Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 15, 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 15, 2023

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, and Mason Clark

June 15, 2023, 6:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2:30pm ET on June 15. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 16 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least three directions and reportedly made gains on June 15. Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun reported that Ukrainian forces conducted successful offensive operations north and northwest of Bakhmut.[1] Ukraine’s Tavrisk Group of Forces Press Center reported that Ukrainian forces advanced up to one kilometer in western Donetsk Oblast and are continuing attempts to improve their tactical positions near Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City).[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops unsuccessfully attacked southwest and south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast and claimed that Ukrainian forces are increasing the tempo of counteroffensive operations in the area due to improved weather conditions.[3] Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Department of the Ukrainian General Staff Brigadier General Oleksii Hromov reported that Ukrainian forces have advanced up to 3km near Mala Tokmachka in western Zaporizhia Oblast and up to 7km near Velyka Novosilka in western Donetsk Oblast and have liberated seven settlements in those areas since beginning counteroffensive operations.[4] Advisor to the Ukrainian Presidential Office Mykhailo Podolyak however stated on June 15 that Ukrainian forces have yet to launch counteroffensives “as such” but acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are conducting offensive actions, a likely clarification that Ukrainian forces have not yet begun their main effort.[5] ISW assesses that ongoing Ukrainian offensive operations are likely setting conditions for wider Ukrainian counteroffensive objectives that are not immediately clear and therefore represent the initial phase of an ongoing counteroffensive.

Russian milbloggers continue to credit alleged superior Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities and defensive doctrine for Russian forces’ successful defenses against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are implementing a “strategic defense” that seeks to attrit advancing Ukrainian forces in extended positional battles along a first line of defense before later launching counterattacks against weakened Ukrainian assault units.[6] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are maintaining doctrinally sound defensive operations in this sector in which a first echelon of forces repels or slows attacking forces before a second echelon of forces counterattacks against any enemy breakthrough.[7] Another prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian EW complexes prevent Ukrainian forces from using precision-guided munitions guided by GPS coordinates and heavily disrupt Ukrainian radio communication.[8] The milblogger specifically claimed that Russian forces use “Murmansk-BN” EW complexes to disrupt sensors on Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance equipment and “Krasukha-4” EW complexes to suppress connections with satellite signals within a radius of 300km.[9] ISW has previously assessed that Russian EW capabilities have been critical in complicating Ukrainian attacks in the Zaporizhia direction, although it is unclear if continued successful Russian EW tactics are a result of superior capacities or improved Russian employment of these systems. ISW has previously noted that initial Ukrainian assaults and Russian defensive operations should not be extrapolated to predict the outcome of all Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[10]

Russian forces conducted another series of drone and missile strikes across Ukraine early in the morning of June 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that between 00:20 and 04:30 local time on June 15, Russian forces launched four Kh-101/555 cruise missiles from four Tu-95 strategic bombers from over the Caspian Sea and 20 Shahed-typed drones from the northern and southern directions.[11]Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down one of the cruise missiles and all 20 Shaheds.[12] The remaining three cruise missiles struck industrial facilities in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[13] Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Department of the UA Gen Staff Brigadier General Oleksii Hromov notably stated on June 15 that Russian forces have deployed a “Bal” Kh-35 coastal defense system to Bryansk Oblast, which Hromov warned may allow Russian forces to conduct strikes on Ukrainian far-rear areas in Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Poltava, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts.[14] Russian forces have long repurposed various missile systems, such as S-300 surface-to-air-missile systems, to strike ground targets and compensate for shortages of precision munitions, which is likely why Russian forces have deployed a coastal defense system to a land-locked oblast.

The Russian military is advancing initial efforts to stand up new corps- and army-level formations to implement Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s announced intent to conduct large-scale force restructuring by 2026, though these new formations are not yet staffed and operational. Independent Western open-source intelligence analysts began reporting in mid-May that Russian military authorities are actively recruiting officers and conscripts from Buryatia and Irkutsk to staff the new 25th Combined Arms Army.[15] The army HQ will reportedly be based in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast.[16] ISW also previously reported on June 3 that Russia is forming the 40th Army Corps as part of the Southern Military District and actively trying to staff one of the corps’ motorized rifle battalions.[17] Efforts to construct and staff both the 25th Combined Arms Army and 40th Army Corps are likely part of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) implementation of intended large-scale reforms of Russia’s ground forces to optimize for large-scale conventional warfare.[18] It remains unclear how Russian authorities intend to staff corps- and army-level formations to their doctrinal end strengths considering endemic force-generation challenges faced by the Russian military.[19] These formations may in part be intended to integrate a number of ad hoc volunteer formations that have been created over the course of the war in Ukraine, although Russia’s previous attempt to integrate volunteer battalions in the form of the 3rd Army Corps over the summer of 2022 did not yield particularly positive results.[20]

