Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 13, 2024

Apr 13, 2024 - ISW Press
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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 13, 2024

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

April 13, 2024, 7:45pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on April 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 14 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

This update considers some most dangerous courses of action (MDCOAs) that could occur if Ukrainian forces continue to suffer from critical shortages in essential artillery, air defense, and other munitions and systems. ISW is not currently forecasting that these MDCOAs will occur, and, on the contrary, assesses that they are very unlikely to occur if additional US and Western aid is rapidly forthcoming. Current Ukrainian shortages of shells and air defense systems, however, have increased the likelihood of these MDCOAs to the level at which they demand careful consideration. These MDCOAs have become more likely because of acute Ukrainian shortages of materiel and manpower rather than because of improvements in Russian tactical or technical capabilities.

Russian forces are pursuing at least three operational-level efforts that are not mutually reinforcing but let Russian forces prioritize grinding, tactical gains on a single sector of their choice at a time. Ukrainian forces will increasingly struggle to defend against these Russian efforts the longer Ukraine lacks further US military assistance. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on April 13 that the situation in eastern Ukraine has significantly worsened in recent days and that Russian forces are conducting mechanized attacks in the Lyman, Bakhmut, and Pokrovsk (west of Avdiivka) directions.[1] Syrskyi stated that hot and dry weather conditions have made most open terrain accessible to Russian tanks and that Russian forces are dedicating new units to achieving tactical successes despite heavy losses. The Russian efforts in the Lyman, Chasiv Yar, and Pokrovsk directions each pursue operationally significant objectives, but these operations are not mutually supporting, and Russian forces still seem to be alternating emphasis among the different operational directions rather than leaning into all three at any given time.[2] Ukrainian forces have successfully defended against prior Russian operational-level offensive efforts of this sort when they had the resources the US is currently withholding, forcing these efforts to culminate before they could achieve operationally significant results.[3] Ukrainian forces currently struggle with significant shortages of both artillery shells and air defense means, both of which are critical components of their defense, and Russian forces are capitalizing on these shortages and improved weather conditions.[4]

The Russian military command likely assesses that Ukrainian forces will be unable to defend against current and future Russian offensive operations due to delays in or the permanent end of US military assistance. Russian forces have recently periodically shifted their focus among offensive operations in the Lyman, Chasiv Yar, and Pokrovsk directions; Russian forces first prioritized the capture of Avdiivka in early 2024, alongside simultaneous but less intense operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, then leaned into the Lyman direction while slightly decreasing the tempo near Avdiivka, and now are intensifying efforts to seize Chasiv Yar in March-April 2024.[5] Though Russian forces likely lack the ability to conduct more than one simultaneous effective large-scale operational effort as they have throughout the war, Russian forces are now able to use multiple alternating offensive efforts to stretch Ukrainian defensive capabilities amid Ukrainian artillery and air defense shortages.[6] The current pattern of Russian offensive operations allows elements of units participating in less intensive efforts to rest and reconstitute while other units, presumably those that are more rested or those that have recently received reinforcements. They can then intensify efforts in another operational direction, forcing Ukrainian forces to reallocate their defensive resources across the theater and creating vulnerabilities that Russian forces can exploit. Russian forces are reportedly developing operational- and strategic-level reserves capable of sustaining ongoing offensive operations in Ukraine, likely to support an anticipated spring-summer offensive effort.[7] ISW continues to assess that these reserves are unlikely to be ready to act as a first-echelon penetration force or second-echelon exploitation force capable of conducting large-scale mechanized assaults in 2024 as long as Ukrainian forces have the wherewithal to resist them.[8] Russian forces would more likely use these reserves to restaff or reinforce existing formations and continue grinding, infantry-led assaults with occasional limited mechanized pushes in their direction of choice at key moments. If the United States does not resume providing aid to Ukraine and Ukrainian forces continue to lack essential artillery and air defense munitions in particular, however, even badly-trained and poorly-equipped Russian troops might be able to conduct successful offensive operations.

