Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 14, 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 14, 2023

Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, and Mason Clark

July 14, 2023, 4:45pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on July 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin further indicated he intends to maintain the Wagner Group as a cohesive fighting force rather than breaking it up but seeks to separate Wagner Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin from Wagner leadership and forces. Putin confirmed to Russian news outlet Kommersant in an interview published on July 13 that he met with Prigozhin and 35 Wagner commanders on June 29.[1] Putin claimed that he offered Wagner fighters the option to serve under a Wagner commander (callsign “Seda”) who has commanded Wagner forces for the last 16 months, further confirming ISW’s previous assessment that the Kremlin seeks to retain Wagner as a cohesive fighting force while separating it from Prigozhin.[2] Putin claimed that “many [Wagner commanders] nodded” in response to his offer, but that Prigozhin, “who was sitting in front of his personnel and did not see them nodding,” said that the Wagner commanders did not agree with the decision. Putin likely emphasized Prigozhin’s differing response to frame Prigozhin as a problem in contrast to loyal Wagner commanders. Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin noted that Putin’s retelling of the July 29 meeting portrays Putin as succumbing to Prigozhin’s demands, but the final outcome of the July 29 meeting is unclear.[3] When asked directly by Kommersant about Wagner’s future as a combat unit, Putin continued to maintain the absurd notion that private military companies (PMCs) do not exist in Russia. Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brigadier General Pat Ryder stated on July 14 that Wagner forces are not participating in military operations in Ukraine in any significant support or combat roles.[4] ISW has previously observed Russian sources reporting that Wagner forces are not involved in combat operations in Ukraine.[5]

Belarusian government and independent sources confirmed on July 14 that Wagner Group instructors previously deployed in Africa previously arrived at training grounds in Belarus. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage on July 14 showing Wagner instructors training Belarusian territorial troops near Asipovichy, Mogilev Oblast.[6] A Belarusian insider source claimed that the Wagner instructors from Wagner‘s African contingent (which the source described as the “Wagner Africa Corps,“ though it is unknown if that is a formal designation) arrived in Belarus on July 11 via a convoy from occupied Luhansk Oblast.[7] The Belarusian insider source suggested that Wagner seeks to rotate troops of their African contingent and that the arrival of some instructors to Belarus is part of a wider troop rotation effort.[8] A Russian milblogger claimed that only a part of Wagner’s Africa contingent has left Africa and that sufficient troops remain in African host nations to perform assigned tasks.[9] Wagner’s internationally deployed commanders are likely arriving in Belarus to prepare training infrastructure and set conditions for the arrival of regular Wagner forces, who are reportedly slated to deploy to Belarus in early August after taking leave and undergoing reorganization following Wagner‘s June 24 armed rebellion.[10] Russian milbloggers additionally amplified an image on July 14 reportedly showing Prigozhin himself either in Belarus or en route to Belarus from occupied Luhansk Oblast, but one milblogger noted that Prigozhin’s current role in Wagner remains unclear.[11]

Former 58th Combined Arms Army Commander Major General Ivan Popov’s dismissal continues to generate pronounced ire against the Russian military command and the Russian civilian leadership. Russian milbloggers argued that Popov’s dismissal shows that the Russian military command is detrimentally suppressing the opinions of commanders about the situation at the front and that Russian command has forgotten that their main priority is preserving their personnel.[12] A Russian military correspondent argued that Popov’s dismissal illustrates a dire issue with both the Russian military leadership as well as Russia’s civilian leadership.[13] The military correspondent accused the civilian leadership of routinely suppressing and ignoring reports from the frontline and of failing to properly mobilize Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) for the war effort.[14] The military correspondent claimed that Russian elites and businessmen have agreements with the Russian military command constraining Russian military action on the ground to avoid damaging economic interests - providing the hypothetical example of Russian forces being denied permission to attack a town to preserve an industrial plant owned by a Russian businessman.[15] Prigozhin previously accused Russia’s oligarchs of deceiving Putin and the Russian public to launch the invasion of Ukraine in order to divide the assets of occupied Ukrainian territories between themselves.[16] The military correspondent also warned that the Russian chain of command in Ukraine is further degrading and that the situation is “beginning to boil.”[17] Popov’s dismissal has exposed a new level of concern about factional dynamics and degraded command structures in the Russian military following Prigozhin’s June 24 rebellion, and will likely serve as a point of neuralgia in the Russian information space for the foreseeable future.[18]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the frontline on July 14 and reportedly made gains in some areas. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut, Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast), and Berdyansk (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area) directions.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved partial success in the Bila Hora-Andriivka direction (9-15km southwest of Bakhmut).[20] Ukrainian Deputy Director of the Department of Application Planning of the Main Directorate of the Ukrainian National Guard Colonel Mykola Urshalovych stated that Ukrainian forces have advanced over 1,700 meters in unspecified places in the Melitopol direction.[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces achieved a localized breakthrough of Russian defensive lines north of Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[22]

Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed drone strikes across Ukraine on July 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 17 Shahed-131/136 drones from Krasnodar Krai and an S-300 missile at targets in Ukraine and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 16 of the launched drones.[23] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces targeted Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[24] Russian sources claimed that an unspecified number of Russian Shahed-131/136 drones struck Ukrainian military infrastructure in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[25]

Russian authorities detained former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer Mikhail Polyakov, who reportedly is the administrator of several popular telegram channels covering internal Kremlin politics. Moscow City police detained Polyakov on accusations that he extorted unspecified Russian politicians and businessmen.[26] Russian sources claimed that Polyakov runs the “Kremlin Laundress” channel and is either affiliated with or an administrator of the telegram channels “Brief” and “Siloviki.”[27] “Brief” and “Siloviki” denied that Polyakov is affiliated with their channels, however.[28] These three telegram channels routinely speculate on internal Kremlin politics and dynamics between Russian political factions and have promoted notable rumors within the Russian information space. Channels that speculate about internal Kremlin politics represent a specific niche of the Russian information space, and Polyakov’s detention suggests that the Kremlin may intend to suppress speculations about internal politics following Wagner’s rebellion.

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are waging an interdiction campaign against Russian military targets in Russia. The Washington Post quoted Zaluzhnyi as saying that Ukraine uses domestically produced weapons to strike Russian military targets in Russia due to Western concerns about Ukrainian forces using Western-provided weapons against Russian territory.[29] Zaluzhnyi also stressed the importance of Ukrainian strikes across the theater in Ukraine. The Washington Post reported that Zaluzhnyi also stated that increased Ukrainian indirect fire can pin down Russian forces and minimize Ukrainian casualties, but that Ukraine is currently dependent on munitions from other countries for this aim. Zaluzhnyi also reiterated Ukraine’s intent to liberate Crimea.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin further indicated he intends to maintain the Wagner Group as a cohesive fighting force rather than breaking it up but seeks to separate Wagner Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin from Wagner leadership and forces.
• Belarusian government and independent sources confirmed on July 14 that Wagner Group instructors previously deployed in Africa previously arrived at training grounds in Belarus.
• Former 58th Combined Arms Army Commander Major General Ivan Popov’s dismissal continues to generate pronounced ire against the Russian military command and the Russian civilian leadership.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the frontline on July 14 and reportedly made gains in some areas.
• Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed drone strikes across Ukraine on July 14.
• Russian authorities detained former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer Mikhail Polyakov, who reportedly is the administrator of several popular telegram channels covering internal Kremlin politics.
• Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are waging an interdiction campaign against Russian military targets in Russia.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks and reportedly advanced around Bakhmut.
• Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizha Oblast border and reportedly made limited gains.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in this direction.
• Russia continues efforts likely aimed at keeping high ranking officers in their positions without needing special exemptions to retirement age limits.
• Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to consolidate administrative control of occupied territories by manipulating residence requirements and forcibly passportizing occupied populations.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line on July 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations east of Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna) and Terny (16km west of Kreminna), near Novosadove (17km northwest of Kreminna), and west of Dibrova (6km southwest of Kreminna).[30] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 13 that Russian forces continued successful ground attacks near Torske (15km west of Kreminna) and partially control the settlement, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation that Russian forces are in Torske.[31] The milblogger also claimed that Russian elements of the 80th Guards Tank Regiment (90th Guards Tank Division, Central Military District) conducted assaults in forest areas near Kreminna on July 13.[32] Another Russian milblogger amplified footage on July 14 purporting to show elements of the 2nd Battalion of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) attacking Ukrainian positions in the Serebryanske forest area south of Kreminna.[33] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 14 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Nevske and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) as well as in other unspecified areas in the Svatove direction.[34] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces captured Novoselivske (16km northwest of Svatove) on July 13 after Ukrainian forces withdrew from the settlement, although other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are continuing offensive operations to capture the settlement as of July 14.[35] ISW has not observed visual confirmation that Russian forces have made further gains in Novoselivske or that they completely captured the settlement.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks and reportedly advanced around Bakhmut on July 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved partial success in the Bila Hora-Andriivka direction (9-15km southwest of Bakhmut).[36] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that Ukrainian forces are advancing near Bakhmut itself and maintaining the initiative around Bakhmut.[37] Cherevaty also reported that Ukrainian forces continue efforts to maximize Russian casualties while conserving Ukrainian forces’ combat capabilities. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Hryhorivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut).[38] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted attacks near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and near Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut).[39] Russian milbloggers claimed on July 13 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks from heights near Klishchiivka, the canal and dam area near Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut), and near Yahidne (2km north of Bakhmut).[40] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Berkhivka.[41] Footage published on July 13 purportedly shows elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) operating in the Bakhmut direction and elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps) operating near Klishchiivka.[42]

Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on July 14. Russian sources claimed on July 13 that Ukrainian forces hold a previously Russian-occupied “Zverinets” area southeast of Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[43] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have been repelling Russian attacks in the ”Zverinets” area for a week.[44] Russian milbloggers claimed on July 13 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Krasnohorivka (9km north of Avdiivka) and Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka).[45] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Valerii Shershen reported that Russians continue to focus their offensive operations in the Avdiivka and Marinka directions.[46] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), Marinka, and Novomykhailivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka).[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted attacks southwest of Avdiivka and near Novokalynove (11km northwest of Avdiivka).[48] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed on July 13 that Chechen “Akhmat” forces are transferring from Marinka to an unspecified “more difficult” area of the frontline.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 13 that elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are operating near Marinka.[50]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizha Oblast border and reportedly made limited gains on July 14. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces broke through Russian defensive lines north of Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) along the Hrusheva gully and are attacking along the Pryyutne—Staromayorske line.[51] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky also claimed that Ukrainian forces are trying to break through Russian lines near Urozhaine (9km due south of Velyka Novosilka).[52] Russian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Oleg Chekhov claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance attempts near Novodonetske (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and Rivnopil (10km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[53] Ukrainian Tavriisk Forces Spokesperson Major Valerii Shershen also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian counterattack near Rivnopil.[54]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in this direction on July 14. Ukrainian Deputy Director of the Department of Application Planning of the Main Directorate of the Ukrainian National Guard Colonel Mykola Urshalovych noted that Ukrainian forces are conducting offensive actions in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction and have advanced over 1,700 meters to the south and southeast of an unspecified location in this direction.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced towards Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and are within one kilometer of the outskirts of the settlement, and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces are continuing attacks towards Robotyne.[56] The Russian MoD emphasized that the heaviest battles in this sector occur near Robotyne during the night.[57] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that elements of the Chechen “Vostok-Akhmat” battalion (291st Motorized Rifle Regiment, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are defending in the Orikhiv area.[58] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Ukrainian forces continued limited reconnaissance efforts and ground attacks along the Pyatykhatky-Zherebryanky line, about 25km southwest of Orikhiv.[59]

