Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 30, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 30, 2024

Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

April 30, 2024, 7:10pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on April 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces did not make any confirmed advances in the Avdiivka area on April 30 for the first time in several days, while Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces conducted several more attacks in the Bakhmut-Chasiv Yar direction than near Avdiivka. The Ukrainian General Staff’s morning and evening reports on April 30 stated that Ukrainian forces repelled a total of 47 Russian attacks in the Avdiivka direction and 57 Russian attacks in the Bakhmut direction throughout the day, notably a much higher number of attacks in the Chasiv Yar direction than Ukrainian sources have recently reported out on.[1] One day’s worth of reporting is not sufficient to establish a pattern, but it may suggest that Russian forces are somewhat slowing down the rate of attacks around Avdiivka while re-committing to offensive pushes around Chasiv Yar, as ISW recently forecasted they would.[2] Russian forces have focused on building on tactical success near Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka) and Novokalynove (north of Avdiivka) since around April 20, but the rate of confirmed advances appears to have slowed as of April 30. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 2.7 kilometers wide and 1.52 kilometers deep north of Novokalynove; in southern Keramik (north of Avdiivka); and in an area up to 1.75 kilometers wide and 1.15 kilometers deep northwest of Ocheretyne in the direction of Novooleksandriivka.[3] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Semenivka and Berdychi (both northwest of Avdiivka).[4] ISW has not observed visual evidence of any of these claims. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating near Ocheretyne are 13 kilometers from the T-0504 (Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka) highway, which is consistent with ISW‘s assessed Russian advances in the area.[5] Fighting also continued northwest of Avdiivka near Arkhanhelske, Sokil, and Solovyove west of Avdiivka near Umanske, and southwest of Avdiivka near Netaylove.[6] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) and 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are operating near Novokalynove and Keramik; elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) are attacking toward Novooleksandrivka; elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA) are operating near Solovyove, Berdychi, and Semenivka; elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA) are operating near Berdychi; and elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are operating west of Orlivka.[7]

Russian forces may decide to push from their salient north of Avdiivka towards the Toretsk area to complement Russian offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, which would likely require Russian forces to conduct a tactical pause to concentrate forces for such a drive. Mashovets stated that Russian forces may focus their efforts on the Stara Mykolaivka-Sukha Balka line (north of the Ochertyne-Keramik line and southwest of Toretsk) instead of northwest of Ocheretyne as Russian forces are already struggling to defend the flanks of their salient near Ocheretyne.[8] ISW recently assessed that Russian forces may decide to advance north from their tactical penetration near Ocheretyne along the H-20 (Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka) highway to pressure Ukrainian forces defending in the Toretsk area and possibly threaten the operational rear of the Ukrainian defense in and west of Chasiv Yar.[9] Chasiv Yar is an operationally significant objective as it would provide Russian forces with a staging ground to launch offensive operations against Druzhkivka and Kostyantynivka, which form the fortress belt of four major cities in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces would likely require a longer pause to reinforce existing units and redeploy additional forces to the Ocheretyne area should they choose to attempt to advance northward to the Toretsk area, however. Mashovets stated that the Russian Central Grouping of Forces (currently responsible for the Avdiivka area) has created a tactical reserve of three small infantry regiments in the Avdiivka direction, and ISW previously assessed that Russian forces have been establishing operational- and strategic-level reserves likely to support an anticipated spring-summer offensive effort.[10]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a short-range MGM-140 ATACMS strike against targets in occupied Crimea on the night of April 29 to 30. Crimean occupation administration head Sergei Aksyonov claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted an ATACMS strike against Simferopol and that Russian forces downed the missiles.[11] Aksyonov claimed that undetonated cluster munitions scattered in the area after air defenses downed the missiles but did not specify if the strike caused any damage. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces launched between 12 and 15 ATACMS missiles targeting Simferopol and the Dzhankoi airfield but claimed that Russian air defenses downed all the missiles.[12] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses destroyed six ATACMS missiles in an unspecified area, likely referring to occupied Crimea.[13] Russia opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian missiles, presumably ATACMS missiles, struck facilities of the Russian 31st Air Defense Division in Chornomorsk and Saky raions and the Dzhankoi airfield, causing a fire and wounding several Russian servicemen.[14] Ukrainian officials have not responded to the reported strike, and ISW cannot independently verify Russian claims about the strike.