The offensive effort to seize Chasiv Yar offers Russian forces the most immediate prospects for operationally significant advances as the seizure of the town would likely allow Russian forces to launch subsequent offensive operations against the cities that form in effect a significant Ukrainian defensive belt in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces have long aimed to capture a group of major cities in Donetsk Oblast that include Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostyantynivka, and the Russian military initially attempted and failed to conduct a wide operational encirclement of Ukrainian forces in eastern Donetsk Oblast by driving on Slovyansk in spring 2022.[9] The Ukrainian liberation of Izyum, Kharkiv Oblast and further advances in northern Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts during the fall of 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive disrupted Russian plans to resume efforts to drive on the northern edge of this Ukrainian “fortress” belt.[10] Russian forces continued their drive towards the southern portion of the Donetsk Oblast “fortress” belt with their attritional, months-long effort to seize Bakhmut, but the seizure of the city and the culmination of Russian offensive operations in the area in May 2023 did not allow Russian forces to immediately threaten the southern edge of the “fortress“ belt.[11] Russian forces began localized offensive operations west of Bakhmut in November 2023 and are now operating on the eastern outskirts of Chasiv Yar. The Russian seizure of Chasiv Yar would allow Russian forces to begin attacking the southern “fortress” cities in the Ukrainian defensive belt directly. Chasiv Yar is roughly seven kilometers from Kostyantynivka (the southernmost “fortress” city) and roughly 20 kilometers from Druzhkivka. Russian forces could launch subsequent offensive operations directly on Druzhkivka or Kostyantynivka after some period of rest and replenishment following the possible seizure of Chasiv Yar. Russian forces could also drive on Oleksiilevo-Druzhkivka (15km west of Chasiv Yar) in an effort to cut off and isolate Kostyantynivka from the rest of the “fortress” belt and set conditions for the operational encirclement of the city. These options depend on the Russian seizure of Chasiv Yar, however, which is not certain.

 

Russian threats to Druzhkivka and Kostyantynivka are very operationally significant since these “fortress” cities help form the backbone of the Ukrainian defense in Donetsk Oblast and of eastern Ukraine in general. The isolation of Kostyantynivka or the outright seizure of the settlement would likely significantly degrade Ukraine’s ability to hold the frontline further south in Donetsk Oblast as it would sever a major ground line of communication along the H-20 (Kostyantynivka-Donetsk City) highway and require Ukrainian forces to commit a significant portion of manpower and materiel to the defense of the remaining “fortress” belt and relatively less fortified areas of central and western Donetsk Oblast. Russian advances through Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka and then further west into Donetsk Oblast would likely present Russian forces with greater opportunities to collapse the Ukrainian frontline in Donetsk Oblast and possibly restore relatively rapid maneuver to the battlefield in pursuit of seizing all of Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces will be challenged to seize either city rapidly as long as Ukrainian forces have the wherewithal to defend them, however. ISW is not forecasting that the Russians will be able to seize either city in the near term. Russian advances further west of these “fortress” cities into Donetsk Oblast could also present Russian forces with opportunities to make offensive operations along diverging axes along the Donetsk Oblast frontline mutually supporting an offensive push on Pokrovsk and the western borders of Donetsk Oblast. The possible Russian seizure of Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka would significantly degrade Ukraine’s operational position even if the frontline then stabilized since the possible Russian seizure of these cities would present Russian forces with more secure positions from which threaten a wider area of Donetsk Oblast that is more sparsely populated and offers less advantageous terrain to defend. These cities, even after the likely widescale destruction that a Russian offensive operation would cause, would present opportunities for Russian forces to establish a significant defensive line that could materially degrade the prospects for Ukrainian counteroffensive operations to retake them. The threat to Druzhkivka and Kostyantynivka presents a potential major operational setback for Ukraine that would be very challenging to reverse. ISW is neither forecasting that Russian forces will seize Chasiv Yar nor forecasting that Russian forces will be able to threaten or even seize Kostyantynivka or Druzhkivka. ISW offers these considerations of the threat that the Russian seizure of Chasiv Yar would present because they are a plausible most dangerous course of action (MDCOA) especially if the US does not rapidly resume the provision of military assistance to Ukraine.

