeli official told Axios that there is some progress and that Hamas may be willing to “soften its position.”[26]

Palestinian militias conducted three indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on February 16. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired rockets targeting an Israeli military site and Ashkelon from the northern Gaza Strip.[27] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters also fired rockets targeting Ashkelon.[28] An Israeli military correspondent reported that three rockets landed in the sea.[29] The launches demonstrate that Palestinian militias in the northern Gaza Strip retain some ability to fire rockets into Israel, despite Israeli operations.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

A Palestinian resident of east Jerusalem conducted a shooting attack in Kiryat Malachi on February 16, injuring four and killing two.[30] Israeli media reported the gunman fired at a bus stop.[31] The Mujahideen Brigades boasted that terror attacks like this one evade Israeli security. Hamas responded to the attack by repeating its previous calls for Palestinian civilians to conduct terror attacks targeting Israelis.[32] Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF found an identification card in the attacker’s vehicle and used it to identify the perpetrator.[33] Local footage showed Israeli forces engaged in clashes with unidentified Palestinian fighters in Shuafat shortly after the shooting attack.[34] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that the attack north of Kiryat Malachi “reminds us that the whole country is a front and that the murderers, who come not only from Gaza, want to kill us all.”[35]

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in three locations across the West Bank. The al Quds Brigades, which is the militant wing of PIJ, in Jenin fired at Israeli forces stationed at the Dotan checkpoint, south of the Israeli Mevo Dotan settlement.[36] Israeli forces arrested one wanted individual in Aqaba, east of Tubas, for shooting at Israeli forces.[37] Unidentified Palestinian fighters threw improvised explosive devices at Israeli forces around Aqaba.[38] Unidentified Palestinian fighters separately clashed with Israeli forces in Aboud.[39]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

The IDF Northern Command conducted a training exercise on February 16 to increase the combat readiness of forces stationed on Israel’s northern border.[40] The IDF 1st Golani Brigade of the 36th Armored Division and reserve forces from the 146th and 210th Divisions conducted a multi-day exercise to simulate combat on the border. Armored, infantry, engineering, and artillery units practiced camouflage techniques, open-field combat, and evacuations.

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 16. Hezbollah conducted two rocket attacks targeting IDF facilities in Ruwaisat al Alam and al Malikiyah.[41] Hezbollah targeted Israeli forces at the Zibdin and Ruwaisat al Alam barracks in Shebaa Farms, using unspecified guided munitions.[42] Hezbollah targeted Israeli forces in a fifth attack in an unspecified area of northern Israel.[43]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani met with the commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Allied Joint Force Command Naples Admiral Stuart Munsch to discuss NATO’s Mission Iraq (NMI) on February 16.[44] Sudani and Munsch discussed NMI’s intelligence sharing with and training Iraqi security officers as well as logistical issues for NMI following a withdrawal of international coalition forces from Iraq.[45] NMI works with Iraqi security forces in a ”non-combat advisory and capacity-building” capacity to ”prevent the return of ISIS/Daesh, fight terrorism, and stabilize their country.”[46] NMI operates in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government.[47]

Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri nominated Mohammed Jassim al Amiri on February 16 as a compromise candidate for governor of Diyala Province.[48] Mohammed Jassim al Amiri is the 28-year-old son of the president of Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court, Judge Jassim Mohammad Aboud.[49] Ameri claimed that his nomination was an attempt to break the political deadlock delaying the appointment of a governor. Provincial councils are responsible for voting a governor into office, under Iraqi law.[50] Ameri’s decision to nominate the candidate for Diyala Province is particularly noteworthy given the military and political influence the Badr Organization has historically had there.

Demonstrators blocked roads in Baqubah, Diyala Province, to protest Ameri’s nomination for provincial governor.[51] The Iraqi Kurdish news outlet Shafaq reported that demonstrators set fire to tires in the street and set up a tent on the road connecting Baqubah to Muqdadiyah and Balad Ruz. Demonstrators called for the provincial council to reinstate the former governor of Diyala Province, Muthanna al Tamimi, as governor.[52]

The Houthis likely conducted a missile attack targeting an unspecified Panama-flagged commercial vessel in the Red Sea on February 16.[53] The UK Royal Navy’s United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) and British maritime security firm Ambrey reported that the vessel’s captain reported an explosion but that the crew and vessel were unharmed. UKMTO and the Associated Press reported that missile fire caused the explosion.[54]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted preemptive strikes targeting Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) in Yemen on February 15.[55] CENTCOM struck three mobile ASCMs that the Houthis had prepared to launch against vessels in the Red Sea. CENTCOM conducted the strikes after determining that the ASCMs presented an “imminent” threat to US ships and merchant vessels in the Red Sea.

