Situation Report, The Russian Crisis Update

Please see PDF file for all 18 situation updates

 

Most recent update below...

 

Update #18 (current as of 11:45 p.m., Saturday, September 13, 2008)

 

Frederick W. Kagan and Kara Flook

NB:  The new title reflects the broader focus of future updates, including the effects of the Georgia crisis on Russia’s relations with other members of the CIS and tensions in Eastern Europe.

Analysis
 
Georgia

• Russian troops have withdrawn to within the boundaries of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, abandoning Poti, Senaki, and Zugdidi.  Russia has agreed to (and in fact insists upon) the rapid deployment of international peacekeepers to Georgia (but not on the lands of South Ossetia and Abkhazia), and says that Sarkozy has committed the EU to ensuring that Georgia does not again use force in the region.

• Russian recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia stands, but Moscow has been disappointed by the refusal of any state other than Nicaragua to recognize the republics.  South Ossetian President Kokoiti said that he wanted South Ossetia to join Russia—but then immediately took it back.  Abkhazian President Bagapsh has said that Abkhazia does not wish to join Russia—but does intend to join the Russian-Belarussian union.

• Russia has announced that it will station 3,800 soldiers each in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and has stated that they will be regular forces of the Russian Federation and not peacekeepers.  Abkhazia has denied that the Black Sea Fleet will transfer its home port from Sevastopol to Sukhumi.

• Both Russian and Abkhazian leaders have asserted that Georgian “partisans” and/or terrorists have conducted attacks or are planning to conduct attacks in Russia and Abkhazia.  South Ossetian President Kokoiti has said that he intends to lay claim to additional lands beyond the current South Ossetian border in Georgia.  Russian President Dmitrii Medvedev has said that Russia will not face any separatist problems in Ingushetia, Daghestan, or elsewhere unless foreign forces intervene in Russia’s internal affairs.  But Pravda reports that separatists within Georgia are about to blow the country apart.

• The Russians believe that they have tricked the EU into guaranteeing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  With 7,600 Russian troops in the republics and EU observers on the Georgian side, there is absolutely nothing that Tbilisi could do to reclaim the territories, and Moscow may claim that the EU has de facto accepted the republics’ independence by deploying forces to monitor the new “international” borders.  This may become the faute de mieux position if Nicaragua remains the only state other than Russia to recognize the republics.

• “Provocations” will be a weekly occurrence in the region for as long as the Russians choose—and possibly longer.  It is not at all clear that Moscow can control Sukhumi or Tskhinvali completely, or that Bagapsh and Kokoiti can control all of their people—incidents are likely even if all leaders attempt to behave responsibly, which is unlikely.  When “provocations” occur after the deployment of EU and OSCE observers, what will Moscow do or demand?  The game remains very much on.

• Moscow is now probably relying on internal Georgian problems, exacerbated by the pressure Russia continues to exert, to bring Saakashvili down.  What happens then?  It is not immediately apparent that the Russians have a coherent plan and, if so, what it is, for a post-Saakashvili Georgia.

• Like it or not, Europe now owns this conflict, and the conflict will in all probability continue.  European forces will be sufficient to involve the credibility and honor of the EU but probably insufficient to prevent the Russians from claiming that Georgia is violating the agreement.  Europe and the US must start now considering their options if the conflict escalates after the deployment of international monitors.

Russian Military Developments

• Russia is conducting very large scale military exercises across the breadth of the Russian Federation.  It is conducting two army-level exercises simultaneously—one in the Privolga-Ural region and the other in the Far East region.  Both exercises emphasize long road-marches and air movements to the training areas and highlight efforts to improve the deployability of Russian military formations.  Russian railroad troops, also key to the movement of almost all of Russia’s ground formations, have also been rehearsing outside of these two army-level exercises.  Exercises involve combined-arms training incorporating ground-attack fixed-wing aviation and anti-aircraft systems, and culminate in force-on-force battalion combats.  The 15th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (Peacekeeping), elements of which fought in South Ossetia, has been involved in the training, which is said to incorporate lessons from that fight.  Considering that the North Caucasus Military District completed a large-scale exercise in July (including rehearsals for the operations in Georgia), Russia has conducted three large-scale maneuvers, including air-ground coordination, live fire exercises, and force-on-force exercises, as well as pre-exercise deployments, in the last three months.  These exercises have involved upwards of 20,000 Russian troops of all services (conservative estimate), including the Strategic Rocket Forces.

• The exercises appear to emphasize not only deployment, but mobilization—in each major exercise and many minor exercises, Russian commanders emphasize that mobilized reservists (i.e., not volunteers) were involved.  The scale and scope of the exercises means that they were very likely preplanned before the Georgia conflict, although it is quite possible that they were adjusted after the outbreak of hostilities.

• This is a very intensive (and expensive) training program, involving the expenditure of a lot of ammunition, the burning of a lot of fuel, and putting a lot of miles on equipment.  I have not yet checked to see how it compares to previous years, but a military that maintains this kind of effort can improve dramatically in a few years’ time, particularly in hard-to-detect or quantify areas such as command-and-control, combined arms coordination, air-ground coordination, the ability to plan and conduct decentralized operations (which is clearly a priority in these exercises), and other niche capabilities.  These exercises track with the notion that Russia intends to develop a very skilled and precise but relatively small professional military that can be rapidly mobilized and deployed from one end of the federation to the other, but probably not very far beyond the federation’s borders.

Russia-NATO Relations

• NATO leaders are talking a good game, but not all NATO countries are playing it:  Belgium, Norway, and Germany have all continued military-to-military connections with Russia at low levels.  In each cases, the connection was unnecessary—a Belgian frigate visited St. Petersburg; a senior Bundeswehr officer attended the opening of a war cemetery in Krasnodar; Norwegian ships exercised together with Russian ships.  In each case, the Russian military made much of it.  If NATO is serious about sending a message, these sorts of apparent trivialities send needlessly mixed messages to Moscow.

Russian Bilateral Military Developments

• The last month has seen the deepening of Russian military relations with Venezuela, Syria, and Iran.  The relationship with Venezuela is the most obvious, with the announcement of planned naval exercises in November, of the planned stationing of anti-submarine aircraft in Venezuela soon, and the flight of two Russian strategic bombers to Venezuela that has already occurred.  Those bombers conducted flights in international waters in the Atlantic and the Caribbean.  A Russian auxiliary ship sailed to the Syrian port of Tartus, worked on rebuilding decayed mooring and maintenance facilities, and returned to station in the Black Sea.  And reportage about the provision of advanced Russian air-defense systems to Iran becomes ever more complicated—some Israelis now assert that Iran already has the S-300 system.  Both Russia and Iran now deny that Iran will obtain the system from Russia, but a Russian military expert disagrees and says that the system will likely move from Russia via Belarus to Iran.

Diplomatic Developments Among Russia’s Allies

• Strains between Russia and Belarus appear to be increasing, with Lukashenko releasing his political prisoners in an apparent attempt to move closer to the West.  He also publicly praised his own wisdom in maintaining Belarus’s formal independence from Moscow and has delayed recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia until next month at the earliest.

• Moscow is clearly disappointed that none of the other CIS member states have recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and that even Venezuela has only supported the Russian decision without copying it.

• On the other hand, Russia is working hard to improve relations with Armenia and has made much of the large-scale joint military exercises it is now holding with Kazakhstan.

• Both China and Iran have remained relatively quiet about the Georgia crisis, which has also likely displeased Moscow.  Cuba, on the other hand, is ostentatiously moving closer to Moscow offering support and asking for money and help against America (but not yet for military assistance).

• It is not yet clear whether these strains will cause Putin/Medvedev to recalculate.

Developments in the Black Sea and Ukraine

• Tensions within the Ukrainian government are soaring and Moscow prefers to allow those internal dynamics to function now without adding more fuel to the fire.  Putin has downplayed the likelihood of a Russian move in the Crimea, and Russian media is focusing on the imminent collapse of the government in Kiiv more than the iniquities of the Ukrainians, as had been the previous focus.  Moscow continues to be very displeased with the intensified NATO presence in the Black Sea, but continues to see no regional response.  The deployment of strategic bombers to Venezuela and the overflight by those bombers of the Caribbean Basin was probably meant as an indirect response to the increase of NATO naval presence off Russia’s shores.

Developments in Georgia

On 4 September, Rossisskaya Gazeta interviewed General Staff spokesman Anatolii Nogovitsyn.  The portion of the transcript posted on the General Staff website is as follows:

• R[ossiisskaia Gazeta]:  Anatolii Alekseevich, please explain this strange contradiction.  The leadership of our country says that it has completed military operations in South Ossetia and the withdrawal of troops from the territory of this republic.  At the same time in the West they are loudly demanding that Russia withdrawal its forces from there.  What is the real situation?

• Novogitsyn:  The stumbling block lies in the different interpretations of administrative boundaries and security zones.  That is, we are talking about the conceptual framework.  As is known, North and South Ossetia are joined by the Roki Tunnel.  Military personnel built this unique lifeline.  After Georgia’s aggression elements of the 58th Army moved through it to Tskhinvali.

• When resolutions were agreed to in a quadrilateral format after the conflict of 1992 about the introduction into the region of peacekeeping forces, a basing agreement was conclucded.  This document was signed by representatives of Russia, South Ossetia, Georgia, and North Ossetia.

• Why is this complex?  We held that the same people live in South and North Ossetia, divided only by a border.  The peacekeeping contingent included representatives of North Ossetia.  For each side a zone of responsibility was designated more or less as they desired.  In some places it coincided with the administrative boundaries of the republic, in other places not.  Peacekeeping posts were also permitted on the territory of Georgia according to this agreement.

• It so happened that several posts from the Georgian side appeared on the territory of the  compact areas of residence of Georgians in South Ossetia.  Tbilisi provided additional financing and development to these enclaves.  And they distanced themselves actually on the social plane from the Ossetians.

• Precisely that configuration of the zone of responsibility of the peacekeepers—somewhat different from the administrative boundaries—is generating certain problems today.  We established a post in the Mosabruni population center.  But Georgia had already tried to send its police forces there, after all the military actions and declaration of South Ossetia’s independences.  Our paratroopers had to drive the Georgian police from this peacekeeping post.  And this is not the only disputed territory.  The West is attempting to speculate on these “points.”