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov deployed Chechen “Akhmat” special forces to border areas in Belgorod Oblast, likely as part of a continued effort to align himself with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Kadyrov claimed on June 15 that the Chechen “Zapad Akhmat” Battalion arrived to the Nekhoteevka and Kozinka border checkpoints in Belgorod Oblast on his orders to protect the border from raids into Russian territory.[21] Kadyrov emphasized that the Akhmat forces will work in tandem with other Russian forces to defend Belgorod Oblast and residents of other border areas. Kadyrov likely aims to posture himself and Chechen forces as cooperating with the MoD, directly contrasting with Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, who previously threatened to deploy Wagner forces to Belgorod Oblast without permission from the Russian MoD or the Russian military command.[22] Kadyrov has also taken advantage of the frequent Russian information-space discourse about Belgorod Oblast to posture himself as an effective and cooperative military leader without having to commit all Chechen forces to an attritive offensive or defense effort.

Western states may provide F-16 fighter aircraft and additional Leopard tanks to Ukraine in the coming months. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced on June 15 that Ukrainian pilots are already training on F-16 aircraft, allowing Western states to provide F-16s to Ukraine on an unspecified timeline.[23] The first of two chambers of the Swiss National Council voted on June 14 to decommission 25 Leopard-2 tanks and send the tanks back to Germany, which would then export the tanks to Ukraine.[24]

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least three directions and reportedly made gains on June 15.
• Russian milbloggers continue to credit alleged superior Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities and defensive doctrine for Russian forces’ successful defenses against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted another series of drone and missile strikes across Ukraine early in the morning of June 15.
• The Russian military is advancing initial efforts to stand up new corps- and army-level formations to implement Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s announced intent to conduct large-scale force restructuring by 2026, though these new formations are not yet staffed and operational.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov deployed Chechen “Akhmat” special forces to border areas in Belgorod Oblast, likely as part of a continued effort to align himself with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
• Western states may provide F-16 fighter aircraft and additional Leopard tanks to Ukraine in the coming months.
• Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Bakhmut, and Russian forces have gained territory as of June 15.
• Ukrainian and Russian forces reportedly continued limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russian forces are beginning to decommission specialized company-size assault units and transferring their personnel to volunteer formations.
• Ukrainian partisans reportedly sabotaged a railway in occupied Melitopol, though ISW has observed no visual confirmation or Russian corroboration of the attack.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Stelmakhivka (16km northwest of Svatove), Vyiimka (25km south of Kreminna), and Vesele (31km south of Kreminna).[25] Russian sources claimed on June 14 that elements of the 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) conducted assaults in the direction of Kupyansk and that Russian forces continue to maintain a bridgehead on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River near Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk).[26] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported on June 15 that Russian forces have intensified indirect fire along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.[27]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click here to read ISW’s retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.

Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks on the northern and southern flanks of Bakhmut on June 15. Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Ukrainian forces conducted successful counterattacks near the Rozdolivka-Krasnopolivka (13–16km north of Bakhmut) and Berkhivka-Yahidne (2–4km north of Bakhmut) lines.[28] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced near Klishchiivka (5km southwest of Bakhmut) and conducted additional counterattacks near Ozaryanivka and Kurdyumivka (both 12–14km southwest of Bakhmut).[29] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Ukrainian forces have recaptured 16 square kilometers of ground during counterattacks near Bakhmut in the past two weeks.[30] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Russian forces are transferring reserves from the Kherson direction to the Bakhmut area, though ISW has not yet observed Russian elements previously committed to Kherson Oblast recommitted near Bakhmut.[31]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks near Bakhmut and have gained territory as of June 15. Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces have captured Sakko i Vantsetti (15km north of Bakhmut) as of June 14.[32] ISW previously reported that milbloggers claimed that Russian forces withdrew from positions near Sakko i Vansetti on May 18.[33] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), Yahidne, Berkhivka, and Rozdolivka.[34]