CENTCOM Deputy Commander Vice Admiral Brad Cooper stated that Iran directly supports the Houthis’ attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea during an interview with CBS News on February 15.[56] Cooper stated that Iranian support has been “critical” for the Houthi attacks on commercial shipping. Cooper also stated that the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is “inside Yemen, and they are serving side by side with the Houthis, advising them and providing target information.” CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla separately told CBS News that the IRGC has continued supplying ”advanced conventional weapons to the Houthis. . . to undermine the safety of international shipping.”[57]

Other American officials and outlets have similarly detailed the IRGC’s direct involvement in the Houthi attacks in recent months. The US deputy national security adviser stated in December 2023 that the IRGC is helping Houthi forces plan and execute drone and missile attacks targeting ships.[58] The Wall Street Journal reported in December 2023 that the IRGC intelligence gathering ship Behshad, which is stationed in the Red Sea, provides the Houthi movement with real-time intelligence, enabling them to target ships that have gone silent.[59] US outlet Semafor reported on January 15 that the IRGC Quds Force placed drone and missile operators and trainers as well as intelligence personnel on the ground in Houthi-controlled Yemen to direct attacks and provide tactical intelligence support to the Houthis.[60] The US Treasury Department sanctioned the Houthi “procurement director” on January 25 for coordinating with the IRGC to smuggle Iranian-provided drones, missiles, and other weapons components into Yemen.[61]

Two unspecified Western officials and an IRGC-affiliated individual told the New York Times that Israel was responsible for the February 14 explosions on natural gas pipelines in central Iran.[62] The sources stated that the attacks on the pipelines required ”deep knowledge” and ”careful coordination.” The office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declined to comment on the article. The sabotage disrupted the gas supply to several villages. Iranian officials stated there were no casualties.[63] IRGC-affiliated media reported that the explosions were a ”terrorist act of vandalism.”[64] Iranian Oil Minister Javad Owji noted on February 14 that the gas pipelines are ”targets” for the United States and its allies, though he did not name Israel specifically.[65]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed Israeli operations around Rafah in a phone call with Saudi Foreign Affairs Minister Faisal bin Farhan on February 16.[66] The ministers called for an end to the Israel-Hamas war and humanitarian aid provision to the Gaza Strip.

Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officers arrested two Jaish al Adl fighters allegedly responsible for a December 2023 attack on a police headquarters in Rask, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[67] The LEC spokesperson stated that the LEC also seized firearms and “related equipment” from the fighters. Jaish al Adl militants killed at least 11 LEC officers in a two-stage attack targeting a police station in Rask on December 15, 2023.[68] This incident is part of an uptick in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since December 2023.[69]

Iran Update, February 15, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

Russian Republic of Tatarstan Head Rustam Minnikhanov paid an official visit to Iran, likely to discuss Russo-Iranian defense industrial and military cooperation. Minnikhanov visited unspecified “large industries and industrial towns” in Esfahan Province and met with the provincial governor on February 14.[1] Several prominent defense industrial and military sites, including some operated by the IRGC and Defense Ministry for aerospace work, are in Esfahan Province. These sites include the Kashan airfield, for instance, which Russian delegations visited in June and July 2022 to examine Iranian Shahed drones.[2] The Iranian Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company, which builds Ababil and Shahed drones, is also located in Esfahan Province.[3] Minnikhanov’s visit is particularly noteworthy given that Iran is helping to construct a military drone manufacturing facility in Yelabuga, which is in the Republic of Tatarstan.[4]  This factory is expected to produce at least 6,000 drones in the “coming years.”[5]

Minnikhanov is a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin and has extensive ties to Russia’s defense industry. He has served as the head of the Republic of Tatarstan since 2010 and also heads the Russian oil and gas company Tatneft.[6] Minnikhanov has separately chaired the board of directors for the Tupolev Public Joint Stock Company since September 2021.[7] Tupolev produces strategic bombers, such as the Backfire and Blackjack bombers, for the Russian armed forces.[8] The United States sanctioned Minnikhanov in January 2023 for his involvement in the “defense and related materiel and aerospace sectors of the Russian Federation economy.”[9] Canada sanctioned Minnikhanov in April 2023 for supporting the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[10]

Minnikhanov separately met with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi to discuss “economic cooperation” in Tehran on February 13.[11] Raisi called for increasing economic, industrial, scientific, and tourism cooperation with the Republic of Tatarstan and other Russian federal subjects. Russian media reported that Raisi will travel to Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan, in October 2024 to attend a BRICS summit.[12]

Some Sunni and Shia Iraqi political factions appear divided on expelling US forces from Iraq.[13] Khaled al Dabouni, a member of the Sunni Mutahidun Alliance, stated that Sunni political parties will not support the Iranian-backed effort to remove US forces. Dabouni argued that Iraq needs US forces to confront ISIS because Iraq is currently incapable of doing so by itself. This assertion is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that an Iraqi decision to expel US forces would very likely create space for ISIS to resurge in Syria within 12 to 24 months and then threaten Iraq.

The Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-aligned Iraqi Shia political parties—and other Iranian-backed Iraqi actors regularly argue that Iraq no longer needs US-led coalition forces because the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) can independently protect Iraq from threats, such as ISIS.[14] These statements ignore the deficiencies that the ISF continues to face in terms of intelligence, fire support, and logistics. Iranian-backed Iraqi parliamentarians accused Sunni and Kurdish factions of “boycotting” the February 10 parliamentary session to discuss the removal of US-led International Coalition forces from Iraq, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[15]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Russian Republic of Tatarstan Head Rustam Minnikhanov paid an official visit to Iran, likely to discuss Russo-Iranian defense industrial and military cooperation.
• Iraq: Some Sunni and Shia Iraqi political factions appear divided on expelling US forces from Iraq.
• Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces reported that it concluded a two-week long, division-sized raid in western Gaza City.
• Southern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces continued to conduct clearing operations in several sectors of Khan Younis.
• West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least six times. Hamas called for three days of demonstrations in the West Bank and abroad.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted eleven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Yemen: The Houthis claimed that they conducted a missile attack targeting a Barbados-flagged, Greek-owned vessel in the Gulf of Aden.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported on February 15 that it concluded a two-week long, division-sized raid in western Gaza City.[16] Several Israeli regular units and special operations forces (SOF) advanced into Gaza City over a few hours—a short period relative to the week that it took Israeli forces to maneuver into Gaza City during the initial phase of clearing operations in November 2023.[17] Israeli forces cleared military infrastructure, located intelligence materials and weapons, and killed around 120 Palestinian fighters during the raid.[18] The IDF previously announced that Israeli forces had “dismantled” all of Hamas’ battalions in the northern Gaza Strip on January 6.  Hamas exploited Israeli withdrawals in late December 2023 to infiltrate areas where Israeli forces previously cleared and reconstitute some of its militia units.[19]

The IDF continued targeting Hamas commanders and fighters in the northern Gaza Strip. Israeli forces killed the al Shati Battalion commander in Hamas’ Gaza Brigade on February 14.[20] The IDF 215th Artillery Brigade killed at least 15 Hamas fighters, including a security official, in Gaza City and other parts of the northern Gaza Strip on February 15.[21] The IDF is continuing to search for the Hamas Gaza Brigade commander, who is responsible for some of Hamas’ reconstitution efforts.[22] Hamas will almost certainly continue to replace commanders killed and/or detained by Israel and learn from its mistakes to better protect its leadership from future Israeli operations.

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in the northern and central Gaza Strip on February 15. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, targeted an Israeli military vehicle with an unspecified explosive device in the northern Gaza Strip.[23] Palestinian militias fired mortars and rockets targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip, although CTP-ISW cannot confirm the point of origin.[24] The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) clashed with Palestinian fighters and directed an airstrike to kill a Hamas commander in the central Gaza Strip.[25]

Israeli SOF operated in Nasser Hospital in western Khan Younis on February 15 to locate Palestinian fighters and Hamas-held hostages.[26] Israeli forces received “credible intelligence” that Hamas-held hostages were in the hospital and that their bodies may remain on the complex grounds.[27] Hamas rejected such claims and denied that it was operating in the hospital.[28] The IDF confirmed that its forces detained several suspects inside Nasser Hospital, including three Hamas fighters who participated in the October 7, 2023, attack.[29]

Nasser Hospital is the largest functioning hospital in the Gaza Strip. The IDF briefed its forces on the importance of preventing harm to patients, medical teams, and medical equipment prior to entering the hospital complex.[30] Doctors Without Borders staff in the hospital reported on February 15 that the situation is ”chaotic” and called on Israel to stop its operations.[31] Israel assesses that Hamas has used over 85 percent of major medical facilities in the Gaza Strip for military operations.[32]

The IDF continued to conduct clearing operations in several sectors of Khan Younis on February 15. The 89th Commando Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division) raided the homes of senior Hamas officials’ family members.[33] Hamas used these homes for military purposes, according to the IDF. Israeli forces detained Palestinian fighters, who participated in the October 7, 2023, attack, including those from Hamas’ elite Nukhba unit.[34] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed on February 15 that its fighters clashed with Israeli forces in the vicinity of Nasser Hospital for the second consecutive day.[35] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters launched mortars and rockets targeting an Israeli supply line east and northeast of Khan Younis.[36]

Egypt is constructing a walled “enclosure” in the Sinai Desert to address concerns that an Israeli operation into Rafah will cause a surge of Palestinian refugees into Egypt, according to Egyptian officials.[37] The enclosure is meant to accommodate over 100,000 people, but an Egyptian official said that Egypt would limit the number of refugees to below the enclosure’s capacity. Egypt has repeatedly expressed concern in recent weeks that an Israeli operation into Rafah could create a flow of Palestinian refugees into the Sinai Peninsula.[38] Egypt has added other fortifications to the border and deployed approximately 40 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to the Rafah border crossing over the past several weeks.[39] Israel has not publicly outlined a plan for how it would evacuate civilians from Rafah in the event of a military operation there.