• At the same time, Russia is fulfilling the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan in a manner that is above reproach.  In the first stage, we were supposed to withdraw our units to the boundaries of the zone of responsibility of the peacekeeping contingent.  This was done.  In the second phase, we were to withdraw the troops that had been sent to reinforce the “blue helmets.”  Remember that the 58th Army entered South Ossetia by order of the Supreme Command.  This occurred after there had already been the first injuries among the peacekeepers and it had become clear that this was a large-scale aggression and the insignificant task force of our “blue helmets”—588 personnel without heavy equipment—had to be saved.

• RG:  And what kind of equipment are our peacekeepers in South Ossetia permitted?

• Nogovitsyn:  Armored personnel carriers, trucks, other vehicles necessary to patrol and fulfill the various tasks at stationary posts and control points.

• We have nevertheless withdrawn our troops from the region?

• When the president of Russia gave the order to end the operation to force Georgia to peace, our troops were already withdrawing to the boundary of the zone of responsibility of the peacekeepers and were on the outskirts of Gori.  We did not enter the town itself.  But in several directions, in particular the direction Gori-Tbilisi, Georgian troops appeared right behind our units.  And there the Western media started to disseminate outright lies.  For example, it was reported that a group of Russian armored vehicles, as many as 50 tanks, were marching on Tbilisi.

• In reality, Georgian tanks are the same type as Russian tanks.  They are T-72s, which are distinguished from ours only by their markings.  At the approach of our troops they turned around and moved toward Tbilisi.  Thus were provoked rumors that Russian armored vehicles were moving on the Georgian capital.

• Now the units of the 58th Army have left the territory of South Ossetia—precisely at the time designated by the president.  Now only our peacekeepers remain there.[1]

• Russian special services have reported on 4 September that international terrorists are trying to get into South Ossetia and Abkhazia to commit terrorist acts. Though he had previously named Al Qaeda, FSB director Alexander Bortnikov is refusing to specify which international terrorists, but cautions that they will go after infrastructure. The FSB claims to have recently broken up the “bulgarii jamaat”in Bashkirstan. The FSB also claims to have stopped potential attacks by an Al Qaeda affiliated group against the northern Caucasus, including in Karbardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, and Stavropol. In an fight against insurgents in Dagestan, a passer-by was killed.[2]  Foreign Minister Lavrov confirmed and expanded on these statements on 6 September.[3]

• 5 September:  OSCE military observers have returned to Georgia and had the opportunity to patrol the road leading from Tskhinvali to the Georgia village of Karaleti. The OSCE declared access to this zone a priority and reiterated an earlier announcement to send 100 observers to this zone soon. Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister announced that Georgia not only welcomes international observes, but demands their presence and that all such forces, including from the EU and the OSCE, have access to the entirety of disputed zones. The Russian Foreign Ministry announced that in addition to the OSCE observers, Russia offers to include in the security zone around South Ossetia an international police force with the possibility of support from the EU. This idea of a civil police force, suggested to the OSCE on September 4th, “goes in the direction of the realization of the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan in the aspect of the creation of international mechanisms barring the repetition of Georgian aggression and maintaining the solid security of South Ossetia.” ("идет в русле реализации плана Медведева-Саркози в части создания международных механизмов по недопущению повторения агрессии Грузии и обеспечению прочной безопасности Южной Осетии".) Russia continues to differ with the EU on where the international police forces should be active, with Russia maintaining they should be in the security zones around South Ossetia and Abkhazia, while the EU thinks they should be on the territory of those two regions (which the EU regards as part of Georgia) as well. Lavrov declared that a question for Tskhinvali and Sukhumi, and pointed out that the legitimate version of the peace plan, signed by Medvedev and Sarkozy, allows an international discussion about the security and stability of the two regions, not in the regions. The South Ossetia Foreign Minister, Murat Dzhioev, has declared that they will only allow Russian peacekeepers and no international forces, as they do not trust them.[4]

• On 9 September, Medvedev met with Defense Minister Anatolii Serdiukov, and told him that the 8 September meeting with Sarkozy had produced some additions to the 12 August agreement, in particular, the withdrawal of Russian forces from the security zone and the deployment of international observers from the OSCE and the EU there.  Medvedev said that Russian military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia was in the capacity of peace support operations, and that he expected to establish diplomatic relations with the republics very soon.  Serdiukov in turn reported that he had negotiated with the governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to maintain 3,800 Russian troops in each republic, to be deployed in the Ossetian towns of Java and Tskinvali and in the current locations of Russian forces in Abkhazia.[5]

 
On 9 September, the Russians made a number of announcements about the August conflict with Georgia:

• Georgian forces outnumbered Russian peacekeepers, according to the Russians, by 14 to 1 (i.e. 7,000 Georgian troops against 500 Russians).[6]

• Georgian headquarters for the operation was at Gori, where the radar and anti-aircraft Bug-M1 system that destroyed four Russian aircraft was based.[7]

• The General Staff does not have information about the continuation of Israeli assistance to Georgia, but it reminded listeners that Israel had helped Georgia in the past.[8]

• “In providing assistance to Georgia, the US has established the precedent of participating in armed conflict on its side.”  The word is simply “assistance” and there is no implication of military assistance.[9]

 

• On September 10, Lavrov declared that the mandates for OSCE and UN observers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia should be coordinated with the authorities of those republics. The OSCE and UN presence in the republics will be as it was up to August 7th. They will be joined by at least 200 EU and OSCE observers. Meanwhile, Abkhaz president Sergei Bagapsh announced that the employees of the “UN Mission in Georgia” in  Abkhazia should either change the organization’s name or leave Abkhazia. He has asked this to be brought up with the UN. However, Bagapsh stressed that the Abkhaz government has normal relations with the UN mission, which has 165 employees. He also announced that Abkhazia will coordinate its foreign policy with Russia. He re-affirmed Abkhazia’s desire for Russian troops to be stationed in Abkhazia, especially in the Kodori Gorge, and Lavrov clarified that the 7600 troops to be stationed in the republics (3800 in each) will not be “peacemakers” (Никакого отношения к миротворчеству они не имеют), but rather active divisions of the RF armed forces. He announced that the Russian posts along the Senaki-Poti line will be drawn back within 7 days from Sept. 8th because of the guarantee of no force that the Sarkozy convinced Saakashvili to sign. Russian troops in the security zones will only be pulled back after international observers come in. It should take them 10 days and they will do it by the Oct. 10th deadline they agreed to. However, Lavrov said that the agreement signed on Sept. 8th in Tbilisi, to which Sarkozy and Barroso were party, that declares EU observers will also be on South Ossetian and Abkhazian territory is invalid. “First, it is a lie. Second, it is an absolutely unfair attempt to not honestly explain to Mr. Saakashvili what obligations the European Union has taken on itself and what obligations Russia has taken on itself, and be under the thumb of Mr. Saakashvili” (Во-первых, это неправда. Во-вторых, это абсолютно недобросовестная попытка не объяснять по-честному господину Саакашвили, какие обязательства взял на себя Евросоюз и какие обязательства взяла на себя Россия, а идти на поводу у господина Саакашвили).  Russia will not recognize that agreement.[10]

• On 2 September, Pravda reported that the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has resulted in a renewed interest in autonomy and independence by several nationalities in Georgia, all of whom have suffered repression under the current government in Tbilisi. The main strongholds are in the following regions: Adjara, Javakheti, Mingrelia, Svanetia and the “Azerbaijani” Marmeul’ski region. There are calls for the return of Aslan Abashidze in Adjara because Tbilisi has not dealt honestly with the issues of Adjara’s autonomy. There are laws on the book, but they allow the Georgian president to revoke it easily, and Adjara citizens don’t trust the Georgian government. Mingrelia’s situation is analogous to Adjara’s; Georgia special forces “fix” suspicious activity. The Mingrelian intelligentsia is preparing to demand an easing of Tbilisi’s pressures. Ossetia is also not yet resolved; Eduard Kokoity recently declared that they intend to “restore not only the territorial integrity of South Ossetia, but even further. We have very serious questions about the land that earlier belonged to Ossetia. I intend to return them.” (Мы не только восстановим территориальную целостность Южной Осетии, но и пойдем дальше. У нас очень серьезные вопросы по тем землям, которые раньше принадлежали Осетии. Я намерен их вернуть.)  In mountain Svanetia, on the border with Abkhazia, there are also insurgents who fought off the Georgian mass cleaning (массовые зачистки) last year and though the insurgency was officially put down, it is not over. In southeastern Georgia, the Azeris and Armenians would also like to escape the oppression of Tbilisi. Armenia is prepared to support its diaspora in Georgia because Georgia has recently harmed its economy by making transport of Russian gas harder. Georgia companies are stealing land from Armenian and Azerbaijani peasants in Georgia, while all political positions go to ethnic Georgians and Azeri and Armenian youth are kept from high schools. If the Armenians and Azeris within Georgia would join together to fight against Tbilisi’s oppression, they would succeed.  Tbilisi’s problems are so bad that “today no one may give the guarantee that Georgia will not collapse tomorrow. At least, [only] with outside help it might become a reality. And for this Georgians should be grateful solely to Mikheil Saakashvili and the Americans who trained him on the Caucasian people.” (И сегодня никто не может дать гарантии, что завтра Грузия не развалится. По крайней мере, при помощи извне это может стать реальностью. И этим грузины должны быть благодарны исключительно Михаилу Саакашвили и натаскивавшим его на кавказские народы американцам.)[11]

• On 13 September, Russian forces announced that they were starting to withdraw from positions in the security zone outside of Abkhazia, with Georgian media stating that they had left Poti and were pulling out of the Khobi and Senaki areas of Western Georgia.[12]

• On 13 September, Georgian Minister of Internal Affairs announced that Georgian police along the Abkhazian and Ossetian borders would be replaced by Georgian special forces troops after the killing of two policemen on patrol (including one the Georgians say was killed in Zugdidi by Abkhazians, which the Abkhaz deny).

