Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 13, 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 13, 2023

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, Christina Harward, and Mason Clark

July 13, 2023, 8:50 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:00pm ET on July 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 14 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Former Commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Major General Ivan Popov claimed in leaked audio that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu dismissed him for expressing persistent grievances about problems on the western Zaporizhia Oblast frontline to senior commanders. Russian State Duma Deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev leaked Popov’s audio message on July 12 in which Popov stated that Russian command fired him for expressing grievances over the lack of support for Russian forces and replaced him with Lieutenant General Denis Lyamin.[1] Popov claimed that he expressed concerns to the “highest level” of Russian command over the lack of Russian counter-battery warfare capabilities, the absence of artillery reconnaissance stations, significant Russian casualties from Ukrainian artillery fire, and other issues.[2] Popov claimed that Shoigu fired him because his honesty in voicing various problems in the Russian military threatened the Russian command. Popov claimed that he chose to “call a spade a spade” in the name of his dead comrades instead of “remaining in silent cowardice.”[3] Russian sources previously claimed that Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov dismissed Popov for expressing concerns over the need for troop rotations in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[4]

Popov was very likely aware that a recipient of his message in the veteran community of the 58th CAA would leak the audio recording. Popov reportedly distributed the recording to various actors including commanders, personnel, and veterans of the 58th CAA.[5] Gurulev, a former Chief of Staff of the 58th CAA, posted the recording on his Telegram channel on July 12, after which some prominent voices of the Russian ultranationalist community criticized Gurulev for breaking the sanctity of a private chat.[6] The voices accused Gurulev of leaking the audio in order to politicize the situation and bolster his own public appeal. Popov’s choice to distribute the audio to voices within the Russian veteran community suggests that he likely used unofficial or non-secure channels to distribute this message and that he was likely aware of the risk of using such channels for a supposedly limited audience. Popov may have intended for some recipients to leak the audio. Gurulev is a prominent voice in the Russian veteran community who has previously criticized the Russian MoD’s conduct of the war, so was likely to distribute such a recording from an insecure channel.[7]  One milblogger claimed that Popov purposefully released the audio to demonstrate that Popov does not fear the wrath of the Russian military command.[8] A Russian source leaked Popov’s grievances and reports of his dismissal on July 11 prior to the leak of the recording, which may suggest that Popov may have coordinated the timing of the July 12 leak.[9]

Popov equated himself with a rebellion leader less than a month after the Wagner Group rebellion, regardless of whether he intended for the recording to leak. Popov referred to himself as "Spartak” - his longtime callsign - and his subordinates as “gladiators,” likely deliberately invoking the memory of Roman slave rebellion leader Spartacus.[10]Popov may have used this comparison to underscore his self-portrayal as separate from the inept and actively harmful Russian military command. Popov claimed that Russia’s “most senior [military] commander” (likely referring to Gerasimov) is attacking Russian forces from the rear as they defend against the Ukrainian counteroffensive on the frontline and painted himself as morally obligated to raise his concerns with the Russian military command. Popov’s portrayal of himself as a rebellion leader with grievances against the MoD - whether intentionally or otherwise - is notably reminiscent of the self-portrayal and rhetoric of Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin leading up to and during his June 24 armed rebellion.[11] Popov notably has no known affiliations with Wagner or Prigozhin, however.

Popov likely attempted to appeal to the Kremlin to partially or fully strip Gerasimov of command over operations in Ukraine. Popov’s indications that senior Russian command was responsible for the operational decisions he opposed and the absence of Southern Military District (SMD) Commander Colonel General Sergey Kuzovlev in the controversy may suggest that Gerasimov is playing a more active role in overseeing operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian sources have speculated that Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) commander and rumored deputy theater commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky recently assumed Gerasimov‘s responsibilities for operations in Ukraine, although ISW has not observed confirmation that such a transfer of responsibilities has occurred.[12] Even if Gerasimov is not directly in charge of the Russian defensive operations in southern Ukraine, Popov’s complaints against the Russian military command suggest that Gerasimov still has significant command over operational decision-making in Ukraine. Popov therefore likely aimed to bypass Gerasimov’s responsibilities as overall theater commander by directly asking Putin to overrule Gerasimov, although it is unclear to what extent Popov aimed to depose Gerasimov of his authority.

