Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 4, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 4, 2024

Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, and George Barros

June 4, 2024, 6:35pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:00pm ET on June 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Select Russian military commentators continue to complain about superior Ukrainian drone and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities on the battlefield, continuing to highlight the rapid and constant tactical and technological innovation cycles that are shaping the battlespace in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger who formerly served as a "Storm-Z" unit instructor posted a list of complaints on June 4 detailing the challenges that Russian forces face in repelling Ukrainian drones and claimed that effective and pervasive Ukrainian drone use is now the "leading factor" in Ukraine's ability to repel Russian offensive actions.[1] The milblogger made six points about the Russian-Ukrainian drone disparity, claiming first and foremost that Ukrainian troops have a large numerical advantage in first person view (FPV) drones and FPV drone operators. The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian assault groups have a 3-4:1 FPV drone advantage over Russian assault units, while Ukrainian mechanized groups have a 6-10:1 FPV drone advantage over comparable Russian units. The milblogger noted that Ukraine also has specialized and centralized drone units within existing Ukrainian ground units, which allows Ukrainian forces to better integrate reconnaissance and attack drone capabilities into basic tactical maneuvers. Russian forces, by contrast, lack the centralized and organized drone-unit system and adequate EW and electronic reconnaissance (ER) capabilities to counter Ukrainian drones.[2] Another milblogger, whose initial post from May 31 spurred the former Storm-Z instructor to weigh in on the issue, noted that specialized Ukrainian drone units have heavily targeted and destroyed unprotected Russian armored equipment in the Avdiivka direction, inhibiting Russian offensive prospects in the area.[3] The milblogger emphasized that the provision of FPV drones and required EW and ER systems to Russian forces is done on an ad hoc volunteer basis, as there is no centralized supply mechanism from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). These remarks on Russia's need to centralize its drone warfare capabilities echo recent calls made by a cadre of Russian commentators, including former Russian Space Agency (Roscosmos) head Dmitry Rogozin.[4] As Ukrainian forces adapt and better integrate new technologies into their force, Russian forces will likely feel pressured to do the same in order to retain technological and tactical parity on the battlefield. This offense-defense and capability scaling race is central to the development of combat means in a contemporary war.

Ukraine and its partners have reportedly drafted a document for the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland on June 15 that calls for future engagement with Russia on a limited number of issues connected to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, although the Kremlin remains unlikely to engage in meaningful negotiations on the proposal or any wider settlement to the war in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on June 4 that the draft document aims to generate consensus among summit participants on nuclear safety, food security, and the return of abducted Ukrainian civilians and children.[5] The document reportedly states that this consensus will serve as a "confidence building measure" for future engagement with Russian officials on these issues.[6] The reported document specifically deems nuclear threats as "inadmissible" and calls for the return of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to Ukrainian control, and freedom of navigation in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov so that Ukrainian agricultural products can reach third parties and the return of all deported and unlawfully displaced Ukrainian children and civilians to Ukraine.[7]

Russian officials have routinely been explicitly hostile to engagement with Ukraine on many of these issues, however. The Kremlin frequently threatens Ukraine and the West with nuclear weapons in order to promote Western self-deterrence. The Kremlin also uses nuclear rhetoric as a common tool of its reflexive control campaign aimed at influencing Western decision-making.[8] Russian officials have repeatedly attempted to use Russia’s physical control over the ZNPP to try to force international organizations to legitimize Russia's occupation of the ZNPP and by extension Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory.[9] Russia withdrew from the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which facilitated limited agricultural exports from Ukrainian ports, in July 2023 and has since routinely targeted Ukrainian ports and agricultural infrastructure in southern Ukraine in an effort to constrain Ukraine's ability to provide grain and other agricultural products to its partners.[10] Russian officials have shown very limited openness to the return of Ukrainian children from Russia and occupied Ukraine to Ukraine through mediation with third parties.[11] The Kremlin and Russian occupation officials continue to deport Ukrainian civilians and children from occupied Ukraine, however, and there is no indication that Russia is willing to stop this campaign or return deported and unlawfully displaced Ukrainians back to Ukraine at scale.[12] The Kremlin continues to feign interest in meaningful negotiations with Ukraine in an effort to push the West to make concessions on Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and the Kremlin may use engagement on these more limited issues to pursue similar concessions.[13]

