Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 20, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 20, 2025

Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, and George Barros with William Runkel

February 20, 2025, 6:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45am ET on February 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Financial Times (FT) published an investigation on February 20 supporting ISW's long-held assessment that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law.[1] The FT investigation provided additional details and analysis following a significant increase in the number of credible reports of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs in 2024 compared to the first two years of the war.[2] FT and experts from the Center for Information Resilience analyzed footage of the executions and used the soldiers' uniforms to confirm that Russian forces were conducting the executions. FT conducted an investigation into footage of a Russian soldier shooting six unarmed Ukrainian POWs and identified the possible perpetrator as a soldier in a "Storm" penal detachment of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]), but noted that the situation warrants further investigation to confirm this soldier's involvement. FT reported that the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade has been fighting near Pokrovsk since Fall 2024, which is consistent with ISW's observations.[3] FT noted that Ukrainian frontline units are often the primary source of execution reports and drone footage of executions. FT noted, however, that tracking these executions is challenging because the Ukrainian units do not always relay reports of Ukrainian POW executions to their commanders.[4] FT noted that Ukrainian prosecutors sometimes find out about the executions based on footage published online. FT interviewed the cofounders of a project reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence who stated that many Ukrainian units do not publish information about executions "because it has become routine" and that there are likely hundreds of instances of POW executions beyond the "dozens" recorded so far.

FT's investigation suggests that more senior Russian commanders may also be complicit in issuing orders to execute Ukrainian POWs.[5] Ukrainian officials opened investigations into 43 executions with 109 victims in 2024, and FT analyzed footage of 30 of these instances with 133 victims. The FT investigation found that Russian forces across the frontline — particularly in eastern Ukraine and Zaporizhia Oblast - are executing Ukrainian POWs, not just a few isolated "rogue [Russian] units." Global Rights Compliance President Wayne Jordash, who is assisting Ukrainian investigations into POW executions, told the FT that Russia is pursuing a "strategy of criminality" in Ukraine, including by torturing, sexually assaulting, and otherwise abusing residents in occupied Ukraine, and that the POW executions are also part of this criminality campaign. Jordash stated that Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs function to degrade Ukraine's military and security apparatus, leaving Ukraine more vulnerable to aggression.

Jordash noted that international law states that individuals who fail to prevent war crimes are also culpable for said war crimes and that government officials calling for POW executions are violating international law.[6] Jordash mentioned specific instances of senior Russian leaders, including Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev and Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, explicitly calling for Russian forces to execute Ukrainian POWs. Jordash highlighted that Russian President Vladimir Putin praised the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) for its actions in combat, which is notable because the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade is has been linked to the beheading of Ukrainian POWs and execution of Ukrainian drone operators in October 2024. Forbes attributed beheadings of Ukrainian POWs in August 2024 and summary executions in October 2024 in Kursk Oblast to the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade.[7] Putin awarded the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade the "Guards" honorific title in July 2024.[8] FT reported that Putin held highly publicized meetings with two unspecified participants of the Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" veterans program who reportedly executed POWs near Robotyne, Zaporizhia Oblast in May 2024.[9] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) recently reported that there is a culture of torture and abuse of Ukrainian POWs detained in Russian penal colonies, and taken together these reports suggest that Russian decisionmakers in higher echelons of the chain of command may be implicitly encouraging, explicitly ordering, or failing to stop Russian executions and other abuses of Ukrainian POWs in a system that seems to incentivize such abuses.[10]