Tajik Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin expressed outrage over Russian authorities’ treatment of Central Asian migrants, particularly Tajik citizens, indicating that increased Russian efforts to control migrants living in and entering Russia following the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack are continuing to strain Tajik-Russian relations. Muhriddin stated in an April 30 phone call with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov that Russian authorities are violating Tajik citizens’ rights and freedoms in Russia and noted that such treatment of Tajik citizens in Russia does not comply with the Tajik-Russian Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Relations and Allied Cooperation treaties.[15] Muhriddin called Lavrov’s claim that Russia has not taken measures against specific ethnicities or religious minorities following the Crocus City Hall attack false and stated that Russian authorities have had an “exclusively“ negative reaction to Tajik citizens. ISW observed increased crackdowns against Russian indigenous and migrant Muslim communities after the Crocus City Hall attack, including crackdowns against Tajik migrants.[16] The BBC News Russian Service reported on March 27 that Russian authorities have initiated a significantly increased number of criminal cases for migration law violations since the Crocus attack, particularly against Tajik citizens.[17] The Russian MFA claimed that Lavrov explained to Muhriddin that Russian authorities are temporarily increasing checks on foreigners attempting to enter Russia in an effort to prevent terrorism following the Crocus City Hall attack.[18] The Russian MFA notably did not report Muhriddin’s criticisms of Russian authorities’ treatment of Tajik citizens in Russia, indicating that Russia is likely attempting to downplay the current rift in Tajik-Russian relations but has no intention of scaling back crackdowns.

Former Georgian Prime Minister and founder of the Georgian Dream political party Bidzina Ivanishvili reiterated a series of standard Kremlin information operations during his first public speech since announcing his return to Georgian public politics in December 2023. Ivanishvili claimed during a Georgina Dream rally in support of Georgia’s “foreign agents” bill on April 29 that Western non-governmental organizations (NGOs) orchestrated Georgia’s pro-democracy and pro-Western 2003 Rose Revolution and installed pro-Western governments that held office between 2004 to 2012.[19] Ivanishvili claimed that Western influence and control over Georgia resulted in the persecution of innocent Georgians and that the West ordered and directed all the policies of pro-Western Georgian governments.[20] Ivanishvili claimed that he attempted to free Georgia from Western control during his time as prime minister and returned to politics in order to finish this work. Ivanishvili accused the “global war party,” which he characterized as unspecified Western actors that have a decisive influence over NATO and the European Union (EU), as only seeing Georgia and Ukraine as “cannon fodder” against Russia and forced Georgia and Ukraine into confrontations with Russia in 2008, 2014, and 2022. The “foreign agents” bill, which the Georgian Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee recently approved in its second reading amid continued protests against the bill, will require NGOs that receive more than 20 percent of their funding from foreign sources to register as “an organization pursuing the interests of a foreign power.”[21] The Kremlin made similar baseless claims that the West controls Ukraine and orchestrated “color revolutions” in several post-Soviet countries in an effort to delegitimize pro-Western governments in post-Soviet countries and question the sovereignty of those countries.[22] The Kremlin also routinely accuses the West of using Ukraine as a “proxy” in what the Kremlin views as its long-term, existential confrontation with the West and NATO.[23]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces did not make any confirmed advances in the Avdiivka area on April 30 for the first time in several days, while Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces conducted several more attacks in the Bakhmut-Chasiv Yar direction than near Avdiivka.
• Russian forces may decide to push from their salient north of Avdiivka towards the Toretsk area to complement Russian offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, which would likely require Russian forces to conduct a tactical pause to concentrate forces for such a drive.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a short-range MGM-140 ATACMS strike against targets in occupied Crimea on the night of April 29 to 30.
• Tajik Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin expressed outrage over Russian authorities’ treatment of Central Asian migrants, particularly Tajik citizens, indicating that increased Russian efforts to control migrants living in and entering Russia following the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack are continuing to strain Tajik-Russian relations.
• Former Georgian Prime Minister and founder of the Georgian Dream political party Bidzina Ivanishvili reiterated a series of standard Kremlin information operations during his first public speech since announcing his return to Georgian public politics in December 2023.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kreminna, Chasiv Yar, and Robotyne.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on April 30 that Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Industry and Trade Denis Manturov and First Deputy Defense Minister Ruslan Tsalikov inspected a drone testing ground in an unspecified area of occupied Ukraine.
• An investigation by Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii implicates Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova and her sister in the deportation of special needs Ukrainian adults to Russia.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated on April 30 that there have been about 20,000 Russian troops in Russia on the northern Kharkiv Oblast border and about 100,000 in total in the Kupyansk direction for the past 10 months and that Russian forces have replaced units that have lost their combat capability in the past two months.[24] Synehubov stated that Ukrainian forces are monitoring possible Russian redeployments in this area and noted that Russian forces may be accumulating troops to storm Ukrainian positions. Synehubov also reiterated that it is too early to assess whether Russian forces intend to open a new front, presumably in reference to speculations that Russia may start an offensive against Kharkiv City in the summer.