Russia is conducting a wide-scale hybrid warfare campaign targeting NATO states in tandem with Russian efforts to augment its conventional military capabilities in preparation for a potential conflict with NATO. Bloomberg reported on June 3 that Norwegian Chief of Defense Eirik Kristoffersen stated that NATO has a window of two to three years to rebuild its forces and stocks before Russia has rebuilt its own ability to conduct a conventional attack, presumably against NATO.[14] Kristoffersen stated that this expedited time frame is due to Russia's current elevated defense industrial base (DIB) output. Western officials also continue to highlight Russia's current engagement in hybrid warfare activities across Europe. The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 4 that Western governments are trying to formulate a response to the growing series of Russian-backed sabotage attempts on military bases and civilian infrastructure in Europe.[15] FT reported that an unspecified Western defense advisor stated that Russia has a "highly developed lexicon" for hybrid warfare, including information and psychological operations and sabotage. The defense advisor noted that Russia is learning from and adapting its hybrid warfare operations, stating that Russia is "constantly observing" the West's reactions to these hybrid warfare operations and "testing to see which of [Russia's] actions work." FT reported that Russia has resorted to using proxies, such as operatives from criminal gangs, to conduct the sabotage attacks after European governments expelled hundreds of Russian diplomats and spies. NATO and its member states have repeatedly warned about intensifying Russian hybrid operations on NATO member territory.[16]

A joint investigation by Russian opposition student journal DOXA and open-source outlet Kidmapping highlights the role of the Kremlin-backed Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Russifying Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities have deported to Russia.[17] DOXA found that from the early days of Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian officials deported children from orphanages and boarding schools in occupied Donetsk Oblast to Russia's Rostov Oblast, where they were visited by Metropolitan Mercury (Igor Ivanov) of Rostov and Novocherkassk, who spoke to them about the ROC and seemingly enticed them to consider baptism into the ROC.[18] ROC clergy have also called for the baptism of deported Ukrainian children into the ROC and reportedly encouraged them to join various "military-patriotic" youth organizations in Russia.[19] DOXA and Kidmapping also found that deported children from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts stayed at shelters run by the ROC in Voronezh Oblast, where ROC clergy and affiliated officials hold "military-patriotic" events for the deported children in order to encourage pro-Russian and pro-ROC sentiment and cut the children off from their Ukrainian identities.[20] ISW has previously assessed that the ROC is instrumental in enacting the Kremlin's occupation plan for Ukraine, and this appears to extend to Russian efforts to Russify deported Ukrainian children living in Russia.[21] Kremlin-appointed Commissioner on Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, against whom the International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant due to her role in facilitating the deportation of Ukrainian children, is notably married to an ROC priest.[22] Lvova-Belova and her husband have themselves adopted a deported Ukrainian child from Mariupol, highlighting the personal involvement of the ROC and other Kremlin officials in the deportation of Ukrainian children.[23] ISW continues to assess that the deportation of Ukrainian children, with the intent to destroy their Ukrainian identities via such Russification projects, amounts to a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which prohibits "forcibly transferring children of a group to another group" on grounds that it is an act of genocide.[24]

Russian President Vladimir Putin named First Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council and United Russia Secretary Andrei Turchak the acting governor of the Altai Republic on June 4.[25] Turchak chaired the Russian State Duma "Special Military Operation" Working Group dedicated to resolving issues with Russia's war effort in Ukraine and reported on the working group's efforts directly to Putin.[26] Former Altai Republic Head Oleg Khorokhordin resigned on June 4 reportedly to transition to a new, unspecified position.[27] Putin met with Turchak via videoconference to discuss Turchak's new position and stated that the Altai Republic is a "promising but difficult" multinational republic where the Russian government wants to develop the tourism industry.[28] Russian outlet Vedomosti reported on June 3 that three sources close to the Russian presidential administration stated that the Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative in the Ural Federal District Vladimir Yakushev may replace Turchak as United Russia Secretary.[29]

Russian sources speculated on the meaning behind Turchak's appointment. Russian opposition outlet Meduza stated that sources close to the presidential administration noted that Putin offered Turchak the position during a videoconference, not during a personal meeting as Putin usually does.[30] Meduza's sources reportedly stated that Turchak's new position is a demotion, comparing it to an "execution" and "deportation to a colony settlement." A source reportedly stated that Turchak lost his position in the "power vertical" and that Turchak must have "seriously screwed up." Meduza reported that a source close to the St. Petersburg government claimed that Putin moved Turchak because Turchak was "too active" in St. Petersburg and St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov complained to Putin — a version with which other Meduza sources reportedly disagreed. A Russian milblogger refuted claims that Turchak's appointment is "political exile" and claimed that the Altai Republic is geographically important given its position near Central Asia and Xinjiang, China.[31] The milblogger claimed that the West is active in Central Asia and that Russia will need logistics hubs and a strong executive power in the area if there are "serious showdowns" in Central Asia between the West and Russia. A Russian insider source claimed that the Russian government may launch a new association of federal subjects that Turchak will supervise.[32] The insider source claimed that the Russian government may hold a referendum, which Turchak will also oversee, to unify the Altai Republic and neighboring Altai Krai. There are multiple defense industrial enterprises in Altai Krai, and if the insider source's claim about plans to unify Altai Republic and Altai Krai are true, the Kremlin may have appointed Turchak to oversee Russian defense industrial efforts in the region as part of a wider Kremlin effort to increase Russia's defense industrial production.[33] Putin may have also moved Turchak in an effort to sideline and demote him without having to make a public show of the demotion, especially if Putin was displeased with Turchak's advocacy for Russian servicemembers fighting in Ukraine.

