Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Updates Page

This page collects ISW's Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Updates.

The Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Update tracks Russian recruitment efforts, force generation, force reconstitution, and technological adaptations. This product line is intended to replace the coverage of Russian force generation and technological adaptations in the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments.

Click here for the Ukraine Conflict Updates page.

Kateryna Stepanenko

April 15, 2025, 6:30 pm

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1000pm ET on April 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 21, 2025, Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Update. 

The Kremlin is using surge pricing for enlistment bonuses to recruit additional volunteers and attempt to sustain Russia's protracted war effort in Ukraine. Numerous Russian federal subjects dramatically increased the price of one-time enlistment bonuses in late 2024 and early 2025 and introduced additional short-term temporary sign-on bonuses to incentivize more Russians to volunteer to fight in Ukraine.[1] Samara, Omsk, Novosibirsk, and other oblasts introduced additional compensation in late 2024 and early 2025 for individuals who sign up during a defined short period – usually between three weeks and two months – to recruit additional volunteers. Russian federal subjects are simultaneously and rapidly increasing the fixed amounts for one-time bonuses. Primorsk Krai Governor Oleg Kozhemyako has increased the regional enlistment bonuses three time since the start of 2025 – the krai paid 800,000 rubles ($9,690) prior to January 1, 2025; one million rubles ($12,114) between January 1 and mid-February 2025; 1.6 million rubles ($19,383) between mid-February and April 1, 2025; and 2.5 million rubles ($30,284) starting April 1, 2025.[2] Irkutsk Oblast Governor increased one-time enlistment bonuses from around 600,000 rubles ($7,207) to 1.4 million rubles ($16,960) on March 19, 2025.[3] The average one-time enlistment bonus offered in Russian federal subjects and in occupied Ukraine as of April 14, 2025, is 1.51 million rubles ($18,292). This figure includes bonuses offered by both regional and federal authorities.[4]

Russian recruitment rates seemingly increased in early 2025, likely as a result of the Kremlin's temporary increases in sign-up bonuses and some Russians' anticipation of a negotiated ceasefire in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on April 11 that statistics from the Unified Selection Point (Russia’s main volunteer recruitment agency) show that monthly contract recruitment rates in Moscow City almost doubled in late March and early April 2025 compared to January 2025.[5] Verstka observed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has recruited over 6,300 people through voluntary military service contracts in Moscow City since the beginning of 2025. Verstka added that recruitment rates suddenly spiked starting on March 17, amidst reports of peace talks between Ukraine and Russia and Russian forces repelling Ukrainian forces from much of Kursk Oblast. An employee of a Russian military recruitment center in an unnamed town in Siberia told Radio Svoboda that the town's recruitment rates peaked in March 2025 after the regional government increased regional one-time enlistment bonuses to one million rubles ($12,114).[6] The employee added that many volunteers who are enlisting had waited for the regional government to increase the one-time payment and hope that the Ukraine-Russia peace talks will lead to a ceasefire that allows them to avoid combat.[7] An analyst at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) extrapolated recruitment data for 37 Russian federal subjects and assessed on April 13 that Russia is currently recruiting around 1,300 volunteers per day, or about 39,000 per month.[8] Russia is unlikely to generate 39,000 volunteers per month indefinitely, however, as the increased enlistment bonuses that generated the previous recruitment bump are temporary, and Russia’s economic and demographic constraints do not likely support continued large-scale recruitment at such rates.[9]

Russian federal subjects appear to have been intensifying their recruitment efforts since March 2025 and are spending significant funds on advertising military service in Russia, suggesting that the Kremlin intends to sustain current force generation efforts for some time, peace talks notwithstanding. Moscow City officials told Verstka in mid-March that Moscow is continuing to recruit volunteers and that the Russian MoD will continue to advertise military service.[10] Verstka also found that Moscow Oblast announced a tender worth 78 million rubles ($944,000) to organize an online recruitment campaign through at least the end of 2025. Verstka observed that the volume of Russian military recruitment ads on Telegram has increased since late March 2025, with recruiters publishing approximately 7,000 ads in the first week of April 2025 compared to 7,300 ads published in the entire month of January 2025.[11] An SWP analyst estimated that Russia likely spends around 1.5 billion rubles ($18 million) in regional enlistment bonuses and 500 million rubles ($6 million) in federal enlistment bonuses per day -- or two billion rubles per day ($24 million) in total. The SWP analyst also observed that average one-time enlistment bonuses are around 10 percent higher in March 2025 than they were in December 2024. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii (iStories) previously observed that the Russian federal budget expenditures for 2025 through 2027 allocated 90 billion rubles ($1.1 billion) to federal one-time enlistment bonuses, not including regional government bonuses.[12]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is using surge pricing for enlistment bonuses to recruit additional volunteers and attempt to sustain Russia's protracted war effort in Ukraine.
• Russian federal subjects appear to have been intensifying their recruitment efforts since March 2025 and are spending significant funds on advertising military service in Russia, suggesting that the Kremlin intends to sustain current force generation efforts for some time, peace talks notwithstanding.
• PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) officially denied PRC state involvement in the recruitment of Chinese nationals to fight with Russian forces in Ukraine after two captured Chinese nationals participated in a Ukrainian press conference on April 14.
• The Russian government censored Telegram posts in a continued effort to conceal North Korean involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine.
• Kremlin pronatalist policies introduced during the 2024 "Year of the Family" are reportedly so far failing to improve Russia’s low birth rates.
• Russian federal subjects are increasingly offering Russian veterans employment and education opportunities as part of the Kremlin's effort to address labor shortages in Russia.
• The Kremlin is continuing to offer hand-selected veterans high-ranking government positions in support of the permanent militarization of Russian youth.
• Russian State Duma officials registered an amendment on April 7 that would extend combat veteran statuses and state benefits to some Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP) clergy who participated in Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in apparent violation of world Orthodox canons.
• Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on April 14 that Russian forces are using chemical agents against Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast in an apparent violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Russia is a party.
• The Kremlin is actively reorienting and expanding its unmanned aerial systems (UAS) production to support its war effort in Ukraine and possibly to prepare for future aggression against NATO states.
• Russian forces completed joint military exercises with India and Tajikistan on April 11.