Senior Ukrainian intelligence officials reported that North Korean forces are conducting joint operations with Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and are gaining new combat capabilities. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov told South Korean outlet Chosun Ilbo in an article published on February 17 that roughly 4,000 North Korean forces have been killed or seriously wounded in Kursk Oblast.[11] Budanov noted that North Korean forces are embedded in Russian units and conduct joint operations in small groups with Russian forces and that North Korean forces move as part of larger Russian units to conduct joint operations. The commander of a Ukrainian platoon operating in Kursk Oblast stated on February 20 that North Korean forces have changed their tactics in the area, reducing the size of their infantry assault groups from 50 personnel to 10 to 15 personnel and moving "more cautiously."[12] The commander noted that North Korean assault groups are still larger than Russian assault groups. South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) stated in November 2024 that North Korean forces had been training alongside Russian naval infantry and airborne (VDV) units - traditionally more elite forces in the Russian military.[13] Budanov noted that there are more artillery and missile units in Kursk Oblast due to the presence of North Korean troops, but that the GUR has not observed additional North Korean deployments to Russia. GUR Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi also told Chosun Ilbo that 1,000 North Korean troops are training on unspecified new military equipment in an unspecified area in Russia. Skibitskyi reported that North Korean forces have rapidly improved their combat effectiveness by adapting to new combat tactics and operating weapons such as tanks and drones. Budanov also confirmed a Reuters report from December 2024 that Russian missile experts have modified North Korean-provided KN-23 ballistic missiles, which previously had a 500 to 1,500 meter margin of error, to make them more precise.[14] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in Kursk Oblast reported on February 16 that North Korean assault groups were attacking in more spread out formations as part of efforts to complicate Ukrainian efforts to strike the attacking forces.[15] North Korean forces reportedly recently withdrew from active combat operations in Kursk Oblast after suffering heavy casualties largely due to Ukrainian drone strikes, and reports that North Korean troops have adjusted their tactics on the battlefield to counter Ukrainian drone strikes indicates that North Korean forces may be learning lessons and internalizing valuable combat experience.

US Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on February 20. Zelensky stated that he had a "good" conversation with Kellogg during which they discussed the battlefield situation, the return of all Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), and effective security guarantees for Ukraine.[16] Zelensky reiterated Ukraine's readiness to make a "strong, effective investment and security agreement" with the United States and stated that Ukraine has proposed the "fastest and most constructive" ways to achieve such results.

The Kremlin is likely attempting to portray the People's Republic of China (PRC) as more aligned with its stance on the war in Ukraine than the PRC is willing to publicly message. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the G20 Foreign Ministers' summit in South Africa on February 20. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)'s official readout stated that Wang emphasized that the PRC's approach to resolving the war in Ukraine focuses on addressing the war's "root causes."[17] The PRC MFA's official readout of the meeting notably differed and stated that Lavrov stated that Russia, not the PRC, is committed to solving the "root causes" of the war.[18] The Russian MFA's likely purposeful misattribution reflects Russia's attempt to align the PRC's position on the war fully with its own in an effort to bolster its international standing and to shape Russian domestic perceptions of Russia’s relationship with China. Russian officials have explicitly defined the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to advance eastward in areas near Russia's border, which indicates that the Kremlin remains committed to imposing its will and security interests on the United States and Europe and is not interested in compromising on this demand.[19]

Key Takeaways:

• The Financial Times (FT) published an investigation on February 20 supporting ISW's long-held assessment that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law.
• FT's investigation suggests that more senior Russian commanders may also be complicit in issuing orders to execute Ukrainian POWs.
• Senior Ukrainian intelligence officials reported that North Korean forces are conducting joint operations with Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and are gaining new combat capabilities.
• US Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on February 20.
• The Kremlin is likely attempting to portray the People's Republic of China (PRC) as more aligned with its stance on the war in Ukraine than the PRC is willing to publicly message.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russia is reportedly increasing its production of glide bombs and modernizing its cruise missiles.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on February 20 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Sudzha near Lebedevka, north of Sudzha near Pogrebki, southeast of Sudzha near Guyevo, and south of Sudzha near Kurilovka on February 19 and 20.[20]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on February 20 that Russian forces advanced in southern Lebedevka, that elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) advanced east of Sverdlikovo (northwest of Sudzha), and that Russian forces advanced southeast of Nikolayevo-Darino (west of Sudzha).[21] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces crossed the Ukraine-Russia international border from Sverdlikovo into Sumy Oblast near Novenke and Basivka (both just south of the international border) and that elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) entered Basivka.[22]

The commander of a Ukrainian platoon operating in Kursk Oblast stated on February 20 stated that Russian forces are using significantly fewer vehicles and are conducting infantry assaults comprised of lower quality personnel and wounded servicemembers.[23]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast, and drone operators of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Sudzha.[24]