Newly appointed Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov reportedly invited select Russian war correspondents and milbloggers to meet with him to coopt several Russian information space actors, prompting limited criticism from a prominent Russian milblogger. A Russian insider source claimed on May 26 that Belousov planned to meet with milbloggers and military correspondents to demonstrate that he has "nothing in common with his predecessor [now Russian Security Council Secretary] Sergei Shoigu."[34] The Russian information space largely celebrated Belousov's appointment as Defense Minister and expressed hope that his appointment would foster positive changes to the endemic problems that persisted under Shoigu's MoD, such as the Shoigu MoD’s tendency to lie about Russia’s military performance in Ukraine and failures to adequately supply frontline forces.[35] ISW has previously observed that the Kremlin began efforts to coopt Russian milbloggers critical of the Russian military's poor performance in the war in Ukraine by offering them state awards and government positions starting in November 2022 in an effort to regain control over the Russian information space.[36] A prominent Russian milblogger, who has previously criticized the Russian MoD and routinely posts complaints on his Telegram channel from Russian servicemen on the frontlines, claimed that Belousov invited a limited number of already-respected military correspondents, whom the Kremlin has coopted and likely deemed to be "safe," and milbloggers to meet with him.[37] The milblogger further claimed that he would not be surprised if Russian MoD employees from the "old team," likely referring to Shoigu's affiliates at the Russian MoD, organized the meeting and expressed doubt that the Russian MoD would listen to milblogger suggestions. Russian milbloggers appear to be experimenting with different ways to express critical opinions of the Russian MoD following Belousov's appointment, and Belousov may be meeting with military correspondents to constrain this criticism.[38]

Key Takeaways:

• Select Russian military commentators continue to complain about superior Ukrainian drone and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities on the battlefield, continuing to highlight the rapid and constant tactical and technological innovation cycles that are shaping the battlespace in Ukraine.
• Ukraine and its partners have reportedly drafted a document for the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland on June 15 that calls for future engagement with Russia on a limited number of issues connected to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, although the Kremlin remains unlikely to engage in meaningful negotiations on the proposal or any wider settlement to the war in Ukraine.
• Russia is conducting a wide-scale hybrid warfare campaign targeting NATO states in tandem with Russian efforts to augment its conventional military capabilities in preparation for a potential conflict with NATO
• A joint investigation by Russian opposition student journal DOXA and open-source outlet Kidmapping highlights the role of the Kremlin-backed Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Russifying Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities have deported to Russia.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin named First Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council and United Russia Secretary Andrei Turchak the acting governor of the Altai Republic on June 4.
• Newly appointed Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov reportedly invited select Russian war correspondents and milbloggers to meet with him to coopt several Russian information space actors, prompting limited criticism from a prominent Russian milblogger.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Siversk, and Donetsk City.
• The Russian military reportedly continues to forcibly send Russian military personnel, including those with serious medical issues, to fight in Ukraine.
• Russia continues efforts to militarize deported Ukrainian youth and prepare them for future service in the Russian armed forces.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyptsi direction (north of Kharkiv City) on June 4, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Fighting continued near Lyptsi and Hlyboke (north of Lyptsi).[39] Kharkiv Oblast occupation administration head Vitaly Ganchev acknowledged on June 4 that the tempo of Russian offensive operations has slowed in northern Kharkiv Oblast, consistent with ISW's observations on Russian forces' rate of advance in this direction since late May 2024.[40]

Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on June 4. Geolocated footage published on June 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced on the northern outskirts of Starytsya (southwest of Vovchansk).[41] Fighting continued near Starytsya and near and within Vovchansk.[42] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated that Ukrainian forces control roughly 70 percent of Vovchansk.[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian artillery units are trying to destroy crossings over the Vovcha River within Vovchansk to complicate Ukrainian logistics and claimed that Russian forces have already destroyed three crossings in the town.[44] A Ukrainian platoon commander operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast stated that Russian forces continue to conduct heavy infantry assaults in the area and that Russian vehicles do not approach within three-to-five kilometers of the international border to avoid Ukrainian strikes.[45] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are building fortifications north of Vovchansk, but noted that Ukrainian forces conduct frequent drone strikes against Russian engineering equipment, likely complicating this effort.[46] Digging field fortifications in the vicinity of the international border area remains challenging for both Russian and Ukrainian forces due to pervasive drone and indirect fire threats from the opposing side.