Popov likely modeled his attempt to secure Putin’s favor for his desired goals off of Teplinsky’s successful appeal to Putin in March.[13] Teplinsky temporarily resigned in January over a conflict with Gerasimov about the use of VDV forces in human wave attacks around Soledar and reportedly used connections in veteran communities to directly appeal to Putin on March 15 to rally support for the anti-Gerasimov group within the MoD.[14] Popov’s message to current and former SMD personnel likely sought to recreate the effect of Teplinsky’s outreach after Popov failed to initially bring his complaints directly to Putin. Popov may have more ambitiously sought to seize on possible Kremlin concerns about the widespread disdain for Gerasimov in order to elevate his own standing in a way reminiscent of Teplinsky’s alleged rise to deputy theater commander.

Gerasimov may have tried to shield Putin from unwanted criticism to uphold Putin’s ignorance by firing Popov before he could appeal directly to the Kremlin. A source reportedly affiliated with the Russian security services claimed that Popov announced that he would appeal to Putin before Gerasimov dismissed him from his position, which may indicate that Gerasimov directly responded to Popov’s threat.[15] ISW had previously observed that Putin has ignored complaints from Russian officials who spoke on behalf of Russian servicemen – likely to distance himself from Russian military failures. For example, the Secretary of the United Russia Party‘s General Council Andrey Turchak delivered a blunt briefing directly to Putin in February 2023 regarding the dire state of the Russian winter-spring offensive but was unsuccessful in triggering a command change.[16] ISW assessed that Teplinsky’s appeal to Russian veteran communities, however, forced Putin to respond to the complaints about the need for preparations for Ukrainian counteroffensives as of March.[17] The anecdote showcases that Putin preferred to remain ignorant until he faced potential backlash from military officials and Russian veterans. Putin may have instructed Gerasimov to prevent and resolve similar compromising situations before these incidents reached the Kremlin.

Popov’s attempt to directly appeal to Putin for support and his insubordination of Gerasimov’s command is indicative of a pattern of corrosive behavior that has developed within the Russian command and the Russian forces fighting in Ukraine. Popov’s and Teplinsky’s attempts to prompt Putin to act against Gerasimov are reminiscent of Prigozhin ’s June 24 rebellion, during which Wagner forces attempted to force Putin to remove Gerasimov and Shoigu.[18] Three prominent figures within the Russian war effort in Ukraine (Teplinsky, Prigozhin, and Popov) have now attempted to weaken Gerasimov and Shoigu’s authority due to a deep concern about the attrition of their forces and have attempted to use their responsibility over key sectors of the front to go outside of the chain of command to compel the Kremlin to act in their favor. ISW has previously assessed that public disagreements between Russian forces in Ukraine over supplies and combat tasks and the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD’s) apparent need to negotiate with subordinate commanders on these issues suggest that there are severe chain of command problems.[19]

The growing precedent of commanders subordinate to Gerasimov conducting outright insubordination to achieve desired goals may be the result of an incentive for commanders to violate the chain of command. Russian commanders may be increasingly taking the wellbeing of their forces into their own hands in the face of the Russian MoD’s continued failures to address endemic issues with the Russian war effort in Ukraine. The increasingly fragile Russian chain of command may prompt a critical command and control crisis in the future, in which field commanders’ support for the Russian military command could become increasingly hollow.