Positional engagements continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on April 30, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced in central and southeastern Kyslivka (southeast of Kupyansk), but ISW has only observed confirmed Russian advances in the eastern part of the settlement.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 29 that Russian forces control half of Kyslivka, and another milblogger claimed on April 30 that Russian forces control about 75 percent of the settlement.[26] Positional engagements continued northwest of Svatove near Berestove, Krokhmalne, and Stelmakhivka; west of Svatove near Kopanky and Raihorodka; and southwest of Svatove near Tverdokhlibove, Novoserhiivka, Novoyehorivka, Hrekivka, and Nevske.[27] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 1st Tank Regiment (both of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are unsuccessfully attacking northeast of Berestove from Krokhmalne.[28] Mashovets stated that elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA) are operating south of Novoselivske (northwest of Svatove) and are trying to advance to the northern outskirts of Stelmakhivka with support from elements of the 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st GTA) that are operating east of Stelmakhivka. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are operating south of Novoyehorivka, and elements of the 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA) are trying to advance to Makiivka (southwest of Svatove).[29]

Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Kreminna amid continued fighting in the area on April 30. Geolocated footage published on April 30 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced east of Yampolivka (west of Kreminna), retaking positions along a windbreak in the area.[30] Positional engagements continued west of Kreminna near Terny, Torske, and Zarichne; southwest of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[31] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District) pushed Ukrainian forces out of positions south of Dibrova (southwest of Kreminna).[32] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 488th and 283rd motorized rifle regiments (both elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA) are operating east of Terny, and other unspecified elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division are operating near Yampolivka and Torske. Mashovets stated that the Russian command committed elements of the 1234th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division) to the Serebryanske forest area to support elements of the Russian 31st and 33rd motorized rifle regiments (67th Motorized Rifle Division).

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Positional engagements continued in the Siversk direction northeast of Bakhmut on April 30, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and south of Siversk near Rozdolivka.[33] Elements of the Russian 6th and 123rd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) reportedly continue operating near Verkhnokamyanske.[34]

 

Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance near Chasiv Yar amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on April 30. Geolocated footage published on April 29 indicates that Russian forces advanced up to the east side of the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal south of Chasiv Yar in an area where the canal flows underground.[35] A Ukrainian reconnaissance platoon commander operating in the Chasiv Yar area reported on April 30 that Russian special operations forces (SSO) have started to operate more frequently at night and that Russian forces continue efforts to bypass Chasiv Yar from the flanks via Bodanivka from the northeast and Ivanivske from the east and are deploying reinforcements to reach the Siverskyi-Donetsk Donbas Canal.[36] The Ukrainian platoon commander stated that the Russian military first deploys Storm-Z and Storm-V convict units to conduct the first wave of assaults on Chasiv Yar followed by mechanized or airborne (VDV) assaults to consolidate new positions. Fighting continued near the Novyi Microraion (eastern Chasiv Yar); east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, Niu York, Shumy, and Pivdenne.[37] Several milbloggers claimed that Russian aviation continued strikes against the Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar).[38] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, Leningrad Military District) are operating south of Hryhorivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar); elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating in northwestern Ivanivske; elements of 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd LNR AC) and 1307th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are operating near Klishchiivka; elements of the 83rd VDV Brigade and 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade are operating near Andriivka.[39]

 

See the topline text for updates on the situation in the Avdiivka direction.

