Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 5, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 5, 2025

Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Davit Gasparyan, Daria Novikov, and Frederick W. Kagan

April 5, 2025, 4:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on April 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

European and NATO officials emphasized that a strong Ukrainian military backed by European security guarantees remains the most effective deterrent against future Russian aggression to ensure long-term peace in Ukraine and Europe. NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte gave an interview to Ukrainian outlet New Voice on April 5 and stated that the "first level" of security guarantees for Ukraine should be the Ukrainian military, which Rutte stated is the "first line of defense in deterrence."[1] Rutte added that Ukraine's European partners, including France, the United Kingdom, and Italy, are also looking for ways to provide security guarantees to Ukraine following the conclusion of a peace agreement. The French General Staff similarly emphasized that the Ukrainian military is Ukraine's primary security guarantee for a lasting peace.[2] The French General Staff added that France and the UK will work to define and develop "reassurance operations" to deter Russia from future aggression after the implementation of a peace deal. ISW continues to assess that a strong Ukrainian military backed by Western security guarantees remains the most vital component of a post-war European security architecture, guaranteeing a sustainable peace in Ukraine and deterring future Russian aggression.[3] Russian demands for Ukraine's "demilitarization" such that Ukraine is unable to defend itself against future Russian aggression are counter to US President Donald Trump's efforts to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine.

Ukraine's European partners continue preliminary technical discussions about a possible future peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine. Delegations from the British and French general staffs met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian military leaders on April 4 and 5 in Kyiv to discuss details about how the first contingent of partner state forces could deploy to Ukraine.[4] Zelensky stated that the meetings resulted in "tangible details" about this possible deployment, established Ukraine's needs, and identified geographical vulnerabilities that may require support.[5] Zelensky stated that the group still needs to decide where the forces would deploy, their responsibilities, and their authority to respond in case of a breach of a future peace agreement.[6] Zelensky stated that it might take one month or longer to finalize additional details and that the group would meet weekly. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated to Ukrainian outlet New Voice on April 5 that it is best to wait to deploy peacekeepers to Ukraine until after the conclusion of a peace agreement but that countries need to keep developing ideas now to implement after peace is achieved.[7]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the only plant in Russia that produces fiber optic cables that are vital for Russian forces' fiber optic drones. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on April 5 that unspecified drones hit the Fiber Optic Systems plant in Saransk, Republic of Mordovia.[8] Kovalenko stated that the plant produces materials for control, communication, and data transmission systems, including drone control in the Russian military. Geolocated footage published on April 5 shows an explosion and fire in Saransk.[9] The Fiber Optic Systems plant is the first and only plant manufacturing optical fiber in Russia.[10] A Russian insider source claimed that the plant produces all the Russian military's fiber optic cables.[11] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces shot down three drones over the Republic of Mordovia overnight, and the Republic of Mordovia Head Artyom Zdunov claimed that a drone struck an enterprise in the republic.[12] ISW cannot independently verify the damage to the Fiber Optic Systems plant, but successful Ukrainian strikes against the enterprise would likely reduce the Russian military's ability to supply troops with fiber optic cables to use with first-person view (FPV) drones on the battlefield.

Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on April 5 that sources in Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) stated that the SBU conducted drone strikes against the Promsintez enterprise in Chapayevsk, Samara Oblast on the night of April 4 to 5, causing at least 20 explosions and several fires.[13] The sources reported that Promsintez produces industrial explosives, including ammonal, ammonite, and granulite, and that the plant stopped operations after the strike. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces destroyed six drones over Samara Oblast overnight, and Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against an industrial enterprise in Chapayevsk, causing a fire.[14]

Ukraine's European partners continue to provide technical support to Ukraine. Reuters reported on April 4 that French commercial satellite communications provider Eutelsat CEO Eva Berneke stated that Eutelsat has been providing Ukraine with its high-speed satellite internet service for roughly one year funded by the German government.[15] Berneke stated that there are fewer than 1,000 terminals connecting Ukraine to Eutelsat's network but that Eutelsat hopes to increase the number of terminals to between 5,000 and 10,000 "within weeks." Eutelsat Spokesperson Joanna Darlington added that it is unclear whether the EU collectively or individual states will fund additional Eutelsat efforts for Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• European and NATO officials emphasized that a strong Ukrainian military backed by European security guarantees remains the most effective deterrent against future Russian aggression to ensure long-term peace in Ukraine and Europe.
• Ukraine's European partners continue preliminary technical discussions about a possible future peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the only plant in Russia that produces fiber optic cables that are vital for Russian forces' fiber optic drones.
• Ukraine's European partners continue to provide technical support to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk and in Kursk Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

Ukraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.