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 4, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced near Stelmakhivka (southeast of Kupyansk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[47] Fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Stelmakhivka, Berestove, and Stepova Novoselivka; northwest of Kreminna near Nevske; west of Kreminna near Terny; and southwest of Kreminna near Yampil.[48]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction and continued intensified offensive operations in the area on June 4. Geolocated footage published on June 3 and June 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Verkhnokamyanske (southeast of Siversk) and south of Rozdolivka (south of Siversk).[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Siversk direction was one of the most intense sectors of the front on June 3 and that Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka; southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka, Verkhnokamyanske, and Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Rozdolivka on June 3 and 4.[50] Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[51]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on June 4, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian forces conducted assaults on Chasiv Yar's eastern outskirts, north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka, east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske, and southeast of Chaisv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka on June 3 and 4.[52] Elements of the Russian 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) and the "Sever-V" Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[53]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction on June 4, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 3 that Russian forces advanced 1.5 kilometers towards Karlivka from Netaylove (both west of Avdiivka), and DNR advisor Igor Kimakovsky claimed on June 4 that Russian forces are pinning Ukrainian forces along the Karlivka Reservoir and maybe surrounding Ukrainian forces within Karlivka.[54] ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims, however, and has not observed visual evidence of Russian forces holding positions around Karlivka that would allow them to meaningfully surround the settlement. Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Avdiivka near Novooleksandrivka, Yevhenivka, Prohres, Kalynove, Sokil, Novoselivka Persha, and Novopokrovske; west of Avdiivka near Semenivka, Umanske, Karlivka, Netaylove, Yasnobrodivka, and Ptyche; and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske on June 3 and 4.[55]

 

Russian forces recently advanced west and southwest of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage published on June 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within western Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City) and west and north of Paraskoviivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[56] Geolocated footage published on June 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in fields south of Pobieda (southwest of Donetsk City) and west of Solodke (west of Donetsk City) during roughly squad-sized mechanized assaults.[57] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 4 that Russian forces advanced up to 400 meters wide and 480 meters deep within western Paraskoviivka and 500 meters deep southeast of Vodyane (southwest of Donetsk City).[58] A Ukrainian brigade operating southwest of Donetsk City published footage on June 4 showing elements of the brigade repelling a roughly platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in the Novomykhailivka area (also southwest of Donetsk City).[59] Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka, Vodyane, and Kostyantynivka on June 3 and 4.[60] Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating within Paraskoviivka.[61]

 

Russian forces continued assaults in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area southeast of Velyka Novosilka near Zolota Nyva and south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske and Urozhaine on June 4.[62]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 4, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported continued fighting near Robotyne, Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne), and Verbove (east of Robotyne) on the evening of June 3 and throughout the day on June 4.[63] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian troops 500 to 700 meters back from the outskirts of Robotyne and advanced near Myrne (northeast of Robotyne) and Nesteryanka (northwest of Robotyne), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Russian advances in these areas.[64] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator and former Russian space agency (Roscosmos) head Dmitry Rogozin complained that Ukrainian forces have an advantage in drones, artillery, and electronic warfare (EW) near Myrne, complicating Russian offensive operations in the area.[65] Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Robotyne.[66]

 

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and in the Dnipro River Delta on June 4, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled several unsuccessful Russian attacks near Krynky on the evening of June 3 and during the day on June 4.[67] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian airborne (VDV) and naval infantry elements are working to clear a limited number of Ukrainian troops from the islands in the Dnipro River Delta and prevent Ukrainian landing attempts on the east bank of the Dnipro River.[68] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and 30th Artillery Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the east bank of Kherson Oblast.[69]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 3 to 4 and during the day on June 4. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-K cruise missiles from occupied Crimea towards Dnipro City and that Ukrainian forces shot down both missiles.[70] Ukrainian military officials reported that falling missile debris damaged civilian infrastructure in Dnipro City.[71] Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces also launched four unspecified drones at northern Ukraine and that Ukrainian forces shot down two of the drones over Chernihiv Oblast while the other two did not reach their intended targets for unspecified reasons.[72] Head of the Ukrainian National Security Service's Investigative Department Serhii Bolvinov stated that Russian forces conducted a D-30 universal joint glide munition (UMPB) strike on Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast on the morning of June 4.[73] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhii Lysak stated that Russian forces also struck Kryvyi Rih with an unspecified number and type of missile on June 4.[74]

Kharkiv Oblast Head of Police Volodymyr Tymoshko stated on June 4 that Russian forces are increasingly striking recreational areas in Kharkiv Oblast in an effort to compel people to flee Kharkiv City.[75] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are increasingly striking Kharkiv City and its environs to force residents to flee.[76]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian military reportedly continues to forcibly send Russian military personnel, including those with serious medical issues, to fight in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on June 4 that Russian military authorities recently forcibly transported mobilized personnel and contract personnel (kontraktniki) who refused or were unable to serve due to medical reasons, such as cancer, tuberculosis, mental disorders, and severe wounds, to the front in Donetsk Oblast.[77] Russian opposition outlet Verstka similarly reported on June 3 that Russian military authorities are forcibly sending hundreds of Russian servicemembers who refuse to fight to the front in Ukraine from Russia instead of standing trial for their refusal to participate in combat.[78]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

