Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 11, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 11, 2024

Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Fredrick W. Kagan

February 11, 2024, 6:35pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on February 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk as Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander, replacing current Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi.[1] Zelensky also made several other service head appointments on February 11. Zelensky appointed Lieutenant General Yuriy Sodol as Joint Forces Commander replacing Lieutenant General Serhiy Nayev.[2] Zelensky appointed Brigadier General Ihor Skybyuk Air Assault Forces Commander replacing Major General Maksym Myrhorodskyi.[3] Zelensky appointed Major General Ihor Plahuta Territorial Defense Forces Commander replacing Major General Anatoliy Barhylevych, who was appointed Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff on February 10.[4]

Russian forces appear to have constructed a 30-kilometer-long barrier dubbed the “tsar train” in occupied Donetsk Oblast, possibly to serve as a defensive line against future Ukrainian assaults. Satellite imagery dated May 10, 2023, and February 6 and 10, 2024 shows that Russian forces constructed a long line of train cars stretching from occupied Olenivka (south of Donetsk City) to Volnovakha (southeast of Vuhledar and north of Mariupol) over the past nine months.[5] A Ukrainian source reported on February 11 that Russian forces have assembled more than 2,100 freight cars into a 30-kilometer-long train.[6] The source reported that Russian forces began assembling the train in July 2023 and suggested that Russian forces intend to use the train as a defensive line against future Ukrainian assaults.[7] The railway line between Olenivka and Volnovakha is roughly six kilometers from ISW’s current assessed frontline southeast of Novomykhailivka at its closest point and is in an area of the front that was relatively inactive when Russian forces reportedly began construction.[8] Russian forces have recently made marginal territorial gains in this area.[9] The Russians could have assembled the train for other purposes as well.

Ukrainian military observers indicated that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is not as productive as Russian authorities portray it to be, but that the Russian DIB is still capable of sustaining Russia’s war effort. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on February 11 that the Russian Security Council’s own DIB production data for 2023 indicates that the Russian DIB reached a peak output in September 2023 that was 38.9 percent higher than its average 2022 monthly output and has steadily declined in the following months.[10] Mashovets stated that the Russian DIB is struggling to compensate for moderately- and highly-skilled labor shortages and Russia’s inability to obtain the necessary industrial production equipment, spare parts, and servicing to sustain the pace and breadth of DIB production efforts.[11] Mashovets noted that Chinese companies in particular are less willing to provide Russia with equipment and spare parts, as ISW previously reported, and that Russia purchased many industrial production systems from Western states before the full-scale invasion but that Western companies are now unwilling to service or supply parts for these machines due to sanctions.[12]

Ukrainian military analyst Oleksandr Kovalenko stated that Russia’s reported tank production numbers in recent years largely reflect restored and modernized tanks drawn from storage rather than new production.[13] Kovalenko stated that Uralvagonzavod, Russia’s primary tank manufacturer, can produce roughly 60-70 T-90 tanks per year under perfect conditions and assessed that Uralvagonzavod is likely only producing between three and six new T-90 tanks per month.[14] Kovalenko noted that tank manufacturers Uralvagonzavod, Omsktransmash, and the 103rd Armored Tank Repair Plant in Chita, Zabaykalsky Krai are primarily focused on restoring, repairing, and modernizing Russian tanks and that Uralvagonzavod is the only manufacturer producing new tanks.[15] Kovalenko stated that Russia is only modernizing T-54/55 and T-62 tanks and assessed that these may be Russia’s main battle tanks in the future. Kovalenko added that Russian manufacturers very rarely modernize T-72 and T-80 tanks. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitri Medvedev previously stated that Russian forces received 1,600 tanks in 2023, and Kovalenko attributed this number primarily to restored and modernized rather than serially produced tanks.[16]