The Russian MoD claimed on April 5 that Ukrainian forces conducted 14 drone and artillery strikes against Russian energy infrastructure in Bryansk, Belgorod, Smolensk, Lipetsk, and Voronezh oblasts and in occupied Luhansk and Kherson oblasts on April 4 and 5.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 5 that the Russian MoD's claims about Ukraine's alleged violations of the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire are false and that Ukrainian forces are only striking legitimate military targets.[17]

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting in the Kursk-Sumy Oblast border area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Guyevo, Kursk Oblast (south of Sudzha).[18]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Basivka, Sumy Oblast (northeast of Sumy City), and advanced southeast of the settlement.[19]

Fighting continued near Oleshnya, Kursk Oblast (southwest of Sudzha), and Basivka.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to attack near Veselivka, Sumy Oblast (north of Sumy City).[21]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating near Guyevo, and the "Tigers" drone detachment of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly using first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber optic cables near the Kursk-Sumy Oblast border.[22]

The Russian military command may have redeployed limited elements of the 98th VDV Division to Kursk-Sumy Oblast border area. One Russian milblogger, who is reportedly associated with the VDV, claimed on April 5 that elements of the 98th VDV Division's 217th VDV Regiment struck Ukrainian forces in the Sumy direction.[23] ISW observed reports in February and March 2025 that elements of the 217th VDV Regiment were operating in the Chasiv Yar direction, and the VDV-affiliated Russian milblogger last claimed that elements of the 217th VDV Regiment were operating near Chasiv Yar in late March 2025.[24] ISW cannot independently verify the milblogger's claim and has not observed other Russian reporting about this alleged redeployment. It is unclear if the 217th VDV Regiment is split between the Chasiv Yar and Sumy directions or if the regiment has entirely redeployed to the Sumy direction.

Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks in northern Belgorod Oblast on April 5.

A Russian milblogger claimed that the Ukrainians unsuccessfully attacked near Demidovka and Popovka (both northwest of Belgorod City).[25]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on April 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on April 4 and 5.[26]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[27]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Pisky (northeast of Kupyansk near the international border) and east of Kamyanka (west of Pisky).[28] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces are advancing southward and southwestward from the outskirts of Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk).[29]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near the international border near Fyholivka and Kamyanka; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka, Kindrashivka, and Mala Shapkivka; and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on April 4 and 5.[30]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continue to advance on either side of the Oskil River in the Kupyansk direction – likely referring to the area near Kamyanka — and have established a land corridor from Valuyki, Belgorod Oblast, to the right (west) bank of the river.[31]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove; east of Borova near Nadiya, Novoserhiivka, and Novoyehorivka; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Olhivka on April 4 and 5.[32]

A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Borova direction reported that Russian forces are accumulating equipment in preparation for a future large-scale assault and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 13 out of 16 pieces of equipment during a March 27 Russian attack.[33] The servicemember noted that Russian forces continue to deploy small infantry groups of five to 10 soldiers and that Russian forces typically deploy personnel with three weeks of training before deploying better trained sabotage and reconnaissance groups that are usually better equipped and operate without body armor for increased maneuverability.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Kontora" Detachment (375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion, 47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Bohuslavka.[34]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 5 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Nove, Katerynivka, Novomykhailivka, and Zelena Dolyna and northeast of Lyman near Novolyubivka and Myrne on April 4 and 5.[35]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attempting to unite the Nevske-Novolyubivka bridgehead (northeast of Lyman) with the Makiivka bridgehead to the north.[36]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka, and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on April 4 and 5.[37]

Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on April 5 that Russian forces are using buggies and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) most actively in the Siversk direction.[38]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 5 that Russian forces advanced along Solidarnosti Street in central Chasiv Yar.[39]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka; and south of Chasiv Yar toward Stupochky and Predtechnye on April 4 and 5.[40]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 215th Reconnaissance Battalion and 331st VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[41]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Druzhba (north of Toretsk).[42]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dachne, Druzhba, and Dyliivka; northeast of Toretsk near Krymske; southwest of Toretsk near Valentynivka, Sukha Balka, and Oleksandropil; and west of Toretsk near Leonidivka and Petrivka on April 4 and 5.[43]

Zaporozhets stated on April 5 that Russian forces in the Toretsk direction continue to attack in small assault groups and are actively using motorcycles to transport infantry into central Toretsk.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that western and northern Druzhba are contested "gray zones."