The Russian MoD presented the new TOS-3 "Drakon" heavy thermobaric artillery system for the first time on June 3.[79] The TOS-3 system has an increased firing range, reportedly between 15 to 24 kilometers.[80] The TOS-1A system reportedly has a range of six to 10 kilometers and the TOS-2 reportedly has a maximum range of 15 kilometers.[81]

The Russian MoD claimed on June 4 that Russian forces used the "Legushka" ("Frog") unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) for the first time in Ukraine in the Avdiivka direction.[82] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces attached mines to the UGV to target a Ukrainian machine gun crew. The "Legushka" UGV system reportedly has a carrying capacity of 30 kilograms and can maneuver to strike targets three kilometers away using a self-destruction attack.[83]

Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec stated on June 4 that Russian forces are testing the "Impulse-M" universal tracked platform UGV, which can be equipped with an anti-tank missile system.[84] Rostec stated that the "Impulse-M" has a lifting capacity of about one ton and can carry 500 kilograms of cargo and can lay mines and transport cargo or wounded personnel. Rostec stated that the robotic system's control system includes artificial intelligence (AI) elements that allow it to operate automatically. Rostec claimed that the communication system is virtually resistant to electronic warfare (EW) systems and can autonomously return the robotic system back to the base if the connection between the operator and system is disrupted.

Rostec subsidiary Kalashnikov stated on June 3 that it has started serial production of the "Granat-4" artillery guidance unmanned aerial vehicle.[85]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukraine's defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russia continues efforts to militarize deported Ukrainian youth and prepare them for future service in the Russian armed forces. Russian media site Readovka reported on May 30 that over 2,500 teenagers aged 13 to 17 from occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts will undergo military training at the "Voin" ("Warrior") camp in Volgograd Oblast.[86] "Voin" director Igor Vorobyov told Readovka that the teenagers will gain experience in combat medicine, engineering, and fires training, as well as drone operation. Vorobyov also emphasized to Readovka that the main goal of the training camp is to "instill in the younger generation a true love for the Motherland," and that "the demand for patriotism is especially acute from children" from occupied territories of Ukraine. ISW has frequently observed that Russian authorities deport Ukrainian children using a variety of avenues, including deporting them to Russia and forcing them to participate in such military training programs.[87] Russia also operates the "Avangard" military training camp for deported Ukrainian teenagers in Volgograd Oblast, for example.[88] These military training programs are intended to Russify Ukrainian teenagers, isolate them from their Ukrainian identities, and prepare them with military skills that would be required if they are ever forced to fight in the Russian military. Vorobyov's statements about the "Voin" camp explicitly underline Russia's intention to use such camps to essentially strip a generation of young Ukrainians of their national, historical, and cultural identities and force them to become more Russian.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian officials continued efforts to discredit the upcoming Ukrainian Global Peace Summit in Switzerland. Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin attempted to portray the number of countries participating in the peace summit as low.[89] Ukrainian Presidential Spokesperson Serhii Nykyforov stated on June 4 that 107 countries and international organizations have confirmed their participation in the peace summit.[90] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin claimed that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member countries are not attending the summit, given that these states are Russia's "closest allies."[91] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently warned that Russian officials are attempting to disrupt the peace summit and discourage countries from attending the summit by threatening to "block" the import and export of food, agricultural, and chemical products.[92]

Russian sources continued to falsely portray the recently concluded NATO Steadfast Defender 2024 military exercises as escalatory. Russian sources claimed that the Steadfast Defender exercises are evidence that the West is preparing for a military conflict with Russia and intends to create a "military Schengen [zone]."[93] ISW continues to assess that Russian sources purposefully misrepresent Steadfast Defender exercises as a threat against Russia, despite the exercises' defensive nature in response to real Russian aggression against Ukraine and overt Russian threats to NATO countries.[94]