• Medvedev said on September 6 that South Ossetia and Abkhazia are examples of democracy and civil order.[13]

• South Ossetian President Kokoiti said on 11 September, “Yes, clearly, we will become part of Russia and we do not want to make some sort of independent Ossetia because historically it was very difficult when our predecessors made such a choice.”[14]  Later he said, “I was obviously misunderstood.  We do not want to abandon our independence, which we have gained at the price of colossal suffering, and South Ossetia will not become part of Russia.  Yes, many in South Ossetia talk about unifying with North Ossetia within the Russian Federation, and no one can forbid the expression of such thoughts.  But South Ossetia does not intend to become part of Russia and aims to develop civilized interstate relations within the framework of international law with all states.”[15]  He added, “We plan to establish closer relations with Russia as a way of bringing South Ossetia into the Russo-Belarussian alliance.”[16]  Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov later emphasized that South Ossetia did not intend to become part of Russia.[17]

• On 1 September Saakashvili asked the US to impose sanctions on investors in Abkhazia.[18]

• On 1 September, Georgia formally requested the CIS to withdraw its peacekeeping forces from Abkhazia on the grounds that “Russia, by its actions against Georgia, has destroyed the previously existing peacekeeping arrangement foreseen in the agreement” between Georgia, Russia, and Abkhazia.[19]

• Medvedev said that Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia would not lead to separatist problems in Russia, specifically in Daghestan and Ingushetia, unless foreign forces involve themselves in those areas.[20]

• Retired Russian General Boris Gromov, now Governor of the Moscow Region, said that even the provision of advanced American weapons to Georgia would not increase Georgia’s fighting abilities, because “The armed forces of Georgia have never been able to fight well.”  Gromov was the last commander of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan who oversaw their withdrawal in 1989.[21]

• Russian MoFA spokesman said on 8 September that America’s refusal to recognize the security zone around South Ossetia, and also to place an embargo on the provision of weapons to Tbilisi, was “unconstructive.”  “If Georgia is rearmed without limits then we can foresee the consequences  such activities might have in the explosive Caucasus region, particularly in light of recent experience.”[22]

• Lavrov said on 9 September that the EU had taken responsibility for ensuring that Georgia does not use force with regard to Ossetia and Abkhazia.[23]

• Russia established diplomatic relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia on 9 September.[24]  Russia also agreed on texts of treaties of friendship with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[25]  These treaties permit the establishment of Russian military bases in the two republics.[26]

• On 10 September, Abkhazia announced that “Georgian partisans” had made an attempt on the life of a regional Abkhazian commander.[27]  Abkhazia is also bringing to trial a resident of Sukhumi accused of spying for Tbilisi.[28]

• President Bagapsh of Abkhazia said on 11 September that there was no question of Abkhazia applying for associate status in the Russian Federation:  “The question is about the independent republic of Abkhazia.”[29]  He did, however, say that Abkhazia would apply to join the Russo-Belarussian Union, and possibly also the CIS and the OSCE.[30]

Russian Military Developments
 

• Smolensk Railroad troops conducted a mobilization exercise on 2 September.[31]  Railroad troops also exercised in the Ural district.[32]

• 2,000 Russian and Kazakh troops exercised together in Chelyabinsk (Russia) as part of the Center-2008 exercises.  The exercises included 70 T-72 tanks, 30 armored fighting vehicles, Grad rocket launchers, Nona and Gvozdik self-propoelled artillery, anti-aircraft and engineer troops.  Units involved included the tank regiment (239th guards tank regiment) of 34th Motorized Rifle Division and the 4th Mechanized Brigade of Kazakhstan.[33]  Exercises involved expending a full combat load of ammunition and a jump by a company of the 31st Separate Air Assault Brigade (Ul’yanovsk air assault company) out of two Il-76 aircraft.[34]  Elements of the ballistic missile regiment of the Ural district participated in the Center 2008 exercises as well, conducting anti-aircraft exercises.[35]  The exercises also involve tactical training for the 15th Peacekeeping Brigade and exercises at the army, division, and regimental levels.[36]  The exercise includes air maneuvers with Il-76MD transports, Su-24 ground-attack aircraft, Mi-24 assault helicopters and Mi-8 transport helicopters, modernized Su-27 and MiG-31 fighters—60 aircraft in all[37].  The exercises also involved force-on-force maneuvers, pitting an aggressor force trying to seize an “energy-rich” area 60 km deep against a defender.[38]  Su-24 and Su-27 aircraft conducted ground-attacks guided by forward air controllers deployed with the ground forces with accuracy of 10-15 meters.[39]

• The Strategic Rocket Forces planned a command-and-control exercise for 2-5 September to “work out questions of controlling the conduct of military operations using conventional means of destruction and nuclear weapons.”[40]

• Marines of the Black Sea Fleet began a two-week exercise on 3 September, particularly the “black berets” of the Air Assault Battalion commanded by LTC Vladimir Karpushenko.  A life-like artificial village was built to facilitate the exercise.[41]

• The Pacific Ocean Fleet and Far Eastern military districts have also been conducting complex sea-air-land maneuvers, including the live-fire of anti-ship cruise missiles.[42]

• The 15th Separate Motor Rifle (Peacekeeping) Brigade conducted a tactical exercise on 12 September, incorporating the lessons of Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia.  The exercise involved the brigade, Army aviation including Su-24 aircraft and Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters, and units of the internal forces.  Lieutenant General Valerii Evnevich, Deputy Commander of the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation, said, “I want to emphasize that in accord with the planned training of the Ground Forces this exercise was planned last year.  However, obviously, the concept of the exercise takes into account the experience of the use of peacekeeping forces fulfilling tasks in South Ossetia involved in forcing Georgia to peace….You yourselves saw, he said, turning to the journalists, that in the final phase of the exercise attack and army aviation conducted missions together with the peacekeeping troops, as well as artillery.  The organization of effective combined arms operations permits a qualitatively new level of performing peacekeeping tasks.”[43]

• Russian troops killed a Chechen insurgent on 12 September.[44]

• A September poll shows that only 7.8% of Lithuanians believe that their government can protect them against cyber-attacks.[45]

 
NATO—Russia Activities
 

• On 5 September, Bundeswehr Inspector General Wolfgang Schneiderhan and German Ambassador to Russia Walter Schmidt attended an opening of a German military ceremony in Krasnodar region (between Georgia and the Crimea).[46]  Belgian Frigate Louisa-Maria made a port call in St. Petersburg, and her captain exchanged formal visits with the commander of the Leningrad naval base.[47]

• Russian and Norwegian naval forces conducted an already-planned exercise, “Barents-2008” aimed at practicing techniques for sea rescues.[48]

• Moscow significantly reduced oil supplies to the Czech Republic in July.[49]

• NATO General Secretary said on 11 September that Russia’s unilateral recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was unacceptable.[50]

Russian Bilateral Military Activities

Syria
 

• On September 9, the Russian Military announced that an auxiliary vessel had returned from the Syrian port of Tartus where its crew had been working on the repair of floating docks and supply points, that had been unused for a long time.[51]  On 29 August, the Russian embassy in Damascus had said that there were no plans afoot to increase Russia’s naval presence in the Mediterranean.[52]

Venezuela
 

• On August 15, Russian military firms said that the contract for providing Su-30MK2 multi-role fighters to Venezuela would be fulfilled, but was not yet concluded.[53]  On 7 September, the BBC revealed that Venezuela and Russia plan to hold joint naval exercises from 10-14 November, involving four Russian ships.[54]  The Russian Foreign Ministry confirmed this announcement on 8 September, noting that the Russian vessels would include the nuclear-powered heavy guided-missile cruiser Petr Velikii, and the large anti-submarine vessel Admiral Chabenenko.  The Russian MoFA added that Russian anti-submarine aircraft would be temporarily stationed in Venezuela.[55] The Russian Ministry of Defense announced on 10 September that two Russian Tu-160 strategic bombers had landed in Venezuela.  The aircraft belong to the Guards Donbass Red Banner Heavy Bomber Aviation Group (Engels garrison).[56]  The Russian Air Force announced that the bombers would return to Russia on 15 September after completing a number of missions over neutral waters in the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean.[57]  The exercise showed, according to the commander of Russia’s Long-range Aviation, that Russia is “able to fly in any region of the world.”[58] Chavez expelled the U.S. Ambassador, nominally in sympathy with Bolivia which had already done so, on 12 September.[59]

Iran
 
Controversy over S-300 anti-missile and anti-aircraft system sale

• Fars News Agency announced that Russia and Iran had agreed on the sale of S-300 systems to Iran on 26 December 2007.[60]

• On 28 December 2007, Russia denied the deal.[61]

In July 2008, Israel asserted that the Iranians would start receiving parts of the S-300 system before the end of the year.[62]  The editor of Janes Air-Launched Weapons said that the deal would be completed through Belarus to provide the Russians deniability.  “Belarus is the proxy route whenever Russia wants to deny it is doing the sale,” he said.

• On 1 September 2008, Iran denied that it was purchasing the system from Russia.[63]  In response, the director of Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies in Moscow said that Russia was likely to move forward with the sale.[64]

• On 9 September, the Jerusalem Post reported that Croatia had already sold Iran several S-300 complexes left over from the collapse of Yugoslavia, and that Israeli satellite imagery analysts had detected modifications in anti-aircraft emplacements around Natanz (at least 26 batteries by September 2006, according to this source).  The Israeli military declined to confirm or deny the report.[65]

• The S-300 was first fielded in 1979 and has been modified several times.  According to Russian sources, it can target two rockets each against 24 targets simultaneously using one launch system, or four rockets each using two.  It can shoot down both aircraft and ballistic missiles, and has a range of 150 km.  Israeli sources say that it can track 100 targets simultaneously and engage 12 at a time with a range of 200 km and a maximum altitude of 27,000 meters. [66]

Diplomatic Developments Among Russia’s Allies

•  Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s Foreign Minister, said there is no parallel between Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on the one hand, and Nagorno-Karabakh (the enclave under dispute by Armenia and Azerbaijan), on the other. Whereas in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Mikhail Saakashvili undermined negotiations and settlements worked out in the 1990s, the presidents of both Armenia and Azerbaijan continue to work within the frameworks set up by the Minsk group, OSCE, CSTO and CIS. Meanwhile, Armenia has said it cannot recognize Abkhazia or South Ossetia for the same reason it has not recognized Kosovo: Nagorno-Karabakh is still not recognized. Azerbaijan has reiterated its commitment to working with Armenia and the Minsk group to resolve the Nargorno-Karabakh issue. The self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh has interpreted Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a positive sign and a step forward toward their own recognition.  “There are not any kind of parallels between the situation around South Ossetia and Abkhazia, on the one hand, and the Nagorno-Karabakh Settlement, on the other”.- Sergei Lavrov (Нет никаких параллелей между ситуацией вокруг Южной Осетии и Абхазии, с одной стороны, и нагорно-карабахским урегулированием, с другой).[67]