Russian forces may not be able to seize Chasiv Yar rapidly and would likely struggle to leverage its operational significance immediately as long as Ukrainian forces have the resources needed to hold their positions. The Russian Southern Grouping of Forces and substantial elements of the Russian Airborne (VDV) forces are currently responsible for offensive operations from northeast of Bakhmut to southeast of Chasiv Yar, and elements of the 98th VDV Division, 11th VDV Brigade, the 150th Motorized Rifle Division’s 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are attacking the immediate outskirts of Chasiv Yar.[12] Elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (Northern Fleet) and Volunteer Corps and limited elements of the 98th VDV Division are attempting to advance on Chasiv Yar from the northeast, and elements of the 83rd VDV Brigade, the Luhansk People’s Republic 2nd Army Corps (AC), and the 3rd AC are currently attempting to recapture territory southeast of Chasiv Yar and push Ukrainian forces across the Siversky-Donets Donbas Canal.[13] Russian forces appear to have committed their most combat-effective elements in the area to frontal assaults on Chasiv Yar, and these frontal assaults will likely produce gradual gains at attritional costs as long as Ukrainian defenders have essential materiel. The elements that Russian forces have currently concentrated northeast and southeast of Chasiv Yar are relatively less combat effective and will struggle to make advances similar to those made east of Chasiv Yar against supplied Ukrainian defenders. Russian tactical gains east of Chasiv Yar have not set conditions for an encirclement or envelopment of the settlement, and Russian forces would likely have to make notable tactical gains southeast and northwest of Chasiv Yar before pursuing an envelopment or encirclement of the settlement, which may require additional and combat effective units and formations. Available imagery, which ISW will not present or describe in greater detail at this time to preserve Ukrainian operational security, shows that Ukrainian forces have established significant fortifications in a ring shape in the Chasiv Yar area, and Russian forces will likely struggle to rapidly break through these defenses at their current offensive tempo in the area as long as Ukrainian forces have the ammunition needed to resist.[14] In the absence of significant new Russian deployments, Russian forces will likely have to fight their way directly through the town or attempt a narrow tactical-level turning movement, which would force Russian forces to contend with Chasiv Yar’s fortifications, elevated Ukrainian positions, and the obstacle of the Siversky-Donets Donbas Canal.

The possible Russian seizure of Chasiv Yar in itself does not allow Russian forces to conduct a successful operation to threaten Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka, and Russian forces would likely need to set other operational conditions to threaten the southern “fortress” cities. The Russian seizure of Chasiv Yar would create a notable salient, and a Russian attempt to advance further west immediately from Chasiv Yar would make that salient increasingly vulnerable to Ukrainian counterattacks. Russian forces would likely need to recapture territory that Russian forces lost southeast of Chasiv Yar during the summer 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive to stabilize the advancing Russian front, an effort that elements of the 83rd VDV Brigade, 2nd AC, and 3rd AC have struggled to pursue. Russian attempts to advance towards Kostyantynivka would likely allow Ukrainian forces to use positions in the Toretsk-Pivnichne area to interdict and threaten rear Russian logistics lines and possibly isolate the immediate battlespace west of Chasiv Yar. The terrain between Chasiv Yar and the southern edge of the Ukrainian “fortress” belt is predominantly open fields with limited cover and concealment, which would likely require Russian forces to conduct effective mechanized maneuver to advance up to the cities. Ukrainian forces have demonstrated their ability to repel intensive Russian mechanized assaults and degrade Russian logistics when well-provisioned, and the Russian ability to leverage the operational significance of Chasiv Yar likely rests in large part on whether the US will resume security assistance to Ukraine.[15]

Ukrainian artillery and air defense shortages resulting from the lack of US security assistance are allowing Russian mechanized forces to make marginal tactical advances, and future Russian mechanized assaults may be able to achieve more significant gains should the US continue to withhold assistance to Ukraine. Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces are strengthening the “most problematic” areas at the front with electronic warfare (EW) systems, air defense systems, drones, and anti-tank missiles.[16] Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces also need to improve the quality of their training, especially for infantry units to optimize their use of limited and dwindling Western-supplied weapons and equipment. The Telegraph reported on April 12 that a Ukrainian lieutenant colonel stated at the end of February 2024 that Russian forces often have three times as many artillery shells as Ukrainian forces and that some Ukrainian artillery units only have enough shells to strike a single Russian mechanized assault group out of several Russian mechanized groups, forcing the Ukrainians to use small arms to defend against subsequent Russian mechanized assaults.[17] A Russian Storm-Z instructor stated on April 13 that recent Russian mechanized assaults have achieved tactical successes but have been unable to make significant advances due to Ukrainian counterattacks, the exhaustion of Russian fire support during the assault, and the incompetence of Russian forces that are meant to consolidate gained positions.[18] The instructor stated that recent Russian tactical advances are not the result of improvements in the quality of Russian combat capabilities, increases in Russian technical means, or the optimization of Russian organizational structures but are rather due to Russia’s increased use of glide bombs and constraints on Ukrainian artillery fire resulting from the lack of US supplies. The instructor claimed that Ukrainian forces are attempting to compensate for their decreased firepower by increasing their use of strike drones but noted that Ukrainian drones are able to strike but not destroy Russian armored vehicles, as ISW has previously observed.[19]

