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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 2, 2025
Apr 2, 2025 - ISW Press
Download the PDFRussian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 2, 2025
Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, and George Barros with Nate Trotter and William Runkel
April 2, 2025, 6:15 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on April 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian officials are continuing to exploit the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire's vague or unfinalized terms. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 2 that the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire is in effect and that Russia is adhering to the ceasefire.[1] Peskov claimed that Ukraine has "not joined" the temporary ceasefire "essentially" and that Russia intends to discuss this with the United States. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on April 1 that Russia forwarded a list of Ukraine's alleged ceasefire violations to US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the United Nations (UN), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 2 that Ukrainian forces are "systematically" conducting drone and artillery strikes against Russian energy infrastructure.[3] The exact contours of the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire remain unclear, and Ukraine and Russia do not appear to have formally agreed on the list of objects covered in the ceasefire or the types of strikes prohibited. ISW previously noted that it is unclear if the temporary ceasefire prohibits striking energy infrastructure with shorter-range tube or rocket artillery.[4] It is also unclear how Ukraine could violate a temporary ceasefire that it has "not joined."
US officials reportedly continue to acknowledge Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine. Two US officials familiar with the matter told Reuters on April 1 that senior Trump administration officials have discussed the likelihood that the United States will not be able to secure a long-term peace agreement in Ukraine in the coming months and are preparing new plans to pressure Russia and Ukraine into an agreement.[5] The sources noted that Trump administration officials acknowledged that Putin is actively resisting US efforts to accomplish a peace agreement in Ukraine and used a series of meetings and calls over the weekend of March 29-30 to discuss possible mechanisms to bring Russia to the negotiating table. A senior US official stated that the Trump administration is considering levying additional tariffs and sanctions against Russia. Another source familiar with the discussions similarly told Fox News on April 1 that US President Donald Trump believes that Putin is "slow-rolling" negotiations on a general ceasefire in Ukraine and that the Trump administration is considering increasing sanctions against Russia in order to force Putin to the negotiating table.[6] Trump recently told NBC News that he is considering additional sanctions against Russian oil and stated during a press conference on March 30 that there is an unspecified "psychological deadline" for Russia to agree to a general ceasefire agreement.[7] ISW previously noted that it is not possible for the United States or the wider West to exert maximum pressure against Russia with economic tools alone, as Russia's ongoing and forecasted future economic struggles are closely tied to Russian military losses on the battlefield.[8] The United States can leverage Russian vulnerabilities and achieve a stronger negotiating position by continuing — or increasing — military aid to Ukraine such that Ukrainian forces can continue to inflict significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia.
CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev will reportedly meet with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Washington, D.C. on April 2. Unnamed US officials and other unspecified sources familiar with Dmitriev's trip told CNN on April 1 that Dmitriev will meet with Witkoff later this week in Washington, D.C., and sources told CNN and CBS that the US government temporarily lifted sanctions against Dmitriev in order to grant him a visa to visit the United States.[9] Sources told CBS on April 2 that Dmitriev will meet with Witkoff on April 2, but the Trump administration has not published information about the meeting.[10] It is unclear if the meeting has occurred as of this publication. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 2 that Dmitriev's visit to Washington, D.C. is possible, and Dmitriev inconclusively responded to US reporting on his possible visit with "maybe."[11]