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Toretsk.[45]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 5 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces in the western outskirts of Solone (southwest of Pokrovsk), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[46] Additional geolocated footage published on April 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Shevchenko (southwest of Pokrovsk).[47]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing toward central Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk) and north of Shevchenko.[48]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka and Oleksandropil; southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Bohdanivka, Udachne, Pishchane, Kotlyne, Novoserhiivka, Nadiivka, Uspenivka, Zvirove, Novooleksandrivka, Muravka, and Kotlyarivka on April 4 and 5.[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shevchenko, Kotlyne, and Lysivka.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on April 5 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Rozlyv and Bahatyr (both southwest of Kurakhove) and toward Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove).[51]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Kostyantynopil, and Oleksiivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv and Bahatyr on April 4 and 5.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces used armored vehicles to attack toward Oleksiivka.[53]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and the 140th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Bahatyr.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on April 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne, Fedorivka, and Burlatske and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and Novodarivka and toward Novopil on April 4 and 5.[55]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade and the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Shevchenko (west of Velyka Novosilka).[56] Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Vesele (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[57]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 5 but did not advance.[58]

Russian forces attacked north of Robotyne toward Mala Tokmachka and northwest of Robotyne near Novoandriivka, Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske on April 4 and 5.[59]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 19th Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Kamyanske.[60]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Dnipro direction on April 5.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 4 to 5. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 92 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Aktarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[61] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 51 drones over northern, southern, eastern, and central Ukraine and that 31 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces struck Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr oblasts.

The Russian MoD attempted to deflect blame for the April 4 Russian missile strike against a residential area in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast that killed civilians, including children. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces conducted a high-precision missile strike against a restaurant in central Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast where Ukrainian commanders were meeting on the evening of April 4.[62] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the April 4 Russian missile strike damaged a residential building and a playground, among other civilian infrastructure, and Ukrainian officials reported that the strike killed 18 people, including nine children.[63]

The Sumy Oblast Military Administration reported on April 4 that Russian forces launched 404 guided glide bombs against the oblast in the past week (roughly March 29 to April 4).[64] Kyiv City Military Administration Spokesperson Yevhen Ievlev reported on April 4 that Russian forces had targeted Kyiv City with 104 drones in the past week (roughly March 29 to April 4), that Ukrainian forces shot down 35 drones, and that the rest were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian EW interference.[65]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian forces fighting in Ukraine continue to innovate frontline electronic warfare (EW) systems. Former Roscosmos head, current Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator, and current head of the BARS-Sarmat Special Purpose Center for Unmanned Systems Dmitry Rogozin claimed on April 4 that the Russian BARS-Sarmat unit is constructing its own EW systems to mount on its vehicles.[66] A BARS-Sarmat scientific and production battalion deputy commander claimed to Russian state media outlet TASS that the center has launched serial production of vehicle-mounted anti-drone guns and sent the first batch to frontline Russian forces.[67] The deputy commander claimed that the center has produced 200 EW samples in one month of production and can scale up to "several thousand" EW systems per month with additional personnel and machines.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is suspending occupation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. Click here to read the April 3 Russian Occupation Update.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://english.nv dot ua/nation/rutte-ukraine-s-nato-path-is-irreversible-but-peace-deal-talks-won-t-include-membership-50503758.html ; https://nv dot ua/ukr/world/geopolitics/mirni-peregovori-ta-vstup-ukrajini-v-nato-ryutte-v-interv-yu-nv-rozpoviv-pro-rol-alyansu-50503720.html

[2] https://suspilne dot media/987797-u-genstabi-francii-rozpovili-pro-so-domovilas-francuzko-britanska-delegacia-z-kerivnictvom-ukraini/ ; https://x.com/EtatMajorFR/status/1908399830520480253

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2025

[4] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13791; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/05/rustem-umyerov-proviv-zustrich-z-nachalnykamy-vijskovyh-shtabiv-francziyi-ta-velykoyi-brytaniyi/; https://suspilne dot media/987551-zelenskij-rozpoviv-pro-pidsumki-zustrici-sodo-vijskovogo-kontingentu/ ; https://suspilne dot media/987575-rosiani-trimaut-64-tisaci-soldativ-u-kurskij-oblasti-zelenskij/