ISW continues to assess that continued delays in US security assistance are specifically impacting Ukraine’s ability to respond to an increased tempo of Russian mechanized assaults in eastern Ukraine.[20] Sparse and inconsistent Ukrainian air defense coverage along the front resulting from shortages in Ukrainian air defense systems and missiles has facilitated Russia’s intensification of guided and unguided glide bomb strikes, which Russian forces used to tactical effect in their seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024 and which Russian forces are using again during their current offensive operations near Chasiv Yar.[21] Ukrainian forces have also suffered from ongoing artillery ammunition shortages, which they have partially mitigated by using first person view (FPV) drones to blunt Russian infantry and armored vehicle assaults.[22] ISW continues to assess, however, that while Ukrainian FPV drones are likely able to temporarily render armored vehicles hors de combat, the relatively light payloads on the current FPV drones are unlikely to destroy armored vehicles very often.[23] Ukrainian forces have been partially able to repel the recently increased tempo of Russian mechanized assaults despite these shortages but will likely be unable to continue to defend against Russian mechanized assaults as effectively in the future should delays in US security assistance continue.

Ukrainian forces have previously demonstrated their ability to repel Russian mechanized assaults and inflict significant equipment losses on Russian forces when adequately provisioned. Ukrainian forces destroyed significant elements of a Russian motorized rifle brigade that tried to cross a pontoon bridge over the Siverskyi Donets River in 2022, and Russian forces lost at least 130 tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) during a three-week offensive near Vuhledar in 2023.[24] Ukrainian forces were recently able to inflict serious armored vehicle losses during several waves of Russian mechanized assaults on Avdiivka in fall 2023 before artillery shortages worsened through the winter into the spring of 2024.[25] ISW has generally observed that recent Russian mechanized assaults have exhibited the same tactical patterns that have previously resulted in large Russian vehicle losses in 2022 and 2023, and Ukrainian forces are therefore likely able to repeat their previous successes against Russian mechanized assaults should the US provide Ukraine with the necessary assistance.[26]

Germany announced that it will immediately transfer another Patriot air defense system to Ukraine in response to recent very urgent Ukrainian requests for additional Patriot systems to defend against the increased Russian strike campaign amid ongoing Ukrainian efforts to expand Ukraine’s air defense capabilities. The German Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on April 13 that Germany will immediately transfer another Patriot system to Ukraine to defend against the ongoing increased Russian strike campaign against the Ukrainian energy grid.[27] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky later clarified that the Patriot system includes an unspecified number of missiles and that Germany and Ukraine are discussing the provision of an additional IRIS-T air defense system.[28] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius stated that the Russian strike campaign against Ukrainian citizens and infrastructure is endangering Ukraine’s energy supply and destroying defense industrial facilities that are critical to Ukraine’s operational readiness.[29] Zelensky and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba recently called on Ukraine’s Western allies to send Ukraine more Patriot batteries to protect Ukrainian cities and frontline areas, particularly Kharkiv City, from Russian ballistic missiles.[30] Kuleba stated on April 10 that Ukraine urgently needs seven Patriot batteries, and the additional German-provided Patriot system will significantly ease, but not resolve, the strain on Ukraine‘s air defense umbrella and the limited number of Patriot batteries currently in Ukraine.[31] Advisor to the Head of the Ukrainian President’s Office Mykhaylo Podolyak stated during an interview on April 13 that Ukraine has not run out of Patriot and IRIS-T missiles, but that Ukraine’s supply of Western air defense missiles is “in deficit.”[32] Former Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat warned in January 2024 that Ukraine began rationing its air defense equipment and ammunition and used a considerable amount of Ukraine’s existing air defense missile stockpile in defending against several large Russian drone and missile strike series in the first two weeks of January.[33] Recent large-scale Russian strikes have likely only further degraded Ukraine’s air defense missile stockpiles, and the German MoD and Zelensky did not specify how many additional Patriot missiles Germany is sending to Ukraine alongside the system.