Ukrainian and Russian forces reportedly continued limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on June 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Avdiivka, Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City), Krasnohorivka (immediately west of Donetsk City), and Novomykhailivka (11km southwest of Donetsk City).[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks near Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka) and Opytne (3km southwest of Avdiivka).[36] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) acknowledged that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Donetsk direction, which likely includes the Bakhmut or Avdiivka areas.[37]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian and Ukrainian forces both conducted offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast on June 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces in the Shakhtarske (western Donetsk direction) conducted an unsuccessful attack towards Vodiane (directly northeast of Vuhledar and about 36km due east of Velyka Novosilka).[38] The Ukrainian Tavrisk Group of Forces Press Center notably reported on June 15 that Ukrainian forces have advanced up to one kilometer in the Vulhedar area, and Tavrisk Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated that Ukrainian troops continue moving forward in this area.[39] Russian forces likely conducted a limited ground attack in the Vuhledar area in order to draw Ukrainian forces away from Velyka Novosilka, where Ukrainian troops continue counteroffensive operations. Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are fighting south of Velyka Novosilka, particularly in the Makarivka-Urozhaine area.[40] One milblogger indicated that Ukrainian troops have made marginal advances southwest of Novodonetske (10km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[41] Several Russian sources claimed that elements of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) operational-tactical formation “Kaskad” are striking Ukrainian concentration areas in the Velyka Novosilka area.[42]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 15. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops unsuccessfully attacked southwest and south of Orikhiv and warned that Ukrainian forces may be regrouping and preparing for renewed offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[43] Several milbloggers additionally claimed that the intensity of Ukrainian attacks near Orikhiv has increased as weather conditions have ameliorated.[44] Geolocated footage posted on June 15 shows elements of the Russian BARS-23 “Sudaplatov” volunteer battalion firing at Ukrainian forces in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Lobkove.[45]

Russian sources seized on International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafeal Grossi’s visit to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to accuse Ukraine of threatening the safety of the plant. A Russian media aggregator posted footage of various Russian authorities escorting Grossi around the ZNPP and claimed that ZNPP employees showed Grossi evidence that Ukraine is endangering the ZNPP.[46] The IAEA and Grossi have not yet released independent statements on the situation at the ZNPP as of the time of this publication. Russian Federal Service for Environmental, Technological, and Nuclear Supervision Rostekhnadzor stated that the ZNPP is operating normally as of June 15.[47] Ukrainian State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate Head Oleh Korikov however reported that Russian officials at the ZNPP stopped automatic transmission of information from radiation monitoring sensors two weeks ago, forcing IAEA inspectors to manually record radiation readings on their phones and send them to the IAEA for monitoring purposes.[48]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited sabotage and reconnaissance efforts on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on June 15. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian troops repelled a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group that attempted to land near Oleshky (just southeast of Kherson City) and Hola Prystan (just southwest of Kherson City) with 40 personnel and four boats.[49] Oleshky and Hola Prystan have both suffered from substantial flooding following the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam, so it is unclear exactly where Russian sources claimed Ukrainian forces were able to land, although Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed that the water level has fallen to 0.1 meters in Oleshky and 0.25 meters in Hola Prystan.[50] Ukrainian Kherson Oblast authorities noted that 27 settlements remain flooded on the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast and 17 remain flooded on the east bank.[51]