The Russian military command reportedly began reorganizing the motorized rifle brigades of the 51st and 3rd combined arms armies (CAAs) such that each army would have three rifle divisions or motorized rifle divisions, likely in an effort to improve the CAAs' administrative structure, especially over larger numbers of unmechanized riflemen. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on April 2 that the Russian military command may be reorganizing the motorized rifle brigades of the 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 3rd CAA (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, SMD) such that both armies would have three “motorized” rifle divisions each.[12] The 51st CAA currently includes six motorized rifle brigades on paper: the 1st, 5th, 9th, 110th, 114th, and 132nd motorized rifle brigades. The 3rd CAA also includes six motorized rifle brigades on paper: the 4th, 6th, 7th, 85th, 88th, and 123rd motorized rifle brigades. Mashovets stated that some unspecified brigades in the 51st and 3rd CAAs are already staffed at levels significantly higher than a typical brigade, at least on paper.[13] Mashovets noted that the brigades are already operating at the front and have control over a number of other units – usually rifle or motorized rifle regiments and battalions – attached to the brigade. Mashovets stated that "it is assumed" that each of the new motorized rifle divisions in the 51st and 3rd CAAs will consist of two assault regiments, two "reinforcement" regiments, and an artillery regiment as well as organic logistics support units at the division-level, but that the divisions‘ are unlikely to have combat engineer or anti-aircraft missile units at the regimental level, as is normal for most Russian motorized rifle divisions. Mashovets stated that the Russian military command plans to create the 1st, 110th, and 132nd motorized rifle divisions within the 51st CAA. Mashovets stated that the Russian military command plans to form the 132nd Motorized Rifle Division on the basis of the 101st and 109th motor rifle regiments and plans to consolidate the 269th, 270th and 272nd rifle battalions into the 103rd Rifle Regiment. Mashovets stated that the only truly mechanized "motorized rifle" unit in the 132nd Motorized Rifle Division will be the 1436th Motorized Rifle Regiment. Mashovets stated that it is unclear if each new division will include a tank regiment and that the situation with tanks "will be very tense," likely given Russia’s shortage of main battle tanks. Mashovets stated that the Russian military command may be making these changes to improve the organizational and staff structure in the 51st and 3rd CAAs in order to "streamline" their command and control processes. Mashovets stated that these changes are unlikely to significantly increase the number of troops in the CAAs or their combat capabilities beyond that of an army corps.[14] ISW has not observed other reports of the Russian military command restructuring the 51st and 3rd CAAs.
The Russian military command reorganized the 1st DNR AC and 2nd LNR AC into the 51st and 3rd CAAs, respectively, in Summer 2024 as part of wider efforts to integrate irregular forces into the Russian Armed Forces.[15] Elements of the 51st CAA are currently operating in the Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions, and elements of the 3rd CAA are currently operating in the Siversk and Chasiv Yar directions and in Belgorod Oblast.[16] The Russian military command has especially attempted to leverage elements of the 51st CAA in offensive operations in the Kurakhove, Pokrovsk, and Toretsk directions in recent months.[17] Most CAAs in the Russian military include less than three divisions, with only the 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) including three divisions.[18] Mashovets’ report suggests that the Russian military does not seek to equip the divisions of the 51st and 3rd CAAs to a normal Russian motorized rifle division’s the full doctrinal end strength, suggesting that the restructuring is in response to specific command and control of force structure challenges afflicting the former DNR 1st and LNR 2nd Army Corps given their hasty reorganization into CAAs.[19]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 1 that Russian forces in Ukraine are continuing to use ammunition equipped with chemical agents prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces recorded 767 cases of Russian forces using regulated K-51 and RG-VO grenade launchers to launch munitions containing chemical agents and ammunition containing unspecified hazardous chemicals that are banned under the CWC in March 2025. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces have used banned chemical agents a total of 7,730 times since February 2023.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian officials are continuing to exploit the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire's vague or unfinalized terms.
- US officials reportedly continue to acknowledge Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine.
- CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev will reportedly meet with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Washington, D.C. on April 2.
- The Russian military command reportedly began reorganizing the motorized rifle brigades of the 51st and 3rd combined arms armies (CAAs) such that each army would have three rifle divisions or motorized rifle divisions, likely in an effort to improve the CAAs' administrative structure, especially over larger numbers of unmechanized riflemen.
- The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 1 that Russian forces in Ukraine are continuing to use ammunition equipped with chemical agents prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
- Russian authorities continued efforts to solidify their control over the Russian information space and discourage critique of the Russian military's conduct of the war in Ukraine.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Alleged Ceasefire Violations
Ukraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.