Positional engagements continued west and southwest of Donetsk City on April 30, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 450 meters deep along a kilometer-wide front on the northeastern outskirts of Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[40] Fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka and Kostyantynivka.[41] Elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[42]

 

Russian forces reportedly advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on April 30, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) advanced up to a kilometer near Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting in the Velyka Novosilka area recently intensified and that Russian aviation is conducting guided glide bomb strikes on Ukrainian positions in the area.[44] Positional engagements continued south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske and Urozhaine and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryyutne and Novodarivka.[45]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance in Robotyne, western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on April 29 shows elements of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) assaulting Robotyne and placing a Russian flag in the western part of the settlement.[46] The geolocated footage notably shows Russian fixed-wing aircraft operating at low altitudes close to the frontline, likely taking advantage of the lack of Ukrainian air defense assets in the area.[47] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that the 2nd Battalion of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment broke through Ukrainian defenses in Robotyne and forced Ukrainian troops to withdraw from the settlement.[48] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces control most of Robotyne but that the northern outskirts of the settlement are a contested “gray zone.”[49] Several other Russian milbloggers warned that reports about extensive Russian advances in Robotyne are premature, however.[50] ISW has not observed visual confirmation that Russian forces control all of Robotyne and currently assesses that Russian forces hold positions in the western and southwestern areas of the settlement. Fighting also continued northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne).[51]

 

Russian forces continued efforts to push Ukrainian forces from positions in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and islands in the Dnipro River on April 30. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked Ukrainian positions on Nestryha Island in the Dnipro River (southwest of Kherson City) and retreated after taking losses.[52] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces also unsuccessfully attacked Ukrainian positions near Krynky.[53]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a limited series of strikes against Ukraine on April 29 and 30. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian ballistic missiles, likely Iskander-M missiles, struck Odesa City on April 29, injuring and killing civilians and damaging civilian infrastructure.[54] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck the Odesa Law School and struck a warehouse in Poltava Oblast on April 30.[55] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Major Ilya Yevlash stated that Ukrainian forces struggle to down drones and missiles that Russian forces launch from occupied Crimea and Kherson Oblast and Belgorod and Kursk oblasts because Ukrainian air defenses have less time to react to the launches due to their physical proximity to their targets.[56]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian MoD reported on April 30 that Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Industry and Trade Denis Manturov and First Deputy Defense Minister Ruslan Tsalikov inspected a drone testing ground in an unspecified area of occupied Ukraine.[57] The Russian MoD claimed that Russia is developing drones that can fire various types of ammunition and conduct reconnaissance during poor weather conditions.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian “Geran” Research and Production Enterprise Chief Designer Oleg Zhukov told Kremlin newswire TASS in an interview published on April 30 that Russian forces are using the “Abzats” mobile anti-drone system with artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities in unspecified frontline areas.[58] Zhukov stated that the “Abzats” system can move along a specified trajectory and use its electronic warfare (EW) system to disable drones without input from the operator.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

An investigation by Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii implicates Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova and her sister in the deportation of special needs Ukrainian adults to Russia.[59] Vazhnye Istorii found that Lvova-Belova's “Kvartal Lui” Penza Oblast-based charity, which is headed by her sister Sofya, deported four Ukrainian adults with special needs from the Oleshky Boarding School in occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast to the “New Shores” facility for individuals with special needs in Penza Oblast. Kvartal Loui started construction on the “New Shores” project in 2018, with the support of many prominent Russian politicians and oligarchs, including Russian President Vladimir Putin.[60] One of the four Ukrainians, whom Vazhnye Istorii interviewed for its investigation, strongly emphasized that he wanted to return to Ukraine, where his adoptive parents and friends remain. The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that Russian occupation authorities are targeting adults with special needs in a new scheme to deport Ukrainians to Russia, wherein Russian authorities can declare them “incompetent” or “deprived of parental care” and assign them a Russian guardian, who can claim ownership of the money or property of their “wards.”[61] International law prohibits an occupying power from conducting “individual or mass forcible transfers of protected persons from the occupied territory to the territory of the occupying power or to that of any other country, regardless of the motive.”[62] The forced deportation of disabled Ukrainian adults likely constitutes a violation of international law, along with the other various schemes that Russia continues to use to deport other vulnerable Ukrainian populations, including children.