Russian sources claimed that Ukraine conducted a drone attack on occupied Crimea on the night of June 14 to 15.[52] Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov claimed that Ukrainian forces launched nine drones at Crimea and that Russian air defense shot down six of the drones and the electronic warfare (EW) disabled the remaining three.[53] One drone reportedly detonated in the village of Dokuchevo in central Crimea.[54]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russian forces are beginning to decommission specialized company-size assault units and transferring their personnel to volunteer formations. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on June 15 that the Russian military formed a special commission, headed by Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian grouping in Ukraine Major General Oleg Polguev, to transfer personnel from “Storm-Z” assault units to four volunteer detachments and three volunteer brigades of the Russian “Volunteer Corps.”[55] Russian forces formed the specialized “Storm-Z” assault units during their 2023 winter–spring offensive campaign to conduct highly attritional assaults and urban combat operations around Bakhmut and along the Donetsk City–Avdiivka line.[56] Russian forces staffed these specialized units primarily with convict recruits, and GUR reported that these personnel have shown extremely low combat capabilities and are particularly prone to alcoholism, looting, and desertion.[57] Russian forces likely decided to decommission the “Strom-Z” assault units because of these personnel issues and due to the fact that Russian forces are largely defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in rural areas that do not require urban combat specialties. GUR reported that the Russian commission ordered Russian forces to transfer 2,000 convict recruits from “Storm-Z” assault units to training grounds in Ukraine where formations of the “Volunteer Corps” are currently training.[58] The formations of the “Volunteer Corps” recently formalized contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), and the MoD is likely using the personnel transfers to further formalize the organization of these volunteer formations.[59]

The Financial Times reported on June 15 that Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a confidential decree strengthening the nationalization of Western assets in Russia. Putin reportedly signed the decree in the past week, which enables Russian officials to appropriate Western assets at significantly lower prices and requires that private Russian buyers of nationalized Western assets are fully Russian held or in the process of excluding foreign shareholders.[60] The Financial Times reported that sources close to the Kremlin stated that Russian officials are attempting to punish Western countries that have seized Russian assets while rewarding Western businesses that have yet to leave Russia.[61] The Kremlin may be intensifying the nationalization of Western assets in Russia to threaten the remaining Western businesses operating in the country from leaving.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are searching for a Russian junior sergeant who is wanted for the murder of five other Russian soldiers in the Bakhmut area.[62]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian partisans reportedly sabotaged a railway in occupied Melitopol. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on June 15 that Ukrainian partisans blew up a railway in northern Melitopol, derailing five train cars carrying iron ore on an unspecified date.[63] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported on June 13 that an explosion in northern Melitopol damaged 50 meters of rail track, derailing a freight train carrying iron ore.[64] ISW has not observed any visual evidence or Russian corroboration of the attack or derailment.

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian occupation authorities continue to forcibly relocate Ukrainian children to Russia and repopulate occupied areas with Russian civilians. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on June 15 that Russian officials forcibly relocated 150 Ukrainian children from children’s camps in occupied Luhansk Oblast to recreation centers in the Karachay-Cherkessia Republicon June 8, where 750 Ukrainian children have resided since early June. [65] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported that 200,000 Russian students will travel to Mariupol in 2023 as part of Russian efforts to “restore” the city.[66] Andryushchenko also stated that Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) authorities will launch a mortgage program to repopulate occupied Donetsk Oblast and build universities for Russian students.

Russian occupation authorities expanded their patronage networks with Russian regions at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. Russian occupation officials announced that occupied Zaporizhia Oblast is partnering with the regional governments of Pskov and Kursk oblasts, and the DNR is partnering with the Republic of Bashkortostan and Kirov Oblast.[67] Russian occupation officials also announced that the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) and the Kherson Oblast occupation administration attended the forum to expand mutual cooperation on development efforts.[68]

Russian authorities continue preparing for the September 2023 elections in occupied regions. The Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) announced that occupied areas will hold elections for 80 total campaigns on September 10, including for the: DNR People’s Council and 21 DNR municipalities, LNR People’s Council and 28 LNR municipalities, the Zaporizhia occupation Legislative Assembly and 16 municipalities, and the Kherson Oblast occupation Duma and 14 municipalities.[69] Russian CEC Chairperson Ella Pamfilova stated that the CEC consulted with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Federal Security Service (FSB) before announcing the timing of elections in occupied areas.[70] The Russian State Duma previously adopted amendments to the martial law legislation allowing officials to postpone regional elections in territories under martial law.[71]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gr56fOP_se4 ; https://suspilne dot media/404624-rosia-sturmue-i-namagaetsa-otociti-bahmut-hronika-boiv-ta-situacia-u-misti/

[2] https://suspilne dot media/508151-zsu-pid-vugledarom-prosunulis-na-odin-kilometr/

[3] https://t.me/rusich_army/9395h; https://t.me/rusich_army/9398; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48489; https://t.me/wargonzo/13265; https://t.me/vrogov/10312; https://t.me/rusich_army/9407; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47351 https://t.me/batalyon15/2007; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48489; https://t.me/sashakots/40397; https://t.me/readovkanews/60817 ; https://t.me/batalyon15/2007; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47351