Russia’s current limited DIB production capacity and insufficient serial tank production lines are not guarantees that Russia will struggle to produce enough materiel to sustain its war effort at its current pace or in the long term. Russia’s ability to modernize and use tanks retrieved from storage still gives Russian forces an advantage on the battlefield in the overall number of available tanks. Mashovets noted that some newly-produced tanks such as the T-14 Armada are poorly produced whereas older tanks such as T-72s (which Russia actively repairs) are more reliable.[17] Russia has consistently attempted to adapt to the limitations resulting from Western sanctions and to circumvent sanctions and will persist in these efforts. Russia’s DIB may struggle in the near term and increasing sanctions evasion measures and partnerships with states including China and North Korea may help compensate for existing DIB shortcomings in the medium to long term.[18]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk as Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander, replacing current Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi.
• Russian forces appear to have constructed a 30-kilometer-long barrier dubbed the “tsar train” in occupied Donetsk Oblast, possibly to serve as a defensive line against future Ukrainian assaults.
• Ukrainian military observers indicated that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is not as productive as Russian authorities portray it to be, but that the Russian DIB is still capable of sustaining Russia’s war effort.
• Russia’s current limited DIB production capacity and insufficient serial tank production lines are not guarantees that Russia will struggle to produce enough materiel to sustain its war effort at its current pace or in the long term.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued positional engagements along the entire frontline.
• CNN reported on February 11 that Russia has recruited as many as 15,000 Nepalis to fight in Ukraine, many of whom complained about poor conditions and lack of adequate training before their deployment to the most active frontlines in Ukraine.
• Russian authorities continue efforts to solidify social control over youth and students in occupied Ukraine and to culturally indoctrinate them into Russian identity and ideology.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Activities in Russian-Occupied Areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional fighting continued on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on February 11, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently made tactical flanking advances near Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk) as well as in eastern Bilohorivka (south of Kreminna) and its environs.[19] Positional fighting also continued southeast of Kupyansk near Orlyanske, Krokhmalne, Ivanivka, and Tabaivka; west of Kreminna near Torske and Yampolivka; and south of Kreminna near Dibrova and the Serebryanske forest area.[20] The Russian “Udaya” Drone Group is reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[21]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces reportedly advanced near Bakhmut amid continued positional engagements in the area on February 11. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut) and are two kilometers away from Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut), although ISW has not observed visual evidence confirming these claims.[22] ISW currently assesses that Russian forces are about 2.3 kilometers from the eastern outskirts of Chasiv Yar.[23] Positional engagements continued near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske; southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka; and south of Bakhmut near Mayorske, Pivdenne, and Niu York.[24] Elements of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the direction of Chasiv Yar, and elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Guards VDV Brigade continue to operate near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[25]

 

Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka amid continued positional battles in the area on February 11. Geolocated footage published on February 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Zaliznychnyi Lane in northern Avdiivka and east of Nevelske (southwest of Avdiivka).[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced along Tymiryazyeva and Silhosptekhniky streets in northern Avdiivka and near Pervomaiske, although ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[27] Positional engagements continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novokalynove and Novobakhmutivka; in Avdiivka itself; west of Avdiivka near Tonenke and Sieverne; and southwest of Avdiivka near Perovmaiske and Nevelske.[28] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continue attempts to interdict Ukrainian forces’ alleged main ground line of communication (GLOC) into Avdiivka.[29] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated that Russian forces are increasingly using groups of armored vehicles during infantry assaults in the Tavriisk direction (from Avdiivka through western Zaporizhia Oblast).[30]

 

Russian forces reportedly advanced southwest of Donetsk City amid continued positional engagements in the area on February 11. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Solodke (southwest of Donetsk City), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced towards Pavlivka (southwest of Donetsk City and near Vuhledar) at the end of last week.[32] Positional engagements continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda and Novomykhailivka.[33] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps) reportedly continue operating along the Krasnohorivka-Heorhiivka line.[34] Elements of the Russian “Russkiye Yastreby” (Russian Hawks) detachment of the 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Novomykhailivka.[35]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

