Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 19, 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 19, 2023

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

April 19, 5pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) appears to be conducting a large-scale overhaul of domestic security organs. Russian state-controlled outlet TASS reported on April 19 that the FSB and the Main Directorate of the Security Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) have been conducting mass checks at the Moscow Central District Internal Affairs Directorate and several Moscow district police offices for the past several weeks due to “the leakage of data from Russian security forces at the request of Ukrainian citizens.”[1] Another Russian source noted that the FSB and MVD have already detained police officers as part of this investigation.[2] Russian outlets reported that the suspected police officers leaked personal data on Russian security forces to external individuals, some of whom are Ukrainian citizens.[3] The reported FSB and MVD raids on the Moscow police departments are occurring against the backdrop of a series of arrests and dismissals of prominent members of Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) leadership.[4] The Kremlin may be pushing for such arrests and investigations in order to conduct an overhaul of the domestic security apparatus to oust officials who have fallen out of Kremlin favor and consolidate further control internal security organs.

Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on April 19 that Ukrainian forces are already conducting some counteroffensive actions. Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces will never preemptively announce when the counteroffensive starts and reiterated that Ukrainian forces aim to liberate all Ukrainian territory.[5] Malyar also reported that Russian forces are concentrating on offensives in the Lyman, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Marinka directions and that Russian forces have concentrated weapons, equipment, and all professional units – including Wagner Group forces, Spetsnaz, and airborne forces (VDV) – around Bakhmut.[6] Malyar noted that Ukrainian counteroffensive actions will be both offensive and defensive in nature given the complex nature of the battlefield.

Russian forces continue to use Shahed drones and other lower-precision systems to offset the degradation of Russia’s precision munition supply. Russian forces launched 12 Shahed-131/136 drones at southern Ukraine from the Sea of Azov on the night of April 18 to 19, 10 of which Ukrainian air defense shot down.[7] Ukrainian United Coordination Press Center of the Southern Defense Forces Head Nataliya Humenyuk noted on April 19 that the Shahed strike was a deliberate attempt to find and destroy Ukrainian air defense systems.[8] Russian milbloggers have recently discussed the importance of targeting Ukrainian air defense capabilities in advance of any potential Ukrainian counteroffensives, and the Shahed strikes were likely intended in part to set conditions to do so.[9] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuri Ihnat noted that Russia has used almost all of its strategic missile stockpile since September 11, 2022, and that Ukrainian forces have shot down 750 of the total 850 missiles that Russian forces have launched at Ukrainian during this period.[10] Ihnat noted that Russian forces have switched to cheaper and shorter-range options such as guided aerial bombs and have removed Kh-50 type missiles from storage for restoration.[11] Ihnat was likely referring to Kh-55 Soviet-era air launched cruise missiles, as Russia is slated to begin production on newer Kh-50 cruise missiles in summer 2023.[12] Russia may be removing Kh-55 cruise missiles from storage to refit them for future strikes on Ukraine.

Key Takeaways

• The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) appears to be conducting a large-scale overhaul of domestic security organs.
• Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on April 19 that Ukrainian forces are already conducting some counteroffensive actions.
• Russian forces continue to use Shahed drones and other lower-precision systems to offset the degradation of Russia’s precision munition supply.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Kreminna.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk frontline, and in western Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian officials continue to prepare to send electronic summonses and establish a digital registry for those eligible for military service.
• A State Duma deputy proposed a bill that would expand contract conditions for the OMON and SOBR units of Rosgvardia and set conditions for the mobilization of Rosgvardia reservists.
• Russian officials and occupation authorities continue efforts to further integrate occupied territories into the Russian economic system.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Kreminna on April 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Kreminna and Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna).[13] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also attacked far north of Kreminna in the Kupyansk area near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk) and repelled Ukrainian forces near Kreminna.[14] Another milblogger published footage purportedly showing elements of the 76th Airborne Assault Division (VDV) operating near Kreminna.[15] The Russian Southern Group of Forces spokesperson Ivan Bigma claimed that Spetsnaz units of the Southern Military District and artillery of the 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Army Corps disrupted two Ukrainian troop rotations near Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna) and Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[16] Some milbloggers amplified claims that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Spirne while others claimed that Ukrainian forces control Spirne and battles continue east of the settlement.[17] ISW has not observed visual confirmation that suggests that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from Spirne.