Russian officials and Kremlin-affiliated sources continued efforts to portray the West as seeking to destabilize Georgia while praising recent actions from the Georgian Dream ruling party. Galuzin claimed that the West is trying to conduct a "Maidan" scenario in Georgia by October 2024 to create a new source of tension on Russia's borders.[95] Russian government officials and Georgian Dream affiliates have previously claimed that Western countries are pursuing "Maidanization" in Georgia — a specific reference to Ukraine's Euromaidan protests and the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, which drove out Ukraine's former pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych.[96] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger seized on recent statements from US Department of State Spokesperson Matthew Miller that the United States is conducting a comprehensive review of US policy toward Georgia that will evaluate hundreds of millions of dollars of US assistance to Georgia. The milblogger insinuated that the United States is seeking to punish Georgia for pursuing a "sovereign" foreign policy.[97] ISW continues to assess that both Kremlin actors and select Georgian officials will likely increasingly malign the West as attempting to interfere in Georgian affairs and that members of the Georgian Dream party are likely purposefully derailing long-term Georgian efforts for Euro-Atlantic integration, which plays into continued Russian hybrid operations to divide, destabilize, and weaken Georgia.[98]

Kremlin officials and affiliates continue to criticize Armenia for perceived anti-Russian positions. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger expressed outrage at Armenian Ambassador to Ukraine Vladimir Karapetyan's and Yerevan Nor Nork District Head Tigran Ter-Margaryan's June 2 visit to Bucha, in which the Armenian officials donated humanitarian and medical aid to the local hospital and visited a memorial for killed civilians.[99] The milblogger claimed that the Armenian officials' visit to Bucha is "unequivocal" evidence that Armenia and its Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan have been supporting Ukraine and are pursuing an anti-Russian policy.[100] Galuzin also criticized Armenian leadership for allowing the European Union (EU) to establish a monitoring mission to Armenia — instead of relying on the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to monitor the border situation with Azerbaijan — and claimed the EU monitoring mission is collecting intelligence about Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan.[101]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian Energy Minister Viktor Karankevich stated on June 4 that Belarus and Russia will continue to develop nuclear energy cooperation, specifically through scientific and technical support, as part of Union State mechanisms.[102]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1020

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-4-2024

[3] https://t.me/vault8pro/51305

[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-2-2024

[5] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-04/ukraine-summit-opens-door-to-limited-future-talks-with-russia

[6] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-04/ukraine-summit-opens-door-to-limited-future-talks-with-russia

[7] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-04/ukraine-summit-opens-door-to-limited-future-talks-with-russia

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052124

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030824 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2024

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071723 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-11-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080423

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042424

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/24-210-01%20ISW%20Occupation%20playbook.pdf ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011224

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052424

[14] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-03/norway-chief-of-defense-eirik-kristoffersen-sees-short-window-to-boost-nato

[15] https://www.ft.com/content/bf128ebf-2e3f-40a3-b7ec-bcd1b477ab9a

[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050324; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052224 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2024 ;

[17] https://doxa dot team/articles/deport-rpc

[18] https://doxa dot team/articles/deport-rpc

[19] http://www.e-vestnik dor ru/reports/obnyat_i_pomolitsja_pomosh_bezhencam_12147/; http://eparchia dot patriarchia.ru/db/text/5906094.html

[20] https://doxa dot team/articles/deport-rpc

[21] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-orthodox-church-declares-%E2%80%9Choly-war%E2%80%9D-against-ukraine-and-articulates-tenets#:~:text=%5B4%5D%20The%20ROC%20MP%20claimed,war%20of%20conquest%20in%20Ukraine.

[22] https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2023/03/19/just-call-me-masha; https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/15/europe/russia-ukraine-children-maria-lvova-belova-intl/index.html

[23] https://missingchildrenukraine.news-exchange.ebu.ch/the-missing-children-of-ukraine/maria-lvova-belova/#:~:text=Lvova%2DBelova%20and%20her%20husband,and%20her%20husband%20Pavel%20Kogelman.

[24] https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf

[25] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74215; https://t.me/tass_agency/252578; https://t.me/tass_agency/252579

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-20-2023

[27] https://t.me/tass_agency/252491

[28] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74215

[29] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2024/06/03/1041295-istochniki-vedomostei-sekretarem-gensoveta-edinoi-rossii-mozhet-stat-vladimir-yakushev

[30] https://meduza dot io/feature/2024/06/04/eto-ne-ponizhenie-a-kazn

[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/20304

[32] https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/15169

[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-30-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2024

[34] https://t.me/rusbrief/234079 ; https://t.me/protiktok/11275

[35] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052324

[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2024

[37] https://t.me/dva_majors/44379

[38] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051924

[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06KLk8QLGKhxTYBRmHCu5jHwNoLaEmLwfVQK4VPWCUkqKTAHXGuGxjBaJm63Hcvsol ; https://t.me/synegubov/9895 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/44314 ; https://t.me/rybar/60640 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69625 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69625 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/10622

[40] https://t.me/tass_agency/252512 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051724

[41] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/15672; https://t.me/batallionnnn/130; https://x.com/GloOouD/status/1797722415293968679

