China-Taiwan Weekly Update, April 24, 2023

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, April 24, 2023

Authors: Nils Peterson, Roy Eakin, and Virginia Wang of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on Chinese Communist Party paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments. This update covers developments through April 21 at Noon Eastern Time.

Key Takeaways

• The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Joint Sword exercise around Taiwan from April 8 to 10 likely provides a rough sketch for future isolation campaigns around Taiwan that the CCP may use to try to create a sense of inevitability regarding “unification” among the Taiwanese populace.
• CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping aims to bolster domestic R&D and manufacturing to insulate China from Western sanctions and export restrictions and is likely to pursue foreign capital to fuel economic growth to develop sectors critical to China’s national security.
• Taiwanese Vice President William Lai’s campaign rhetoric emphasizing continuity with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen's cross-strait approach may increase popular support for his candidacy as the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election nears.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Geopolitical Initiatives

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) may view the tenth anniversary on March 23 of Xi Jinping’s announcement of a “community with a shared future for mankind” as an opportunity to redouble efforts to focus international governance discussions on economic development. Xi’s speech laid the intellectual foundation for ongoing Chinese initiatives such as the Belt and Road, Global Security, Global Development, and Global Civilizational Initiatives, which aim to reorient the international political, economic, and security architecture towards Beijing.[1] Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang used the anniversary to publish a report about Sino-Russian relations that argued against viewing the world in a democracy versus autocracy framework but rather as a “struggle between development and [the] containment of development.”[2] The report builds on Xi’s 2013 speech, which laid the intellectual foundation for ongoing Chinese initiatives that aim to reorient the international political, economic, and security architectures towards Beijing. Such programs include the Belt and Road, Global Security, Global Development, and Global Civilizational Initiatives.

Qin Gang’s report is also part of the CCP’s effort to gain “discourse power” by focusing international governance discussions on economic development rather than governance models. “Discourse power” refers to CCP efforts to shape international public opinion about sensitive subjects for the party, such as human rights, in service of setting international norms for discussing such issues. [3] The term is part of Xi’s aim to have CCP narratives gain substantial traction in the global information space as alternatives to those produced in democratic countries. China can use advances in “discourse power” in conjunction with economic engagement to strengthen its ideological appeal amid a larger US–China competition in regions like the Global South. “Discourse power” advances can also encourage these states to support Chinese initiatives in international organizations like the United Nations.

CCP Leadership Activity

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping aims to bolster domestic R&D and manufacturing to insulate China from Western sanctions and export restrictions and is likely to pursue foreign capital to fuel economic growth to develop sectors critical to China’s national security. Xi stated his intent for the PRC to achieve technological self-reliance and obtain the “two must-haves" of a secure food supply and strong domestic manufacturing industry on March 5.[4] Xi primarily aims for China to develop strong domestic manufacturing in areas relevant to manufacturing high-tech products including computers, robots, and planes.[5] CCP leaders have tried to develop strong domestic manufacturing since the Reform and Opening Up period began in 1978. Xi aims for manufacturing to work in tandem with technological innovation toward self-reliance to insulate China from US sanctions and technological export bans. Xi aims to keep the threat of Western sanctions from limiting his policy options due to the prospect of facing economic downturn like Russia. The CCP aggressively sought foreign investment prior to the pandemic and will now redouble those efforts going forward to achieve Xi’s stated must-haves.[6]

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin from March 20 to 22 shows Xi attempts to balance the need to incorporate Russia into its international economic and strategic architecture while avoiding Western sanctions. Xi aims to utilize Russia as part of his strategy to develop alternatives such as Chinese-led international organizations like the Global Security and the Global Development Initiatives that aim to reorient the international development and security architecture towards Beijing. Putin claimed that Sino-Russian relations are stronger than the Cold War era military-political alliance between the two countries and that the relationship is “without leaders and followers” in a Chinese state-controlled media piece titled “Russia and China: A Partnership Looking to the Future.”[7] Chinese agreement to include the phrase “without leaders and followers” indicates the CCP’s desire to portray Sino–Russian relations as ostensibly aligning with Beijing’s often repeated mantra of providing “win-win cooperation” with partner states as equals. However, China clearly remains the more powerful country in the relationship. Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang displayed the limits to the Sino–Russian relationship by stating on April 14 that China will not sell weapons to either side in the Russian war in Ukraine.[8] The PRC simultaneously funds Russia’s war effort by purchasing vast quantities of oil from the country while disregarding G7 price caps.[9]