Russian sources continued to claim on April 2 that Ukrainian forces violated the temporary energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a substation near Klyukva, Kursk Oblast and shelled an energy facility in another area of Kursk Oblast on the morning of April 2.[21] Luganskgaz, a Russian-controlled energy company operating in occupied Luhansk Oblast, claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Svatove gas distribution station in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[22]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 2 that a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone struck an electrical substation in Sumy Oblast and that an artillery strike damaged a power line in Nikopil, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast overnight from April 1 to 2 leaving almost 4,000 residents of both oblasts without power.[23]
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border on April 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Zhuravka and near Basivka (both northeast of Sumy City).[24]
Russian sources claimed that fighting continued northeast of Sumy City near Basivka and Zhuravka; south of Sudzha near Guyevo and Plekhovo; and southwest of Suzdha near Oleshnya.[25]
Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian "Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[26] Elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near the Kursk Oblast border.[27] Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating in Guyevo.[28]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on April 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 2 that Russian forces advanced south of Popovka and west of Demidovka (both northwest of Belgorod City).[29]
Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued near Demidovka and Popovka.[30]
A Russian milblogger claimed that the area near Popovka is a contested "gray zone."[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck the Korochyanskoye Dam near Popovka to complicate Ukrainian crossings of the Korocha River.[32]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Popovka.[33] Elements of the "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment and of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Demidovka.[34]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on April 2 but did not advance.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[35]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on April 1 and 2.[36]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction reported on April 2 that Russian forces have been conducting reconnaissance-in-force missions as part of efforts to resume offensive operations over the past two weeks.[37]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kupyansk direction on April 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 1 and 2 that Russian forces advanced to the northern outskirts of Kindrashivka.[38] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces consolidated their positions in northern Kindrashivka after seizing a stronghold near the P79 Kupyansk-Dvorichna road northeast of the settlement.[39]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near the international border near Kamyanka and Krasne Pershe, north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and Mala Shapivka, and east of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in Mala Shapkivka and near Stepova Novoselivka.[41]
A Russian milblogger claimed that ravines and gullies are complicating Russian efforts to move equipment in the direction of Kindrashivka.[42]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the "Kontora" Detachment (375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion, 47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating north of Stepova Novoselivka.[43]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 2 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka, Zahyrzove, and Nova Krulyakivka and east of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Novolyubivka.[44]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 1 and 2 that Russian forces advanced near Novolyubivka (northeast of Lyman).[45]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Lyman near Katerynivka, Nove, Zelena Dolyna, and Novomykhailiva; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Myrne, and Yampolivka; and east of Lyman near Dibrova and Torske on April 1 and 2.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 2 that Russian forces continued to attack in the direction of Nove (north of Lyman) and Katerynivka (north of Lyman).[47]
Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor reported on April 2 that Russian forces have increased their assault tempo and activity in Luhansk Oblast.[48] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on April 2 that Russian forces are increasingly using mass infantry attacks for daily assaults and that Russian force are not conducting mechanized assaults as frequently as they used to in Fall 2024.[49] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces recently have been conducting ground assaults nearly daily, primarily sending penal recruits into fire to expose Ukrainian firing positions and to enable trained Russian infantry to better attack Ukrainian positions. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces conduct artillery, MLRS, air, and first-person view (FPV) drone strikes to support small group infantry attacks before assembling into larger groups of 10 to 15 soldiers for subsequent attacks. The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on April 2 that Russian forces are trying to seize Lyman by enveloping its flanks in order to facilitate movement to the Oskil River and establish Lyman as a Russian logistics node.[50]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[51]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 2 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Siversk toward Serebryanka; northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on April 1 and 2.[52]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 2 but did not make confirmed advances.[53]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 2 that Russian forces advanced north of Chasiv Yar.[54]
Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and Ozaryanivka; and south of Chasiv Yar toward Predtechnye and Stupochky on April 1 and 2.[55]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including elements of its 215th Reconnaissance Battalion, are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[56] Elements of the "Nevsky" Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[57] Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and drone elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar).[58]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published April 2 shows Russian forces raising a flag in southwestern Oleksandropil (southwest of Toretsk), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[59]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 2 that Russian forces advanced north of Toretsk, near the Toretska Mine in northern Toretsk, northwest of Toretsk, in the southwestern outskirts of Toretsk, and near the Tsentralna mine in southwestern Toretsk.[60]
Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dachne and Dyliivka; east of Toretsk near Krymske; west of Toretsk near Romanivka, Shcherbynivka, and Leonidivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Panteleymonivka, Oleksandropil, Valentynivka, and Sukha Balka on April 1 and 2.[61]
Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on April 1 that Russian forces are periodically trying to attack in armored columns in the Toretsk direction.[62]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) and the 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (purportedly of the 8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Oleksandropil and Stara Mykolaivka (southwest of Toretsk).[63] Elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[64]
Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[65]
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) and southeast of Bohdanivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[66]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Lysivka, northeast of Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk), northwest of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk), southwest of Nadiivka, and near Preobrazhenka (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced in eastern Zelene (south of Pokrovsk).[68]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka and Berezivka; east of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Kalynove; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene and Vidrodzhennya (formerly Novyi Trud); and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Kotlyarivka, Uspenivka, Sribne, Novooleksandrivka, Bohdanivka, and Novoserhiivka on April 1 and 2.[69] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on April 1 that Ukrainian forces repelled a platoon-sized mechanized assault consisting of three infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and an unspecified number of motorcycles in the Novopavlivka direction (southwest of Pokrovsk).[70] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Lysivka, Shevchenko, Novooleksandrivka, and Udachne and are accumulating forces for future counterattacks.[71]
A Ukrainian officer stated that Russian forces have started to use tanks and IFVs during assaults in the Pokrovsk direction.[72] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction stated that Russian forces are conducting assaults mainly with motorcycles, quad bikes, and buggies.[73] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are accumulating Soviet-era equipment for assaults and that Russian losses have tripled in the area since the start of negotiations (likely referring to mid-February 2025).[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck a bridge near Solone.[75] A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed that Uspenivka is a contested "gray zone" and that Russian forces have not been able to advance past Shevchenko.[76] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones have low altitude air superiority, forcing Russian forces have to conduct rotations on foot over 10 kilometers and causing problems with Russian supplies of ammunition, water, and gasoline.
Order of Battle: Air defense elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[77] Elements of the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 428th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhzhia (southwest of Pokrovsk), and drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Tarasivka.[78]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on April 2 but did not make any confirmed advances.|
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[79]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Andriivka and Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on April 1 and 2.[80]
Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Burlatske (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[81]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Vesele and Vilne Pole (both northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[82]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Velyka Novosilka near Dniproenerhiya and northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele, Shevchenko, and Burlatske on April 2.[83] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Vilne Pole.[84]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Sharkhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[85]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on April 2.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade and artillery elements of the Russian 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy direction.[86]
Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 2 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Lobkove (northwest of Robotyne) and advanced east and west of the settlement.[87]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 2 that elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division advanced north of Mali Shcherbaky (northwest of Robotyne).[88]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka and northwest of Robotyne near Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske on April 1 and 2.[89]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dnipro direction on April 2 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 2 that Russian forces advanced on Velikiy Potemkin Island (south of Kherson City) and that Ukrainian forces are attempting to use boats to cross the Dnipro River near the Antonivka Road Bridge (east of Kherson City) in order to land on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.[90]
Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of the Dnipro direction on April 1 and 2.[91]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[92]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 1 to 2 and a missile strike on April 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 74 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[93] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 41 drones over northern, eastern, and southern Ukraine and that 20 drones were ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian official sources reported that the drone strikes struck Kharkiv, Donetsk, Sumy, and Odesa oblasts and that a ballistic missile struck civilian infrastructure in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast during the day on April 2, killing four civilians.[94]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian authorities continued efforts to solidify their control over the Russian information space and discourage critique of the Russian military's conduct of the war in Ukraine. Russian state media reported on April 2 that the Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its first reading on criminal penalties for "discrediting" the Russian military.[95] The bill proposes that the government confiscate the property of people who accept payment in exchange for discrediting the Russian military, for calling for anti-Russia sanctions, or for working in an international organization of which Russia is not a member. Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin noted that the bill is aimed at punishing Russian citizens who fled the country after the start of the full-scale invasion or who commit treason. The Russian State Duma also adopted a bill criminalizing failures to report sabotage efforts against Russian energy and transport infrastructure.[96]
Occupation governments continue to expand their analogues to the Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" program. Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed on April 2 that 933 people, including 823 residents of occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, have applied to join the "Sevastopol — City of Heroes" program.[97] Rozvozhaev stated that the program will begin on September 1 and will accept 30 participants. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration stated on April 2 that 1,515 people recently submitted applications for the "Heroes of Kherson Oblast" program.[98] ISW has previously noted that Russian officials intend to leverage analogues to the federal "Time of Heroes" program in occupied Ukraine as part of long-term efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia and militarize society in occupied Ukraine.[99]
Russian officials may be attempting to address systematic issues of unprofessionalism and violence in the Russian military three years into the war. Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported on April 2 that the Russian Southern Military District (SMD) Court stated that it sentenced two Russian commanders accused of murdering, torturing, and abusing the bodies of seven fellow Russian servicemembers in Ukraine.[100] The court sent both commanders to a maximum-security penal colony and stripped the commanders of their ranks. Russian opposition media and Ukrainian media outlets previously reported that the commanders were part of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC]).[101] ISW has consistently observed reports of Russian commanders injuring, killing, or unjustly imprisoning their subordinates in Ukraine throughout the full-scale invasion.[102] Russian officials have not undertaken any significant effort to prevent or address systemic violence in the Russian military.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
The People's Front (Narodnyi Front) political coalition told Kremlin newswire TASS on April 2 that Russian forces have deployed 120 newly developed "Rubin" modular electronic warfare (EW) systems designed to protect infantry and vehicles in Ukraine.[103]
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is suspending occupation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. Click here to read the March 31 Russian Occupation Update.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://tass dot ru/politika/23574837 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/308966
[2] https://t.me/tass_agency/308869; https://t.me/tass_agency/308870 ; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3825 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/54758
[3] https://t.me/mod_russia/50824
[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040125
[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-officials-eye-longer-road-ukraine-peace-frustration-mounts-2025-04-01/
[6] https://x.com/JacquiHeinrich/status/1907132555293581469
[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar033025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033125
[8] https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russia%27s%20Weakness%20Offers%20Leverage%20PDF.pdf
[9] https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/01/politics/senior-russian-official-washington-visit/index.html ; https://www.cbsnews.com/news/steve-witkoff-kirill-dmitriev-russia-white-house-meeting/?ftag=CNM-00-10aab8f&linkId=789427694
[10] https://x.com/saraecook/status/1907418670235619498 ; https://www.cbsnews.com/news/steve-witkoff-kirill-dmitriev-russia-white-house-meeting/?ftag=CNM-00-10aab8f&linkId=789427694