Russian investigative opposition outlet Dossier Center reported on April 30 that high-ranking Russian military and political officials are personally investing in the rapid reconstruction of occupied Mariupol.[63] Dossier stated that Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov, whom Russian authorities recently arrested on corruption charges, was supervising the state-owned “Military Construction Company” and its construction contracts in occupied Mariupol. Dossier noted that the Military Construction Company’s main Mariupol contractor was the “Olympsitistroy” company — an organization with alleged links to Ivanov — which built a residential complex, medical center, and school in occupied Mariupol by the spring of 2024.[64] Dossier suggested that following Ivanov’s arrest, construction contracts in Mariupol would transfer to the state-owned “Unified Customer” company, which is affiliated with Russian Deputy Prime Minister for Construction and Regional Development Marat Khusnullin. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported in October 2023 that Khusnullin played a key role in distributing construction contracts to projects throughout occupied Ukraine, and it appears that Khusnullin will be one of the largest beneficiaries of contract re-allocation following Ivanov’s arrest.[65] Russian officials are likely incentivized to become personally involved in the construction of occupied cities in Ukraine with the promise of lucrative contracts. The reconstruction of occupied cities (which Russia destroyed in the first place) by Russian actors further increases the Kremlin’s control over occupied Ukraine and makes occupied areas appear more attractive to Russian investors and those seeking to move.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Unspecified actors, likely Russian, are reportedly spreading false information about issues at the Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), likely to discredit Ukrainian authorities, sow panic in the Ukrainian population, and legitimize Russian claims that Ukraine is endangering the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP. Ukrainian nuclear energy operator Energoatom reported on April 30 that anonymous Telegram channels are spreading false information about an alleged emergency situation at the Khmelnytskyi NPP that led to increased amounts of radiation in Khmelnytskyi and Rivne oblasts.[66]

Several Russian milbloggers promoted Russian information operations aimed at creating panic among Ukrainians about a future Russian offensive operation against Kharkiv City.[67] Several Russian milbloggers falsely claimed that Ukrainian officials are conducting widescale evacuations of people and enterprises from Kharkiv City.[68] The Ukrainian Ministry of Reintegration reported that Russia is using Ukrainian media sources that report incorrect headlines about evacuations to promote Russian information operations.[69]

A Russian ultranationalist ideologue and avid supporter of the Russian war against Ukraine, Alexander Dugin, advanced a false narrative that the West seeks to destroy Russia over Russia’s commitment to “traditional values” during an interview with an American TV personality on April 29.[70] Dugin claimed that the West is engaging in “Russophobia” because Russia is defending “traditional values” that the West is attempting to eradicate. Dugin’s statement is consistent with ongoing Kremlin information operations that seek to falsely portray Russia as the bastion of Christianity, culture, and conservative ideals in the modern world. Russia, however, regularly represses religious institutions in Russia and occupied Ukraine and employs an ultranationalist ideology to garner support for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and confrontation against the West.[71]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oUDXDsViiaWi9FzhjB7ZE6ddvYCHGZMCF9twct42EyJcUDyE4GkZwbbaUySt9aZDl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLjkCBqJscKgKw8145eYcWHQkmyaFSddbqLujnm4Gw677cbgCmcuxFqtq4qQxHKml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023stmuudL2pUmEuL454y4ofQyhF1e1WVvmBhuuNd7iLuNzCik9khpKtvEWKyPprhLl

[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042724

[3] https://t.me/dva_majors/41202 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/22287 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/22280 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/22284 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121934

[4] https://t.me/wargonzo/19650 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/41199 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10155 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/14351 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10193

[5] https://t.me/dva_majors/41202 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10160

[6] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oUDXDsViiaWi9FzhjB7ZE6ddvYCHGZMCF9twct42EyJcUDyE4GkZwbbaUySt9aZDl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLjkCBqJscKgKw8145eYcWHQkmyaFSddbqLujnm4Gw677cbgCmcuxFqtq4qQxHKml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023stmuudL2pUmEuL454y4ofQyhF1e1WVvmBhuuNd7iLuNzCik9khpKtvEWKyPprhLl ; https://t.me/mod_russia/38083 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/41199 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10155 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26656 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/22268 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19650 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121942 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121957 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121984

[7] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1824

[8] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1824

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042824

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2024

[11] https://t.me/Aksenov82/4765

[12] https://t.me/rusich_army/14347 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/55883 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/10638 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10172 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/41201 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/41199 ; https://t.me/rybar/59650