Other

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Joint Sword exercise around Taiwan from April 8 to 10 likely provides a rough sketch for future isolation campaigns around Taiwan that the CCP may use to try and create a sense of inevitability regarding “unification” among the Taiwanese populace. The Shandong aircraft carrier operated east of Taiwan during the exercise, which indicates China aims to create a sense of inevitability that the PLA can isolate the island at will and prevent foreign intervention. The April exercises included tactical-level firsts, such as PLA J-15s launched from the Shandong entering Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) from the east of the island. These firsts do not reflect new PLA operational-level capabilities, however. China demonstrated it could fly tens of aircraft around Taiwan on a daily basis in August 2022.[10] The Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning also previously sailed well east of Taiwan in December 2022 and could operate where the Shandong did in April if ordered.[11] The Chinese Fujian Maritime Safety Administration’s April 5 announcement that it would embark on a three day “special joint patrol and inspection operation” in the central and southern Taiwan Strait indicates the CCP may interfere in future Taiwan Strait shipping in conjunction with military activity to isolate the island.[12] The exercises were China’s response to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen meeting with US officials in the United States and in Taiwan between April 5 and April 8. Taiwanese political figures routinely visit the United States and meet with American political figures without the trappings of a state visit.[13] The April exercises also helped increase sales in Taiwan of a clothing patch showing a Formosan black bear punching Winnie the Pooh, a symbol for Xi Jinping that Chinese social media censors.[14] This example demonstrates the potential difficulty PLA exercises around Taiwan will have inducing fear among the Taiwanese populace.

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024, presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third-party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024, and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

Taiwanese Vice President William Lai’s campaign rhetoric emphasizing continuity with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen's cross-strait approach may increase popular support for his candidacy as the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election nears. Lai became the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential nominee on April 12.[15] Lai's cross-strait policy approach does not promote Taiwan independence, despite previously declaring himself a ”political worker for Taiwan independence” in 2017 and 2018.[16] Lai defended Taiwan’s de facto independence through the Republic of China (ROC) framework after becoming the DPP nominee by emphasizing that there is no need for Taiwan to declare independence because Taiwan is “already a sovereign and independent country."[17] This position aligns with the views of Tsai Ing-wen.[18] Lai further displayed his support for Tsai’s approach by saying that he supports Tsai's "four persistences" policy, which consists of adhering to democracy and freedom, emphasizing that the Republic of China and People’s Republic of China are not affiliated with each other, emphasizing that sovereignty is not compatible with annexation, and to confirm that the Taiwanese people will determine the future of Taiwan.[19] Lai also said he would follow Tsai's "road of democracy" and attempted to reframe the election debate away from discussions involving unification and independence by emphasizing a struggle between democracy and authoritarianism.[20] This rhetoric incorporates defending the existing status quo from Chinese military and political threats against Taiwan. Lai's rhetoric portraying himself as a defender of the existing status quo may make it difficult for the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) to portray him as a pro-independence radical that will endanger Taiwan. This approach may also undercut the KMT's attempts to portray itself as the sole traditional defender of the Taiwan Strait status quo and ROC framework.[21] Lai will likely maintain this rhetoric unless "deep green" pro-independence elements within the DPP force Lai to signal support for Taiwan independence rhetoric.

Lai’s rhetorical advances occurred as former KMT Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou redoubled support for cultural and political unity between China and Taiwan. Ma explicitly called for the “revitalization” of zhonghua during a visit to China from March 27-April 7.[22] He also emphasized his belief that Mainland China and Taiwan belong to one-China under the ROC constitution.[23] Zhonghua is a term that refers to China in a cultural sense while not being bound by the physical borders of China. The KMT defended Ma’s comments by reiterating support for Ma’s “one China” approach and accusing the DPP of “lack[ing] the determination to defend the Republic of China.”[24] Ma retains substantial influence in the KMT as the party’s last leader in government. Ma’s repetition of this terminology likely means that the KMT has not rethought its CCP-friendly cross-strait policy emphasizing one-China with different interpretations despite its unpopularity with the Taiwanese electorate.[25] Their formulation encourages political, cultural, and economic engagement across the strait while maintaining ROC autonomy from the PRC. An emphasis on cross-strait cultural and political unity may make the KMT appear out of touch with public opinion if William Lai successfully frames himself as a pragmatic defender of the status quo and Republic of China (Taiwan) autonomy. [26] Early polling shows that Lai is narrowly leading in the election despite the fact that the KMT have not yet selected their presidential election nominee.[27] While Lai still leads in the polls, April polling data showed a small decline in support for Lai.[28] This is likely tied to undecided voters’ reactions to Lai officially becoming the nominee. Eventual 2020 Taiwanese presidential election winner Tsai Ing-wen also trailed in April 2019 presidential election polls.[29] Lai’s pragmatic rhetoric may gain appeal as the importance of the cross-strait issue grows with the nearing of the election. This appeal will likely gain strength if the KMT refuses to rethink its current cross-strait approach.

[1] http://hk.ocmfa dot gov.cn/eng/jbwzlm/xwdt/zt/xzxcf/201304/t20130419_10095330.htm

[2] https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/web/wjbzhd/202303/t20230322_11047407.shtml?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email

[3] https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/discourse-power/

The characters for discourse power are 话语权.