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut on April 19. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that heavy fighting is ongoing within Bakhmut itself and that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Stupochky (12km southwest of Bakhmut along the T0504 Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway).[18] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian and Ukrainian forces engaged in 34 combat clashes in Bakhmut over the past day.[19] The commander of a Ukrainian territorial defense brigade, Colonel Dmytro Zavorotnyuk, noted that Russia forces in Bakhmut are attacking in squad-sized assault groups of five to six people.[20] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group forces made significant progress in urban areas in northwestern Bakhmut and have taken control of the area north of Vesela Street, including the territory of Bakhmut Hospital No. 2.[21] One milblogger claimed that Wagner fighters are storming Ukrainian positions as far west as Marshal Tolbukhina Street, which lies between western Bakhmut and eastern Khromove.[22] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) advisor Yan Gagin claimed that Russian forces control about 90% of Bakhmut.[23] ISW’s current control of terrain estimate shows that Russian assessed advances and claimed territory amount to about 87.9% of Bakhmut. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are using FAB air-dropped bombs to destroy Ukrainian fortified areas in Bakhmut.[24]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline on April 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions in the Avdiivka area towards Avdiivka itself; Stepove (7km northwest of Avdiivka), Berdychi (10km northwest of Avdiivka), and Sieverne (5km west of Avdiivka); on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Vodyane, Pervomaiske, and Nevelske; and on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Marinka and Pobieda.[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Novobakhmutivka (12km north of Avdiivka) and near Keramik (13km northwest of Avdiivka) and made gains near Pervomaiske and Nevelske.[26] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces are conducting positional battles and advancing along Druzhba Avenue in Marinka.[27] Russian sources continued to discuss operations of various DNR elements, including the 14th ”Kalmius” Brigade, ”Sparta” Battalion, and 1453rd Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment, on this sector of the front.[28]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on April 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Prechystivka (40km southwest of Donetsk City) and Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City).[29] Russian milbloggers posted footage reportedly of 155th Naval Infantry Brigade elements shooting down a Ukrainian Su-25 aircraft near Vuhledar.[30] Russian sources also claimed that Ukrainian forces are conducting unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force operations in the Vuhledar area.[31]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued defensive operations in southern Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 19 that Russian forces continue to conduct defensive actions in the Zaporizhia and Kherson directions.[32] Satellite images published on April 18 show Russian forces continuing to use a base that they constructed at the end of 2022 near Henicheska Hirka (180km southeast of Kherson City) in far southeastern Kherson Oblast in the Arabat Spit.[33] Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo claimed on April 18 that Russian forces have built several echelons of defensive structures on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast that could repel Ukrainian forces in the upcoming counteroffensive.[34]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast on April 19. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) repelled Ukrainian probing actions in the Zaporizhia direction.[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that on April 18 Ukrainian forces attacked near Orikhiv and toward Rabotyne but did not specify the outcome of these attacks.[36]

Russian forces conducted routine shelling west of Hulyaipole in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.[37]

 

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian officials continue to prepare to send electronic summonses and establish a digital registry for those eligible for military service. Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrei Kartapolov stated on April 19 that Russian officials may send electronic summonses in a test mode during the ongoing conscription cycle but that Russian officials should duplicate them in existing formats, and clarified that electronic subpoenas will have no legal effect during the spring 2023 conscription cycle.[38] Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a law on April 14 on the creation of a digital register of Russian citizens eligible for military service that permits the sending of electronic conscription summonses.[39] The State Duma adopted a law on April 19 on mandatory fingerprinting of volunteers, likely in part to support efforts to create the digital registry.[40] A Russian source reported that medical facilities in Moscow are collecting extensive health information about men aged 18 to 64 because they are required to provide health information about potential recruits to enlistment offices under the digital registry law.[41] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin passed the legislation in order to utilize tools of digital authoritarianism to improve the effectiveness of issuing summonses and to crack down on Russian draft dodgers.[42]