• The heads of state in the CSTO have agreed Friday on a declaration that expresses concern at Georgia’s use of force to attempt to resolve its conflict with South Ossetia. “The member states of the CSTO are deeply concerned by Georgia undertaking an attempt to use force to resolve the conflict in South Ossetia, which has led to numerous victims amongst the peaceful population and peacekeepers” ("Государства - члены ОДКБ глубоко озабочены предпринятой Грузией попыткой силового решения конфликта в Южной Осетии, которая привела к многочисленным жертвам среди мирного населения и миротворцев"). Medvedev again accused Georgia of causing serious humanitarian consequences. The CSTO also expressed concern about the potential for escalation and intensification of conflict in the Caucasus and asked all states to objectively assess the situation, without double standards (без двойных стандартов), and prevent further problems. This is was a compromise declaration after three separate texts were offered by Russia, Kazakhstan and Armenia. In the Kazakh and Armenian variants, Georgia was not directly mentioned, while the Russian variant was the strictest. This was noticeable when Medvedev declared the consolidated position a the summit’s main output and claimed that CSTO made a unequivocally negative judgment of Georgia’s aggression against South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The member states also approved the Medvedev-Sarkozy pact and called for strict performance with the view of preventing new attempts of force in the resolution of the conflict. (призывают стороны к их неукоснительному выполнению (принципов) в целях недопущения новых попыток силового решения конфликтов, обеспечение стабильности в данном регионе). The member states supported Russia’s role in the security of South Ossetia and encouraged a greater involvement of the OSCE and a strengthening of the role of the UN.[68]

• Belarus has released the last of its political prisoners, and the US responded by lifting some (but by no means all) sanctions on Belarus.[69]

• Medvedev has invited Azerbaijani President Aliev to visit Moscow on 16 September, which he will do.[70]

• Hugo Chavez supported Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on 1 September.  “We support Russia.  Russia is defending her interests and acting properly.”[71]

• Armenian president met with Medvedev in Sochi early in September.  Medvedev was to explain the situation in Georgia to him and discuss efforts to expand ties between Russia and Armenia, particularly in the energy sector.  Sources said before the meeting there would be “intensive work on the preparation of an intermediate agreement about the supply of Russian gas to Armenia in 2009-2011.”[72]

• Nicaragua recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia on 3 September.[73]

• Lukashenko said on 8 September that the Belarussian parliament might take up the question of recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the elections coming up at the end of September.[74]  He also said that the “events in the Caucasus confirmed the correctness of his position with regard to preserving Belarus’s sovereignty from the standpoint of its alliance relations with Russia.  ‘In the context of the events in the Caucasus it is apparent why Belarus could not have become part of Russia…[If it had], Russia would have lost an ally and a subject of international law [by which he presumably means a sovereign state supporting Russia in international law]…The events in the Caucasus have emphasized this and many politicians quietly are saying that I was right.’”[75]

• The new Cuban ambassador to Moscow asked for Russian investment of $2 billion in Cuba’s economy.  He declined to say if Cuba would recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but did say, “We supported Russia against injustices in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  We kept solidarity with you,” while asking for Russian support for Cubans held in American prisons.[76]

Developments in the Black Sea and Ukraine
 

• The USS Mount Whitney has arrived in Poti on 5 September with 17 tons of humanitarian aid, according to US officials. It’s arrival will be celebrated after the ship is unloaded (from the “spot check”, because it is too big for the port). The ship, which holds the staff of the 6th Fleet, will then coordinate the activities of NATO in the Black Sea. Russian officials question whether the USS Mount Whitney meets the Convention of 1936, which regulates the maximum tonnage of ships entering the Black Sea. They also doubt the humanitarian aspect of the ship’s arrival and pointed out that it is the fourth US ship to arrive in the past few weeks. In addition, there is a US ship in Sevastopol for a joint project with Ukraine and 3 other NATO ships, from Spain, Poland and Germany.[77]

• On 13 September, representative of President Viktor Yushchenko says that he was excluded from a meeting of the Ukrainian Cabinet (part of the rising tensions between Yushchenko and Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko).  Issues in dispute include Yushchenko’s desire to pay off Ukraine’s $1 billion debt to Russia and to increase funding for the Ukrainian military dramatically; the Cabinet’s budget, according to Yushchenko’s representative, does not address the issue of debt to Russia and proposes a defense spending increase only 1/5 of what Yushchenko wants for the “re-equipping of the army and its transition to voluntary service [as opposed to conscription].”[78]  Part of the issue on the Russian debt relates to Yushchenko’s desire to increase Russian payments for their Black Sea Fleet basing to “market rates.”[79]

• On 13 September Interfax reported that a Deputy of the Russian Duma, the Ataman of the Union of Cossack Troops of Russia and Abroad, was prevented from entering Ukraine by the Ukrainian MVD.[80]

• On 2 September, Ukrainian deputy foreign minister spoke out against imposing sanctions on Russia.[81]

• Abkhazian President Sergei Bagapsh said on 2 September that Abkhazia would not become the base for the Russian Black Sea Fleet:  “As you well know, the Russian Black Sea Fleet is based in Sevastopol.  We will have [Russian] land forces here.”[82]

• On 5 September, Yushchenko said that the basing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on Ukrainian territory was a threat to Ukrainian national security, and that Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was unacceptable.[83]

• Putin said on 11 September that discussions about joining Crimea and Russia were provocations.  “We agreed on the borders after the collapse of the USSR long ago, and we recognize these borders,” he said, noting that there was no comparing the situation in Crimea with the situation between Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[84]

 

 

 

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[1] Генштаб ВС РФ уполномочен заявить, 4 September 2008, www.mil.ru.

[2] http://interfax.ru/politics/txt.asp?id=30849, Террористы рвутся в Россию, Sept. 4, 2008, “Terrorists are straining to get into Russia.”

[3] Лавров заявляет о важности поддержки со стороны народов Северного Кавказа решений РФ по Абхазии и Южной Осетии, 6 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[4] http://interfax.ru/politics/txt.asp?id=31030, Военные наблюдатели ОБСЕ вернулись в Грузию
September 5, 2008,  “Military observers from the OSCE return to Georgia.”

[5] Президент Российской Федерации Дмитрий Медведев провёл рабочую встречу с Министром обороны Анатолием Сердюковым, 9 September 2008, www.mil.ru.

[6] Перед вторжением в Южную Осетию грузинская группировка в 14 раз превосходила силы российских миротворцев, 9 September 2008, www.mil.ru.

[7] Центр управления грузинской военной акцией в Южной Осетии находился в Гори, 9 September 2008, www.mil.ru.

[8] У Генерального штаба ВС РФ нет информации о возобновлении военно-технического сотрудничества Грузии и Израиля, 9 September 2008, www.mil.ru.

[9] США, оказав помощь Грузии, создали прецедент соучастия в вооруженном конфликте на ее стороне, 9 September 2008, www.mil.ru.

[10] “The OSCE and UN have to make arrangements,” ОБСЕ и ООН придется договариваться, Sept. 10, 2008
http://interfax.ru/politics/txt.asp?id=31933.

[11] “Several states may emerge in Georgia,” http://pravda.ru/world/former-ussr/georgia/281575-4/. Pravda, 2 September 2008.

[12] Вывод войск, 13 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[13] Южная Осетия и Абхазия должны стать примером национального согласия и демократии – президент РФ, 6 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[14] Южная Осетия намерена стать частью России, 11 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[15] Южная Осетия не собирается входить в состав России, 11 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[16] Южная Осетия планирует войти в союз Белоруссии и России, 11 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[17] Лавров подтвердил, что Южная Осетия не намерена входить в состав России, 11 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[18] Саакашвили просит США ввести санкции для инвесторов, работающих в Абхазии, 1 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[19] Грузия требует вывода миротворческих сил СНГ из Абхазии, 2 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[20] Без поддержки из-за рубежа сепаратизм не опасен для России, заявляет Медведев, 2 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[21] Никакое оружие не сможет повысить боеспособность армии Грузии, считает Громов, 6 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[22] Москва предупреждает об опасности отказа Вашингтона ввести эмбарго на поставки вооружений Грузии, 8 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[23] Лавров: ЕС гарантирует неприменение Грузией силы, 9 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[24] Москва обменялась с Абхазией и Южной Осетией нотами об установлении дипотношений, 9 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[25] МИД России подписал договоры о дружбе с абхазскими и югоосетинскими коллегами, 9 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[26] Договоры о дружбе с Абхазией и РЮО допускают создание в республиках российских военных баз, 9 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[27] В Абхазии совершено покушение на сотрудника военкомата, в нем подозревают грузинских диверсантов, 10 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[28] В Абхазии возбуждено уголовное дело в отношении жительницы Сухуми,шпионившей в пользу Тбилиси, 11 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[29] Сухуми не рассматривает вариант ассоциированного членства в РФ, 11 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[30] Абхазия подаст заявку на присоединение к Союзу Белоруссии и России, 11 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[31] Под руководством командира смоленского соединения Железнодорожных войск генерал-лейтенанта Геннадия Погуляева, прошло командно-штабное мобилизационное учение, 2 September 2008, www.mil.ru.

[32] Совместные учения военных железнодорожников Урала и ОАО "РЖД" по Уральскому Федеральному округу, 2 September 2008, www.mil.ru.

[33] В тренировке на полигоне в Челябинской области были задействованы десятки танков, бронемашин и почти 2 тыс. военнослужащих России и Казахстана, 2 September 2008, www.mil.ru.

[34] Совместная тренировка подразделений вооруженных сил России и Казахстана, 2 September 2008, www.mil.ru.  Части и подразделения Вооруженных сил России и Казахстана готовы к проведению основного этапа учений "Центр-2008", 3 September 2008.

[35] Зенитно-ракетный полк Уральского соединения ПУрВО занимается боевой подготовкой на полевом выходе, 3 September 2008, www.mil.ru.

[36] В ходе оперативно-стратегических учений "Центр-2008", которые начались 1 сентября, будут проведены оперативные учения со второй армией, три дивизионных и пять полковых тактических учений с боевой стрельбой, а также тактические учения с 15-й миротворческой бригадой, 3 September 2008, www.mil.ru.

[37] ВВС проведут КШУ в рамках учения "Центр-2008", 3 September 2008, www.mil.ru.

[38] Боевые стрельбы под Челябинском, 4 September 2008, www.mil.ru.

[39] Самолеты Военно-воздушных сил успешно выполнили задачи, 4 September 2008, www.mil.ru.

[40] В РВСН началась командно-штабная тренировка, 2 September 2008, www.mil.ru.

[41] В части морской пехоты Черноморского флота начался очередной полевой выход, 3 September 2008, www.mil.ru.

[42] Береговые комплексы поразили цель первой же ракетой на максимальной дальности, 5 September 2008, www.mil.ru (and numerous other articles not directly referenced here).