A Russian milblogger claimed on February 11 that Russian forces “significantly” advanced towards Pryyutne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka) on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border over the past week, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[36] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 11 that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks north of Pryyutne.[37] Elements of the Russian 77th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating in the southern Donetsk direction; elements of the 14th Guards Special Purpose Brigade (Spetsnaz, Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces [GRU]) are operating near Pryyutne; elements of the 11th Air and Air Defense Forces Army (Russian Aerospace Forces) are operating near Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka); and a mortar crew of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (11th Army Corps, Baltic Sea Fleet) and elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating in the Vremivka direction.[38] Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA) are reportedly operating near Chervone (6km southeast of Hulyaipole).[39]

 

Russian forces recently marginally advanced west of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on February 9 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced west of Robotyne.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced one kilometer northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne), but ISW has not observed evidence confirming this claim.[41] Positional battles continued near Robotyne and Novopokrovka (northeast of Robotyne), and west of Verbove (east of Robotyne).[42] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian and Russian forces are consistently competing for the initiative in the Zaporizhia direction and noted that this frontline is no longer a priority for either of the sides.[43] Elements of the Russian 108th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Regiment (7th Guards VDV Division) are reportedly continuing to attack near Robotyne and Verbove, and unspecified elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[44]

 

Geolocated footage published on February 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently made marginal territorial gains in Krynky in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.[45] Positional battles continued near Krynky on February 11.[46]

 

Russian forces increased the number of ships at sea in the Black Sea on February 11. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that there are 14 Russian ships currently at sea in the Black Sea, including four surface missile carriers.[47] Pletenchuk assessed that Russian ships may be returning to their usual practice of carrying out training and combat missions in response to the Ukrainian strike on the Ivanovets Tarantul-class corvette (41st Missile Boat Brigade) near Lake Donuzlav in occupied Crimea overnight on January 31 to February 1.[48]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted another series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on February 10-11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 45 Shahed-136/131 drones from occupied Balaklava and Cape Chauda, Crimea, and that Ukrainian forces shot down 40 of the drones over Kyiv, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kherson oblasts.[49] Ukrainian military and government officials reported that Ukrainian forces shot down all the drones targeting Kyiv City.[50] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 18 Shahed drones over Mykolaiv Oblast, four Shaheds over Odesa Oblast, and one Shahed drone each over Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, and Vinnytsia oblasts. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command added that the strike series lasted for five and a half hours and chiefly targeted coastal infrastructure and agricultural facilities.[51] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces regularly launch drones along the Danube River (presumably in international airspace off the mouth of the Danube) - likely hoping to bypass Ukrainian air defenses by flying along Ukraine’s southwestern border -to ensure that Russian drones hit their intended targets.[52]

The Ukrainian government reported on February 11 that Russian forces damaged nearly 200 port infrastructure objects and injured more than 26 civilians since July 18, 2023, when Russian forces began a deliberate missile and drone campaign to destroy Ukrainian port and agricultural infrastructure.[53] The Ukrainian government added that Ukraine has exported over 22 million tons of various goods since the beginning of the operation of the temporary corridor through the Black Sea and that more than 700 vessels have used the corridor since August 2023 – despite Russian strikes on port infrastructure.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

CNN reported on February 11 that Russia has recruited as many as 15,000 Nepalis to fight in Ukraine, many of whom complained about poor conditions and lack of adequate training before their deployment to the most active frontlines in Ukraine.[54] Nepali opposition lawmaker and former foreign minister Bimala Tai Paudyal stated on February 8 that between 14,000 and 15,000 Nepalis are fighting on the frontlines in Ukraine according to testimonials from Nepali servicemen who had returned home. The Nepali government stated that about 200 Nepalis are currently fighting in Ukraine, however, and that at least 13 Nepalis have been killed on the frontlines. CNN, citing interviews with some Nepalis who fought in Ukraine, reported that Russia is offering Nepalis at least $2,000 per month and a fast-tracked process of obtaining Russian citizenship. Nepali interviewees revealed that the Russian command deployed some recruited personnel to Bakhmut in September 2023 after only two weeks of training and that the language barrier plays a large part in deaths among Nepalis on the frontlines as they struggle to communicate with Russian servicemen. CNN reported that many Nepali men travel to Russia on a tourist visa via the United Arab Emirates or India and are taken to a recruitment center upon arrival in Moscow, where they sign a contract to fight for one year. One Nepali recruit stated that many recruits try to escape from military camps after seeing gruesome images and realities on the frontlines.