The Wagner Group continues to reportedly force mobilized personnel into service with Wagner. Independent Russian outlet Astra reported on April 19 that six mobilized personnel from the Republic of Sakha complained that Russian officials forcibly assigned the personnel to the Wagner Group and sent them to Bakhmut.[43] ISW previously assessed that the Wagner Group may be attempting to force mobilized Russian personnel to sign contracts with Wagner in an effort to offset Wagner’s losses in Ukraine.[44] Wagner Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin denied the reports about the mobilized personnel from Sakha Republic on April 19 and stated that there has not been one case of forced miliary service in Wagner and that Wagner does not recruit active military personnel.[45]

A State Duma deputy proposed a bill on April 18 that would expand contract conditions for OMON and SOBR units of Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) and set conditions for the mobilization of Rosgvardia reservists.[46] Duma Information Policy Committee Chairman Alexander Khinshtein proposed a bill on April 18 allowing Russians to sign a contract with Rosgvardia OMON and SOBR units for up to a year ”to perform special tasks or tasks in special conditions” and removing existing age thresholds for admission to these units.[47] The bill would also assign Rosgvardia departments control over the mobilization of reservists and assign reservists to Rosgvardia units, subdivisions, and bodies in advance. [48] The bill would allow wounded Rosgvardia servicemen to continue serving.[49] The bill likely aims to set conditions for a rapid expansion of Rosgvardia, particularly its internal security elements, in the event of a wider domestic crackdown in Russia and occupied Ukraine. Rosgvardia also notably includes elements responsible for Russia’s domestic regime security.

Russian occupation officials continue measures to conduct conscription despite previous claims that the spring 2023 conscription cycle will not occur in occupied territories. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin signed a decree on April 19 creating a draft commission for conscription in 2023, although the decree stipulates that Russian officials will not conscript residents in Donetsk Oblast during the spring conscription cycle.[50] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) head Leonid Pasechnik signed a decree on April 14 authorizing spring and fall conscription in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[51] Russian occupation measures to conduct conscription contradict Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrei Kartapolov’s March 30 claim that the current conscription cycle will not occur in occupied Ukraine.[52] Russian occupation officials may be setting conditions for the fall 2023 conscription cycle or may be creating conscription apparatuses to augment their ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.

The Kremlin continues efforts to gradually mobilize Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) amid assessments that Russia is increasingly reliant on old stocks of equipment and weapons to continue the war in Ukraine. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited a military industrial enterprise in Kaluga Oblast that produces electronic warfare equipment on April 19 and met with the company’s management and other military officials to discuss increasing the production of such equipment.[53] The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published a report on April 14 assessing that Russia has enough stocks of older weapons and equipment to continue waging the war in Ukraine.[54] CSIS reported that Russian forces have lost 1,845 to 3,511 tanks in Ukraine but that it has 5,000 tanks in reserve.[55] CSIS assessed that Russian import substitution efforts have been unsuccessful causing Russian forces to use increasingly degraded weapons and equipment on the battlefield in Ukraine.[56] ISW has previously assessed that widespread equipment losses are constraining the Russian military’s ability to conduct effective mechanized maneuver warfare in Ukraine.[57]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials and occupation authorities continue efforts to further integrate occupied territories into the Russian economic system. The Russian State Duma adopted a draft law in the first reading on April 19 that would create a Free Economic Zone (FEZ) in occupied territories. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed on April 19 that he suggested that the Duma consider a single fixed tax for tax agreements with long-term investors during its second reading of the bills in an effort to promote stable growth and opportunities in occupied territories.[58]

Russian forces continue to seize civilian infrastructure and private property in occupied territories for military purposes. Kherson Obast occupation administration Head Vladimir Saldo stated on April 19 that last week he had ordered occupation authorities to seize civilian boats and transfer them to Russian forces in occupied Kherson Oblast.[59] Saldo stated that Russian forces have since taken 30 private vessels from the port city of Henichesk and that owners can report their property as seized for compensation or the eventual return of their boats.[60] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 19 that occupation authorities received an order to deploy a 40-bed military hospital in Kabychivka, Kherson Oblast, and that an unspecified number of Russian doctors are expected to arrive to the hospital by the end of week.[61]