[43] На полигоне Сафакулево (Курганская область) прошла активная фаза бригадного тактического учения с бое-вой стрельбой по специальной тематике (проведение миротворческой операции в зоне вооруженного кон-фликта) с 15 отдельной мотострелковой (миротворческой) бригадой, 12 September 2008, www.mil.ru.

[44] В Чечне ликвидирован боевик, проходит спецоперация, 13 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[45] Жители Литвы не вверят в способность государства защитить себя от кибератак, 13 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[46] В Краснодарском крае состоится церемония открытия сборного немецкого военного кладбища в городе, 5 September 2008, www.mil.ru.

[47] Бельгийские военные моряки посетят северную столицу России, 5 September 2008, www.mil.ru.

[48] Северный флот принял участие в совместном российско-норвежском учении по спасанию на море "Баренц-2008", 12 September 2008, www.mil.ru.

[49] MOSCOW FORCING CZECH REPUBLIC TO GUESS AS TO REASONS BEHIND OIL SUPPLY CUT, Vladimir Socor
Monday, July 28, 2008, Jamestown Foundation Report.

[50] Генсек НАТО считает неприемлемым признание Россией независимости Южной Осетии и Абхазии, 11 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[51] Судно Черноморского флота "КИЛ-158" выполнило работы по восстановлению плавпричалов в сирийском пункте материально-технического обеспечения Тартус, 9 September 2008, www.mil.ru.

[52] Россия в ближайшее время не будет увеличивать военно-морское присутствие в Средиземноморье, 29 August 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[53] Контракт на поставку в Венесуэлу истребителей Су-30МК2 находится в стадии выполнения, 15 August 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[54] Россия и Венесуэла проведут совместные морские военные учения, 7 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[55] Россия планирует временно разместить в Венесуэле свои противолодочные самолеты, 8 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[56] Два стратегических бомбардировщика ВВС России приземлились в Венесуэле -Минобороны РФ, 10 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[57] Российские стратегические бомбардировщики вернутся из Венесуэлы 15 сентября, 11 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[58] Авиация РФ доказала, что достанет врага в любой точке мира, 11 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[59] Чавес высылает из Венесуэлы американского посла, 12 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[60] Ирану достаются российские С-300, 26 December 2007, www.rosbalt.ru.

[61] Иран не получит российские С-300, 28 December 2007, www.rosbalt.ru.

[62] Обострение комплекса С-300, 24 July 2008, www.gazeta.ru.; also Iran to get new Russian air defences by '09 –Israel, 23 July 2008, www.reuters.com. 

[63] Иран не собирается покупать российские зенитные установки С-300, 1 September 2008, www.gezeta.ru.

[64] Russia May Push Forward With S-300 Sales To Iran, 4 September 2008, (http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Russia_May_Push_Forward_With_S_300_Sales_To_Iran_999.html); Поставки ЗРС Ирану зависят от принятия Грузии и Украины в НАТО – Пухов, 1 September 2008, rian.ru.

[65] Website: Croatia has sold S300 to Iran, www.jpost.com, 9 September 2008.

[66] Ирану достаются российские С-300, 26 December 2007, www.rosbalt.ru.  Website: Croatia has sold S300 to Iran, 9 September 2008, www.jpost.com.

[67] http://interfax.ru/politics/txt.asp?id=30855, Москва не меняет позицию по Карабаху
 “Moscow has not changed its position on Karabakh.”

[68] http://interfax.ru/politics/txt.asp?id=31196, Итоговая декларация, September 5, 2008,  “Concluding Declaration.”

[69] US lifts some Belarus sanctions, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7601181.stm, 5 September 2008.

[70] Президент Азербайджана по приглашению Медведева посетит 16 сентября Россию, 12 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[71] Уго Чавес поддерживает действия России в отношении Абхазии и Южной Осетии, и называет Саакашвили "марионеткой Вашингтона", 1 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[72] Президент Армении обсудит с Медведевым вопросы газового сотрудничества и ситуацию на Кавказе, 2 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[73] Никарагуа признает независимость Абхазии и Южной Осетии, 3 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[74] Белорусский парламент после выборов может обратиться к теме признания Абхазии и Южной Осетии, 8 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[75] Лукашенко видит в кавказских событиях подтверждение идеи суверенитета Белоруссии, 8 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.  The Russian is complex, periphrastic, and obscure.

[76] Посол Кубы в Москве: Россия и Куба должны укреплять политические отношения, наращивать объем инвестиций и товарооборот, 12 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[77] http://interfax.ru/politics/txt.asp?id=31154, Загадка натовских трюмов
September 5, 2008,  “The riddle of NATO’s hold (as in a ship).”

[78] В секретариате Ющенко заявляют, что представителя президента Украины не пустили на заседание правительства, 13 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[79] Украина собирается досрочно погасить долг перед Россией для пересмотра арендной платы ЧФ, 13 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[80] Депутата Госдумы РФ не пустили в Украину, 13 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[81] Украина выступает против введения санкций в отношении РФ, 2 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[82] Багапш заявляет, что Абхазия не станет местом базирования Черноморского флота РФ, 2 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[83] Ющенко считает, что базирование ЧФ в Крыму угрожает нацбезопасности Украины, 5 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

[84] Разговоры вокруг возможности присоединения Крыма к РФ являются провокацией, 11 September 2008, www.interfax.ru.

 

Update #18 (current as of 11:45 p.m., Saturday, September 13, 2008)

Frederick W. Kagan and Kara Flook

NB:  The new title reflects the broader focus of future updates, including the effects of the Georgia crisis on Russia’s relations with other members of the CIS and tensions in Eastern Europe.

 

Analysis

 

Georgia

• Russian troops have withdrawn to within the boundaries of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, abandoning Poti, Senaki, and Zugdidi.  Russia has agreed to (and in fact insists upon) the rapid deployment of international peacekeepers to Georgia (but not on the lands of South Ossetia and Abkhazia), and says that Sarkozy has committed the EU to ensuring that Georgia does not again use force in the region.

• Russian recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia stands, but Moscow has been disappointed by the refusal of any state other than Nicaragua to recognize the republics.  South Ossetian President Kokoiti said that he wanted South Ossetia to join Russia—but then immediately took it back.  Abkhazian President Bagapsh has said that Abkhazia does not wish to join Russia—but does intend to join the Russian-Belarussian union.

• Russia has announced that it will station 3,800 soldiers each in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and has stated that they will be regular forces of the Russian Federation and not peacekeepers.  Abkhazia has denied that the Black Sea Fleet will transfer its home port from Sevastopol to Sukhumi.

• Both Russian and Abkhazian leaders have asserted that Georgian “partisans” and/or terrorists have conducted attacks or are planning to conduct attacks in Russia and Abkhazia.  South Ossetian President Kokoiti has said that he intends to lay claim to additional lands beyond the current South Ossetian border in Georgia.  Russian President Dmitrii Medvedev has said that Russia will not face any separatist problems in Ingushetia, Daghestan, or elsewhere unless foreign forces intervene in Russia’s internal affairs.  But Pravda reports that separatists within Georgia are about to blow the country apart.

• The Russians believe that they have tricked the EU into guaranteeing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  With 7,600 Russian troops in the republics and EU observers on the Georgian side, there is absolutely nothing that Tbilisi could do to reclaim the territories, and Moscow may claim that the EU has de facto accepted the republics’ independence by deploying forces to monitor the new “international” borders.  This may become the faute de mieux position if Nicaragua remains the only state other than Russia to recognize the republics.

• “Provocations” will be a weekly occurrence in the region for as long as the Russians choose—and possibly longer.  It is not at all clear that Moscow can control Sukhumi or Tskhinvali completely, or that Bagapsh and Kokoiti can control all of their people—incidents are likely even if all leaders attempt to behave responsibly, which is unlikely.  When “provocations” occur after the deployment of EU and OSCE observers, what will Moscow do or demand?  The game remains very much on.

• Moscow is now probably relying on internal Georgian problems, exacerbated by the pressure Russia continues to exert, to bring Saakashvili down.  What happens then?  It is not immediately apparent that the Russians have a coherent plan and, if so, what it is, for a post-Saakashvili Georgia.

• Like it or not, Europe now owns this conflict, and the conflict will in all probability continue.  European forces will be sufficient to involve the credibility and honor of the EU but probably insufficient to prevent the Russians from claiming that Georgia is violating the agreement.  Europe and the US must start now considering their options if the conflict escalates after the deployment of international monitors.

Russian Military Developments

• Russia is conducting very large scale military exercises across the breadth of the Russian Federation.  It is conducting two army-level exercises simultaneously—one in the Privolga-Ural region and the other in the Far East region.  Both exercises emphasize long road-marches and air movements to the training areas and highlight efforts to improve the deployability of Russian military formations.  Russian railroad troops, also key to the movement of almost all of Russia’s ground formations, have also been rehearsing outside of these two army-level exercises.  Exercises involve combined-arms training incorporating ground-attack fixed-wing aviation and anti-aircraft systems, and culminate in force-on-force battalion combats.  The 15th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (Peacekeeping), elements of which fought in South Ossetia, has been involved in the training, which is said to incorporate lessons from that fight.  Considering that the North Caucasus Military District completed a large-scale exercise in July (including rehearsals for the operations in Georgia), Russia has conducted three large-scale maneuvers, including air-ground coordination, live fire exercises, and force-on-force exercises, as well as pre-exercise deployments, in the last three months.  These exercises have involved upwards of 20,000 Russian troops of all services (conservative estimate), including the Strategic Rocket Forces.

• The exercises appear to emphasize not only deployment, but mobilization—in each major exercise and many minor exercises, Russian commanders emphasize that mobilized reservists (i.e., not volunteers) were involved.  The scale and scope of the exercises means that they were very likely preplanned before the Georgia conflict, although it is quite possible that they were adjusted after the outbreak of hostilities.

• This is a very intensive (and expensive) training program, involving the expenditure of a lot of ammunition, the burning of a lot of fuel, and putting a lot of miles on equipment.  I have not yet checked to see how it compares to previous years, but a military that maintains this kind of effort can improve dramatically in a few years’ time, particularly in hard-to-detect or quantify areas such as command-and-control, combined arms coordination, air-ground coordination, the ability to plan and conduct decentralized operations (which is clearly a priority in these exercises), and other niche capabilities.  These exercises track with the notion that Russia intends to develop a very skilled and precise but relatively small professional military that can be rapidly mobilized and deployed from one end of the federation to the other, but probably not very far beyond the federation’s borders.