[13] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/20685597

[14] https://t.me/astrapress/54326 ; https://t.me/astrapress/54332

[15] https://www.mfa dot tj/ru/main/view/14952/telefonnaya-beseda-glav-mid-tadzhikistana-i-rossii ; https://www.mfa dot tj/tg/main/view/14952/suhbati-telefonii-vazironi-korhoi-khorijii-tojikiston-va-rusiya

[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041124

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar033024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032724

[18] https://t.me/MID_Russia/39184

[19] https://civil dot ge/archives/602348

[20] https://civil dot ge/archives/602348

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2024 ; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/20682341 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/246196 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/246131 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/246132 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/246134 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/246147 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/246137 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/246138 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/246139

[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040824 ; https://www.voanews.com/a/putin-no-more-color-revolutions/6390636.html ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122222

[23] https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-lavrov-says-nato-is-in-proxy-war-in-ukraine-11650965583 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122822

[24] https://suspilne dot media/734957-udar-po-odesi-vbiti-vijskovi-v-nimeccini-ta-novij-paket-dopomogi-797-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1714484746&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[25] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121957

[26] https://t.me/rybar/59639 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/22295

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oUDXDsViiaWi9FzhjB7ZE6ddvYCHGZMCF9twct42EyJcUDyE4GkZwbbaUySt9aZDl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLjkCBqJscKgKw8145eYcWHQkmyaFSddbqLujnm4Gw677cbgCmcuxFqtq4qQxHKml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023stmuudL2pUmEuL454y4ofQyhF1e1WVvmBhuuNd7iLuNzCik9khpKtvEWKyPprhLl ; https://t.me/mod_russia/38083 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/38073 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/41199

[28] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1821

[29] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1822

[30] https://t.me/ombr_63/601; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1785230395690152180; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1785232893402325321; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1785235138315477126

 

[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oUDXDsViiaWi9FzhjB7ZE6ddvYCHGZMCF9twct42EyJcUDyE4GkZwbbaUySt9aZDl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLjkCBqJscKgKw8145eYcWHQkmyaFSddbqLujnm4Gw677cbgCmcuxFqtq4qQxHKml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023stmuudL2pUmEuL454y4ofQyhF1e1WVvmBhuuNd7iLuNzCik9khpKtvEWKyPprhLl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/41199

[32] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1822

[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oUDXDsViiaWi9FzhjB7ZE6ddvYCHGZMCF9twct42EyJcUDyE4GkZwbbaUySt9aZDl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLjkCBqJscKgKw8145eYcWHQkmyaFSddbqLujnm4Gw677cbgCmcuxFqtq4qQxHKml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023stmuudL2pUmEuL454y4ofQyhF1e1WVvmBhuuNd7iLuNzCik9khpKtvEWKyPprhLl

[34] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1822 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid0Q3Cy56URWwjGf1YNA3cittpz3WnBqkqhef3QM2hSJBVUuLQGgWM4Fu8dnqu3fF54l

[35] https://t.me/slovianskbrigade/87; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1785282955142660491 https://t.me/z_arhiv/26659 https://t.me/motopatriot/22310

[36] https://suspilne dot media/734957-udar-po-odesi-vbiti-vijskovi-v-nimeccini-ta-novij-paket-dopomogi-797-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1714464262&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oUDXDsViiaWi9FzhjB7ZE6ddvYCHGZMCF9twct42EyJcUDyE4GkZwbbaUySt9aZDl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLjkCBqJscKgKw8145eYcWHQkmyaFSddbqLujnm4Gw677cbgCmcuxFqtq4qQxHKml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023stmuudL2pUmEuL454y4ofQyhF1e1WVvmBhuuNd7iLuNzCik9khpKtvEWKyPprhLl ; https://t.me/rybar/59639 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19650 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121945 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/38083

[38] https://t.me/motopatriot/22307 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10191 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10194

[39] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1823 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid0Q3Cy56URWwjGf1YNA3cittpz3WnBqkqhef3QM2hSJBVUuLQGgWM4Fu8dnqu3fF54l

[40] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10170

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oUDXDsViiaWi9FzhjB7ZE6ddvYCHGZMCF9twct42EyJcUDyE4GkZwbbaUySt9aZDl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLjkCBqJscKgKw8145eYcWHQkmyaFSddbqLujnm4Gw677cbgCmcuxFqtq4qQxHKml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023stmuudL2pUmEuL454y4ofQyhF1e1WVvmBhuuNd7iLuNzCik9khpKtvEWKyPprhLl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/41199 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19650