Ukrainian officials also continue to discuss their envisioned use of F-16 and other fixed wing aircraft as part of Ukraine’s broader air defense umbrella. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Major Ilya Yevlash stated on April 13 that Ukraine needs at least 150 aircraft to effectively conduct air operations and noted that the Ukrainian Air Force will base its rearmament around F-16s, Swedish produced Gripen multirole fixed-wing aircraft, and other aircraft.[34] Yevlash stated that Ukraine will use F-16s to augment existing Ukrainian ground-based air defenses defending against Russian Shahed-136/131 drones and cruise and guided missiles and to constrain Russian aviation operations. Yevlash noted that even two squadrons, roughly 18 aircraft, could significantly influence the situation in the Ukrainian air space and ease pressure on strained Ukrainian air defense systems. Zelensky stated on April 6 that the promised F-16 fighter jets from Ukraine’s Western partners only account for 10 percent of the fighter aircraft that Ukraine would need to defeat the Russian aviation threat.[35] Zelensky suggested that Ukraine will need a combination of air defense systems and fighter aircraft to defeat the Russian aviation threat. Some of the promised European-provided F-16s are expected to arrive in Ukraine in the summer of 2024, although ISW continues to assess that only the United States can rapidly provide aircraft and air defense systems to Ukraine at the scale necessary to significantly improve Ukraine’s air defense capabilities.[36]

Key Takeaways:

  • Russian forces are pursuing at least three operational-level efforts that are not mutually reinforcing but let Russian forces prioritize grinding, tactical gains on a single sector of their choice at a time. Ukrainian forces will increasingly struggle to defend against these Russian efforts the longer Ukraine lacks further US military assistance.
  • The Russian military command likely assesses that Ukrainian forces will be unable to defend against current and future Russian offensive operations due to delays in or the permanent end of US military assistance.
  • The offensive effort to seize Chasiv Yar offers Russian forces the most immediate prospects for operationally significant advances as the seizure of the town would likely allow Russian forces to launch subsequent offensive operations against the cities that form in effect a significant Ukrainian defensive belt in Donetsk Oblast.
  • Russian threats to Druzhkivka and Kostyantynivka are very operationally significant since these “fortress” cities help form the backbone of the Ukrainian defense in Donetsk Oblast and of eastern Ukraine in general.
  • Russian forces may not be able to seize Chasiv Yar rapidly and would likely struggle to leverage its operational significance immediately as long as Ukrainian forces have the resources needed to hold their positions.
  • Ukrainian artillery and air defense shortages resulting from the lack of US security assistance are allowing Russian mechanized forces to make marginal tactical advances, and future Russian mechanized assaults may be able to achieve more significant gains should the US continue to withhold assistance to Ukraine.
  • Germany announced that it will immediately transfer another Patriot air defense system to Ukraine in response to recent very urgent Ukrainian requests for additional Patriot systems to defend against the increased Russian strike campaign and ongoing Ukrainian efforts to expand Ukraine’s air defense capabilities.
  • Russian forces made confirmed advances near Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut) and Donetsk City.
  • Bloomberg reported on April 12 that Russia still relies on Chinese companies to supply most of the foreign-produced machine tool components and microelectronics to Russia’s defense industry for Russian weapons production.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Russian Technological Adaptations
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas
  • Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
  • Russian Information Operations and Narratives
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional engagements continued near Kreminna on April 13, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued west of Kreminna near Terny and Torske and south of Kreminna near Dibrova, the Serebryanske forest area, and Bilohorivka.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction.[38]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a Storm Shadow strike against the Luhansk Machine Building Plant in Luhansk City on April 13.[39] Geolocated footage published on April 13 shows a smoke plume and fires near the Luhansk Machine Building Plant in Luhansk City.[40] Russian occupation officials claimed that Ukrainian forces targeted the Luhansk Machine Building Plant, which Russian authorities had been preparing to reopen soon.[41]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Note: ISW will be orientating activity in the immediate Bakhmut area around Chasiv Yar for the foreseeable future as ISW assesses that the seizure of Chasiv Yar is the current Russian operational objective in the area.

Positional fighting continued northeast of Bakhmut on April 13. Positional fighting continued east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and Spirne, and south of Siversk near Rozdolivka.[42] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are operating north of Vesele (southeast of Siversk).[43]

 

Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Chasiv Yar and continued offensive operations in the area on April 13. Geolocated footage published on April 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[44] Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces advanced to the northern outskirts of Bohdanivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar) on the evening of April 12 but failed to establish footholds in the area, and the Ukrainian officials stressed that Ukrainian forces still control the settlement.[45] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces seized Bohdanivka and advanced closer to Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar) and further west of Ivanivske (east of Chasiv Yar).[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered the Kanal microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar), although ISW has not observed further Russian advances on the outskirts of the Kanal microraion since April 4.[47] Fighting also continued near the Novyi microraion (southeastern Chasiv Yar); southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka, Opytne, and Andriivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Pivdenne.[48] Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Ivanivske.[49] Elements of the Russian 331st VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) and elements of the 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating on the eastern outskirts of Chasiv Yar.[50]