Russian sources claimed that Russian authorities prevented a Ukrainian partisan attack in Crimea on April 19. Russian milbloggers claimed on April 19 that personnel of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) detained an individual on allegations that he planned to use an improvised explosive device (IED) to attack an energy infrastructure facility in Kerch, Crimea.[62] The milbloggers claimed that FSB officers found evidence that the individual, who holds both Russian and Ukrainian citizenship, had been communicating with the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU).[63]

Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to integrate occupied territories into the Russian administrative system. Russian President Vladimir Putin included DNR head Denis Pushilin Luhansk Peoples’ Republics (LNR) head Leonid Pasechnik in the Russian Development of Local Self-Government Presidential Council on April 19.[64] Pushilin emphasized the importance of developing local governance as DNR officials are actively forming multiple municipalities.[65]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Belarusian maneuver elements continue to conduct exercises in Belarus. An unspecified Belarusian tank battalion of Belarus’ Northwestern Operational Command participated in the ongoing Belarusian command staff exercises at a training ground near Borisov on April 19.[66]

The Belarusian military continues to exercise most services of its armed forces. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense announced on April 19 that unspecified Belarusian air defense elements will conduct a tactical exercise including deploying to an unspecified area to defend airspace from April 19 – 22.[67]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/17559435

[2]  https://t.me/bazabazon/17012

[3] https://t.me/bazabazon/17012; https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/17559435; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/19/04/2023/643fd8b59a794730b513e320; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/19/fsb-prishla-s-proverkoy-v-moskovskuyu-politsiyu-ee-svyazyvayut-so-slivom-lichnyh-dannyh-rossiyskih-silovikov-grazhdanam-ukrainy

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040523; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032923

[5] https://suspilne dot media/449784-ukraina-otrimala-zrk-patriot-vid-nimeccini-polsa-rozblokue-tranzit-ukrainskogo-zerna-420-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1681904121&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[6] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/19/rosiyany-vdayutsya-do-syrijskoyi-taktyky-ganna-malyar/

[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035Erhj6HD11mgHdFeMaVkSCoF1Bi145x6762R9C2fWBE6phnEzNtkhQK3BTD1d4gil; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0vSr7VrZrwozFZ5YdTzYNhhokVNjJNpdmn8FCAWEpp67aNurJyWZsVnFLuC3W5n1Ml; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0AghHjemki4WePWeFU9zk7CAkjSBjRu1Ly8uxTJffRMDnUuhLqmGssp5G2qUsYewkl; https://t.me/kpszsu/2475; https://t.me/readovkanews/57127

[8] https://suspilne dot media/449784-ukraina-otrimala-zrk-patriot-vid-nimeccini-polsa-rozblokue-tranzit-ukrainskogo-zerna-420-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1681897440&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[9] https://t.me/milchronicles/1792

[10] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/19/nashi-zahysnyky-znyshhyly-blyzko-750-krylatyh-raket-z-ponad-850-yaki-vorog-zastosuvav-proty-ukrayiny-yurij-ignat/

[11] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/19/nashi-zahysnyky-znyshhyly-blyzko-750-krylatyh-raket-z-ponad-850-yaki-vorog-zastosuvav-proty-ukrayiny-yurij-ignat/

[12] https://en.defence-ua dot com/industries/russia_is_about_to_start_the_kh_50_missile_production_but_what_news_do_they_have_with_another_kh_65_missile_project-6420.html; https://svidomi.in dot ua/en/page/russia-plans-to-start-mass-production-of-kh-50-cruise-missiles-in-june-general-staff#:~:text=%22The%20Kh%2D50%20is%20a,up%20to%20950%20km%2Fh.