Russia-NATO Relations

• NATO leaders are talking a good game, but not all NATO countries are playing it:  Belgium, Norway, and Germany have all continued military-to-military connections with Russia at low levels.  In each cases, the connection was unnecessary—a Belgian frigate visited St. Petersburg; a senior Bundeswehr officer attended the opening of a war cemetery in Krasnodar; Norwegian ships exercised together with Russian ships.  In each case, the Russian military made much of it.  If NATO is serious about sending a message, these sorts of apparent trivialities send needlessly mixed messages to Moscow.

Russian Bilateral Military Developments

• The last month has seen the deepening of Russian military relations with Venezuela, Syria, and Iran.  The relationship with Venezuela is the most obvious, with the announcement of planned naval exercises in November, of the planned stationing of anti-submarine aircraft in Venezuela soon, and the flight of two Russian strategic bombers to Venezuela that has already occurred.  Those bombers conducted flights in international waters in the Atlantic and the Caribbean.  A Russian auxiliary ship sailed to the Syrian port of Tartus, worked on rebuilding decayed mooring and maintenance facilities, and returned to station in the Black Sea.  And reportage about the provision of advanced Russian air-defense systems to Iran becomes ever more complicated—some Israelis now assert that Iran already has the S-300 system.  Both Russia and Iran now deny that Iran will obtain the system from Russia, but a Russian military expert disagrees and says that the system will likely move from Russia via Belarus to Iran.

Diplomatic Developments Among Russia’s Allies

• Strains between Russia and Belarus appear to be increasing, with Lukashenko releasing his political prisoners in an apparent attempt to move closer to the West.  He also publicly praised his own wisdom in maintaining Belarus’s formal independence from Moscow and has delayed recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia until next month at the earliest.

• Moscow is clearly disappointed that none of the other CIS member states have recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and that even Venezuela has only supported the Russian decision without copying it.

• On the other hand, Russia is working hard to improve relations with Armenia and has made much of the large-scale joint military exercises it is now holding with Kazakhstan.

• Both China and Iran have remained relatively quiet about the Georgia crisis, which has also likely displeased Moscow.  Cuba, on the other hand, is ostentatiously moving closer to Moscow offering support and asking for money and help against America (but not yet for military assistance).

• It is not yet clear whether these strains will cause Putin/Medvedev to recalculate.

Developments in the Black Sea and Ukraine

• Tensions within the Ukrainian government are soaring and Moscow prefers to allow those internal dynamics to function now without adding more fuel to the fire.  Putin has downplayed the likelihood of a Russian move in the Crimea, and Russian media is focusing on the imminent collapse of the government in Kiiv more than the iniquities of the Ukrainians, as had been the previous focus.  Moscow continues to be very displeased with the intensified NATO presence in the Black Sea, but continues to see no regional response.  The deployment of strategic bombers to Venezuela and the overflight by those bombers of the Caribbean Basin was probably meant as an indirect response to the increase of NATO naval presence off Russia’s shores.

Developments in Georgia

On 4 September, Rossisskaya Gazeta interviewed General Staff spokesman Anatolii Nogovitsyn.  The portion of the transcript posted on the General Staff website is as follows:

• R[ossiisskaia Gazeta]:  Anatolii Alekseevich, please explain this strange contradiction.  The leadership of our country says that it has completed military operations in South Ossetia and the withdrawal of troops from the territory of this republic.  At the same time in the West they are loudly demanding that Russia withdrawal its forces from there.  What is the real situation?

• Novogitsyn:  The stumbling block lies in the different interpretations of administrative boundaries and security zones.  That is, we are talking about the conceptual framework.  As is known, North and South Ossetia are joined by the Roki Tunnel.  Military personnel built this unique lifeline.  After Georgia’s aggression elements of the 58th Army moved through it to Tskhinvali.

• When resolutions were agreed to in a quadrilateral format after the conflict of 1992 about the introduction into the region of peacekeeping forces, a basing agreement was conclucded.  This document was signed by representatives of Russia, South Ossetia, Georgia, and North Ossetia.

• Why is this complex?  We held that the same people live in South and North Ossetia, divided only by a border.  The peacekeeping contingent included representatives of North Ossetia.  For each side a zone of responsibility was designated more or less as they desired.  In some places it coincided with the administrative boundaries of the republic, in other places not.  Peacekeeping posts were also permitted on the territory of Georgia according to this agreement.

• It so happened that several posts from the Georgian side appeared on the territory of the  compact areas of residence of Georgians in South Ossetia.  Tbilisi provided additional financing and development to these enclaves.  And they distanced themselves actually on the social plane from the Ossetians.

• Precisely that configuration of the zone of responsibility of the peacekeepers—somewhat different from the administrative boundaries—is generating certain problems today.  We established a post in the Mosabruni population center.  But Georgia had already tried to send its police forces there, after all the military actions and declaration of South Ossetia’s independences.  Our paratroopers had to drive the Georgian police from this peacekeeping post.  And this is not the only disputed territory.  The West is attempting to speculate on these “points.”

• At the same time, Russia is fulfilling the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan in a manner that is above reproach.  In the first stage, we were supposed to withdraw our units to the boundaries of the zone of responsibility of the peacekeeping contingent.  This was done.  In the second phase, we were to withdraw the troops that had been sent to reinforce the “blue helmets.”  Remember that the 58th Army entered South Ossetia by order of the Supreme Command.  This occurred after there had already been the first injuries among the peacekeepers and it had become clear that this was a large-scale aggression and the insignificant task force of our “blue helmets”—588 personnel without heavy equipment—had to be saved.

• RG:  And what kind of equipment are our peacekeepers in South Ossetia permitted?

• Nogovitsyn:  Armored personnel carriers, trucks, other vehicles necessary to patrol and fulfill the various tasks at stationary posts and control points.

• We have nevertheless withdrawn our troops from the region?

• When the president of Russia gave the order to end the operation to force Georgia to peace, our troops were already withdrawing to the boundary of the zone of responsibility of the peacekeepers and were on the outskirts of Gori.  We did not enter the town itself.  But in several directions, in particular the direction Gori-Tbilisi, Georgian troops appeared right behind our units.  And there the Western media started to disseminate outright lies.  For example, it was reported that a group of Russian armored vehicles, as many as 50 tanks, were marching on Tbilisi.

• In reality, Georgian tanks are the same type as Russian tanks.  They are T-72s, which are distinguished from ours only by their markings.  At the approach of our troops they turned around and moved toward Tbilisi.  Thus were provoked rumors that Russian armored vehicles were moving on the Georgian capital.

• Now the units of the 58th Army have left the territory of South Ossetia—precisely at the time designated by the president.  Now only our peacekeepers remain there.

  [1]

 

• Russian special services have reported on 4 September that international terrorists are trying to get into South Ossetia and Abkhazia to commit terrorist acts. Though he had previously named Al Qaeda, FSB director Alexander Bortnikov is refusing to specify which international terrorists, but cautions that they will go after infrastructure. The FSB claims to have recently broken up the “bulgarii jamaat”in Bashkirstan. The FSB also claims to have stopped potential attacks by an Al Qaeda affiliated group against the northern Caucasus, including in Karbardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, and Stavropol. In an fight against insurgents in Dagestan, a passer-by was killed.

  [2]

    Foreign Minister Lavrov confirmed and expanded on these statements on 6 September.

  [3]

• 5 September:  OSCE military observers have returned to Georgia and had the opportunity to patrol the road leading from Tskhinvali to the Georgia village of Karaleti. The OSCE declared access to this zone a priority and reiterated an earlier announcement to send 100 observers to this zone soon. Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister announced that Georgia not only welcomes international observes, but demands their presence and that all such forces, including from the EU and the OSCE, have access to the entirety of disputed zones. The Russian Foreign Ministry announced that in addition to the OSCE observers, Russia offers to include in the security zone around South Ossetia an international police force with the possibility of support from the EU. This idea of a civil police force, suggested to the OSCE on September 4th, “goes in the direction of the realization of the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan in the aspect of the creation of international mechanisms barring the repetition of Georgian aggression and maintaining the solid security of South Ossetia.” ("идет в русле реализации плана Медведева-Саркози в части создания международных механизмов по недопущению повторения агрессии Грузии и обеспечению прочной безопасности Южной Осетии".) Russia continues to differ with the EU on where the international police forces should be active, with Russia maintaining they should be in the security zones around South Ossetia and Abkhazia, while the EU thinks they should be on the territory of those two regions (which the EU regards as part of Georgia) as well. Lavrov declared that a question for Tskhinvali and Sukhumi, and pointed out that the legitimate version of the peace plan, signed by Medvedev and Sarkozy, allows an international discussion about the security and stability of the two regions, not in the regions. The South Ossetia Foreign Minister, Murat Dzhioev, has declared that they will only allow Russian peacekeepers and no international forces, as they do not trust them.

  [4]

• On 9 September, Medvedev met with Defense Minister Anatolii Serdiukov, and told him that the 8 September meeting with Sarkozy had produced some additions to the 12 August agreement, in particular, the withdrawal of Russian forces from the security zone and the deployment of international observers from the OSCE and the EU there.  Medvedev said that Russian military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia was in the capacity of peace support operations, and that he expected to establish diplomatic relations with the republics very soon.  Serdiukov in turn reported that he had negotiated with the governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to maintain 3,800 Russian troops in each republic, to be deployed in the Ossetian towns of Java and Tskinvali and in the current locations of Russian forces in Abkhazia.

  [5]

 

On 9 September, the Russians made a number of announcements about the August conflict with Georgia:

• Georgian forces outnumbered Russian peacekeepers, according to the Russians, by 14 to 1 (i.e. 7,000 Georgian troops against 500 Russians).

  [6]

• Georgian headquarters for the operation was at Gori, where the radar and anti-aircraft Bug-M1 system that destroyed four Russian aircraft was based.

  [7]

• The General Staff does not have information about the continuation of Israeli assistance to Georgia, but it reminded listeners that Israel had helped Georgia in the past.

  [8]

• “In providing assistance to Georgia, the US has established the precedent of participating in armed conflict on its side.”  The word is simply “assistance” and there is no implication of military assistance.