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Kharkiv direction on February 20 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 19 and 20.[25] The Ukrainian Air Force published an interview on February 19 with the commander of a Ukrainian platoon operating in the Vovchansk direction who stated that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a Russian mechanized assault, destroying 30 personnel and an unspecified number of armored vehicles.[26]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 20 but did not advance. Russian forces continued attacking north of Kupyansk near Zapadne, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on February 19 and 20.[27]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk), southeast of Petropavlivka, and north of Stepova Novoselivka.[28]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1431st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Territorial Troops, currently subordinated to 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Orlyanka (east of Kupyansk).[29]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 20 but did not advance. Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Makiivka on February 19 and 20.[30]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Kruhlyakivka (north of Borova), south of Lozova (northeast of Borova), and southwest of Makiivka.[31]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 20 but did not advance. Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka, Balka Zhuravka (formerly Nevske), Novolyubivka, and Kolodyazi and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on February 19 and 20.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yampolivka and in the Serebryanske forest area.[33]

A Ukrainian regiment operating in Luhansk Oblast published footage on February 18 and stated that it destroyed a North Korean-provided M1978 “Koksan” self-propelled artillery system in an unspecified area of Luhansk Oblast on an unspecified date.[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 20 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on February 19 and 20.[35]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[36]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on February 20 but did not advance. Russian forces continued attacking within and near Chasiv Yar, north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Vasyukivka, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and Ozaryanivka on February 19 and 20.[37]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Hryhorivka.[38]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Sever-V" Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly continue operating near Hryhorivka.[39]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on February 20 but did not advance. Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk itself and southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka on February 19 and 20.[40]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole and Yelyzavetika; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Novotoretske, Vozdvyzhenka, and Vodyane Druhe; west of Pokrovsk towards Serhiivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Pishchane, Nadiivka, Sribne, and Kotlyne and toward Bohdanivka on February 19 and 20.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Myrne and Zvirove (just southwest of Pokrovsk).[42]

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Zaporizhzhia (southwest of Pokrovsk).[43]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Zaporizhzhia.[44]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Zelene Pole and Zaporizhzhia and advanced near Vodyane Druhe, Udachne, and Kotlyne.[45] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of Pishchane.[46]

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that Ukrainian forces recently launched successful counterattacks that pushed Russian forces out of Pishchane and that the intensity of Russian attacks in the Pokrovsk direction periodically decreases.[47] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are using fewer armored vehicles in attacks due to weather conditions and exhaustion.[48]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 428th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhzhia; elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating in Tarasivka (northeast of Pokrovsk); elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Kotlyne; and elements of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA) are reportedly operating in Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk in the Russian near rear).[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on February 20 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Ulakly, and Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozdolne on February 19 and 20.[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kostyantynopil.[51]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Ulakly; advanced east and south of Kostyantynopil; and advanced west, northwest, and north of Andriivka.[52]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynopil; elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove); and elements of the 68th Tank Regiment and 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Ulakly.[53]

Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka. Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Velyka Novosilka near Novyi Komar and Novoocheretuvate; northwest of Velyka Novosilka toward Pryvilne and Burlatske; and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on February 19 and 20.[54] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces stated on February 20 that Russian forces conducted an at least reduced company-sized mechanized assault near Novyi Komar and that Ukrainian forces destroyed two tanks and seven armored personnel carriers.[55]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Novosilka.[56]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Skudne (north of Velyka Novosilka) and Dniproenerhiia (north of Skudne and across the Mokri Yaly River), north of Vremivka (west of Velyka Novosilka), and on the southeastern outskirts of Novosilka.[57]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 57th and 60th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Novosilka; elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Burlatske; and elements of the 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Novyi Komar.[58]

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 20 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Robotyne near Novoandriivka, Mali Shcherbaky, and Stepove on February 19 and 20.[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Kamyanske.[60]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Pyatykhatky and advanced southwest of Kamyanske and north of Luhove (all northwest of Robotyne).[61] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces occupy half of Pyatykhatky and that the rest of the settlement is a contested "gray zone."[62]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Pyatykhakty.[63]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on February 20.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 19 to 20. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 14 missiles of various types, including Kh-101/Kh-55 cruise missiles from Volgograd Oblast, Kalibr/Iskander-K cruise missiles from the Black Sea and occupied Crimea, and Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast.[64] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 161 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 80 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts; that 78 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that missile and drone strikes damaged objects in Kharkiv, Sumy, Odesa and Kyiv oblasts. Official Ukrainian sources reported that Russian drones struck Cherkasy, Kyiv, and Odesa oblasts damaging civilian infrastructure, enterprises, and energy infrastructure facilities.[65]