Russian lawmakers recently introduced a bill into the Russian State Duma that would allow individuals in common-law marriages with Russian servicemen who died fighting in Ukraine to retroactively marry the servicemen.[55] Chairman of the State Duma Committee on State Building and Legislation Pavel Krasheninnikov explained that this bill aims to protect the interests of the “actual” family members of military personnel. The bill stipulates that cohabitants of soldiers killed or missing in action will be able to confirm that they were in a common-law marriage before the deployment in a new court proceeding.[56] The bill, if passed, will allow courts to confirm a marriage if both individuals were in a common-law marriage and lived together for at least three years or at least one year if they have a child in common. The bill will allow common-law wives to petition the government for financial compensation following the death of their partners in combat. St. Petersburg-based outlet Fontanka observed that Russian officials first began discussing support for common-law wives after Russian President Vladimir Putin first drew attention to this issue during the meeting of the Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights on December 4, 2023.[57]

A Russian Telegram channel focusing on military law observed on February 11 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) deleted the draft law on raising the age for dismissal for all contract (kontrakniki) personnel to 65 years of age and for senior officers to 70 years of age during mobilization.[58] The Russian MoD previously proposed on February 8 to establish a single age limit for service during the mobilization period for all kontrakniki.[59]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Ukraine continues to expand its domestic drone production capabilities. Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated on February 11 that Ukraine has met and surpassed Russia’s production of long-range kamikaze drones over the past six months as part of Ukraine’s “Army of Drones” initiative.[60] Fedorov stated that up to 10 drone production factories are currently operating in Ukraine.[61] Fedorov added that Ukraine upgraded its Maritime Autonomous Guard Unmanned Robotic Apparatus (MAGURA) marine drone with unspecified upgrades that will allow Ukrainian forces to conduct ”new surprises” in 2024.[62] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Ivanovets Tarantul-class corvette (41st Missile Boat Brigade) in occupied Crimea overnight from January 31 to February 1 with a MAGURA V-5 marine drone.[63]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian authorities continue efforts to solidify social control over youth and students in occupied Ukraine and to culturally indoctrinate them into Russian identity and ideology. Crimean occupation head Sergei Aksyonov reported on February 11 that authorities opened a student media center under the Russian Ministry of Education at the Crimean Federal University.[64] Aksyonov stated that the media center will provide professional development and growth opportunities for student media activists.[65] Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Head Ivan Fedorov stated that Russian schools and youth organizations in occupied Ukraine teach false history and propaganda to militarize and destroy the Ukrainian identity of students.[66]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reiterated on February 11 that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s February 8 interview with American media personality Tucker Carlson was aimed at justifying Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to an American audience.[67] Peskov claimed that Americans “traditionally know little” about foreign countries and that it was important for Putin to convey his “historical vision” to the United States.

The Ukrainian Center for Combating Disinformation reported on February 11 that Russian information actors are attempting to portray newly appointed Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi as a Russian and a Soviet in order to discredit Syrskyi and sow domestic distrust of the Ukrainian military.[68] ISW has observed Russian milbloggers and officials engaging in this information operation following Syrskyi’s appointment on February 8.[69] Syrskyi was deployed to Kharkiv Oblast during the 1980s and chose to remain in Ukraine and join the Ukrainian army when the Soviet Union collapsed.[70] Syrskyi chose to serve Ukraine against Russia even though he was born in Russia. Syrskyi has commanded Ukrainian troops against Russian-backed proxy forces and the Russian military since 2014.[71]

French Foreign Minister Stephane Sejourne stated on February 10 that he hopes to announce a joint project to search for and counter Russian disinformation and interference in European politics with German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski following their upcoming meeting in Paris on February 12.[72] Sejourne stated that the project will work to publicly explain the “tools” of Russian disinformation and provide evidence of disinformation in European politics. The French Foreign Ministry recently summoned the Russian ambassador to France after a Russian strike in Ukraine killed two French humanitarian workers amid a reported “upsurge” in Russian disinformation targeting France.[73] ISW recently observed Russian disinformation campaigns targeting France, which were aimed at constraining ongoing and future French security assistance to Ukraine.[74]

