Moqtada al-Sadr's "Resistance Cells"

 

O

n June 13, 2008, Liwa Smeisem, a Sadrist parliamentarian, announced that Moqtada al-Sadr had authorized the creation of "cells to resist the occupation."

[i]

  Upon closer examination, these “resistance cells” appear to be Special Groups cells that the Iranian Qods Force has trained and financed.

[ii]

Special Groups are often made up members of Sadr’s militia, the Mahdi Army (“Jaysh al-Mahdi”, or JAM) and carried out lethal operations against Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces despite Sadr’s publicly declared cease-fire, which came into effect in late August 2007.

 

Until now, mainstream Sadrist and JAM members Special Groups been denounced as “rogue elements” or “criminals” by mainstream Sadrists and militia members who were attempting to dissociate themselves from the continuing operations, even though Special Groups operated under Sadr’s control.

[iii]

Sadr’s announcement is therefore not creating any new force, but acknowledging the reality that he does in fact direct Special Groups activity.

It is notable that Sadr explicitly stated that these cells will only be authorized to carry out military action on Coalition Forces rather than Iraqi Security Forces.

[iv]

 This is important because the two major offensives against Sadrist strongholds –in Basra and Sadr City – have been spearheaded by Iraqi troops with limited Coalition support. Furthermore, Coalition Forces are not found in great numbers in many Sadrist strongholds like Maysan province, Basra, or Sadr City. This means that Sadr will likely target the smaller coalition presences in those areas while also targeting the Iraqi Security Forces whom they regularly fight.

This statement is a further indication that Moqtada al-Sadr and the Sadrist Trend have come under a great deal of pressure from Iraqi Security Forces and are attempting to stake out a . Indeed, the defeat of JAM in Sadr City appears to have undermined some of Moqtada al-Sadr’s popular support as turnout for protests against the Status of Forces Agreement between the United States in Iraq has been quite low.

[v]

This suggests that Sadr is less capable of harnessing the Sadrist movement to incite disruptions in public life through protests than once thought. This limitation of Sadr’s ability as a popular political leader as well as the Sadrist parliamentarians’ failure to garner sympathy from other Iraqi constituencies has left Sadr with his military option.

 

This announcement means that Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces will continue to target Special Groups networks throughout Iraq, limiting Sadr’s ability to cast himself as a participant in Iraq’s legitimate political process. This appears to have played itself out fully, as Sadr declared that he will not participate in Iraq’s 2008 Provincial Elections while attempting to position himself as the primary opponent to the United States' continued presence in Iraq.