Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 12, 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 12, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 12, 2023, 5pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on September 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian insider sources claimed that the Kremlin’s inner circle is again actively disagreeing about the necessity of and preparations for a second wave of reserve mobilization ahead of the semi-annual fall conscription cycle, which starts on October 1. A Russian Telegram channel with alleged connections to Russian security sources claimed that select Russian officials are “seriously” preparing for a second wave of reserve mobilization and are hoping to conduct another reserve mobilization wave in the fall.[1] It is important to distinguish between Russia’s normal semi-annual conscription callup, a large-scale reserve mobilization like the one that brought more than 300,000 reservists into the Russian armed forces in Fall 2022, crypto-mobilizations that bring reservists into the force at lower numbers over a long period of time, and various efforts to encourage or coerce Russians to sign ostensibly voluntary contracts with the Russian military. The channel claimed that Russian officials want to mobilize between 170,000 to 175,000 reservists and move the fall conscription date from October 1 to November 1 to accommodate a reserve mobilization processes, while simultaneously conducting “contract mobilization” to recruit an additional 130,000 personnel for contract service using coercive measures.[2] The channel claimed that a powerful group of “siloviki hawks” is also proposing stricter reserve mobilization measures such as restricting certain individuals from obtaining mobilization deferrals, which has sparked major disagreements with officials in the Russian Presidential Administration. The channel claimed that the Presidential Administration fears a response to such measures from other Russian officials and broader Russian society.

These plans, proposals, and disagreements are not new and do not indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin has ultimately decided to conduct a second reserve mobilization wave in the near term. ISW previously observed an increase in discussions about reserve mobilization preparations and speculations in the lead-up to the spring conscription cycle earlier in 2023.[3] Select Russian officials have also proposed more dramatic mobilization measures that have not materialized.[4] Putin also emphasized Russian contract service recruitment rates when responding to the question about the potential second reserve mobilization wave at the Eastern Economic Forum on September 12.[5] Putin’s response does not necessarily set information conditions to prepare Russian society for involuntary mobilization and instead may suggest his commitment to ongoing crypto mobilization practices. Any new reserve mobilization wave depends on Putin.[6]

Putin also reamplified several boilerplate information operations falsely framing the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failed endeavor and accused Ukraine of being unwilling to negotiate during his address at the Eastern Economic Forum. Putin claimed that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has failed to produce concrete results and presented likely very inflated numbers of claimed Ukrainian personnel and equipment losses.[7] Putin also accused Ukraine of being unwilling to negotiate and claimed that Russia cannot pursue an end to hostilities as long as Ukraine is pursuing a counteroffensive, thereby furthering a longstanding Russian information operation that seeks to accuse Ukraine as being the party disinterested in negotiations in order to undermine Ukrainian battlefield successes and reduce international support for Ukraine, as ISW has previously reported.[8]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts on September 12 and have reportedly advanced south of Bakhmut and Robotyne. Ukrainian military sources stated that Ukrainian forces are conducting active offensive operations near Klishchiivka (6km southwest of Bakhmut).[9] The Ukrainian General Staff also stated that Ukrainian forces were additionally successful south and southeast of Robotyne (about 13km south of Orikhiv).[10] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun clarified that Ukrainian forces have advanced between 300-500 meters south and southeast of Robotyne.[11] The Ukrainian Military Media Center noted that Russian forces are increasingly pulling reserves from deep within Russian territory to the frontline in Ukraine out of fear of a Ukrainian breakthrough.[12]

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un arrived in Primorsky Krai on September 12 and will meet with Putin in the coming days, likely to discuss the provision of North Korean artillery munitions to Russia. Kim met with Russian Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology Alexander Kozlov and Primorsky Krai Governor Oleg Kozhemyako upon arriving in Russia.[13] Kim’s trip to Russia is his first known trip outside of North Korea since the COVID-19 pandemic.[14] ISW will continue to follow developments in the lead-up to the meeting and will report on the content of the meeting once it becomes available.