Significant Activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/02/11/pryznacheno-novogo-komanduvacha-syl-terytorialnoyi-oborony-zbrojnyh-syl-ukrayiny/ ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/692024-49717

[2] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/02/11/pryznacheno-novogo-komanduvacha-syl-terytorialnoyi-oborony-zbrojnyh-syl-ukrayiny/ ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/712024-49725 ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/702024-49721

[3] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/02/11/pryznacheno-novogo-komanduvacha-syl-terytorialnoyi-oborony-zbrojnyh-syl-ukrayiny/ ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/742024-49737 ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/732024-49733 ;

[4] https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/742024-49737

[5] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/18821 ; https://twitter.com/Deepstate_UA/status/1756722423779533240 ; https://twitter.com/Schizointel/status/1756735006473441512

[6] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/18821 ; https://twitter.com/Deepstate_UA/status/1756722423779533240

[7] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/18821 ; https://twitter.com/Deepstate_UA/status/1756722423779533240

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13-2023

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2024

[10] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1620; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1621

[11] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1620; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1621

[12] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1620; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1621; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Jan%2016%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF.pdf

[13] https://sprotyv dot info/analitica/kovalenko-shho-naspravdi-hovaєtsya-za-gigantskim-virobnicztvom-tankiv-u-rosiї/ ; https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3825558-so-naspravdi-hovaetsa-za-gigantskim-virobnictvom-tankiv-u-rosii.html

[14] https://sprotyv dot info/analitica/kovalenko-shho-naspravdi-hovaєtsya-za-gigantskim-virobnicztvom-tankiv-u-rosiї/ ; https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3825558-so-naspravdi-hovaetsa-za-gigantskim-virobnictvom-tankiv-u-rosii.html

[15] https://sprotyv dot info/analitica/kovalenko-shho-naspravdi-hovaєtsya-za-gigantskim-virobnicztvom-tankiv-u-rosiї/ ; https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3825558-so-naspravdi-hovaetsa-za-gigantskim-virobnictvom-tankiv-u-rosii.html

[16] https://sprotyv dot info/analitica/kovalenko-shho-naspravdi-hovaєtsya-za-gigantskim-virobnicztvom-tankiv-u-rosiї/ ; https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3825558-so-naspravdi-hovaetsa-za-gigantskim-virobnictvom-tankiv-u-rosii.html

[17] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1621

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Sept%2014%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-29-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/high-price-losing-ukraine; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-8-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2023

[19] https://t.me/dva_majors/34388 ; https://t.me/rybar/56987; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/7731; https://t.me/wargonzo/18121

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qUUqDhGN5JYwqi5UaaWQZzKkS3ADHcR2M5VYYTYHBDbh9ecPpUaCQb1Ar7Esa1NCl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mhdBYmgB3tQnwMAx6grkU76ReEcC1FyxmwChAfykZgQMgBSRom95ukVvdagSiJLxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037Xc8SsmwC3C6vz3onpWGgSLCzasujqbwBUAX9JH1wTYZFSd8qh46YKJfTTvRjvDVl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7231; https://t.me/mod_russia/35549; https://t.me/mod_russia/35546; https://t.me/wargonzo/18121

[21] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/112619

[22] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/112564 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18111 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/112595 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7225 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/53915

[23] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/112564

[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qUUqDhGN5JYwqi5UaaWQZzKkS3ADHcR2M5VYYTYHBDbh9ecPpUaCQb1Ar7Esa1NCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mhdBYmgB3tQnwMAx6grkU76ReEcC1FyxmwChAfykZgQMgBSRom95ukVvdagSiJLxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037Xc8SsmwC3C6vz3onpWGgSLCzasujqbwBUAX9JH1wTYZFSd8qh46YKJfTTvRjvDVl ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35549 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34388 ; https://t.me/rybar/56987 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18111 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/112595 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7225