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035Erhj6HD11mgHdFeMaVkSCoF1Bi145x6762R9C2fWBE6phnEzNtkhQK3BTD1d4gil; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0vSr7VrZrwozFZ5YdTzYNhhokVNjJNpdmn8FCAWEpp67aNurJyWZsVnFLuC3W5n1Ml

[14] https://t.me/voenacher/43150; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83394; https://t.me/wargonzo/12032

[15] https://t.me/kommunist/16994  

[16] https://t.me/mod_russia/25779

[17] https://t.me/grey_zone/18334; https://t.me/wargonzo/12032; https://t.me/milinfolive/99478; https://t.me/milinfolive/99486

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035Erhj6HD11mgHdFeMaVkSCoF1Bi145x6762R9C2fWBE6phnEzNtkhQK3BTD1d4gil; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0vSr7VrZrwozFZ5YdTzYNhhokVNjJNpdmn8FCAWEpp67aNurJyWZsVnFLuC3W5n1Ml

[19] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/19/uprodovzh-doby-vorog-zdijsnyv-539-obstriliv-pozyczij-nashyh-vijsk-na-donechchyni-sergij-cherevatyj/

[20] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/19/u-bahmuti-vorog-atakuye-malymy-grupamy-ta-vstupaye-v-kontaktni-strileczki-boyi-polkovnyk-dmytro-zavorotnyuk/

[21] https://t.me/rybar/45977; https://t.me/rlz_the_kraken/57809; https://t.me/mod_russia/25787 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/25788; https://t.me/readovkanews/57152

[22] https://t.me/readovkanews/57126

[23] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36369

[24] https://t.me/milchronicles/1791

[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035Erhj6HD11mgHdFeMaVkSCoF1Bi145x6762R9C2fWBE6phnEzNtkhQK3BTD1d4gil; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0vSr7VrZrwozFZ5YdTzYNhhokVNjJNpdmn8FCAWEpp67aNurJyWZsVnFLuC3W5n1Ml

[26] https://t.me/wargonzo/12032; https://t.me/readovkanews/57126

[27] https://t.me/rybar/45977; https://t.me/readovkanews/57126

[28] https://t.me/mod_russia/25779; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83336; https://t.me/nm_dnr/10229; https://t.me/z_arhiv/20459 https://t.me/wargonzo/12030

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035Erhj6HD11mgHdFeMaVkSCoF1Bi145x6762R9C2fWBE6phnEzNtkhQK3BTD1d4gil; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0vSr7VrZrwozFZ5YdTzYNhhokVNjJNpdmn8FCAWEpp67aNurJyWZsVnFLuC3W5n1Ml

[30] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83344; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83349; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83397; https://t.me/z_arhiv/20454; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36372 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/99468 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46900

[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/12032; https://t.me/rybar/45977

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0vSr7VrZrwozFZ5YdTzYNhhokVNjJNpdmn8FCAWEpp67aNurJyWZsVnFLuC3W5n1Ml

[33] https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1648393522574131200

[34] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/683

[35] https://t.me/vrogov/8824; https://t.me/vrogov/8821  

[36] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/18337; https://t.me/z_arhiv/20445

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035Erhj6HD11mgHdFeMaVkSCoF1Bi145x6762R9C2fWBE6phnEzNtkhQK3BTD1d4gil; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0vSr7VrZrwozFZ5YdTzYNhhokVNjJNpdmn8FCAWEpp67aNurJyWZsVnFLuC3W5n1Ml; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/5254; https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1648444226882129920?s=20; https://t.me/combat_cypress/711; https://t.me/hueviyherson/38161; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83382; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83333

[38] https://www.fontanka dot ru/2023/04/19/72233075/h; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/19/v-gosdume-zayavili-chto-v-vesenniy-prizyv-elektronnye-povestki-budut-rassylat-v-testovom-rezhime-oni-yakoby-ne-budut-imet-yuridicheskoy-sily ; https://t.me/severrealii/16158 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/57146 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/11258

[39] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/11106; https://t.me/severrealii/16091; https://t.me/bazabazon/16951; http://publication.pravo.gov dot ru/Document/View/0001202304140051?index=55&rangeSize=1; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/14/putin-podpisal-zakon-ob-elektronnyh-povestkah-i-ogranicheniyah-dlya-uklonistov

[40] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/17560961

[41] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/11271

[42] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041123

[43] https://t.me/astrapress/25190

[44] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041623

[45] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/793; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/794

[46] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/17553369 ; https://t.me/Hinshtein/3741

[47] https://t.me/Hinshtein/3741

[48] https://t.me/Hinshtein/3741

[49] https://t.me/Hinshtein/3741

[50] https://tass dot ru/politika/17557755

 