Russian glide bombs struck a ten-story high-rise building in Kherson Oblast.[66]

Ukraine's State Emergency Service reported on February 20 that emergency services are still working to dismantle damaged shelter structures and extinguish smoldering fires at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) following the February 14 Russian drone strike on the NPP.[67]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia is reportedly increasing its production of glide bombs and modernizing its cruise missiles. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) reported on February 14 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) plans for Russia to produce more than 750 9M723 Iskander ballistic missiles and more than 560 Kh-101 cruise missiles in 2025.[68] RUSI stated that Russia is adding a wider variety of warheads, including cluster warheads, to Kh-101 missiles and have upgraded the camera and processing units such that the missiles can perform much better visual terrain tracking and avoid disruption from Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) during the missile's terminal phase. RUSI reported that the Russian MoD ordered over 70,000 glide bombs for 2025 — up from 40,000 produced glide bombs in 2024.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on February 20 that unspecified actors assassinated former deputy head of the Berdyansk City occupation administration Yevgeny Bogdanov by planting an explosive in his car.[69] The GUR reported that Bogdanov supervised the occupation administration's finances and the construction of Russian fortifications in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian International Military Cooperation Department Head Valery Revenko stated on February 20 that the Russian-Belarusian "Zapad-2025" combined military exercise will occur in mid-September.[70]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.ft.com/content/d73113b4-f58a-442e-ae10-a74973ebc49f; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122224; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar090624 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122823 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar090424 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062324; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2024

[2] https://www.ft.com/content/d73113b4-f58a-442e-ae10-a74973ebc49f

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2024

[4] https://www.ft.com/content/d73113b4-f58a-442e-ae10-a74973ebc49f

[5] https://www.ft.com/content/d73113b4-f58a-442e-ae10-a74973ebc49f

[6] https://www.ft.com/content/d73113b4-f58a-442e-ae10-a74973ebc49f

[7] https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/10/14/days-after-russian-marines-murdered-nine-ukrainian-prisoners-ukrainian-paratroopers-are-looking-for-revenge-and-finding-it/; https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/10/13/russian-troops-captured-nine-ukrainian-drone-operators-stripped-them-and-then-murdered-them/; https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/10/18/ukrainian-paratroopers-cornered-a-war-criminal-russian-marine-brigade-the-teleportation-of-the-enemy-to-hell-took-place/

[8] http://www.en.kremlin dot ru/acts/news/74679

[9] https://www.ft.com/content/d73113b4-f58a-442e-ae10-a74973ebc49f

[10] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-prisons-ukranian-pow-torture-52df7908; https://www.wsj.com/world/putins-torturers-couldnt-break-these-ukrainian-prisoners-ae4db9e4

[11] https://www.chosun dot com/english/north-korea-en/2025/02/17/GQCB3UC4YFHQTNG3QYGBSSTX3A/; https://t.me/DIUkraine/5391

[12] https://youtu.be/Rf_lKz_bQO8; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/20/hodyly-yurbamy-po-piv-roty-teper-po-piv-vzvodu-pivnichnokorejczi-zminyly-taktyku-na-kurshhyni/

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2024

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020825

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-16-2025

[16] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13396 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1892630191991595394

[17] https://t.me/tass_agency/301751 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/52495

[18] https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/wjbzhd/202502/t20250220_11559660.shtml

[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013025

[20] https://t.me/yurasumy/21295 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21296 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24877; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24136 ; https://t.me/rybar/68161; https://t.me/dva_majors/64912

[21] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32489; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32495; https://t.me/zovpobedy/14505; https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/17006

[22] https://t.me/rybar/68161; https://t.me/dva_majors/64912; https://t.me/wargonzo/24877; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86592 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62291; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32495; https://t.me/zovpobedy/14505

[23] https://youtu.be/Rf_lKz_bQO8; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/20/kuhari-ta-nedolicheni-poraneni-na-kurshhyni-vorog-kydaye-v-bij-kogo-tilky-mozhe/