[5] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13791

[6] https://suspilne dot media/987551-zelenskij-rozpoviv-pro-pidsumki-zustrici-sodo-vijskovogo-kontingentu/ ; https://suspilne dot media/987575-rosiani-trimaut-64-tisaci-soldativ-u-kurskij-oblasti-zelenskij/

[7] https://nv dot ua/ukr/world/geopolitics/mirni-peregovori-ta-vstup-ukrajini-v-nato-ryutte-v-interv-yu-nv-rozpoviv-pro-rol-alyansu-50503720.html

[8] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9071

[9] https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1908306968995111122 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1908311531110236480 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1908311646113591658 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1908318284287553602 ; https://t.me/ukrbavovna/20092

[10] https://www.rusfiber dot ru/o-kompanii/

[11] https://t.me/vchkogpu/55796

[12] https://t.me/zdunov/10186; https://t.me/mod_russia/50923

[13] https://suspilne dot media/987885-droni-sbu-atakuvali-dronami-zavod-promsintez-u-samarskij-oblasti-rf-vin-zupiniv-robotu-dzerela/

[14] https://t.me/mod_russia/50923; https://ria dot ru/20250405/bespilotniki-2009471527.html; https://t.me/Fedorischev63/2438

[15] https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/germany-funds-eutelsat-internet-ukraine-musk-tensions-rise-2025-04-04/

[16] https://t.me/mod_russia/50933

[17] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22744

[18] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27077; https://t.me/soniah_hub/9926

[19] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89448; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26503

[20] https://t.me/tass_agency/309358; https://t.me/dva_majors/68367

[21] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26503

[22] https://t.me/sashakots/52870; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/160336

[23] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26497

[24] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25634; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025 ;

[25] https://t.me/wargonzo/25746

[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22703 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22693 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7426

[27] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8817 ; https://t.me/kcaebirds/1636

[28] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/160259

[29] https://t.me/tass_agency/309348

[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22743 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22703 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22693 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7426 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63318 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/68367

[31] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12816

[32] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7426 ; https://t.me/rybar/69425 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22743; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22703 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22693 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/68367

[33] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/05/vid-mobilizacziyi-do-utylizacziyi-prohodyt-try-tyzhni-rosiyany-nakopychuyut-resursy-pislya-provalnogo-shturmu/

[34] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/160284

[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22743; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22703 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22693 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7426 ; https://t.me/rybar/69425

[36] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63314

[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22743; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22703; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22693; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7426

[38] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/05/na-toreczkomu-napryamku-rosiyany-vykorystovuyut-protytankovi-miny-dlya-rujnacziyi-prymishhennya-ta-ukryttiv/

[39] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26501

[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22743; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22703; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22693; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7426

[41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26497; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/160320

[42] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1908489931090952357; https://t.me/REVo28omBr/113

[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22743; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22703; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22693; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7426; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26484

[44] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/05/na-toreczkomu-napryamku-rosiyany-vykorystovuyut-protytankovi-miny-dlya-rujnacziyi-prymishhennya-ta-ukryttiv/

[45] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/160256

[46] https://t.me/gostrikartuzy/846; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1908427801419473275

[47] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1908340058362442110; https://t.me/hudozhnik30/192; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27076

[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26505; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63325

[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22743; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22703; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22693; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7426 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25746; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26505 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63325

[50] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63325; https://t.me/wargonzo/25746; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26505

[51] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/160344; https://t.me/tass_agency/309416; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26489

[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22743 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22703; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22693 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7426 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26489

[53] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26489

[54] https://t.me/voin_dv/14239 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/160322

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22703; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22693; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12327; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/160344

[56] https://t.me/voin_dv/14240 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/160338

[57] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/160305

[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22743; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22703; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02E7yAXhJcqHhnLRRxRjyjhaHD9fju1ooSAF38m9DdwJBLqVwCreWbPcSpdiepMQZJl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22693; https://t.me/dva_majors/68367; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89414; https://t.me/wargonzo/25746

[60] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89414

[61] https://t.me/kpszsu/31945

[62] https://t.me/mod_russia/50918

[63] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040425; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/20649 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13790

[64] https://www.facebook.com/sumska.oda/posts/pfbid0TvG6Kbd3gLPure7fL8wMJEm7Jnt3gbfNW5uqFcBpjCJXUZMkj4sdQ8zDCzvSXaZHl

[65] https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/11261

[66] https://t.me/rogozin_do/6954

[67] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/23603335