[4] The characters for two-must haves are 两个必保.

 http://paper.people dot com.cn/rmrb/html/2023-03/06/nw.D110000renmrb_20230306_3-01.htm?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email

https://english.news dot cn/20230306/525a0fe0e9e54811869d54133590dc00/c.html

[5] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/content/1164852.shtml

[6] http://www.gov dot cn/guowuyuan/2023-03/27/content_5748493.htm

https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202303/1288066.shtml

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-27/china-s-new-premier-rolls-out-red-carpet-to-foreign-executives?leadSource=uverify%20wall#xj4y7vzkg

http://www.gov dot cn/guowuyuan/2023-03/26/content_5748362.htm

[7] http://paper.people dot com.cn/rmrb/html/2023-03/20/nw.D110000renmrb_20230320_2-03.htm

[8] https://apnews dot com/article/china-taiwan-weapons-germany-ukraine-2a51d2c64c12fca75683d20fbafba475

[9] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/india-china-snap-up-russian-oil-april-above-price-cap-2023-04-18/

https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-march-imports-russian-oil-may-hit-record-shiptracking-data-2023-03-02/

[10] https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1555197565372895232

https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1555575042402324481

https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1555888160273739781

https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1556284247853629440

https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1556621069569884160

https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1557030771931885569

https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1557319212280197120

[11] https://www.mod.go.jp/js/pdf/2022/p20221228_01.pdf

[12] https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/en/news/4856713

https://www.mac dot gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=05B73310C5C3A632&sms=1A40B00E4C745211&s=A0203DA639EB1169

[13] President Tsai previously transited through the United States six times since taking office in 2016. https://www.state.gov/briefings-foreign-press-centers/transit-of-taiwan-president-through-us

[14] https://focustaiwan dot tw/cross-strait/202304100017

[15] https://news dot ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4268468

[16] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/front/archives/2018/04/16/2003691399

[17] https://udn dot com/news/story/123307/7094031?from=udn-catebreaknews_ch2

[18] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/front/archives/2020/01/16/2003729328

[19] https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4246962

[20] https://news dot ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4246962

[21] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2023/04/04/2003797296

[22] The characters for zhonghua are 中华.

https://focustaiwan dot tw/cross-strait/202303280014

https://taiwan.huanqiu dot com/article/4CGEO4dwevg

https://udn dot com/news/story/123435/7079265?from=udn-catelistnews_ch2

[23] https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4259770

https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4259909

https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4259951

[24] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2023/04/04/2003797296

[25] https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/en/news/4866215

https://www.tpof dot org/%e5%85%a9%e5%b2%b8%e9%97%9c%e4%bf%82/%e5%85%a9%e5%b2%b8%e6%94%bf%e6%b2%bb/2023%e5%b9%b44%e6%9c%8817%e6%97%a5%e3%80%8c%e5%9c%8b%e4%ba%ba%e5%b0%8d%e3%80%8c%e4%b9%9d%e4%ba%8c%e5%85%b1%e8%ad%98%e3%80%8d%e7%9b%b8%e9%97%9c%e5%95%8f%e9%a1%8c%e7%9a%84%e6%85%8b%e5%ba%a6/

[26] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2023/04/04/2003797296

[27] https://www dot tpof.org/%e7%b2%be%e9%81%b8%e6%96%87%e7%ab%a0/2023%e5%b9%b43%e6%9c%88%e3%80%8c%e5%9c%8b%e9%9a%9b%e6%83%85%e5%8b%a2%e3%80%81%e6%94%bf%e9%bb%a8%e7%ab%b6%e7%88%ad%e8%88%872024%e7%b8%bd%e7%b5%b1%e5%a4%a7%e9%81%b8%e3%80%8denglish-excerpt/

https://www.tpof dot org/%e9%81%b8%e8%88%89/%e7%b8%bd%e7%b5%b1%e9%81%b8%e8%88%89/2024%e5%8f%b0%e7%81%a3%e7%b8%bd%e7%b5%b1%e9%81%b8%e6%b0%91%e7%9a%84%e6%94%af%e6%8c%81%e5%82%be%e5%90%91%ef%bc%882023%e5%b9%b44%e6%9c%8818%e6%97%a5%ef%bc%89/

[28] https://www.tpof dot org/%e9%81%b8%e8%88%89/%e7%b8%bd%e7%b5%b1%e9%81%b8%e8%88%89/2024%e5%8f%b0%e7%81%a3%e7%b8%bd%e7%b5%b1%e9%81%b8%e6%b0%91%e7%9a%84%e6%94%af%e6%8c%81%e5%82%be%e5%90%91%ef%bc%882023%e5%b9%b44%e6%9c%8818%e6%97%a5%ef%bc%89/

[29] http://www dot my-formosa.com/DOC_145194.htm

https://www dot upmedia.mg/news_info.php?Type=24&SerialNo=61850