[24] https://youtu.be/Rf_lKz_bQO8; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/20/kuhari-ta-nedolicheni-poraneni-na-kurshhyni-vorog-kydaye-v-bij-kogo-tilky-mozhe/ ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86578; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76299 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/49123

[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034iL5LJeaaD5c8xYD1czRxE76YBVtV8neKyz3ujFCmRkVtz4H6giermqjHu7CtQi4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XFRpfj2ZWqkJdVNWYzHeqCmAGkEeb5f69yVsodjTQxguit6cqVx967NHwrkGTW28l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GyQ5iKXW3qGipo97trfMSx77jL5XZ3Xrx9GQSgGXbpkdm1qNLNgLYC5ZsdnF5g5pl; https://t.me/otukharkiv/4462

[26] https://t.me/kpszsu/29109; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/19/kep-z-materyka-yak-shestero-voyiniv-aviatoriv-znyshhyly-vzvod-rosiyan-ta-kilka-odynycz-bronetehniky/

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XFRpfj2ZWqkJdVNWYzHeqCmAGkEeb5f69yVsodjTQxguit6cqVx967NHwrkGTW28l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GyQ5iKXW3qGipo97trfMSx77jL5XZ3Xrx9GQSgGXbpkdm1qNLNgLYC5ZsdnF5g5pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GyQ5iKXW3qGipo97trfMSx77jL5XZ3Xrx9GQSgGXbpkdm1qNLNgLYC5ZsdnF5g5pl

[28] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30918 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32486

[29] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32486 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1597

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XFRpfj2ZWqkJdVNWYzHeqCmAGkEeb5f69yVsodjTQxguit6cqVx967NHwrkGTW28l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GyQ5iKXW3qGipo97trfMSx77jL5XZ3Xrx9GQSgGXbpkdm1qNLNgLYC5ZsdnF5g5pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034iL5LJeaaD5c8xYD1czRxE76YBVtV8neKyz3ujFCmRkVtz4H6giermqjHu7CtQi4l ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24165

[31] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30918 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24165 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30919

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XFRpfj2ZWqkJdVNWYzHeqCmAGkEeb5f69yVsodjTQxguit6cqVx967NHwrkGTW28l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GyQ5iKXW3qGipo97trfMSx77jL5XZ3Xrx9GQSgGXbpkdm1qNLNgLYC5ZsdnF5g5pl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5482

[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034iL5LJeaaD5c8xYD1czRxE76YBVtV8neKyz3ujFCmRkVtz4H6giermqjHu7CtQi4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XFRpfj2ZWqkJdVNWYzHeqCmAGkEeb5f69yVsodjTQxguit6cqVx967NHwrkGTW28l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GyQ5iKXW3qGipo97trfMSx77jL5XZ3Xrx9GQSgGXbpkdm1qNLNgLYC5ZsdnF5g5pl ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/155234

[34] https://t.me/nemesis_412/175

[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034iL5LJeaaD5c8xYD1czRxE76YBVtV8neKyz3ujFCmRkVtz4H6giermqjHu7CtQi4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XFRpfj2ZWqkJdVNWYzHeqCmAGkEeb5f69yVsodjTQxguit6cqVx967NHwrkGTW28l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GyQ5iKXW3qGipo97trfMSx77jL5XZ3Xrx9GQSgGXbpkdm1qNLNgLYC5ZsdnF5g5pl

[36] https://t.me/epoddubny/22530

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034iL5LJeaaD5c8xYD1czRxE76YBVtV8neKyz3ujFCmRkVtz4H6giermqjHu7CtQi4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XFRpfj2ZWqkJdVNWYzHeqCmAGkEeb5f69yVsodjTQxguit6cqVx967NHwrkGTW28l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GyQ5iKXW3qGipo97trfMSx77jL5XZ3Xrx9GQSgGXbpkdm1qNLNgLYC5ZsdnF5g5pl ; https://t.me/rybar/68171 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24160 ; https://t.me/rybar/68161; https://t.me/dva_majors/64912 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24877

[38] https://t.me/rybar/68171 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/155228 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24160 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24877

[39] https://t.me/dva_majors/64916; https://t.me/Sever_Z/10157; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32469