  [9]

 

• On September 10, Lavrov declared that the mandates for OSCE and UN observers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia should be coordinated with the authorities of those republics. The OSCE and UN presence in the republics will be as it was up to August 7th. They will be joined by at least 200 EU and OSCE observers. Meanwhile, Abkhaz president Sergei Bagapsh announced that the employees of the “UN Mission in Georgia” in  Abkhazia should either change the organization’s name or leave Abkhazia. He has asked this to be brought up with the UN. However, Bagapsh stressed that the Abkhaz government has normal relations with the UN mission, which has 165 employees. He also announced that Abkhazia will coordinate its foreign policy with Russia. He re-affirmed Abkhazia’s desire for Russian troops to be stationed in Abkhazia, especially in the Kodori Gorge, and Lavrov clarified that the 7600 troops to be stationed in the republics (3800 in each) will not be “peacemakers” (Никакого отношения к миротворчеству они не имеют), but rather active divisions of the RF armed forces. He announced that the Russian posts along the Senaki-Poti line will be drawn back within 7 days from Sept. 8th because of the guarantee of no force that the Sarkozy convinced Saakashvili to sign. Russian troops in the security zones will only be pulled back after international observers come in. It should take them 10 days and they will do it by the Oct. 10th deadline they agreed to. However, Lavrov said that the agreement signed on Sept. 8th in Tbilisi, to which Sarkozy and Barroso were party, that declares EU observers will also be on South Ossetian and Abkhazian territory is invalid. “First, it is a lie. Second, it is an absolutely unfair attempt to not honestly explain to Mr. Saakashvili what obligations the European Union has taken on itself and what obligations Russia has taken on itself, and be under the thumb of Mr. Saakashvili” (Во-первых, это неправда. Во-вторых, это абсолютно недобросовестная попытка не объяснять по-честному господину Саакашвили, какие обязательства взял на себя Евросоюз и какие обязательства взяла на себя Россия, а идти на поводу у господина Саакашвили).  Russia will not recognize that agreement.

  [10]

• On 2 September, Pravda reported that the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has resulted in a renewed interest in autonomy and independence by several nationalities in Georgia, all of whom have suffered repression under the current government in Tbilisi. The main strongholds are in the following regions: Adjara, Javakheti, Mingrelia, Svanetia and the “Azerbaijani” Marmeul’ski region. There are calls for the return of Aslan Abashidze in Adjara because Tbilisi has not dealt honestly with the issues of Adjara’s autonomy. There are laws on the book, but they allow the Georgian president to revoke it easily, and Adjara citizens don’t trust the Georgian government. Mingrelia’s situation is analogous to Adjara’s; Georgia special forces “fix” suspicious activity. The Mingrelian intelligentsia is preparing to demand an easing of Tbilisi’s pressures. Ossetia is also not yet resolved; Eduard Kokoity recently declared that they intend to “restore not only the territorial integrity of South Ossetia, but even further. We have very serious questions about the land that earlier belonged to Ossetia. I intend to return them.” (Мы не только восстановим территориальную целостность Южной Осетии, но и пойдем дальше. У нас очень серьезные вопросы по тем землям, которые раньше принадлежали Осетии. Я намерен их вернуть.)  In mountain Svanetia, on the border with Abkhazia, there are also insurgents who fought off the Georgian mass cleaning (массовые зачистки) last year and though the insurgency was officially put down, it is not over. In southeastern Georgia, the Azeris and Armenians would also like to escape the oppression of Tbilisi. Armenia is prepared to support its diaspora in Georgia because Georgia has recently harmed its economy by making transport of Russian gas harder. Georgia companies are stealing land from Armenian and Azerbaijani peasants in Georgia, while all political positions go to ethnic Georgians and Azeri and Armenian youth are kept from high schools. If the Armenians and Azeris within Georgia would join together to fight against Tbilisi’s oppression, they would succeed.  Tbilisi’s problems are so bad that “today no one may give the guarantee that Georgia will not collapse tomorrow. At least, [only] with outside help it might become a reality. And for this Georgians should be grateful solely to Mikheil Saakashvili and the Americans who trained him on the Caucasian people.” (И сегодня никто не может дать гарантии, что завтра Грузия не развалится. По крайней мере, при помощи извне это может стать реальностью. И этим грузины должны быть благодарны исключительно Михаилу Саакашвили и натаскивавшим его на кавказские народы американцам.)

  [11]

• On 13 September, Russian forces announced that they were starting to withdraw from positions in the security zone outside of Abkhazia, with Georgian media stating that they had left Poti and were pulling out of the Khobi and Senaki areas of Western Georgia.

  [12]

• On 13 September, Georgian Minister of Internal Affairs announced that Georgian police along the Abkhazian and Ossetian borders would be replaced by Georgian special forces troops after the killing of two policemen on patrol (including one the Georgians say was killed in Zugdidi by Abkhazians, which the Abkhaz deny).

• Medvedev said on September 6 that South Ossetia and Abkhazia are examples of democracy and civil order.

  [13]

• South Ossetian President Kokoiti said on 11 September, “Yes, clearly, we will become part of Russia and we do not want to make some sort of independent Ossetia because historically it was very difficult when our predecessors made such a choice.”

  [14]

    Later he said, “I was obviously misunderstood.  We do not want to abandon our independence, which we have gained at the price of colossal suffering, and South Ossetia will not become part of Russia.  Yes, many in South Ossetia talk about unifying with North Ossetia within the Russian Federation, and no one can forbid the expression of such thoughts.  But South Ossetia does not intend to become part of Russia and aims to develop civilized interstate relations within the framework of international law with all states.”

  [15]

    He added, “We plan to establish closer relations with Russia as a way of bringing South Ossetia into the Russo-Belarussian alliance.”

  [16]

    Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov later emphasized that South Ossetia did not intend to become part of Russia.

  [17]

• On 1 September Saakashvili asked the US to impose sanctions on investors in Abkhazia.

  [18]

• On 1 September, Georgia formally requested the CIS to withdraw its peacekeeping forces from Abkhazia on the grounds that “Russia, by its actions against Georgia, has destroyed the previously existing peacekeeping arrangement foreseen in the agreement” between Georgia, Russia, and Abkhazia.

  [19]

• Medvedev said that Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia would not lead to separatist problems in Russia, specifically in Daghestan and Ingushetia, unless foreign forces involve themselves in those areas.

  [20]

• Retired Russian General Boris Gromov, now Governor of the Moscow Region, said that even the provision of advanced American weapons to Georgia would not increase Georgia’s fighting abilities, because “The armed forces of Georgia have never been able to fight well.”  Gromov was the last commander of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan who oversaw their withdrawal in 1989.

  [21]

• Russian MoFA spokesman said on 8 September that America’s refusal to recognize the security zone around South Ossetia, and also to place an embargo on the provision of weapons to Tbilisi, was “unconstructive.”  “If Georgia is rearmed without limits then we can foresee the consequences  such activities might have in the explosive Caucasus region, particularly in light of recent experience.”

  [22]

• Lavrov said on 9 September that the EU had taken responsibility for ensuring that Georgia does not use force with regard to Ossetia and Abkhazia.

  [23]

• Russia established diplomatic relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia on 9 September.

  [24]

    Russia also agreed on texts of treaties of friendship with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

  [25]

    These treaties permit the establishment of Russian military bases in the two republics.

  [26]

• On 10 September, Abkhazia announced that “Georgian partisans” had made an attempt on the life of a regional Abkhazian commander.

  [27]

    Abkhazia is also bringing to trial a resident of Sukhumi accused of spying for Tbilisi.

  [28]

• President Bagapsh of Abkhazia said on 11 September that there was no question of Abkhazia applying for associate status in the Russian Federation:  “The question is about the independent republic of Abkhazia.”

  [29]

    He did, however, say that Abkhazia would apply to join the Russo-Belarussian Union, and possibly also the CIS and the OSCE.

  [30]

Russian Military Developments

 

• Smolensk Railroad troops conducted a mobilization exercise on 2 September.

  [31]

    Railroad troops also exercised in the Ural district.

  [32]

• 2,000 Russian and Kazakh troops exercised together in Chelyabinsk (Russia) as part of the Center-2008 exercises.  The exercises included 70 T-72 tanks, 30 armored fighting vehicles, Grad rocket launchers, Nona and Gvozdik self-propoelled artillery, anti-aircraft and engineer troops.  Units involved included the tank regiment (239th guards tank regiment) of 34th Motorized Rifle Division and the 4th Mechanized Brigade of Kazakhstan.

  [33]

    Exercises involved expending a full combat load of ammunition and a jump by a company of the 31st Separate Air Assault Brigade (Ul’yanovsk air assault company) out of two Il-76 aircraft.

  [34]

    Elements of the ballistic missile regiment of the Ural district participated in the Center 2008 exercises as well, conducting anti-aircraft exercises.

  [35]

    The exercises also involve tactical training for the 15th Peacekeeping Brigade and exercises at the army, division, and regimental levels.

  [36]

    The exercise includes air maneuvers with Il-76MD transports, Su-24 ground-attack aircraft, Mi-24 assault helicopters and Mi-8 transport helicopters, modernized Su-27 and MiG-31 fighters—60 aircraft in all

  [37]

  .  The exercises also involved force-on-force maneuvers, pitting an aggressor force trying to seize an “energy-rich” area 60 km deep against a defender.

  [38]

    Su-24 and Su-27 aircraft conducted ground-attacks guided by forward air controllers deployed with the ground forces with accuracy of 10-15 meters.

  [39]

• The Strategic Rocket Forces planned a command-and-control exercise for 2-5 September to “work out questions of controlling the conduct of military operations using conventional means of destruction and nuclear weapons.”

  [40]

• Marines of the Black Sea Fleet began a two-week exercise on 3 September, particularly the “black berets” of the Air Assault Battalion commanded by LTC Vladimir Karpushenko.  A life-like artificial village was built to facilitate the exercise.

  [41]

• The Pacific Ocean Fleet and Far Eastern military districts have also been conducting complex sea-air-land maneuvers, including the live-fire of anti-ship cruise missiles.

  [42]

• The 15th Separate Motor Rifle (Peacekeeping) Brigade conducted a tactical exercise on 12 September, incorporating the lessons of Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia.  The exercise involved the brigade, Army aviation including Su-24 aircraft and Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters, and units of the internal forces.  Lieutenant General Valerii Evnevich, Deputy Commander of the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation, said, “I want to emphasize that in accord with the planned training of the Ground Forces this exercise was planned last year.  However, obviously, the concept of the exercise takes into account the experience of the use of peacekeeping forces fulfilling tasks in South Ossetia involved in forcing Georgia to peace….You yourselves saw, he said, turning to the journalists, that in the final phase of the exercise attack and army aviation conducted missions together with the peacekeeping troops, as well as artillery.  The organization of effective combined arms operations permits a qualitatively new level of performing peacekeeping tasks.”

  [43]

• Russian troops killed a Chechen insurgent on 12 September.