Russian milbloggers expressed varied reactions to Popov’s dismissal, though none disagreed with Popov’s complaints about problems Russian forces experience on the front. Many Russian sources characterized Popov as “intelligent,” “competent,” and “authoritative” and claimed that he was a good commander who had wide support of his troops.[20]  Popov is a respected commander who has followed a promising promotion path similar to that of generals who have gone on to command military districts, and ISW does not have any reason to doubt milblogger characterizations of Popov as an effective and respected commander. Some Russian sources used Popov’s firing to express longstanding disdain for the Russian military command and Gerasimov, claiming that the Russian military command never listens to their complaints.[21] Wagner-affiliated sources attempted to co-opt Popov’s grievances by likening Popov to Prigozhin and describing their situations as beloved and respected commanders who faced punishment for voicing genuine concerns.[22] Other milbloggers noted that Popov and Prigozhin held many similar unresolved complaints that eventually led to Wagner’s armed rebellion, regardless of Prigozhin’s personal ambitions.[23] Milbloggers also expressed concerns that continued outspoken dissatisfaction from senior Russian commanders following the Wagner armed rebellion could set a precedent for Russian forces conducting armed protests.[24] Prominent Russian milblogger and former Russian officer Igor Girkin cynically claimed that Russian forces are only one major military defeat away from conventional Russian forces conducting their own march on Moscow.[25] Russian milbloggers notably did not disagree with Popov’s list of problems on the frontline, with one milblogger explicitly asserting that ineffective Russian counter-battery fire and artillery reconnaissance result in Russian casualties that diminish Russian forces’ long-term ability to hold defensive positions.

Disruptions to the Russian command overseeing Russian defensive operations in southern Ukraine will likely have some immediate but marginal impacts on Russian forces. ISW has observed that the 58th CAA’s 19th and 42nd Motorized Rifle Divisions are heavily committed to defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[26] Popov’s sudden firing may temporarily disrupt Russian command and control in these areas and degrade Russian morale given the widespread support Popov had among Russian servicemembers of the 58th CAA. These impacts will likely be marginal and ISW continues to assess that Russian forces in the area are conducting a sound doctrinal defense.[27]

Popov’s dismissal over the issue of Russian casualties and reported complaints about lack of force rotations further supports ISW’s assessment that Russian defenses in Ukraine are likely brittle. ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces lack the reserves to rotate frontline units and that without operational reserves Russian forces would have to fall back to prepared defensive positions without significant support in the case of a Ukrainian breakthrough.[28] Popov’s complaint about Russian casualties from artillery fire likely indicates that Russian forces need rotations and reinforcements to sustain their defenses in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russia’s lack of reserves likely made it impossible for Gerasimov to seriously consider Popov’s appeal, and Popov’s dismissal has further illustrated that Russian forces are unable to conduct force rotations. The apparent theater-wide lack of force rotations suggests that Russian forces would have to rely on existing and already degraded forces in the event of any Ukrainian breakthrough. Popov’s complaints about Russian forces’ poor counterbattery capabilities and significant Russian casualties from Ukrainian artillery fire are likely a result of what ISW assesses to be a Ukrainian effort to attrit Russian forces defending in southern Ukraine.[29]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the frontline on July 13 and made gains in some areas. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut, Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast), and Berdyansk (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area) directions.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved partial success in the Novodanylivka-Shyroka Balka (roughly 3km south of Orikhiv) and Mala Tokmachka-Novopokrovka (6-13km southeast of Orikhiv) directions.[31] Ukrainian officials also reported that Ukrainian forces advanced on Bakhmut‘s southern flank.[32] Geolocated footage published on July 11 shows that Ukrainian forces recently made limited advances north of Krasnohorivka (9km north of Avdiivka).[33]

Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed drone strikes across Ukraine on July 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 20 Shahed-131/136 drones from Kursk Oblast and the Sea of Azov, two Kalibr missiles from the Black Sea, and one Iskander-M missile from occupied Dzhankoi, Crimea.[34] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces targeted Mykolaiv, Kirovohrad, and Kyiv oblasts.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down all 20 Shahed drones and both Kalibr missiles.[36] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces constantly use combined missile and drone strikes and seek opportunities to bypass Ukrainian air defenses to inflict maximum damage.[37] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that they conducted a successful group strike with sea-based long-range high-precision weapons and destroyed Ukrainian ammunition storage facilities.[38]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reiterated boilerplate Russian rhetoric to deter Western security assistance to Ukraine following the NATO summit. Lavrov claimed that Russia would recognize the appearance of F-16s in Ukraine as a nuclear threat because F-16s are technically capable of carrying nuclear warheads.[39] The US and other NATO states are extremely unlikely to provide F-16s to Ukraine with the specific modifications necessary to carry nuclear weapons, and the notion of Ukraine acquiring nuclear weapons is preposterous. Many airframes and other common weapons systems are capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons if the weapons or warheads have the correct modifications.[40] Lavrov also claimed that Ukraine rejected multilateral negotiations frameworks from China, Brazil, and African states.[41] ISW has consistently assessed that Russia is currently highly unlikely to meaningfully engage in any negotiations framework despite efforts to signal falsely otherwise.[42]  ISW has assessed that the Kremlin routinely amplifies information operations about nuclear escalation with the West over the war in Ukraine or Russia’s willingness to negotiate in an effort to weaken Western support for Ukraine.[43]