Russian authorities have reportedly adjusted air defense systems around Moscow in light of recent increased drone strikes on the city, likely in part to assuage complaints in the Russian information space about the ineffectiveness of air defenses around the capital. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) stated that Russian authorities have moved short and medium-range air defense systems, including Pantsir-S1 systems, to elevated positions around Moscow City to target drones.[15] The UK MoD noted that these adjustments are also likely meant to visibly demonstrate to the population that Russian authorities are taking steps to combat increasingly frequent drone strikes in the Russian rear, particularly in Moscow Oblast.[16] ISW has previously reported that Russian sources have complained about Moscow air defenses’ inability to stop such drone strikes, with some blaming Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin and his administration directly.[17]

A car killed a Russian milblogger in occupied Donetsk City on September 11. Russian milblogger Gennady Dubovoy died after a car struck him as he crossed the road, and some other Russian milbloggers mourned Dubovoy’s death.[18] Dubovoy’s death comes amid an ongoing Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) campaign to censor Russian ultranationalist milbloggers whose narratives and complaints deviate too far from accepted official narratives.[19] Dubovoy has recently levied criticisms against the Russian government for its treatment of Russian combat veterans and former Wagner Group fighters, and recently stated that he took a step back from the ultranationalist information space due to demands to report on the “confirmation of your [referring to Russian officials] delusions.”[20] Dubovoy recently indicated that he is not a supporter of imprisoned ultranationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin, whose supporters have recently been the targets of official and public censorship.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian insider sources claimed that the Kremlin’s inner circle is again actively disagreeing about the necessity of and preparations for a second wave of reserve mobilization ahead of the semi-annual fall conscription cycle, which starts on October 1.
• These plans, proposals, and disagreements are not new and do not indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin has ultimately decided to conduct a second reserve mobilization wave in the near term.
• Putin also reamplified several boilerplate information operations falsely framing the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failed endeavor and accused Ukraine of being unwilling to negotiate during his address at the Eastern Economic Forum.
• North Korean leader Kim Jong Un arrived in Primorsky Krai on September 12 and will meet with Putin in the coming days, likely to discuss the provision of North Korean artillery munitions to Russia.
• Russian authorities have reportedly adjusted air defense systems around Moscow in light of recent increased drone strikes on the city, likely in part to assuage complaints in the Russian information space about the ineffectiveness of air defenses around the capital.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia and advanced in some areas on September 12.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in at least two sectors of the front on September 12 and advanced near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian officials introduced a bill to the Russian State Duma that would punish Russian servicemen fighting within volunteer armed formations for losing or deliberately destroying military equipment or supplies.
• Russian occupation officials continue to deport children from occupied areas of Ukraine to Russia under the guise of recreational programs.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line but did not advance on September 12. Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the direction of Berestove (20km northwest of Svatove), south of Kuzmyne (3km southwest of Kreminna), near Torske (15km west of Kreminna) and in the Serebryanske forest area (10km southwest of Kreminna) and reported that fighting is ongoing near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk) and in the directions of Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk) and Kyslivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk).[22] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces regularly attack in the forest area west of Kreminna.[23]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on September 12 and advanced. Geolocated footage published on September 11 indicates that Russian forces advanced north of Serhiivka (12km southwest of Svatove).[24] A Russian news aggregator claimed on September 11 that Russian forces also advanced near Synkivka and Petropavlivka.[25] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations east of the Oskil River (west of and parallel to the Svatove-Kreminna line) and advanced slightly in unspecified areas.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 12 that Russian forces continue attempts to break through Ukrainian defenses near Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove).[27]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut on September 12 and recently advanced. Geolocated footage published on September 11 and 12 shows that Ukrainian forces made limited gains north of Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut) and southwest of Mayorsk (21km southwest of Bakhmut).[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces are continuing offensive operations and advancing south of Bakhmut.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are operating in the center of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) where unspecified Chechen ”Akhmat” units previously held positions.[30] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Mayorsk and west of Andriivka (9km southwest of Bakhmut).[31] A Russian news aggregator claimed on September 11 that Ukrainian forces entered Andriivka but that Russian forces maintain positions in the settlement.[32]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut on September 12 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful operations near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut) and Klishchiivka.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked near Kurdyumivka.[34] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz units are defending near Kurdyumivka and noted that the Russian defense of Klishchiivka and Kurdyumivka is necessary in order to prevent Ukrainian forces from capturing Bakhmut.[35] Kremlin newswire RIA Novosti claimed in an article published on September 12 that the “St. George” sabotage and reconnaissance volunteer brigade is defending along the Klishchiivka-Kurdyumivka-Andriivka line (7-13km southwest of Bakhmut).[36] Footage shot on September 11 purportedly shows elements of the 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment of the 106th VDV Division operating near Rozdolivka (15km northeast of Bakhmut).[37]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on September 12 and reportedly advanced. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked near Opytne (3km southwest of Avdiivka) and Spartak and recaptured unspecified positions that Ukrainian forces had captured on September 11.[38] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Avdiivka, Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City), and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack near Novokalynove (11km northwest of Avdiivka).[40] Geolocated footage published on September 12 shows elements of the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Slavic” Brigade (1st DNR Army Corps) defending north of Opytne.[41]