Russian forces continued routine shelling and reconnaissance activity in Kherson Oblast on July 14. Ukraine’s Kherson Oblast Administration reported that Russian forces shelled the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast 76 times with 487 shells over the past day.[60] Ukrainian sources reported Russian artillery strikes on several settlements in Beryslav Raion.[61] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Ukrainian counterbattery fire destroyed four Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems and three sabotage and reconnaissance groups on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and that Russian forces continue attempts to restore positions lost during the flooding following the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam explosion.[62] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces destroyed several Ukrainian boats near the Antonivsky Bridge on the east bank, but that the situation near the bridge otherwise remains unchanged.[63]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin advanced efforts likely aimed at keeping high ranking officers in their positions without needing to obtain special exemptions for retirement age limits. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on July 14 increasing the age limitations for all reservists by five years: personnel with “first class” ranks from 35 to 40 years, “second class” ranks from 40 to 45 years, “third class” ranks from 50 to 55 years, junior officers from 55 to 60 years, and senior officers from 60 to 65 years.[64] The decree stipulates that the age limitations for each category will increase by one year annually from January 2024 to January 2028. The Russian federal government recently adopted a law similarly extending the retirement ages for senior military officers, as ISW has previously reported.[65]

Russia continues extending social benefits for participants in the war in Ukraine. Putin signed a decree authorizing death and injury payments to Russian fortification builders in Ukraine and their families.[66] The decree stipulates that the payments – five million rubles ($55,401) for death and three million rubles ($33,240) for injury – will come from the Russian federal budget and are retroactive for all deaths and injuries since the start of the full-scale invasion in Ukraine.

Ukraine continues to indicate that Russia is evading international sanctions and acquiring dual-use components for domestic weapons manufacturing. The head of the Ukrainian General Staff’s Center for the Research of Trophy and Prospective Weapons and Military Equipment’s Information and Analytical Department, Oleksandr Zaruba, reported that Ukrainian forces continue to find dual use products, including plug connectors from a Swiss company, in Russian weapons captured by Ukrainian forces.[67] Zaruba reported that Russian companies import sanctioned high-tech goods through Armenia and Kazakhstan.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to consolidate administrative control of occupied territories by manipulating residence requirements and forcibly passportizing occupied populations. The Kherson Oblast Occupation Ministry of Internal Affairs announced on July 14 that “foreigners” and “stateless people” who have resided in Russian-occupied territories since September 30, 2022, can apply for residence permits from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs by supplying fingerprints, photographs, and Russian language documents.[68] Russian President Vladimir Putin previously signed a decree that defines foreigners and stateless persons as essentially subject to deportation from occupied areas of Ukraine in the absence of such residence documents, and occupation authorities are likely pushing for residents of occupied areas to register for residence permits to collect personal data for future use. The Ukrainian Resistance Center similarly reported on July 14 that Russian occupation authorities are forcing employees of state-owned enterprises who refused Russian passports to fill out ”migration cards” and register for “temporary residence permits” and are threatening residents with deportation after 90 to 180 days if they fail to obtain the permits[69] Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated on July 14 that Russian occupation authorities are increasing inspections on Ukrainian civilians without Russian passports and that Ukrainian civilians without Russian passports will be deported starting in December.[70] A Ukrainian source stated on July 13 that Russian occupation authorities have already begun forcibly evicting Ukrainian citizens in the Henichesk Raion that do not have Russian passports and are repopulating the residences of ousted Ukrainian citizens with Russian citizens of underprivileged ethnic minorities.[71]

Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to prepare for regional elections in occupied areas. Russian opposition media outlet Verstka reported on July 14 that Russian authorities are attempting to minimize representation of opposition parties in elections in occupied Ukrainian territories but are struggling to find candidates due to widespread fear that those who run in elections under the occupation administration will be criminally charged as collaborators by Ukrainian authorities.[72] Verstka also reported that Russian authorities are offering financial incentives to political consultants to coordinate elections in the occupied territories but are struggling to fill these roles.[73]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

A Ukrainian military source reported that the number of Russian troops stationed in Belarus and at Belarusian training grounds has recently decreased. Ukrainian State Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated that there were 2,000 Russian forces stationed in Belarus until recently but that this number has recently decreased, possibly due to troop rotations.[74] Demchenko noted that Russian and Belarusian authorities may have re-established regular Russian units in Belarus.[75]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.