[42] https://t.me/motopatriot/22305

[43] https://t.me/voin_dv/8227

[44] https://t.me/dva_majors/41191 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/41199 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/121286

[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oUDXDsViiaWi9FzhjB7ZE6ddvYCHGZMCF9twct42EyJcUDyE4GkZwbbaUySt9aZDl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLjkCBqJscKgKw8145eYcWHQkmyaFSddbqLujnm4Gw677cbgCmcuxFqtq4qQxHKml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023stmuudL2pUmEuL454y4ofQyhF1e1WVvmBhuuNd7iLuNzCik9khpKtvEWKyPprhLl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/8750 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/41199

[46] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5302; https://t.me/voen_producer/834; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/17324 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26654 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/10837; https://t.me/polk105/20859 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121918

[47] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5302; https://t.me/voen_producer/834; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/17324 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26654 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/10837; https://t.me/polk105/20859 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121918

[48] https://t.me/rybar/59644

[49] https://t.me/rybar/59644 ; https://t.me/polk105/20859 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/10633 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/121311 ;https://t.me/tass_agency/246267

[50] https://t.me/dva_majors/41260 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19654 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/22290 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/22291 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121957 ; https://t.me/sashakots/46398 ; https://t.me/batalyon15/4145

[51] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121957 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19654 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/41199 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19650

[52] https://suspilne dot media/734957-udar-po-odesi-vbiti-vijskovi-v-nimeccini-ta-novij-paket-dopomogi-797-den-vijni-onlajn/

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oUDXDsViiaWi9FzhjB7ZE6ddvYCHGZMCF9twct42EyJcUDyE4GkZwbbaUySt9aZDl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLjkCBqJscKgKw8145eYcWHQkmyaFSddbqLujnm4Gw677cbgCmcuxFqtq4qQxHKml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023stmuudL2pUmEuL454y4ofQyhF1e1WVvmBhuuNd7iLuNzCik9khpKtvEWKyPprhLl

[54] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/8751 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0GmyzAApaxQs5AGp3NQ1GbzLVapwgFvx6JvdzgevPz6zu8wnpJ2aVJ7iZbg8QLo6Al ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/8739

[55] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121897; https://t.me/rybar/59634 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/10641 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/10637

[56] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/30/u-povitryanyh-sylah-rozpovily-zvidky-i-yakoyu-zbroyeyu-rosiyany-byut-po-ukrayini/

[57] https://t.me/mod_russia/38079

[58] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/20684009 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/246228

[59] https://storage dot googleapis.com/istories/stories/2024/04/26/oni-dumayut-chto-mi-ikhnie/index.html

[60] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/69973

[61] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/novi-zlochyny-okupantiv-na-tot-na-rosiyu-vyvozyat-nepovnospravnyh-ukrayintsiv/

[62] https://casebook.icrc dot org/a_to_z/glossary/deportation#:~:text=Under%20the%20Fourth%20Geneva%20Convention,motive%20for%20such%20removal%2Ftransfer.

[63] https://dossier dot center/hus-ivanov/

[64] https://t.me/vchkogpu/47834 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/47806 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/47809

[65] https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/10/04/v-2010-h-marat-husnullin-polnostyu-perestroil-moskvu-teper-on-glavnyy-po-vosstanovleniyu-anneksirovannyh-ukrainskih-territoriy

[66] https://t.me/energoatom_ua/17624

[67] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042224

[68] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10177 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/14355 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/10364 ;

[69] https://minre.gov dot ua/2024/04/30/u-mediapovidomlennyah-pro-evakuacziyu-potribno-dotrymuvatysya-korektnosti-v-formulyuvannyah/

[70] https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/04/30/russian-philosopher-dugin-rails-against-western-liberalism-in-tucker-carlson-interview-a84990 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GIULmTprQ6o ; https://t.me/tass_agency/246223 ; https://twitter.com/TuckerCarlson/status/1785066534995714067 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/79860; https://t.me/bbcrussian/64357 ; https://t.me/astrapress/54322

[71] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-orthodox-church-declares-%E2%80%9Choly-war%E2%80%9D-against-ukraine-and-articulates-tenets