Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 11, 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 11, 2023
Grace Mappes, George Barros, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan
April 11, 5:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

The Kremlin passed legislation to use tools of digital authoritarianism to digitize and improve the effectiveness of issuing summonses and crack down on Russian draft dodgers. The Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its third reading on April 11 to create a digital unified register of Russian citizens eligible for military service.[1] Russian military recruitment offices will use the digital register to issue summonses to military service. The unified register harvests Russian citizens’ personal identification information—including medical, educational, and residence history, foreign citizenship status, and insurance and tax data—from multiple Russian legal entities, including Russia’s Federal Tax Service, investigative bodies, courts, medical institutions, the Russian Pension and Social Insurance Fund, the Central Election Commission, and federal and local authorities.[2]  Summoned individuals may not leave Russia and must appear at a military recruitment office within 20 days of being summoned. The law bans summoned individuals who are 20 days delinquent for reporting from driving vehicles, buying or selling real estate, and taking out loans. A senior Russian legislator stated that the law will correct some of the bureaucratic shortcomings that appeared during Russia’s partial mobilization in September 2022.[3] Some Russian milbloggers who have long agitated for more aggressive force generation policies praised the law and stated that it exemplifies healthy interactions between Russian civil society and government.[4] ISW previously forecasted that the Kremlin would marry Soviet-style societal control measures with big data and 21st-century information technology to intensify control over the Russian population after Russia used facial recognition, QR codes, and mobile device geo-tracking technology to enforce a draconian COVID-19 quarantine in 2020.[5]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin acknowledged each other's roles in the Bakhmut effort on April 11. The Russian MoD and Prigozhin claimed that Wagner fighters comprise the main effort to take territory and push Ukrainian forces in central Bakhmut, whereas unspecified Russian Airborne (VDV) elements comprise the supporting effort on Wagner’s flanks north and south of Bakhmut, including near Zalizhnyanske, Sakko i Vantsetti, and Mykolaivka.[6] The Russian VDV forces on the flanks likely aim only to hold the flanks rather than make any significant advances. This array of forces suggests that the Russian MoD intends to use the Wagner Group to capture Bakhmut while minimizing casualties among conventional Russian forces—supporting ISW’s prior assessments that the MoD seeks to use Wagner forces to capture Bakhmut then supplant them and take credit for the victory.[7] Prigozhin reiterated that Wagner forces are making gains within Bakhmut, however, claiming that Russian forces control 80 percent of Bakhmut due to Wagner advances.[8] Russian forces occupy at least 30.68 square kilometers (about the size of the Chicago O’Hare airport) or 76.5 percent of Bakhmut based on ISW's control of terrain assessment.  However, this area increases to 34.5 square kilometers or 86.1 percent of Bakhmut when factoring in all Russian-claimed territory in Bakhmut, including contradictory claims.

A small, fringe group of pro-war Russian milbloggers called for the Russian government to repeal the censorship laws against discrediting the Russian military. A group of at least 20 Russian milbloggers amplified a blanket statement expressing solidarity with "angry patriots” and others enraged at and weary of the poor application of the Russian censorship laws.[9] These milbloggers, many of whom have limited social media followings, represent a small fraction of the Russian information space and their statement does not indicate broader anger over the mere existence of these laws.  However, this faction of milbloggers is the most likely to face prosecution under these laws because they lack Kremlin affiliation, are among the most critical of the Russian war effort, and would likely be among the first targets of an expanded application of the law. The pro-war information space has expressed continued outrage over Russian authorities prosecuting a Russian medic under these censorship laws, which ISW has assessed will likely be a growing source of discontent in the pro-war information space.[10]

Key Takeaways

• The Kremlin passed legislation to use tools of digital authoritarianism to digitize and improve the effectiveness of issuing summonses and to crack down on Russian draft dodgers.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin acknowledged each other's roles in the Bakhmut effort.
• A small, fringe group of pro-war Russian milbloggers called for the Russian government to repeal the censorship laws against discrediting the Russian military.
• Russian forces appear to hold positions northeast of Kupyansk and have made gains in the forest area south of Kreminna.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks in and around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Russian forces conducted defensive operations in southern Ukraine.
• Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu visited defense industrial enterprises in Tula Oblast as part of the ongoing effort to portray the resilience of Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).
• Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova continues to confirm that Russian authorities are taking a number of actions vis-a-vis Ukrainian children in an attempt to exculpate herself from the International Criminal Court's (ICC) warrant for her arrest.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces appear to hold positions within 10km northeast of Kupyansk. Geolocated footage posted on April 11 indicates that Russian forces captured Lyman Pershyi (10km northeast of Kupyansk) and have likely occupied the settlement for a while.[11]

Russian forces have made gains in the forest area south of Kreminna as of April 11. Geolocated footage posted on April 10 shows elements of the 76th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Division with TOS-1A thermobaric artillery operating 4km south of Kreminna, indicating that VDV elements have advanced in the surrounding forest.[12] Additional geolocated footage posted on April 10 indicates that Russian forces have captured Ukrainian positions in the forest just over 5km directly south of Kreminna.[13] The Russian command recently allocated TOS-1A systems to VDV forces for the first time on April 3, and ISW has noted a sizeable VDV commitment (including elements of the 76th and 98th Divisions) near Kreminna.[14] While ISW continues to assess that TOS-1A systems will not offer VDV forces a decisive offensive advantage, their application to operations near Kreminna may have assisted VDV elements in making localized tactical gains.

The Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration also noted on April 11 that combat activity has increased in the forests near Kreminna.[15] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupied several new strongholds northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka (22km northwest) and in the area of the Zhuravka gully.[16] Russian sources amplified reports that Chechen “Akhmat” elements and the BARS (Combat Reserve)-14 battalion are active in the Kreminna area.[17] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that BARS-16 elements are preparing for Ukrainian counterattacks near Spirne, 25km south of Kreminna.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka and Chervonopopivka (6km northwest) and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka (10km south) and Spirne.[19]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks in and around Bakhmut on April 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks in Bakhmut, and near Khromove (2km west of Bakhmut), Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), and Hryhorivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut).[20] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are gradually advancing near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut) and Bohdanivka and near the rail station in central Bakhmut, but another denied any Russian successes northwest of Bakhmut.[21] One milblogger claimed that Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin’s April 10 visit to Bakhmut suggests that Ukrainian forces are losing more ground within Bakhmut, but Pushilin’s location remains unclear.[22] Russian milbloggers also claimed that fighting continues near the Bakhmut-Kostyantynivka highway and southwest of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (2km southwest), Klishchiivka (6km southwest), and Kurdyumivka (12km southwest), but that Russian forces have not made any significant gains.[23] Geolocated footage posted on April 3 shows that Russian forces have made marginal gains northwest of Ozaryanivka (15km south of Bakhmut).[24]

Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on April 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Avdiivka, Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (10km southwest of Avdiivka), Nevslske (15km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka.[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Keramik (10km north of Avdiivka),  Novokalynove (9km north of Avdiivka), Novobakhmutivka (9km northwest of Avdiivka), Berdychi (7km northwest of Avdiivka), and Vodyane (6km southwest of Avdiivka).[26] Other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near the agricultural complex in southwestern Marinka.[27] Ukrainian Tavriisk Direction Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi stated on April 10 that Russian forces are attempting to take Marinka to reach Kurakhove (18km west of Donetsk City) because Russian forces are unable to capture Avdiivka.[28]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on April 11.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces conducted defensive operations in southern Ukraine. Satellite imagery from March 21 shows new trenches and dragon’s teeth fortifications near Sovkhoznoye, occupied Crimea.[29] Ukrainian United Coordination Press Center of the Southern Defense Forces Head Nataliya Humenyuk noted that Russian forces are conducting maneuvers on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast to avoid Ukrainian strikes and establish better positions from which to strike Ukrainian positions on the west (right) bank.[30] Russian sources claimed that elements of the 22nd Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) and the “Storm-Ossetia” formation are active in Zaporizhia Oblast.[31]

Russian forces conducted routine shelling in Kherson, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts on April 11.[32] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command noted that Russian forces launched guided aerial bombs from Su-35 aircraft at Beryslav, Kherson Oblast.[33]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu visited defense industrial enterprises in Tula Oblast as part of the ongoing effort to portray the resilience of Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published images of Shoigu inspecting the production capabilities of the Research and Production Association “SPLAV” and PSCJ Imperial Tula Arms Factory enterprises.[34] Shoigu met with Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin, the heads of the defense enterprises, and other unspecified military officials to discuss the DIB and said that the MoD would be “ready to become actively involved” in defense enterprises’ work should problems executing the state defense order arise. Shoigu’s visits to Russian defense enterprises are likely part of an ongoing effort to swiftly investigate and correct problems within the DIB in an attempt to increase production capacity.