The Kremlin continues to navigate the aftermath of Wagner’s armed rebellion, as the future of the Wagner Group and Prigozhin continues to be unclear. Geolocated footage published on July 13 purportedly shows Wagner forces driving along the M4 highway in Voronezh Oblast redeploying from field camps likely in the rear of Russian occupied Ukraine.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that the footage showed Russian police escorting the convoy and buses with Belarusian license plates, possibly indicating the convoy’s destination.[45] The Russian military continues to express concerns over the security of the SMD headquarters in Rostov-on-Don after Wagner forces surrounded the building during the armed rebellion. Images published on July 13 show that Russian forces placed gabions filled with sand around the headquarters, and milbloggers claimed that unspecified Spetsnaz personnel and an armored car equipped with a machine gun are stationed outside the building.[46]

Russian outlet RTVI reported on July 12 that companies associated with Prigozhin have received nine contracts with Russian businesses amounting to 1.064 billion rubles (about $11.8 million) since Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24.[47] The largest contract is reportedly between the company Prodfutservis and the Ministry of Education of Mytishchi in Moscow Oblast for over 705 million rubles (about $7.8 million) to supply meals to public schools from 2023 to 2025.[48] Other customers include Russian government linked entities such as the hospitals subordinate to the Moscow Department of Health and the Medical and Health Center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which claimed that it had not received complaints over catering services and therefore had no grounds to terminate the contract. It is unclear if Prigozhin is still linked to these companies, however.

The Kremlin reportedly ordered the detention and suspension of several senior military officers following the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion on June 24, supporting ISW’s prior assessment that the Kremlin likely intends to purge the MoD of figures viewed as disloyal.[49] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on July 13 that Russian authorities detained at least 13 senior military officers and suspended or fired around 15 senior officers following the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion on June 24.[50] Russian authorities reportedly detained Wagner-affiliated Deputy Commander of Russian Forces in Ukraine Army General Sergei Surovikin, former Russian Deputy Defense Ministry for Logistics Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev, and other unnamed senior officers. Russian authorities also reportedly detained and later released Surovikin’s deputy Colonel General Andrey Yudin and deputy head of Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU) Lieutenant General Vladimir Alexeyev. The WSJ reported that one source claimed that the detentions are intended to ”clean ranks” of those Russian President Vladimir Putin no longer sees as trustworthy.[51]

Russian authorities arrested the Russian Deputy Minister for Digital Development Maxim Parshin for allegedly accepting bribes. The Russian Investigative Committee announced the arrest on July 13, and Russian State Duma Deputy Alexander Khinshtein claimed that Russian law enforcement witnessed Parshin accept a bribe of 3.5 million rubles ($33,350), after which law enforcement detained him.[52] Russian authorities also arrested the Director of the Budget and Financial Technologies LLC, Alexander Monosov, for attempting to bribe Parshin.[53]

The Russian Ministry of Digital Development and the Union of Journalists expressed support for measures that would grant Russian military correspondents some type of veteran status. Russian Union of Journalists Head and state propagandist Vladimir Solovyev announced that the Union of Journalists and the Russian Ministry of Digital Development mutually support an effort to officially designate Russian military correspondents as “veterans of military journalism.”[54] Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head Leonid Slutsky stated on July 5 that the LDPR aims to pass legislation that will grant military correspondents the status of combat veterans, which would afford these milbloggers state guarantees and payments in cases of injury or death in Ukraine.[55] ISW assessed that Russian ultranationalist figures are likely supporting these measures to court the Russian milblogger community as a key constituency.[56] The Kremlin could use such measures to exert more control over milbloggers and determine who qualifies as a recognized milblogger, however.