[51] https://lug-info dot com/documents/ukaz-glavy-lnr-o-merah-po-obespecheniyu-prizyva-grazhdan-1996-2005-godov-rozhdeniya-na-voennuyu-sluzhbu-v-luganskoj-narodnoj-respublike-v-2023-godu; https://www.sovsekretno dot ru/news/v-lnr-proydyet-vesenniy-prizyv-vopreki-zayavleniyam-glavy-komiteta-gosdumy-po-oborone/; https://t.me/astrapress/24984; https://lnr-news dot ru/society/2023/04/14/167535.html; https://xn--80aafc4bdoy dot xn--p1ai/documents/bank/Ukaz_Glavi_Luganskoi_Narodnoi_Respubliki_%22Ob_utverzhdenii_Pravil_raspredeleniya_tarifnoi_kvoti_na_vivoz_s_territorii_Luganskoi_Narodnoi_Respubliki_za_predeli_territorii_Rossiiskoi_Federatsii_v_gosudarstva,_ne_yavlyayushchiesya_chlenami_Yevraziiskogo_ekonomicheskogo_soyuza,_pshenitsi_i_meslina_(kodi_1001_19_000_0,_______________________________________________________1001_99_000_0_TN_VED_YeAES),_yachmenya_(kod_1003_90_000_0_TN_VED_YeAES),_kukuruzi_(kod_1005_90_000_0_TN_VED_YeAES),_soevikh_bobov_(kod_1201_90_000_0_TN_VED_YeAES),_semyan_rapsa_______________________________________________________(kod_1205_10_900_0_TN_VED_YeAES)_na_srok_s_1_yanvarya_po_31_dekabrya_2023_g._(vklyuchitelno),_semyan_podsolnechnika_(kod_1206_00_990_0_TN_VED_YeAES),_masla_podsolnechnogo_(kodi_1512_11_910_1,_1512_11_910_9,_1512_19_900_2,________________1512_19_900_9,_1517_90_910_0_TN_VED_YeAES),_podsolnechnogo_shrota_____________________________________________(kod_2306_30_000_0_TN_VED_YeAES)_na_srok_s_1_yanvarya_po_31_avgusta_2023_g._(vklyuchitelno),_pomeshchaemikh_pod_tamozhennuyu_protseduru_eksporta%22?id=1242

[52] https://www.interfax-russia dot ru/main/kartapolov-prizyvnikov-ne-napravyat-sluzhit-v-novye-subekty-rf?ysclid=lfuu925mnd764589320; https://t.me/astrapress/24984

[53] https://t.me/mod_russia/25785

[54] https://www.csis.org/analysis/out-stock-assessing-impact-sanctions-russias-defense-industry

[55] https://www.csis.org/analysis/out-stock-assessing-impact-sanctions-russias-defense-industry

[56] https://www.csis.org/analysis/out-stock-assessing-impact-sanctions-russias-defense-industry

 

[57] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032223

[58] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3355

[59] https://t.me/astrapress/25155; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/683

[60] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/686

[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035Erhj6HD11mgHdFeMaVkSCoF1Bi145x6762R9C2fWBE6phnEzNtkhQK3BTD1d4gil

[62] https://t.me/readovkanews/57134 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/57135 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/15604 ; https://t.me/sashakots/39370; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46896; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/19/fsb-otchitalas-o-zaderzhanii-grazhdanina-rossii-i-ukrany-podozrevaemogo-v-podgotovke-diversii-na-ob-ekte-energetiki-v-anneksirovannom-krymu; https://t.me/rybar/45990

[63] https://t.me/readovkanews/57134 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/57135 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/15604 ; https://t.me/sashakots/39370; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46896; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/19/fsb-otchitalas-o-zaderzhanii-grazhdanina-rossii-i-ukrany-podozrevaemogo-v-podgotovke-diversii-na-ob-ekte-energetiki-v-anneksirovannom-krymu; https://t.me/rybar/45990

[64] https://t.me/basurin_e/879; https://t.me/pushilindenis/3354; http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202304190001?index=0&rangeSize=1

[65] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3354

 

[66] https://t.me/modmilby/26014

[67] https://t.me/modmilby/25983