[25] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61872 ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3456

[26] https://t.me/BUAR110ombr/256 ; https://x.com/EerikMatero/status/1756614450499538996?s=20 (Avdiivka)

https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/10785; https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1756651133135720803 (Nevelske)

[27] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/112615 (Avdiivka)

https://t.me/boris_rozhin/112615; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/112630 (Pervomaiske)

[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qUUqDhGN5JYwqi5UaaWQZzKkS3ADHcR2M5VYYTYHBDbh9ecPpUaCQb1Ar7Esa1NCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mhdBYmgB3tQnwMAx6grkU76ReEcC1FyxmwChAfykZgQMgBSRom95ukVvdagSiJLxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037Xc8SsmwC3C6vz3onpWGgSLCzasujqbwBUAX9JH1wTYZFSd8qh46YKJfTTvRjvDVl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34388 ; https://t.me/rybar/56987 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18111 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/112581 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/53917 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/112597 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/112633

[29] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61902 ; https://t.me/rybar/56980 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/112581

[30] https://t.me/otarnavskiy/476

[31] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/112615; https://t.me/z_arhiv/25994

[32] https://t.me/wargonzo/18121

[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qUUqDhGN5JYwqi5UaaWQZzKkS3ADHcR2M5VYYTYHBDbh9ecPpUaCQb1Ar7Esa1NCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mhdBYmgB3tQnwMAx6grkU76ReEcC1FyxmwChAfykZgQMgBSRom95ukVvdagSiJLxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037Xc8SsmwC3C6vz3onpWGgSLCzasujqbwBUAX9JH1wTYZFSd8qh46YKJfTTvRjvDVl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34388 ; https://t.me/rybar/56987 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18111 ;

[34] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61877 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/112554 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/11744

[35] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61890 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/11743

[36] https://t.me/wargonzo/18121

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qUUqDhGN5JYwqi5UaaWQZzKkS3ADHcR2M5VYYTYHBDbh9ecPpUaCQb1Ar7Esa1NCl

[38] https://t.me/dva_majors/34399 (south Donetsk direction); https://t.me/voin_dv/6976 (Pryyutne); https://t.me/voin_dv/6977 (Urozhaine); https://t.me/voin_dv/6984; https://t.me/voin_dv/6987 (Vremivka direction)

[39] https://t.me/voin_dv/6986; https://t.me/Vmsd127/197

[40] https://t.me/RUBAK_65/131; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4338

[41] https://t.me/zvofront/2184

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qUUqDhGN5JYwqi5UaaWQZzKkS3ADHcR2M5VYYTYHBDbh9ecPpUaCQb1Ar7Esa1NCl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mhdBYmgB3tQnwMAx6grkU76ReEcC1FyxmwChAfykZgQMgBSRom95ukVvdagSiJLxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037Xc8SsmwC3C6vz3onpWGgSLCzasujqbwBUAX9JH1wTYZFSd8qh46YKJfTTvRjvDVl; https://t.me/mod_russia/35549; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61874 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7237; https://t.me/wargonzo/18111

[43] https://t.me/wargonzo/18121

[44] https://t.me/dva_majors/34389 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34393 (Zaporizhia direction); https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61874 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7237 (Robotyne and Verbove)

[45] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4342; https://t.me/russian_airborne/4127

[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qUUqDhGN5JYwqi5UaaWQZzKkS3ADHcR2M5VYYTYHBDbh9ecPpUaCQb1Ar7Esa1NCl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mhdBYmgB3tQnwMAx6grkU76ReEcC1FyxmwChAfykZgQMgBSRom95ukVvdagSiJLxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037Xc8SsmwC3C6vz3onpWGgSLCzasujqbwBUAX9JH1wTYZFSd8qh46YKJfTTvRjvDVl; https://t.me/wargonzo/18111; https://t.me/wargonzo/18121

[47] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/02/11/u-chornomu-mori-aktyvizuvavsya-vorozhyj-flot-vyvely-14-korabliv-ye-nosiyi-kalibriv/