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on September 12 and did not make any confirmed advances. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar confirmed that Ukrainian forces entered Opytne and that fighting is ongoing in the settlement.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control Opytne and that fighting is ongoing north of the settlement where Ukrainian forces control unspecified positions.[43] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Avdiivka.[44]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and did not make confirmed advances on September 12. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack on the northwestern outskirts of Novomayorske (18km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) on the morning of September 12.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also conducted unsuccessful attacks on the Urozhaine-Staromayorske line (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[46] Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Oleg Chekov claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian infantry attack north of Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces went on the defensive in the area.[47]

Russian forces conducted limited counterattacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on September 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks south of Novodarivka (13km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Staromayorske but did not specify an outcome.[49]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced on September 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified successes south and southeast of Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv).[50] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Ukrainian forces advanced 300-500 meters south and southeast of Robotyne and near Novodanylivka (4km south of Orikhiv).[51] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne, Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv), and Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv).[52] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that the number of daily Ukrainian attacks on the Robotyne-Verbove line decreased as of September 11.[53]

Russian forces continued limited counterattacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast and did not advance on September 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled multiple Russian attacks near Robotyne.[54]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian officials introduced a bill to the Russian State Duma that would punish Russian servicemen fighting within volunteer armed formations for losing or deliberately destroying military equipment or supplies.[55] Chairperson of the Duma Defense Committee Andrei Kartapalov and other deputies submitted the bill, which stipulates that volunteers do not currently bear financial responsibility for the loss or deliberate destruction of military property unlike Russian regular military personnel, despite receiving military equipment from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). The bill is likely a part of the ongoing Russian effort to integrate Russian irregular armed formations into the Russian Armed Forces.

A Russian insider source claimed that deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin used to participate in the release of wealthy inmates and crime bosses from prison under the pretext that they would go fight in Ukraine.[56] The source claimed that wealthy and influential prisoners could purchase parole in return for claiming to participate in combat in Ukraine. The sources claimed that the market for parole purchases has seemingly shut down following Prigozhin’s death.

NOTE: Flightradar24 incorrectly reported that a Pouya Air aircraft flew to Russian-occupied Crimea on September 7.[57] This announcement changes ISW’s September 8 assessment that the aircraft was possibly transferring military materials and/or personnel to Russian positions in Crimea. Iran continues to supply Russia with military equipment via other routes, such as the Caspian Sea route, however.[58]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continue to deport children from occupied areas of Ukraine to Russia under the guise of recreational programs. A source affiliated with the Kherson Oblast occupation administration announced on September 12 that 37 children from the Skadovsk Raion of occupied Kherson Oblast went on a 21-day “recreational vacation” to the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic and will receive medical and psychological assistance at the “Rainbow” rehabilitation center.[59] The occupation source posted footage of the children accompanied by an individual in military uniform, suggesting that Russian security forces are overseeing such “trips.” ISW continues to assess that any removals of children from their homeland during the course of military conflicts by the occupying power is inherently coercive, and therefore inherently deportation and a violation of international law.[60]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarus appears to continue efforts to leverage the Wagner Group. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on September 12 that representatives of the Wagner Group taught tactical medicine classes as part of the ongoing “Voenkor-2023” special tactical exercises.[61] The Ukrainian Resistance Center additionally reported that former Wagner fighters who have recently joined the Belarusian “GardService” private military company (PMC) are signing contracts to deploy to an unspecified central African country to guard facilities and train local soldiers.[62]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.