Russian forces denied appeals from relatives of mobilized personnel who spoke out against the poor treatment of mobilized personnel. A video published on April 10 purportedly shows relatives of mobilized personnel from Tula Oblast appealing to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, Human Rights Commissioner Tatyana Moskalkova, and Tula Governor Alexei Dyumin asking to return mobilized personnel from Tula serving in the 14th and 15th Companies of the 5th Battalion of the 137th Guards Airborne Regiment (VDV) of the 106th Guards Airborne Division.[35] ISW has previously observed elements of the 106th VDV Division operating in the Bakhmut area.[36] The relatives of mobilized personnel claimed that soldiers are sent into combat without adequate training, weapons, ammunition, and provisions. A video published on April 11 purportedly shows members of the 137th Airborne Regiment addressing their relatives on the orders of their commanders, denying mistreatment, and claiming that the formation is well equipped.[37]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova continues to confirm that Russian authorities are taking a number of actions vis-à-vis Ukrainian children in an attempt to exculpate herself from the International Criminal Court's (ICC) warrant for her arrest. Lvova-Belova published a 13-page English-language pamphlet on April 11 evidently aimed at an international audience and entitled “Activities of the Russian Federation Presidential Commission for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova to protect children during a special military operation.”[38] The pamphlet outlines Lvova-Belova's explicit links with the Russian Presidential Administration and claims that all actions of Lvova-Belova fall firmly within the bounds of Russian law.[39] The pamphlet notably confirms that Russian authorities are engaged in several lines of effort pertaining to Ukrainian children in occupied areas of Ukraine and notes that Lvova-Belova’s administration oversees the placement of vulnerable children from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts into Russian families.[40] Lvova-Belova claimed that her administration prioritizes family reunification following foster placement and decried international condemnation of the deportation of Ukrainian children as “fake.”[41] Lvova-Belova's attempts to justify the work of her administration further confirm that Russian officials are using a variety of guises to strengthen social control over occupied areas of Ukraine and facilitate the deportation and adoption of Ukrainian children.

Russian officials continue social programming efforts aimed at eradicating Ukrainian identity in youth. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on April 11 that Russian authorities launched the “Children of Donbas,” “My Family Lineage,” and “Primakov Children’s Aid” funds to facilitate the removal of Ukrainian children to Russia for “educational programs” aimed at “ideological processing promotion of Russian propaganda.”[42] The Crimean branch of the Ukrainian service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Krym Realii, also stated on April 10 that Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov ordered increased cooperation between military enlistment offices and schools in Crimea through the “Yunarmia” military-patriotic education program.[43] “Yunarmia” and similar military-patriotic education programs are likely meant to instill pro-Russian and militarized ideals in youth and discredit the Ukrainian state.

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Belarusian maneuver elements continue conducting exercises in Belarus. Company-sized elements of the Zaslonovo-based Belarusian 19th Mechanized Brigade conducted exercises to camouflage fighting positions at the 227thCombined Arms Training Ground in Borisov, Belarus.[44]

The Belarusian military continues to conduct large-scale combat readiness checks in Belarus. A senior Belarusian defense official announced on April 11 that the Belarusian military is improving Belarusian combat readiness by conducting planned combat training, verifying reservists’ personal information, checking Belarusian territorial defense elements’ readiness, and conducting other large-scale readiness checks.[45] The Belarusian Ministry of Defense announced on April 10 that Belarusian authorities established a collection point for accumulating national resources to support combat-operational and serviced logistics trucks to support long cargo drives. [46] The Russian military will likely continue leaning on the Belarusian military’s administrative capacity to support Russian force generation efforts.[47]  

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/readovkanews/56656; https://t.me/readovkanews/56654; https://t.me/readovkanews/56653; https://t.me/readovkanews/56652; https://t.me/readovkanews/56651; https://t.me/readovkanews/56650; https://t.me/readovkanews/56649; https://t.me/readovkanews/56648; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/11/gosduma-odobrila-vo-vtorom-chtenii-popravki-ob-elektronnyh-povestkah-v-armiyu-i-o-tselom-ryade-zapretov-dlya-uklonistov

[2] https://t.me/readovkanews/56656; https://t.me/readovkanews/56654; https://t.me/readovkanews/56653; https://t.me/readovkanews/56652; https://t.me/readovkanews/56651; https://t.me/readovkanews/56650; https://t.me/readovkanews/56649; https://t.me/readovkanews/56648; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/11/gosduma-odobrila-vo-vtorom-chtenii-popravki-ob-elektronnyh-povestkah-v-armiyu-i-o-tselom-ryade-zapretov-dlya-uklonistov

[3] https://t.me/readovkanews/56630

[4] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/82717; https://t.me/bazabazon/16884; https://t.me/notes_veterans/8888

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-putin-deploys-new-authoritarian-controls-during-covid-19-pandemic

[6] https://t.me/mod_russia/25550; https://t.me/readovkanews/56660; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/728; https://t.me/brussinf/5859

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-6-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2023

[8] https://t.me/readovkanews/56660; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/728; https://t.me/brussinf/5859