 

Russian forces reportedly advanced west and southwest of Avdiivka on April 13, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 13 that elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces seized Pervomaiske, although ISW assessed that Russian forces captured the settlement as of April 9.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced on the southern outskirts of Novokalynove (northwest of Adiivka), in the western outskirts of Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka), further west within Semenivka (west of Avdiivka), and south of Pervomaiske (southwest of Avdiivka) along the E-50 (Donetsk City-Pokrovsk) highway.[52] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 4.95 kilometers in width and 1.6km in depth towards Umanske and Yasnobrodivka (west of Avdiivka).[53] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these Russian claims. Fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novokalynove, Novobakhmutivka, and Berdychi; west of Avdiivka near Semenivka, Umanske, and Yasnobrodivka; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Netaylove.[54] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Avdiivka direction stated that Ukrainian forces repelled mechanized Russian assaults of unspecified size in the Avdiivka direction and destroyed a column of an unspecified number of Russian armored vehicles.[55] Elements of the Russian 41st CAA (Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Avdiivka direction.[56]

 

Russian forces recently advanced west and southwest of Donetsk City and continued offensive operations in the area on April 13. Geolocated footage published on April 13 indicates that Russian forces recently made marginal gains on the southeastern outskirts of Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City).[57] Geolocated footage published on April 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced during at least squad-sized mechanized assaults north of Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[58] Fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka, Kostyantynivka (west of Novomykhailivka), and Vodyane.[59] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Marinka direction.[60]

 

Positional fighting continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on April 13 amid claims of intensified Russian offensive activity in the area. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske and Urozhaine.[61] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the outskirts of Urozhaine, and another milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered Urozhaine a few days ago but that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces out of the settlement.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces destroyed a bridge between Velyka Novosilka and Vremivka, and geolocated footage published on April 13 shows Russian forces striking a bridge over the Mokri Yaly River northeast of Vremivka.[63] Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Urozhaine.[64]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 13, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Fighting continued near Robotyne, where a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwards along Silska Street.[65] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from positions northwest of Verbove (northeast of Robotyne) and that Ukrainian forces are now four kilometers from the settlement.[66] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim, however. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces are assessing Ukraine’s strength on the Robotyne-Verbove line and that Russian forces have not established lasting positions in Robotyne.[67]

 

Positional fighting continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near Krynky on April 13.[68]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Bloomberg reported on April 12 that Russia still relies on Chinese companies to supply most of the foreign-produced machine tool components and microelectronics to Russia’s defense industry for Russian weapons production.[69] A source familiar with US intelligence told Bloomberg that 70 percent of Russia’s machine tool imports and 90 percent of Russia’s microelectronic imports came from China in the last quarter of 2023 (October-December). The source stated that Chinese companies are also working to produce drones in Russia. Sources familiar with US intelligence told Bloomberg that there is no evidence that Chinese firms are supplying Russia with lethal assistance but noted that the Russian defense industry would struggle without Chinese imports. Bloomberg reported on April 6 that China has provided Russia with microelectronics, optics, machine tools for tanks, propellants for missiles, and nitrocellulose — an intermediary good used in producing gunpower and explosives.[70] Russian imports of Chinese-made electronic components and machine tools are likely part of Russia’s efforts to address its reliance on sanctioned, Western-produced precision machine tools and components in the short-term as Russia works to develop its domestic production capacity for these products in the long-term.[71]

The United States and United Kingdom (UK) continue to issue sanctions aimed at reducing Russia’s war chest. The US Department of Treasury and UK announced on April 12 that the United States and UK issued new sanctions prohibiting the import of Russian origin aluminum, copper, and nickel and limiting the use of these three Russian origin metals on global metal exchanges and in over-the-counter derivatives trading.[72]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied area today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo announced on April 12 that Belgian prosecutors are investigating Russian interference in the June 2024 European Parliament election.[73] De Croo stated that Belgian intelligence services have discovered pro-Russian interference networks operating in Belgium and several other unspecified European countries to promote pro-Russian candidates in the elections. De Croo stated that Czech authorities found that Kremlin-affiliated actors paid European members of parliament to promote pro-Russian policies.