[4] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/06/15/nashi-vijska-povernuly-ponad-100-kv-km-ukrayinskoyi-terytoriyi-oleksij-gromov/

[5] https://strana dot today/news/437089-mikhail-podoljak-nazval-tseli-tekushchikh-udarov-vsu.html ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/06/15/v-ofise-zelenskogo-zayavili-chto-nastuplenie-ukrainy-esche-ne-nachalos-odnoy-iz-tseley-nyneshnih-udarov-vsu-tam-nazvali-unichtozhenie-mobilizovannyh

[6] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/89149

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060823 ;

[8] ttps://t.me/sashakots/40397

[9] ttps://t.me/sashakots/40397

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061023

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02nzBrzJPBHB3vbPRokrfeiYUCxZ29zPMj33qKYsNziTGLB8mpeaY56dnDdD7wLgnzl

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02nzBrzJPBHB3vbPRokrfeiYUCxZ29zPMj33qKYsNziTGLB8mpeaY56dnDdD7wLgnzl; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid025ZEm8zx4N3VuC9UJqz4S4Ab8CdeQoWrKaj88H2PviQDJUrvkUHSvHijJ638HeTaLl; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/06/15/zahid-ne-buv-gotovyj-do-takoyi-masshtabnoyi-vijny-v-ukrayini-ale-zaraz-vyrobnycztvo-ozbroyennya-naroshhuyetsya-yurij-ignat/

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02nzBrzJPBHB3vbPRokrfeiYUCxZ29zPMj33qKYsNziTGLB8mpeaY56dnDdD7wLgnzl

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TKGgJFZp2ynxqhu7ZZgKov1Xq6RtpfLpacYG5pq5PK6a1kzEtDhZMSfVTS2Gy6Atl

[15] The 25th CAA is technically a reformed unit, as it previously existed as a Soviet unit based in a similar area from 1941-1957. However, the modern 25th CAA will be functionally a new unit, with no continuity of structure and certainly not personnel. https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1659528766928855041?t=klwo7ELLHZkTBatS7XCFUQ&s=19; https://thelookoutn.substack.com/p/new-russian-formations-update-004?sd=pf

[16] https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1659528766928855041?t=klwo7ELLHZkTBatS7XCFUQ&s=19

[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2023

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2023

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2023

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051023

[21] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3701

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2023

[23] https://www.nato dot int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_215676.htm?selectedLocale=en

[24] https://meduza. dot io/news/2023/06/15/v-shveytsarii-traditsionno-neytralnoy-strane-odobrili-spisanie-25-tankov-leopard-2-dlya-ih-reeksporta-v-germaniyu-potom-ih-mozhno-budet-peredat-ukraine

[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0KsTL88z36u3wSbNdVNBFXqi17cdsyhiJoDvV7BegBjUQXBnX3FQoWNzJBndBZQLhl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02nzBrzJPBHB3vbPRokrfeiYUCxZ29zPMj33qKYsNziTGLB8mpeaY56dnDdD7wLgnzl

[26] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47302 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/60817

[27] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/06/15/narazi-bilshu-vognevu-aktyvnist-vorog-proyavlyaye-na-lymano-kupyanskomu-napryamku-sergij-cherevatyj/

[28] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gr56fOP_se4 ; https://suspilne dot media/404624-rosia-sturmue-i-namagaetsa-otociti-bahmut-hronika-boiv-ta-situacia-u-misti/

[29] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47357; https://t.me/wargonzo/13265

[30] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/06/15/narazi-bilshu-vognevu-aktyvnist-vorog-proyavlyaye-na-lymano-kupyanskomu-napryamku-sergij-cherevatyj/

[31] https://suspilne dot media/508065-malar-rf-perekidae-vijska-z-pivdna-ukraini-na-donbas-sob-zavaditi-prosuvannu-zsu/

[32] https://t.me/aerobomber/113 ; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/1886 ; https://twitter.com/klinger66/status/1669132425937539072?s=20