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06KLk8QLGKhxTYBRmHCu5jHwNoLaEmLwfVQK4VPWCUkqKTAHXGuGxjBaJm63Hcvsol ; https://t.me/dva_majors/44314 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/04/za-chas-aktyvizacziyi-nastupu-rosiyan-na-harkivshhyni-u-polon-vzyaly-blyzko-60-rosiyan/ ; https://t.me/rybar/60640 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69625 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11406 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/20305 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11418

[43] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/04/za-chas-aktyvizacziyi-nastupu-rosiyan-na-harkivshhyni-u-polon-vzyaly-blyzko-60-rosiyan/

[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11418 ; https://t.me/rybar/60640 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69593

[45] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/742913-sproba-nastupu-rf-na-pivnoci-harkivsini-so-vidbuvaetsa-na-prikordonni-10-travna/?anchor=live_1717495196&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[46] https://t.me/rybar/60640

[47] https://t.me/tass_agency/252524

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0o13WPStdc2XDYrZhtPnp8geb2HuDbqdg34gFJVp9H4xUZGDKctgyCtPGYzuEwHp4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0KEQuMGRLAud4JC4JgxwWW8QVLyE7w8UjnDLsm18RBT94RV9jMuyfK5kuRmgKCZ9El; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0KEQuMGRLAud4JC4JgxwWW8QVLyE7w8UjnDLsm18RBT94RV9jMuyfK5kuRmgKCZ9El ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06KLk8QLGKhxTYBRmHCu5jHwNoLaEmLwfVQK4VPWCUkqKTAHXGuGxjBaJm63Hcvsol ; https://t.me/mod_russia/39397 ;

[49] https://fb.watch/suPjKpEOK6/; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1797974417882091775; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1797974421262712875 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5723; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/423

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0KEQuMGRLAud4JC4JgxwWW8QVLyE7w8UjnDLsm18RBT94RV9jMuyfK5kuRmgKCZ9El ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06KLk8QLGKhxTYBRmHCu5jHwNoLaEmLwfVQK4VPWCUkqKTAHXGuGxjBaJm63Hcvsol

[51] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/36566; https://t.me/readovkanews/81017 (Siversk direction)

[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0o13WPStdc2XDYrZhtPnp8geb2HuDbqdg34gFJVp9H4xUZGDKctgyCtPGYzuEwHp4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0KEQuMGRLAud4JC4JgxwWW8QVLyE7w8UjnDLsm18RBT94RV9jMuyfK5kuRmgKCZ9El ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CsPepTuocnFpi3FpDSzFT2Yz6hZuEDR6UkWTQjPxCiphBHHwrKCQ1KHi3SEnuhe2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06KLk8QLGKhxTYBRmHCu5jHwNoLaEmLwfVQK4VPWCUkqKTAHXGuGxjBaJm63Hcvsol ; https://t.me/wargonzo/20305

[53] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69602 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69630 (Chasiv Yar)

[54] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11396 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/252583

[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0o13WPStdc2XDYrZhtPnp8geb2HuDbqdg34gFJVp9H4xUZGDKctgyCtPGYzuEwHp4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0KEQuMGRLAud4JC4JgxwWW8QVLyE7w8UjnDLsm18RBT94RV9jMuyfK5kuRmgKCZ9El ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CsPepTuocnFpi3FpDSzFT2Yz6hZuEDR6UkWTQjPxCiphBHHwrKCQ1KHi3SEnuhe2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06KLk8QLGKhxTYBRmHCu5jHwNoLaEmLwfVQK4VPWCUkqKTAHXGuGxjBaJm63Hcvsol ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11396 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/44314 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/20305 ; https://t.me/rybar/60641 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/125766 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/14990

[56] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5718; https://x.com/small10space/status/1797526240565620841; https://t.me/Perun_Group/314; https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1797751081096937942; https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1796183426485068106; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1797761939373986134 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1797726794222903632; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1797728170701132065; https://t.me/ua_dshv/2795; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/15683; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5727

[57] https://t.me/escadrone/1380; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5724 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5730; https://t.me/usinfantryman1/17138 ; https://x.com/mon_mon_1064552/status/1798012783977714162

[58] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11401 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69626

[59] https://t.me/ua_dshv/2795

[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0o13WPStdc2XDYrZhtPnp8geb2HuDbqdg34gFJVp9H4xUZGDKctgyCtPGYzuEwHp4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0KEQuMGRLAud4JC4JgxwWW8QVLyE7w8UjnDLsm18RBT94RV9jMuyfK5kuRmgKCZ9El ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CsPepTuocnFpi3FpDSzFT2Yz6hZuEDR6UkWTQjPxCiphBHHwrKCQ1KHi3SEnuhe2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06KLk8QLGKhxTYBRmHCu5jHwNoLaEmLwfVQK4VPWCUkqKTAHXGuGxjBaJm63Hcvsol ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69647 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/44314