[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2024

[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0363z8Kz4dMHf28goEEwVWLxL4LTaq8ULTdn4WivArtvfp58aNPYkXcA2K6MoQ1wntl ; https://www.facebook.com/kpszsu/posts/pfbid0Duq7f8V9PZsC28w6fA73sWt7CrPDT9cWH3ezkvLFqTUwi6GTxcVTMCBUHaiUvvs4l ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/02/11/nichna-ataka-shahediv-znyshheno-40-bpla-u-9-oblastyah/; https://suspilne dot media/681802-ukrainski-vijskovi-vnoci-znisili-40-sahediv-povitrani-sili/

[50] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/02/11/polovynu-shahediv-u-napryamku-kyyeva-zbyly-mobilni-grupy-sergij-nayev/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/02/11/syly-ppo-znyshhyly-vsi-drony-kamikadze-shho-pryamuvaly-na-kyyiv/

[51] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/6165 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/02/11/syly-oborony-pivdnya-pid-chas-nichnoyi-ataky-pidrozdily-ppo-praczyuvaly-ponad-55-godyn/

[52] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/02/11/u-sylah-oborony-poyasnyly-chomu-rosiyany-zapuskayut-shahedy-vzdovzh-dunayu/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA

[53] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/02/11/z-lypnya-mynulogo-roku-poshkodzheno-majzhe-200-obyektiv-portovoyi-infrastruktury/

[54] https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/10/asia/nepal-fighters-russia-ukraine-families-intl-cmd/index.html ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61904

[55] https://sozd.duma dot gov.ru/bill/539969-8; https://www.fontanka dot ru/2024/02/05/73195430/

[56] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6479680

[57] https://www.fontanka dot ru/2024/02/05/73195430/

[58] https://t.me/tass_agency/231253 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/02/11/minoborony-rf-udalilo-zakonoproekt-ob-ustanovlenii-edinogo-vozrasta-dlya-uvolneniya-kontraktnikov-so-sluzhby-v-period-mobilizatsii; https://t.me/voen_advokaty/1085

[59] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/19931151

[60] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/02/11/ukrayina-nazdognala-rosiyu-za-kilkistyu-vyroblenyh-dalnih-droniv-kamikadze/

[61] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/02/11/ukrayina-nazdognala-rosiyu-za-kilkistyu-vyroblenyh-dalnih-droniv-kamikadze/

[62] https://suspilne dot media/681978-morskij-dron-magura-otrimav-pokrasenu-versiu-aka-gotuetsa-do-novih-zastosuvan-z-novimi-surprizami-fedorov/

[63] https://suspilne dot media/681978-morskij-dron-magura-otrimav-pokrasenu-versiu-aka-gotuetsa-do-novih-zastosuvan-z-novimi-surprizami-fedorov/ ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020124

[64] https://t.me/Aksenov82/4032

[65] https://t.me/Aksenov82/4032

[66] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/4611

[67] https://t.me/tass_agency/231239 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/231244 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/231245 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/231247 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/231250 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/231251

[68] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/02/11/propaganda-rf-navyazuye-novomu-golovkomu-zsu-obraz-rosiyanyna/

[69] https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/14742 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/7728 ; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/39619 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/73875 ; https://t.me/rsotmdivision/13891 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/32997 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/14694 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61762 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/25087; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/33025 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/6953 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/444 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/15501 ; https://t.me/arbat/1781

[70] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/9/who-is-colonel-general-oleksandr-syrsky-ukraines-new-army-chief

[71] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/9/who-is-colonel-general-oleksandr-syrsky-ukraines-new-army-chief

[72] https://www.ouest-france.fr/medias/ouest-france/le-grand-entretien/entretien-stephane-sejourne-otan-et-europe-nous-avons-besoin-dune-deuxieme-assurance-vie-424b1356-c80a-11ee-9a26-b3fe0ec43b85 ; https://pravda-en dot com/world/2024/02/11/313978.html

[73] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/france-summon-russias-ambassador-diplomatic-source-2024-02-05/ ; https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-02-05/france-to-summon-russias-ambassador-diplomatic-source

[74] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2024