[33] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051823

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0KsTL88z36u3wSbNdVNBFXqi17cdsyhiJoDvV7BegBjUQXBnX3FQoWNzJBndBZQLhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02nzBrzJPBHB3vbPRokrfeiYUCxZ29zPMj33qKYsNziTGLB8mpeaY56dnDdD7wLgnzl

[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02nzBrzJPBHB3vbPRokrfeiYUCxZ29zPMj33qKYsNziTGLB8mpeaY56dnDdD7wLgnzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0KsTL88z36u3wSbNdVNBFXqi17cdsyhiJoDvV7BegBjUQXBnX3FQoWNzJBndBZQLhl

[36] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48490

[37] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48490

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0KsTL88z36u3wSbNdVNBFXqi17cdsyhiJoDvV7BegBjUQXBnX3FQoWNzJBndBZQLhl

[39] https://t.me/otarnavskiy/121; https://t.me/otarnavskiy/120; https://suspilne dot media/508151-zsu-pid-vugledarom-prosunulis-na-odin-kilometr/

[40] https://t.me/wargonzo/13273; https://t.me/wargonzo/13265; https://t.me/rusich_army/9395; https://t.me/rusich_army/9395; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47320 https://t.me/boris_rozhin/89149; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48489; https://t.me/sashakots/40397;

[41] https://t.me/rybar/48521

[42] https://t.me/milinfolive/102170; https://t.me/wargonzo/13280

[43] https://t.me/rusich_army/9395h; https://t.me/rusich_army/9398; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48489; https://t.me/wargonzo/13265; https://t.me/vrogov/10312; https://t.me/rusich_army/9407; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47351 https://t.me/batalyon15/2007; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48489; https://t.me/sashakots/40397; https://t.me/readovkanews/60817

[44] https://t.me/batalyon15/2007; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47351

[45] https://twitter.com/DaniloTartaglia/status/1669276471997677569?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1669324942804918272?s=20

[46] https://t.me/readovkanews/60856; https://t.me/readovkanews/60852; https://t.me/readovkanews/60849; https://t.me/readovkanews/60850

[47] https://t.me/energoatom_ua/13575

[48] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mv2DQDf2QNs ; https://suspilne dot media/507807-rosia-zakrila-dostup-do-informacii-pro-riven-radiacii-na-zaes/

[49] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36896; https://t.me/epoddubny/16395; https://t.me/rusich_army/9400 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/16395

[50] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/892

[51] https://t.me/khersonskaODA/6924

[52] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/11808; https://t.me/rybar/48526; https://t.me/idelrealii/28118 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47319; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/89115; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48491

[53] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/892

[54] https://t.me/Aksenov82/2681 ; https://t.me/sashakots/40394; https://t.me/bazabazon/18562; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/11808; https://t.me/rybar/48526; https://t.me/idelrealii/28118 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47319; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/89115; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48491

[55] https://t.me/mod_russia/27366 ; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/derzhava-ahresor-perekydaie-zalyshky-zekiv-okupantiv-iz-tak-zvanykh-shturmovykh-rot-z-do-tak-zvanoho-dobrovolchoho-korpusu.html

[56] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031323

[57] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/derzhava-ahresor-perekydaie-zalyshky-zekiv-okupantiv-iz-tak-zvanykh-shturmovykh-rot-z-do-tak-zvanoho-dobrovolchoho-korpusu.html

[58] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/derzhava-ahresor-perekydaie-zalyshky-zekiv-okupantiv-iz-tak-zvanykh-shturmovykh-rot-z-do-tak-zvanoho-dobrovolchoho-korpusu.html

[59] https://t.me/mod_russia/27366

[60] https://www.ft.com/content/cd627211-68f6-4dfa-8a04-3344deee2e85

[61] https://www.ft.com/content/cd627211-68f6-4dfa-8a04-3344deee2e85

[62] https://t.me/rybar/48529

[63] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/v-melitopoli-zaporizki-partyzany-pidirvaly-zaliznytsyu/

[64] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/2261; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/2253

[65] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/23840-2/

[66] https://t.me/andriyshTime/10772

[67] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3517; https://t.me/BalitskyEV/1198; https://t.me/BalitskyEV/1197; https://t.me/BalitskyEV/1196

[68] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/1262; https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/1262

[69] https://t.me/cikrossii/2810

[70] https://t.me/sotaproject/60974

[71] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20May%2017%2C%202023%20PDF.pdf