The US Central Intelligence Agency director met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel on February 15 to discuss the recent hostage negotiations, according to Israeli media and two sources familiar with the meeting.[40] Netanyahu declined to send an Israeli delegation to Cairo on February 14 after the Israeli, US, and Egyptian intelligence chiefs met with the Qatari prime minister to broker a deal for hostages’ releases and an extended pause in fighting in the Gaza Strip.[41]

PIJ fighters fired rockets from the Gaza Strip targeting Ashkelon in southern Israel and the periphery of the Gaza Strip on February 14.[42] These attacks occurred after CTP-ISW's data cutoff from the previous update.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least six times across the West Bank. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades conducted three attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern West Bank with small arms fire and explosive devices on February 14.[43] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades conducted a separate small arms attack targeting the Shaked settlement south of Jenin.[44] Unidentified Palestinian fighters targeted Israeli forces with small arms fire and threw Molotov cocktails in Arroub refugee camp and Beitunia.[45]

Hamas called for three days of demonstrations in the West Bank and abroad from February 16 to 18. Hamas in Ramallah and al Bireh called on local Palestinians to hold demonstrations on February 16 after Friday prayers in support of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.[46] Hamas also called for demonstrations in Arab countries on February 17 and globally on February 18.[47]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted eleven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 15.[48]

Israel conducted an airstrike on February 15 that killed a Hezbollah Radwan Unit commander and his deputy in Nabatiya, Lebanon.[49] One source “familiar with Hezbollah thinking” told Reuters that the Israeli airstrike was an “escalation” but “within [the] unwritten rules of engagement]” between Hezbollah and Israel.”[50] The IRGC Quds Force established the Radwan Unit, which is Hezbollah’s special operations forces unit focused on infiltrating Israeli territory.[51]

Israel held a military exercise to increase the national readiness to handle several scenarios in case of a “multi-arena war.”[52] The exercises included scenarios involving damage to Israel's electricity sector and threats to civilians, such as mass shootings. The IDF, Ministry of Defense, and National Emergency Authority organized the exercise, which follows an Israeli assessment of the northern Israel border with Lebanon.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed on February 15 that it conducted a drone attack targeting an unspecified “military target” in the Golan Heights.[53] CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and other unspecified Arab countries are restricting US military operations out of US bases in their countries, according to a Politico report citing US and other Western officials “familiar with the issue.”[54] An unidentified US official said that Arab countries, especially those “attempting a detente with Iran,” are “increasingly restricting” US self-defense strikes. Another Western official specified that the UAE is attempting to portray itself as a neutral actor between the United States and Iran to pacify domestic popular opinion. Another official added that some countries are restricting airspace and facilities for assets used in strikes targeting Iranian-backed actors in the region. An unidentified US Department of Defense official cited in the report rejected reports of tensions between the United States and UAE over these issues. Pentagon spokesperson Major General Pat Ryder separately said in a statement to Politico that the United States and US Central Command (CENTCOM) maintain “the capability. . . to defend our forces and conduct self-defense strikes at the times and places of our choosing.”

The Houthis claimed that they conducted a missile attack targeting a Barbados-flagged, Greek-owned vessel in the Gulf of Aden on February 15.[55] Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree stated that the Houthis will continue conducting such attacks in the Red Sea until Israel and Hamas reach a ceasefire agreement.[56] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations agency separately posted that a vessel reported an explosion approximately 85 nautical miles east of Aden.[57]

The United States conducted preemptive strikes targeting Houthi missile sites and naval attack drones in Houti-controlled areas of Yemen on February 14.[58] US forces conducted four strikes against seven mobile anti-ship cruise missiles, three drones, and one explosive mobile unmanned surface vehicle that the Houthis were ”prepared to launch against ships in the Red Sea.”

CENTCOM reported on February 15 that a US Coast Guard cutter intercepted a shipment of Iranian weapons bound for Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen.[59] CENTCOM said that the US Coast Guard seized medium-range ballistic missile components, explosives, one-way surface and sub-surface naval attack drone components, military-grade communication and network equipment, anti-tank guided missile launcher components, and other unspecified military equipment.[60] US and allied naval forces routinely interdict Iranian shipments to the Houthis in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.[61]