Key Takeaways:

• Former Commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Major General Ivan Popov claimed in leaked audio that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu dismissed him for expressing persistent grievances about problems on the western Zaporizhia Oblast frontline to senior commanders.
• Popov likely attempted to appeal to the Kremlin to partially or fully strip Gerasimov of command over operations in Ukraine.
• Gerasimov may have tried to shield Putin from unwanted criticism to uphold Putin’s ignorance by firing Popov before he could appeal directly to the Kremlin.
• Popov’s attempt to directly appeal to Putin for support and his insubordination of Gerasimov’s command is indicative of a pattern of corrosive behavior that has developed within the Russian command and the Russian forces fighting in Ukraine.
• Russian milbloggers expressed varied reactions to Popov’s dismissal, though none disagreed with Popov’s complaints about problems Russian forces experience on the front.
• Disruptions to the Russian command overseeing Russian defensive operations in southern Ukraine will likely have some immediate but marginal impacts on Russian forces.
• Popov’s dismissal over the issue of Russian casualties and reported complaints about lack of force rotations further supports ISW’s assessment that Russian defenses in Ukraine are likely brittle
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the frontline on July 13 and made gains in some areas.
• The Kremlin reportedly ordered the detention and suspension of several senior military officers following the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion on June 24, supporting ISW’s prior assessment that the Kremlin likely intends to purge the MoD of figures viewed as disloyal.
• Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed drone strikes across Ukraine on July 13.
• Russian and Ukrainian sources engaged in positional battles near Kreminna.
• Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks and reportedly advanced around Bakhmut.
• Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to conduct ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian forces reported conducting limited offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast and continued counteroffensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblasts border area.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations and made some gains in western Zaporizhia Oblast as of July 13.
• Russia may not be fulfilling some of its commitments to Iran in their bilateral security partnership, even as the Russian military continues to rely heavily on Iranian-made drones in Ukraine.
• The Associated Press (AP) reported on July 13 that Russian forces and occupation administrations are conducting a wide scale campaign to detain and abuse civilians and are planning to build additional internment infrastructure in the occupied territories.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) 

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces made territorial gains and conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk and Svatove on July 13. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces cut off Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in an unspecified area along the N26 Chuhuiv-Mylove highway, which passes through Kupyansk and Svatove, although ISW has not observed evidence corroborating these Russian claims at this time.[57] Russian sources claimed that fighting continued in Novoselivske (16km northwest of Svatove) and that the frontline now runs along the Novoselivske railway.[58] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near the forest belt in the vicinity of the Novoselivske railway line and that Russian forces conducted offensive operations south of Novoselivske and near the Novoselivske railway.[59]  A Russian milblogger indicated that elements of the Russian 27th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District) are fighting in the Novoselivske area.[60] Russian sources also claimed Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Kuzemivka (14km northwest of Svatove).[61] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian advances in this area would create conditions for Russian forces to partially encircle Novoselivske and develop further attacks towards Stelmakhivka (16km west of Svatove).[62] Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian offensive operations near Novoselivske were unsuccessful, however.[63]

Russian and Ukrainian forces engaged in positional battles near Kreminna on July 13. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked Russian positions near Dibrova (4km southwest of Kreminna) and Kreminna.[64] Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Ambassador to Russia Rodion Miroshnik claimed that Russian forces engaged with Ukrainian forces in the Kreminna and Serebryanske forestry areas.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued assault operations near Torske (13km west of Kreminna).[66] Another milblogger indicated that medical personnel of the 74^th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) operated in the Torske direction.[67] Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions east of Nevske (19km northwest of Kreminna), east of Terny (15km northwest of Kreminna), and near Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[68] Former Russian officer Igor Girkin claimed that Russian forces continued attacks west of Kreminna and Svatove in an effort to pull Ukrainian reserves to the Luhansk Oblast frontline from their positions in the Bakhmut area.[69]