[11] https://t.me/tass_agency/308968 ; https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/1907213823502696722
[12] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2664
[13] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2664
[14] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2665; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2664
[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2024
[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-30-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2025
[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010525
[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/October%2012%2C%202023%20Russian%20Orbat_Final.pdf
[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage
[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QBb1y2wz7ZtA1r5BEEupBbPkphmAsjz9EN2eB6jGYXQissKV9cpSW47ZTDLtkdp9l
[21] https://t.me/mod_russia/50824
[22] https://t.me/luganskgaz_lnr/793
[23] https://suspilne dot media/985117-zelenskij-pro-obstrili-u-moskvi-znevazaut-diplomaticni-zusilla-partneriv/; https://www.facebook.com/zelenskyy.official/videos/1309292320154958/
[24] https://t.me/rybar/69327
[25] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26317; https://t.me/wargonzo/25693; https://t.me/dva_majors/68155; https://t.me/rusich_army/22262; https://t.me/rybar/69327; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26338; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89221
[26] https://t.me/milinfolive/145367
[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/50821
[28] https://t.me/rybar/69327; https://t.me/dva_majors/68111; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89210
[29] https://t.me/wargonzo/25693
[30] https://t.me/wargonzo/25693; https://t.me/dva_majors/68155; https://t.me/rybar/69351
[31] https://t.me/rybar/69351
[32] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89211 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/145380
[33] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89211; https://t.me/milinfolive/145380
[34] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89230
[35] https://t.me/tass_agency/308915
[36]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl
[37] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/02/navit-iz-siryaka-ne-vyjshly-a-yih-vzhe-rozbyly-bezgluzdi-ataky-rosiyan-poblyzu-vovchanska/
[38] https://t.me/epoddubny/22984; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26311
[39] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63264
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22622; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl?__cft__%5B0%5D=AZWcTfmUIOxyngkNF0eTcgMV5ovkEhT2ueo5gop4wcj51A_8YcO4dBI-ZpFnH6qVOZ78HAY7X4k6nSZ-53N8xXnJJIn6ETfLuou4PDGikVBoA9ypHU1TniJmLUQ20P1vk8NgBXDyf9cloQGLjsz7F9s094UUGoBKEQxlwickn_DKLHiRpUQ77daZ4NGNST71zms&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26311; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63264
[41] https://t.me/dva_majors/68179 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22984
[42] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89200
[43] https://t.me/dva_majors/68179
[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl?__cft__%5B0%5D=AZWcTfmUIOxyngkNF0eTcgMV5ovkEhT2ueo5gop4wcj51A_8YcO4dBI-ZpFnH6qVOZ78HAY7X4k6nSZ-53N8xXnJJIn6ETfLuou4PDGikVBoA9ypHU1TniJmLUQ20P1vk8NgBXDyf9cloQGLjsz7F9s094UUGoBKEQxlwickn_DKLHiRpUQ77daZ4NGNST71zms&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22622 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl
[45] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31203
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22622; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl?__cft__%5B0%5D=AZWcTfmUIOxyngkNF0eTcgMV5ovkEhT2ueo5gop4wcj51A_8YcO4dBI-ZpFnH6qVOZ78HAY7X4k6nSZ-53N8xXnJJIn6ETfLuou4PDGikVBoA9ypHU1TniJmLUQ20P1vk8NgBXDyf9cloQGLjsz7F9s094UUGoBKEQxlwickn_DKLHiRpUQ77daZ4NGNST71zms&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/68155
[47] https://t.me/dva_majors/68155
[48] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/25667
[49] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Szeuva9Fl4s ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/02/vyklykayut-na-sebe-vogon-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-pershymy-v-myasorubku-kydayut-vyazniv/
[50] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/02/vpered-vpered-bez-urahuvannya-vtrat-kombryg-rozpoviv-navishho-vorog-atakuye-lyman/
[51] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159964
[52]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22622; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl; https://t.me/tass_agency/308925
[53] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31209
[54] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31209
[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mLEZbQsXy31Scmy87ayLz7VQRkPSZb3aVD5LujuyUKqU2BAZ2qPkTWXxhDxpffKXl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl
[56] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26329
[57] https://t.me/tass_agency/308947
[58] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13633; https://t.me/tass_agency/308962
[59] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1907409422927663490; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1907411519396000088; https://tme/partizani68/148
[60] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26340
[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mLEZbQsXy31Scmy87ayLz7VQRkPSZb3aVD5LujuyUKqU2BAZ2qPkTWXxhDxpffKXl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl; https://t.me/dva_majors/68155; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl
[62] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/videos/948417157133091/
[63] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13632; https://t.me/KubanArtilery/1205; https://t.me/KubanArtilery/1207; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13633
[64] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89269