Kremlin officials continue to falsely implicate the West and Ukraine as sponsoring terrorism following the Crocus City Hall attack. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova continued to promote the Russian claim that the West and Ukraine have financed terrorist attacks in Russia and abroad “for many years.”[74]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://t.me/osirskiy/650

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053123; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050423; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032223

[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2023

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032224

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040524

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2023

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2024

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2024

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut

[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2024

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2024

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-1-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2024

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032124 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15-2024%C2%A0

[16] https://t.me/osirskiy/650

[17] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/04/12/only-crowdfunded-drones-holding-the-russians-back-ukraine/

[18] https://t.me/philologist_zov/914

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041024

[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2024

[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041124

[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041024

[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041024

[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-1-2023

[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar102623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120723

[26] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2024

[27] https://twitter.com/bmvg_bundeswehr/status/1779135302776271134?s=46&t=4wmqwhVOM9naZdo-cYGVgw ; https://liveblog dot zdf.de/aktuelles-zum-ukraine-konflikt/131967/

[28] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/10078; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/10077

[29] https://twitter.com/bmvg_bundeswehr/status/1779135302776271134?s=46&t=4wmqwhVOM9naZdo-cYGVgw ; https://liveblog dot zdf.de/aktuelles-zum-ukraine-konflikt/131967/

[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041124 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041024

[31] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041124 ; https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-says-identified-100-patriots-allies-could-spare-against-russia-2024-4

[32] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/13/ukraine-air-defences-overwhelmed-as-russia-pounds-power-stations

[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2024

[34] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/13/u-povitryanyh-sylah-rozpovily-skilky-litakiv-potribno-ukrayini/

[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2024

[36] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032224

[37] https://t.me/mod_russia/37593 ; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/18163 ; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/18163 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ey2EF1YntemgHf3tZsqbrD3BE1uRj1LzRvgxMtseC4D628RuyigGxvnaY18pnDmMl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0bMLBxKD4rJo7cUT2xL17TY4AR2ifq7ecPyy91tKcQpBfj76777Bn8Pmpojw3Gxt6l

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CxpiQbQkYByr9yYMoF8UwH5TYxHdCtLFLdtJMDwB88gVXKV76zrxTBTpRwxkUkQGl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ey2EF1YntemgHf3tZsqbrD3BE1uRj1LzRvgxMtseC4D628RuyigGxvnaY18pnDmMl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0bMLBxKD4rJo7cUT2xL17TY4AR2ifq7ecPyy91tKcQpBfj76777Bn8Pmpojw3Gxt6l

[39] https://t.me/rybar/59128 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/39888 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/39885 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/65973 ;https://t.me/tass_agency/243600 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/243601 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/243604; https://t.me/tass_agency/243605 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/120233 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/243616; https://t.me/tass_agency/243621

[40] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1779067582210818263; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1779077063778934963            

[41] https://t.me/tass_agency/243610 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/39890 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/21621; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9498 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/119996 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/65979 ; https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/2306 ; https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/2307 ; . https://t.me/boris_rozhin/119982 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/120237

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CxpiQbQkYByr9yYMoF8UwH5TYxHdCtLFLdtJMDwB88gVXKV76zrxTBTpRwxkUkQGl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ey2EF1YntemgHf3tZsqbrD3BE1uRj1LzRvgxMtseC4D628RuyigGxvnaY18pnDmMl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0bMLBxKD4rJo7cUT2xL17TY4AR2ifq7ecPyy91tKcQpBfj76777Bn8Pmpojw3Gxt6l ; https://t.me/dva_majors/39863 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/39865 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9499

[43] https://t.me/mod_russia/37588

[44] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1778861219790623013; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/97; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5108

[45] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/102 ; https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/9288 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/13/bogdanivka-pid-kontrolem-syl-oborony-za-selo-tryvayut-intensyvni-boyi/

[46] https://t.me/z_arhiv/26509 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9513 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9499 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9496 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/39863

[47] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9496

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ey2EF1YntemgHf3tZsqbrD3BE1uRj1LzRvgxMtseC4D628RuyigGxvnaY18pnDmMl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0bMLBxKD4rJo7cUT2xL17TY4AR2ifq7ecPyy91tKcQpBfj76777Bn8Pmpojw3Gxt6l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CxpiQbQkYByr9yYMoF8UwH5TYxHdCtLFLdtJMDwB88gVXKV76zrxTBTpRwxkUkQGl ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9496 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37593; https://t.me/tass_agency/243611

[49] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/65932 (Ivanivske)

[50] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/65932 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/65956 (Chasiv Yar)

[51] https://t.me/mod_russia/37593 ;

[52] https://t.me/rybar/59130 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/21620