[61] https://t.me/z_arhiv/26981

[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0o13WPStdc2XDYrZhtPnp8geb2HuDbqdg34gFJVp9H4xUZGDKctgyCtPGYzuEwHp4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0KEQuMGRLAud4JC4JgxwWW8QVLyE7w8UjnDLsm18RBT94RV9jMuyfK5kuRmgKCZ9El ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CsPepTuocnFpi3FpDSzFT2Yz6hZuEDR6UkWTQjPxCiphBHHwrKCQ1KHi3SEnuhe2l

[63] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11405; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0KEQuMGRLAud4JC4JgxwWW8QVLyE7w8UjnDLsm18RBT94RV9jMuyfK5kuRmgKCZ9El; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06KLk8QLGKhxTYBRmHCu5jHwNoLaEmLwfVQK4VPWCUkqKTAHXGuGxjBaJm63Hcvsol

[64] https://t.me/tass_agency/252538; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11397; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11405; https://t.me/dva_majors/44314

[65] https://t.me/rogozin_do/5866 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1797840337836405046

[66] https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/11869

[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0KEQuMGRLAud4JC4JgxwWW8QVLyE7w8UjnDLsm18RBT94RV9jMuyfK5kuRmgKCZ9El; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CsPepTuocnFpi3FpDSzFT2Yz6hZuEDR6UkWTQjPxCiphBHHwrKCQ1KHi3SEnuhe2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06KLk8QLGKhxTYBRmHCu5jHwNoLaEmLwfVQK4VPWCUkqKTAHXGuGxjBaJm63Hcvsol; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/9745

[68] https://t.me/dva_majors/44314; https://t.me/rusich_army/14995

[69] https://t.me/dva_majors/44316; https://t.me/voin_dv/8927

[70] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CsPepTuocnFpi3FpDSzFT2Yz6hZuEDR6UkWTQjPxCiphBHHwrKCQ1KHi3SEnuhe2l; https://t.me/ComAFUA/305

[71] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CsPepTuocnFpi3FpDSzFT2Yz6hZuEDR6UkWTQjPxCiphBHHwrKCQ1KHi3SEnuhe2l; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/13377

[72] https://t.me/ComAFUA/305; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CsPepTuocnFpi3FpDSzFT2Yz6hZuEDR6UkWTQjPxCiphBHHwrKCQ1KHi3SEnuhe2l

[73] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/04/okupanty-skynuly-aviabombu-na-kypansk-poshkodzheni-bilshe-10-budivel/

[74] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/13411

[75] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/760653-comu-rf-be-po-bazah-vidpocinku-harkivsini-komentar-kerivnika-policii-regionu-timoska/

[76] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051624; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-22-2024

[77] https://t.me/astrapress/56955

[78] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2024

[79] https://t.me/genshtab24/59852; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26977 ; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/rf-vpershe-predstavyla-systemu-tos-3-drakon/ ; https://t.me/milinfolive/123393

[80] https://en.defence-ua dot com/weapon_and_tech/tos_3_dragon_flamethrower_system_was_shown_for_the_first_time_in_russia-10731.html

[81] https://en.defence-ua dot com/weapon_and_tech/tos_3_dragon_flamethrower_system_was_shown_for_the_first_time_in_russia-10731.html ; https://en.defence-ua dot com/weapon_and_tech/the_russian_tos_2_tosochka_flamethrower_system_was_first_observed_on_the_front-9207.html#:~:text=The%20main%20feature%20of%20this,reaches%20up%20to%2024%20kilometers.

[82] https://t.me/mod_russia/39407

[83] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/665f41069a79479cf9ece0a2

[84] https://rostec dot ru/news/pri-uchastii-rostekha-sozdan-universalnyy-raketnyy-robot-polya-boya/

[85] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/20982793

[86] https://t.me/readovkanews/80834

[87] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/24-210-01%20ISW%20Occupation%20playbook.pdf

[88] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/14634

[89] https://t.me/tass_agency/252476

[90] https://kyivindependent dot com/107-countries-confirm-their-participation-in-ukraines-peace-summit-presidential-office-says/

[91] https://t.me/tass_agency/252480

[92] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-2-2024

[93] https://t.me/dva_majors/44368 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/20037 ; https://t.me/brussinf/7610 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/20040

[94] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2024

[95] https://t.me/tass_agency/252549

[96] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050824 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/17236177

[97] https://t.me/wargonzo/20311 ; https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-june-3-2024/#post-563042-georgia

[98] https://isw.pub/UkrWar043024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2024

[99] https://www.armenpress dot am/arm/news/1138574/

[100] https://t.me/rybar/60646 ; https://t.me/pezdicide/3560

[101] https://t.me/tass_agency/252613

[102] https://www.belta dot by/economics/view/karankevich-belarus-i-rossija-budut-razvivat-sotrudnichestvo-v-atomnoj-energetike-638949-2024/