A Ukrainian official observed that Russian forces are accumulating a powerful grouping of forces in the Kupyansk and Lyman (west of Kreminna) directions. Cherevaty stated that Russian forces are concentrating airborne (VDV) forces, unspecified infantry formations, BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) units, territorial defense elements, small private military companies (PMC) like Veterany PMC, and Storm-Z assault groups on the Luhansk Oblast frontline.[70] Cherevaty also identified that Chechen units are operating near Svatove but noted that these forces are carrying out purely policing tasks.[71]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks and reportedly advanced around Bakhmut on July 13. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces continue counteroffensive operations north and south of Bakhmut and advanced on Bakhmut’s southern flank.[72] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that Ukrainian forces have the initiative around Bakhmut and are advancing to new positions in unspecified heights.[73] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Southern Group of Forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Vesele (20km northeast of Bakhmut).[74] Footage published on July 13 purportedly shows elements of the 3rd Assault Detachment (a subunit of unknown size) of the 137th Guards Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th Guards VDV Division) repelling a Ukrainian attack in the Soledar direction (12km northeast of Bakhmut).[75] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian forces from heights near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[76] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted attacks near Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut) and that fighting is ongoing near Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut).[77]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Bakhmut on July 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled all Russian attacks near Berkhivka.[78] Cherevaty reported that unspecified Chechen formations are operating near Klishchiivka in an internal security capacity with no combat value.[79]  A Russian milblogger claimed that unit of the 106th Guards VDV Division is placing mines in areas near Bakhmut every night and can install over 400 mines in two hours.[80] Footage published on July 13 purportedly shows elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps) operating in the Bakhmut direction.[81]

Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to conduct ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on July 13. Geolocated footage published on July 11 shows that Ukrainian forces recently made limited advances north of Krasnohorivka (9km north of Avdiivka).[82] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Krasnohorivka, Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City), and Novomykhailivka (30km southwest of Donetsk City).[83] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Avdiivka, Keramik (10km north of Avdiivka), and Marinka.[84]  Prominent Russian milblogger and former Russian officer Igor Girkin claimed that Storm-Z assault units continue to attack in the direction of the Avdiivka industrial zone.[85] Footage published on July 12 and 13 purportedly shows elements of the 10th Tank Regiment (3rd Army Corps, Western Military District) operating in the Avdiivka direction and elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) operating in the Marinka direction.[86] The UK MoD reported that Russian forces, likely Chechen formations, conducted many vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks near Marinka throughout June and that most VBIEDs detonated before reaching their intended target due to anti-tank mines and direct fire.[87]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes

Ukrainian forces reported conducting limited offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast on July 13. A Russian source claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group north of Volodymyrivka (10km southeast of Vuhledar).[88]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblasts border area on July 13. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled two Ukrainian ground attacks near Rivnopil (8km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Novodonetske (11km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[89] Other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces additionally attacked near Pryyutne (14km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), Makarivka (5km south of Velyka Novosilka), and Staromaiorske (8km south of Velyka Novosilka).[90] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces have increased the intensity of offensive activity in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblasts border area and that fighting in that area is becoming attritional.[91]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations and made some gains in western Zaporizhia Oblast as of July 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian operations in the Novodanylivka-Shyroka Balka (roughly 3km south of Orikhiv) and Mala Tokmachka-Novopokrovka (6-13km southeast of Orikhiv) directions were partially successful.[92] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces captured a position of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) northeast of Robotyne (11km south of Orikhiv).[93] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne, however.[94] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks along the Pytaykhatky-Zherebyanky line (23-26km southwest of Orikhiv).[95]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain a limited presence in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast as of July 13. The Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian artillery fire prevents Ukrainian forces from reinforcing or resupplying the grouping near the Antonivsky Bridge in east bank Kherson Oblast.[96]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that Russian occupation authorities are still refusing IAEA personnel access to some critical areas of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). The IAEA stated on July 12 that Russian ZNPP operators still have not allowed IAEA personnel to access the rooftops of reactor containment units to inspect for the presence of explosives.[97] The IAEA noted that IAEA personnel at the ZNPP have not observed any mines or other explosives during inspections of other areas so far. The IAEA also stated that the ZNPP is preparing to transition reactor no. 4 from cold shutdown to hot shutdown and reactor no. 5 from hot shutdown to cold shutdown for routine maintenance of reactor no. 5.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia may not be fulfilling some of its commitments to Iran in their bilateral security partnership, even as the Russian military continues to rely heavily on Iranian-made drones in Ukraine. United Kingdom based research group Bourse and Bazaar reported on July 13 that current and former Iranian diplomats claimed that Iran completed payments for 50 Russian SU-35 fighter jets during Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s second term between 2017 and 2021.[98] Russia has yet to deliver SU-35s to Iran despite speculations to the contrary, and Bourse and Bazaar’s Iranian sources reportedly stated that Russia will likely fail to deliver the fighter jets to Iran by the end of 2023 as promised.[99] The Wall Street Journal reported on July 13 that retrieved Iranian drones in Ukraine show that Iranian companies are replicating drone components that they previously used to source from Western firms.[100] Weapons investigators in Ukraine have reportedly discovered parts in downed drones indicating that Iranian private electronics firm Sarmad Electronics Sepahan has started producing analogs for parts that used to come from Japanese electronics manufacturers.[101] Iran‘s efforts to produce their own components appear to be in part focused on maintaining the supply of drones to Russia, though these efforts to domestically produce key components also have inherent value to Iran. The failure to deliver the Su-35 to Iran is unlikely to disrupt existing Iranian commitments to provide Russia with drones, although the delayed deliveries may become a larger obstacle in continued efforts at strengthening the Russian-Iranian bilateral security partnership.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems) 