[9] https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/22706; https://t.me/micromedia666/35325; https://t.me/alexandrshtefanov/6577; https://t.me/zprognozb/1483; https://t.me/vasiileevaa/4801; https://t.me/bogemasranaya/25852; https://t.me/ilyashepelin/4943; https://t.me/truelom/1809; https://t.me/kukluxkife/15627; https://t.me/LittlePruss/291; https://t.me/lomtikneba/4100; https://t.me/hatingleft/1921; https://t.me/rightliberalism/21386; https://t.me/riggedfromthestart/1250; https://t.me/AncapJudge/4438; https://t.me/alteright/13158; https://t.me/viatka_aristocrat/3755; https://t.me/russian_obrez/87; https://t.me/ZOV_OP/196; https://t.me/Netvru/21600

[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2023

[11] https://www.facebook.com/14ombr/videos/1993189611030471/; https://twitter.com/cyber_boroshno/status/1645740689731338240; https://twitter.com/cyber_boroshno/status/1645740692507967489; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1645815433574875137?s=20; https://www.facebook.com/14ombr/videos/1993189611030471/

[12] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1645504953392455680?s=20; https://twitter.com/200_zoka/status/1645454044155052038?s=20

[13] https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1645771051198996482; https://twitter.com/TheHumanFund5/status/1645444869630967811; https://twitter.com/TheHumanFund5/status/1645445584700989445

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2023

[15] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/9788

[16] https://t.me/rybar/45684

[17] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/82691; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36310  https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36310  

[18] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1645612515416473602?s=20

[19]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0JvGSPZqC55ocVpwNFJ7cFi1BSRsrk8cCmTLBm8WEuMiweeauFJ6GzABSyo22QTnZl;https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XF3dNofxpZF7uXvQ4bDtVpxecCa9oiBfVbskkyUfQTHiPrnh6Gp1tktxfU3TTvoLl

[20]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XF3dNofxpZF7uXvQ4bDtVpxecCa9oiBfVbskkyUfQTHiPrnh6Gp1tktxfU3TTvoLl;https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0JvGSPZqC55ocVpwNFJ7cFi1BSRsrk8cCmTLBm8WEuMiweeauFJ6GzABSyo22QTnZl

[21] https://t.me/readovkanews/56613; https://t.me/wargonzo/11878; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46699; https://t.me/milchronicles/1762

[22] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46699

[23] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46699; https://t.me/wargonzo/11878

[24] https://twitter.com/JagdBandera/status/1645493797294415886; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/715

[25]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XF3dNofxpZF7uXvQ4bDtVpxecCa9oiBfVbskkyUfQTHiPrnh6Gp1tktxfU3TTvoLl;https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0JvGSPZqC55ocVpwNFJ7cFi1BSRsrk8cCmTLBm8WEuMiweeauFJ6GzABSyo22QTnZl

[26] https://t.me/wargonzo/11878; https://t.me/readovkanews/56613

[27] https://t.me/readovkanews/56613; https://t.me/z_arhiv/20202

[28] https://suspilne dot media/441735-paket-dopomogi-vid-nimeccini-povernenna-sotni-ludej-z-polonu-rf-412-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1681160401&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[29] https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1645754948297138176

[30] https://suspilne.media/441765-manevruut-vse-dali-j-dali-vid-livogo-berega-gumenuk-pro-situaciu-na-hersonskomu-napramku/

[31] https://t.me/ZA_FROHT/15620; https://t.me/kommunist/16892  

[32] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/4026; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/3169; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0JvGSPZqC55ocVpwNFJ7cFi1BSRsrk8cCmTLBm8WEuMiweeauFJ6GzABSyo22QTnZl; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/18188; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/4748; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XF3dNofxpZF7uXvQ4bDtVpxecCa9oiBfVbskkyUfQTHiPrnh6Gp1tktxfU3TTvoLl; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/5048

[33]https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02qQbVrhxgxpFTrbNvN65XMBNWz3aY6yR8myDzSLkG5gdDGmXSBxpBoTFDdhNhyUh1l

[34] https://t.me/mod_russia/25552; https://t.me/mod_russia/25553; https://t.me/readovkanews/56645; https://t.me/milinfolive/99130

[35] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/10881

[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2023

[37] https://t.me/rusich_army/8346  

[38] http://deti.gov dot ru/detigray/upload/documents/April2023/QYQjD1VHtlNu74bQuDAF.pdf

[39] http://deti.gov dot ru/detigray/upload/documents/April2023/QYQjD1VHtlNu74bQuDAF.pdf

[40] http://deti.gov dot ru/detigray/upload/documents/April2023/QYQjD1VHtlNu74bQuDAF.pdf

[41] http://deti dot gov.ru/detigray/upload/documents/April2023/QYQjD1VHtlNu74bQuDAF.pdf

[42] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/04/11/okupanty-zapustyly-novi-programy-promyvky-mizkiv-dityam-na-tot/

[43] https://t.me/krymrealii/21428

[44] https://t.me/modmilby/25590

[45] https://t.me/modmilby/25556

[46] https://t.me/modmilby/25523; https://t.me/voentv_by/3669

[47] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2023