[65] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1907191969358471538; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1907194310300148082; https://t.me/sudoplatov_official/4518
[66] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8792; https://t.me/BULAVA72b/201; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1907153899993063524; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1907146579103870984; https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1907427492471660719; https://t.me/moment_war/385; https://t.me/Stabikus2024/633
[67] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63270 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26318; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26318; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63274
[68] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63274
[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mLEZbQsXy31Scmy87ayLz7VQRkPSZb3aVD5LujuyUKqU2BAZ2qPkTWXxhDxpffKXl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63262; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63270; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63274; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2276
[70] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7229
[71] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26318; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63270; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63274; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89258; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26343
[72] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/02/na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-shturmuyut-z-bronetehnikoyu-ale-bezrezultatno/
[73] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXWlQ2K0dM ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/02/apokaliptychna-kartyna-lyudozherska-absolyutno-rosijski-motoshturmovyky-mchat-po-tilam-pobratymiv/
[74] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Szeuva9Fl4s ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/02/pislya-balachok-pro-peremovyny-vtraty-voroga-zrosly-vtrychi-poblyzu-pokrovska-tryvayut-intensyvni-boyi/
[75] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26318
[76] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2276
[77] https://t.me/milinfolive/145308;
[78] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89203; https://t.me/dva_majors/68161 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/68177
[79] https://t.me/wargonzo/25693; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26320
[80] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mLEZbQsXy31Scmy87ayLz7VQRkPSZb3aVD5LujuyUKqU2BAZ2qPkTWXxhDxpffKXl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl
[81] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/26965; https://t.me/sicariofly/15; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1907122739439161456
[82] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63267; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31212
[83] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mLEZbQsXy31Scmy87ayLz7VQRkPSZb3aVD5LujuyUKqU2BAZ2qPkTWXxhDxpffKXl; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63267; https://t.me/voin_dv/14203
[84] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63267
[85] https://t.me/voin_dv/14188
[86] https://t.me/voin_dv/14204
[87] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8793; https://t.me/rusich_army/22266
[88] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20973
[89] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mLEZbQsXy31Scmy87ayLz7VQRkPSZb3aVD5LujuyUKqU2BAZ2qPkTWXxhDxpffKXl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0oBNSADXWHoKMYK4F3N46jFMSdwAcb6GrHSwKL2wphoQDbkhb3tpXrnjxmKdyevVql
[90] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26361
[91] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mLEZbQsXy31Scmy87ayLz7VQRkPSZb3aVD5LujuyUKqU2BAZ2qPkTWXxhDxpffKXl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0oBNSADXWHoKMYK4F3N46jFMSdwAcb6GrHSwKL2wphoQDbkhb3tpXrnjxmKdyevVql
[92] https://t.me/dva_majors/68168
[93] https://t.me/kpszsu/31768
[94] https://t.me/kpszsu/31768; https://t.me/synegubov/13654; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2296; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2297; https://t.me/synegubov/13657; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2293 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/984867-ponad-14-vibuhiv-prolunali-u-harkovi-rosiani-atakuut-misto-bezpilotnikami/; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2305; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/985045-u-holodnogirskomu-rajoni-harkova-usuvaut-naslidki-nicnoi-ataki-bpla/; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2307; https://t.me/astrapress/78010; https://t.me/astrapress/77999; https://t.me/astrapress/78049; https://t.me/astrapress/78054; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/985567-armia-rf-atakuvala-balistikou-krivij-rig-so-vidomo; https://suspilne dot media/985117-zelenskij-pro-obstrili-u-moskvi-znevazaut-diplomaticni-zusilla-partneriv/; https://www.facebook.com/zelenskyy.official/videos/1309292320154958/
[95] https://ria dot ru/20250402/gosduma-2008869612.html
[96] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/67ed15789a7947dbc713187f
[97] https://t.me/razvozhaev/10903
[98] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/29468
[99] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2025
[100] https://zona dot media/news/2025/04/02/maly-tim
[101] https://zona dot media/news/2025/04/02/maly-tim; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/04/02/sud-v-rostove-na-donu-prigovoril-k-20-i-18-godam-dvuh-rossiyskih-komandirov-obvinyaemyh-v-ubiystve-i-pytkah-semeryh-soldat-svoey-divizii; https://suspilne dot media/796295-pidirvati-rozstrilati-spaliti-ak-rosijski-vijskovi-vbivaut-svoih-na-linii-frontu-v-ukraini/; https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/16564
[102] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2023
[103] https://t.me/tass_agency/308937 ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/23572995