The Associated Press (AP) reported on July 13 that Russian forces and occupation administrations are conducting a wide scale campaign to detain and abuse civilians and are planning to build additional internment infrastructure in the occupied territories.[102] AP obtained a Russian government document dated January 2023 that outlined plans to build 25 new prison colonies and six new detention centers in occupied Ukraine by 2026, signaling that the Russian government is likely planning to detain thousands more Ukrainian citizens.[103] Russian plans to build new internment infrastructure in the occupied territories are consistent with Russia’s intention to maintain long-term control of the occupied territories.

AP reported that the Ukrainian government estimates around 10,000 civilians could be detained throughout Russia, Belarus, and the occupied territories.[104] ISW has previously reported that Ukrainian officials are aware of the Belarusian facilitation of deportation schemes.[105]  AP reported that Ukrainian detainees are being held in at least 40 various detention facilities in Russia and Belarus and 63 facilities in the occupied territories.[106] AP discovered that Russian officials force detainees who are not imprisoned in detention centers to build fortifications and dig trenches along the lines of combat to protect Russian forces.[107] AP also interviewed dozens of government officials and witnesses, including 20 former detainees.[108] AP noted that every former detainee mentioned the prevalence of physical and mental torture in detention centers.[109] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov stated that at the beginning of the invasion, Russian forces focused on detaining activists, pro-Ukrainian community leaders, and veterans but that recently there has been ”no logic” to the detentions.[110] AP reported that many detainees have been arrested for speaking Ukrainian and simply existing in the occupied territories.[111]

The Ukrainian Resistance Center released a report on July 13 on the “Situation in the occupied territories in the first half of 2023.”[112] The Resistance Center reported that Russia continues efforts to ”legalize” its power in the occupied territories through regional elections and is carrying out policies intended to change the demographic composition of the occupied territories through the deportation of children.[113] The Resistance Center also reported that Russian-funded economic and infrastructure projects are intended to facilitate the further integration the occupied territories with the Russian economic zone and Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), as ISW has previously reported.[114] The Resistance Center noted that the most significant challenge for the Russian and occupation administrations is the resistance of the local population, which is particularly strong in the southern occupied regions.[115]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

Russian milbloggers continued to speculate on the future of Wagner Group in Belarus. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner forces began preparations to transfer personnel to Belarus after they turned their heavy weapons, small arms, and ammunition over to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[116] The milblogger claimed that after Wagner forces arrive in Belarus, they will train Belarusian forces in coordination with the Belarusian MoD and will retain their organizational structure. The milblogger observed that Wagner is undergoing the process of restructuring its activities.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.