[53] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9485; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9486

[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CxpiQbQkYByr9yYMoF8UwH5TYxHdCtLFLdtJMDwB88gVXKV76zrxTBTpRwxkUkQGl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ey2EF1YntemgHf3tZsqbrD3BE1uRj1LzRvgxMtseC4D628RuyigGxvnaY18pnDmMl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0bMLBxKD4rJo7cUT2xL17TY4AR2ifq7ecPyy91tKcQpBfj76777Bn8Pmpojw3Gxt6l ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37593; https://t.me/tass_agency/243611 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/39863 ; https://t.me/rybar/59130 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/120003 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/16769 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19329 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9485; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9486 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/55600

[55] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/13/pryloty-po-lugansku-tro-kontratakuvala-na-doneczkomu-napryamku-strim-iz-pryfrontovoyi-studiyi/

[56] https://t.me/wargonzo/19333; https://t.me/wargonzo/19338

[57] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1779107560462950480; https://x.com/small10space/status/1779053919638839695

[58] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/7819; https://t.me/BULAVA72b/96; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1779191850349240387;

[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ey2EF1YntemgHf3tZsqbrD3BE1uRj1LzRvgxMtseC4D628RuyigGxvnaY18pnDmMl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0bMLBxKD4rJo7cUT2xL17TY4AR2ifq7ecPyy91tKcQpBfj76777Bn8Pmpojw3Gxt6l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CxpiQbQkYByr9yYMoF8UwH5TYxHdCtLFLdtJMDwB88gVXKV76zrxTBTpRwxkUkQGl ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37593 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/13/pryloty-po-lugansku-tro-kontratakuvala-na-doneczkomu-napryamku-strim-iz-pryfrontovoyi-studiyi/

[60] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/65972 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/119959 (Marinka direction)

[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ey2EF1YntemgHf3tZsqbrD3BE1uRj1LzRvgxMtseC4D628RuyigGxvnaY18pnDmMl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0bMLBxKD4rJo7cUT2xL17TY4AR2ifq7ecPyy91tKcQpBfj76777Bn8Pmpojw3Gxt6l https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CxpiQbQkYByr9yYMoF8UwH5TYxHdCtLFLdtJMDwB88gVXKV76zrxTBTpRwxkUkQGl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/39863

[62] https://t.me/motopatriot/21637 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19329

[63] https://t.me/rybar/59112 ; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1779039144389337596 ; https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1779052849948733830

[64] https://t.me/voin_dv/7903

[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ey2EF1YntemgHf3tZsqbrD3BE1uRj1LzRvgxMtseC4D628RuyigGxvnaY18pnDmMl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0bMLBxKD4rJo7cUT2xL17TY4AR2ifq7ecPyy91tKcQpBfj76777Bn8Pmpojw3Gxt6l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CxpiQbQkYByr9yYMoF8UwH5TYxHdCtLFLdtJMDwB88gVXKV76zrxTBTpRwxkUkQGl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9500

[66] https://t.me/motopatriot/21624

[67] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/13/yim-tam-ne-radi-nataliya-gumenyuk-pro-pronyknennya-dyversantiv-u-robotyne/

[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CxpiQbQkYByr9yYMoF8UwH5TYxHdCtLFLdtJMDwB88gVXKV76zrxTBTpRwxkUkQGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ey2EF1YntemgHf3tZsqbrD3BE1uRj1LzRvgxMtseC4D628RuyigGxvnaY18pnDmMl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0bMLBxKD4rJo7cUT2xL17TY4AR2ifq7ecPyy91tKcQpBfj76777Bn8Pmpojw3Gxt6l

[69] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-12/us-warns-china-providing-russia-with-drone-missile-components

[70] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040724

[71] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040724

[72] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2249#:~:text=U.S.%20Department%20of%20the%20Treasury,-Search&text=This%20new%20action%20prohibits%20the,%2Dthe%2Dcounter%20derivatives%20trading.; https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-us-to-clamp-down-harder-on-the-trade-of-russian-metals#:~:text=The%20Prime%20Minister%20first%20announced,on%20various%20Russian%20metal%20imports. ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/04/13/ssha-vveli-zapret-na-import-alyuminiya-medi-i-nikelya-rossiyskogo-proishozhdeniya

[73] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/belgium-probing-alleged-russian-interference-eu-election-campaign-2024-04-12/ ; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/12/belgium-investigates-alleged-russian-payments-to-meps

[74] https://t.me/MID_Russia/38638 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2024

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Ukraine Project