  [44]

• A September poll shows that only 7.8% of Lithuanians believe that their government can protect them against cyber-attacks.

  [45]

 

NATO—Russia Activities

 

• On 5 September, Bundeswehr Inspector General Wolfgang Schneiderhan and German Ambassador to Russia Walter Schmidt attended an opening of a German military ceremony in Krasnodar region (between Georgia and the Crimea).

  [46]

    Belgian Frigate Louisa-Maria made a port call in St. Petersburg, and her captain exchanged formal visits with the commander of the Leningrad naval base.

  [47]

• Russian and Norwegian naval forces conducted an already-planned exercise, “Barents-2008” aimed at practicing techniques for sea rescues.

  [48]

• Moscow significantly reduced oil supplies to the Czech Republic in July.

  [49]

• NATO General Secretary said on 11 September that Russia’s unilateral recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was unacceptable.

  [50]

Russian Bilateral Military Activities

Syria

 

• On September 9, the Russian Military announced that an auxiliary vessel had returned from the Syrian port of Tartus where its crew had been working on the repair of floating docks and supply points, that had been unused for a long time.

  [51]

    On 29 August, the Russian embassy in Damascus had said that there were no plans afoot to increase Russia’s naval presence in the Mediterranean.

  [52]

Venezuela

 

• On August 15, Russian military firms said that the contract for providing Su-30MK2 multi-role fighters to Venezuela would be fulfilled, but was not yet concluded.

  [53]

    On 7 September, the BBC revealed that Venezuela and Russia plan to hold joint naval exercises from 10-14 November, involving four Russian ships.

  [54]

    The Russian Foreign Ministry confirmed this announcement on 8 September, noting that the Russian vessels would include the nuclear-powered heavy guided-missile cruiser Petr Velikii, and the large anti-submarine vessel Admiral Chabenenko.  The Russian MoFA added that Russian anti-submarine aircraft would be temporarily stationed in Venezuela.

  [55]

  The Russian Ministry of Defense announced on 10 September that two Russian Tu-160 strategic bombers had landed in Venezuela.  The aircraft belong to the Guards Donbass Red Banner Heavy Bomber Aviation Group (Engels garrison).

  [56]

    The Russian Air Force announced that the bombers would return to Russia on 15 September after completing a number of missions over neutral waters in the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean.

  [57]

    The exercise showed, according to the commander of Russia’s Long-range Aviation, that Russia is “able to fly in any region of the world.”

  [58]

  Chavez expelled the U.S. Ambassador, nominally in sympathy with Bolivia which had already done so, on 12 September.

  [59]

Iran

 

Controversy over S-300 anti-missile and anti-aircraft system sale

• Fars News Agency announced that Russia and Iran had agreed on the sale of S-300 systems to Iran on 26 December 2007.

  [60]

• On 28 December 2007, Russia denied the deal.

  [61]

In July 2008, Israel asserted that the Iranians would start receiving parts of the S-300 system before the end of the year.

[62]

  The editor of Janes Air-Launched Weapons said that the deal would be completed through Belarus to provide the Russians deniability.  “Belarus is the proxy route whenever Russia wants to deny it is doing the sale,” he said.

• On 1 September 2008, Iran denied that it was purchasing the system from Russia.

  [63]

    In response, the director of Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies in Moscow said that Russia was likely to move forward with the sale.

  [64]

• On 9 September, the Jerusalem Post reported that Croatia had already sold Iran several S-300 complexes left over from the collapse of Yugoslavia, and that Israeli satellite imagery analysts had detected modifications in anti-aircraft emplacements around Natanz (at least 26 batteries by September 2006, according to this source).  The Israeli military declined to confirm or deny the report.

  [65]

• The S-300 was first fielded in 1979 and has been modified several times.  According to Russian sources, it can target two rockets each against 24 targets simultaneously using one launch system, or four rockets each using two.  It can shoot down both aircraft and ballistic missiles, and has a range of 150 km.  Israeli sources say that it can track 100 targets simultaneously and engage 12 at a time with a range of 200 km and a maximum altitude of 27,000 meters.

  [66]

Diplomatic Developments Among Russia’s Allies

•  Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s Foreign Minister, said there is no parallel between Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on the one hand, and Nagorno-Karabakh (the enclave under dispute by Armenia and Azerbaijan), on the other. Whereas in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Mikhail Saakashvili undermined negotiations and settlements worked out in the 1990s, the presidents of both Armenia and Azerbaijan continue to work within the frameworks set up by the Minsk group, OSCE, CSTO and CIS. Meanwhile, Armenia has said it cannot recognize Abkhazia or South Ossetia for the same reason it has not recognized Kosovo: Nagorno-Karabakh is still not recognized. Azerbaijan has reiterated its commitment to working with Armenia and the Minsk group to resolve the Nargorno-Karabakh issue. The self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh has interpreted Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a positive sign and a step forward toward their own recognition.  “There are not any kind of parallels between the situation around South Ossetia and Abkhazia, on the one hand, and the Nagorno-Karabakh Settlement, on the other”.- Sergei Lavrov (Нет никаких параллелей между ситуацией вокруг Южной Осетии и Абхазии, с одной стороны, и нагорно-карабахским урегулированием, с другой).

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• The heads of state in the CSTO have agreed Friday on a declaration that expresses concern at Georgia’s use of force to attempt to resolve its conflict with South Ossetia. “The member states of the CSTO are deeply concerned by Georgia undertaking an attempt to use force to resolve the conflict in South Ossetia, which has led to numerous victims amongst the peaceful population and peacekeepers” ("Государства - члены ОДКБ глубоко озабочены предпринятой Грузией попыткой силового решения конфликта в Южной Осетии, которая привела к многочисленным жертвам среди мирного населения и миротворцев"). Medvedev again accused Georgia of causing serious humanitarian consequences. The CSTO also expressed concern about the potential for escalation and intensification of conflict in the Caucasus and asked all states to objectively assess the situation, without double standards (без двойных стандартов), and prevent further problems. This is was a compromise declaration after three separate texts were offered by Russia, Kazakhstan and Armenia. In the Kazakh and Armenian variants, Georgia was not directly mentioned, while the Russian variant was the strictest. This was noticeable when Medvedev declared the consolidated position a the summit’s main output and claimed that CSTO made a unequivocally negative judgment of Georgia’s aggression against South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The member states also approved the Medvedev-Sarkozy pact and called for strict performance with the view of preventing new attempts of force in the resolution of the conflict. (призывают стороны к их неукоснительному выполнению (принципов) в целях недопущения новых попыток силового решения конфликтов, обеспечение стабильности в данном регионе). The member states supported Russia’s role in the security of South Ossetia and encouraged a greater involvement of the OSCE and a strengthening of the role of the UN.

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• Belarus has released the last of its political prisoners, and the US responded by lifting some (but by no means all) sanctions on Belarus.

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• Medvedev has invited Azerbaijani President Aliev to visit Moscow on 16 September, which he will do.

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• Hugo Chavez supported Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on 1 September.  “We support Russia.  Russia is defending her interests and acting properly.”

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• Armenian president met with Medvedev in Sochi early in September.  Medvedev was to explain the situation in Georgia to him and discuss efforts to expand ties between Russia and Armenia, particularly in the energy sector.  Sources said before the meeting there would be “intensive work on the preparation of an intermediate agreement about the supply of Russian gas to Armenia in 2009-2011.”

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• Nicaragua recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia on 3 September.

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• Lukashenko said on 8 September that the Belarussian parliament might take up the question of recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the elections coming up at the end of September.

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    He also said that the “events in the Caucasus confirmed the correctness of his position with regard to preserving Belarus’s sovereignty from the standpoint of its alliance relations with Russia.  ‘In the context of the events in the Caucasus it is apparent why Belarus could not have become part of Russia…[If it had], Russia would have lost an ally and a subject of international law [by which he presumably means a sovereign state supporting Russia in international law]…The events in the Caucasus have emphasized this and many politicians quietly are saying that I was right.’”

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• The new Cuban ambassador to Moscow asked for Russian investment of $2 billion in Cuba’s economy.  He declined to say if Cuba would recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but did say, “We supported Russia against injustices in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  We kept solidarity with you,” while asking for Russian support for Cubans held in American prisons.

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Developments in the Black Sea and Ukraine

 

• The USS Mount Whitney has arrived in Poti on 5 September with 17 tons of humanitarian aid, according to US officials. It’s arrival will be celebrated after the ship is unloaded (from the “spot check”, because it is too big for the port). The ship, which holds the staff of the 6th Fleet, will then coordinate the activities of NATO in the Black Sea. Russian officials question whether the USS Mount Whitney meets the Convention of 1936, which regulates the maximum tonnage of ships entering the Black Sea. They also doubt the humanitarian aspect of the ship’s arrival and pointed out that it is the fourth US ship to arrive in the past few weeks. In addition, there is a US ship in Sevastopol for a joint project with Ukraine and 3 other NATO ships, from Spain, Poland and Germany.

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• On 13 September, representative of President Viktor Yushchenko says that he was excluded from a meeting of the Ukrainian Cabinet (part of the rising tensions between Yushchenko and Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko).  Issues in dispute include Yushchenko’s desire to pay off Ukraine’s $1 billion debt to Russia and to increase funding for the Ukrainian military dramatically; the Cabinet’s budget, according to Yushchenko’s representative, does not address the issue of debt to Russia and proposes a defense spending increase only 1/5 of what Yushchenko wants for the “re-equipping of the army and its transition to voluntary service [as opposed to conscription].”

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    Part of the issue on the Russian debt relates to Yushchenko’s desire to increase Russian payments for their Black Sea Fleet basing to “market rates.”

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• On 13 September Interfax reported that a Deputy of the Russian Duma, the Ataman of the Union of Cossack Troops of Russia and Abroad, was prevented from entering Ukraine by the Ukrainian MVD.

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• On 2 September, Ukrainian deputy foreign minister spoke out against imposing sanctions on Russia.

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• Abkhazian President Sergei Bagapsh said on 2 September that Abkhazia would not become the base for the Russian Black Sea Fleet:  “As you well know, the Russian Black Sea Fleet is based in Sevastopol.  We will have [Russian] land forces here.”

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• On 5 September, Yushchenko said that the basing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on Ukrainian territory was a threat to Ukrainian national security, and that Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was unacceptable.

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• Putin said on 11 September that discussions about joining Crimea and Russia were provocations.  “We agreed on the borders after the collapse of the USSR long ago, and we recognize these borders,” he said, noting that there was no comparing the situation in Crimea with the situation between Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

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