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034iL5LJeaaD5c8xYD1czRxE76YBVtV8neKyz3ujFCmRkVtz4H6giermqjHu7CtQi4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XFRpfj2ZWqkJdVNWYzHeqCmAGkEeb5f69yVsodjTQxguit6cqVx967NHwrkGTW28l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GyQ5iKXW3qGipo97trfMSx77jL5XZ3Xrx9GQSgGXbpkdm1qNLNgLYC5ZsdnF5g5pl

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034iL5LJeaaD5c8xYD1czRxE76YBVtV8neKyz3ujFCmRkVtz4H6giermqjHu7CtQi4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XFRpfj2ZWqkJdVNWYzHeqCmAGkEeb5f69yVsodjTQxguit6cqVx967NHwrkGTW28l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GyQ5iKXW3qGipo97trfMSx77jL5XZ3Xrx9GQSgGXbpkdm1qNLNgLYC5ZsdnF5g5pl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5482; https://t.me/dva_majors/64912; https://t.me/yurasumy/21279

[42] https://t.me/dva_majors/64912; https://t.me/yurasumy/21279; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62283

[43] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1892540248799805854; https://t.me/OSHP_225/4919; https://t.me/black_swan_ukraine/299

[44] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1892540248799805854; https://t.me/OSHP_225/4919; https://t.me/black_swan_ukraine/299

[45] https://t.me/rybar/68156; https://t.me/dva_majors/64912; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62283; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32462; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32496

[46] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62283

[47] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/20/intensyvnist-boyiv-troshky-znyzhuyetsya-vorog-ne-polyshaye-planiv-vzyaty-pokrovsk/; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/952851-ci-vplinuli-uspihi-sil-oboroni-pid-pokrovskom-na-plani-armii-rf-dani-vid-osuv-hortica/

[48] https://youtu.be/Rf_lKz_bQO8; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/20/velyka-kilkist-droniv-zupynyla-rosiyan-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/

[49] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24157; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62277 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21279 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32462; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32466; https://t.me/wargonzo/24897

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034iL5LJeaaD5c8xYD1czRxE76YBVtV8neKyz3ujFCmRkVtz4H6giermqjHu7CtQi4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XFRpfj2ZWqkJdVNWYzHeqCmAGkEeb5f69yVsodjTQxguit6cqVx967NHwrkGTW28l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GyQ5iKXW3qGipo97trfMSx77jL5XZ3Xrx9GQSgGXbpkdm1qNLNgLYC5ZsdnF5g5pl; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62279

[51] http://t.me/voin_dv/13514; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62279; https://t.me/yurasumy/21291

[52] https://t.me/voin_dv/13514; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62279; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62287; https://t.me/wargonzo/24877; https://t.me/yurasumy/21291

[53] https://t.me/voin_dv/13514; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32487; https://t.me/voin_dv/13505

[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034iL5LJeaaD5c8xYD1czRxE76YBVtV8neKyz3ujFCmRkVtz4H6giermqjHu7CtQi4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XFRpfj2ZWqkJdVNWYzHeqCmAGkEeb5f69yVsodjTQxguit6cqVx967NHwrkGTW28l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GyQ5iKXW3qGipo97trfMSx77jL5XZ3Xrx9GQSgGXbpkdm1qNLNgLYC5ZsdnF5g5pl; https://t.me/rybar/68156; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62280; https://t.me/wargonzo/24877; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32464

[55] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5482

[56] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8443; https://t.me/nova_afu/174

[57] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32464; https://t.me/voin_dv/13514; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32465; https://t.me/yurasumy/21290

[58] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62280; https://t.me/voin_dv/13514; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32464; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32465; https://t.me/voin_dv/13505

[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034iL5LJeaaD5c8xYD1czRxE76YBVtV8neKyz3ujFCmRkVtz4H6giermqjHu7CtQi4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XFRpfj2ZWqkJdVNWYzHeqCmAGkEeb5f69yVsodjTQxguit6cqVx967NHwrkGTW28l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GyQ5iKXW3qGipo97trfMSx77jL5XZ3Xrx9GQSgGXbpkdm1qNLNgLYC5ZsdnF5g5pl

[60] https://t.me/wargonzo/24877; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24169

[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32460; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24169 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32485

[62] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24144

[63] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32460

[64] https://t.me/kpszsu/29165

[65] https://suspilne dot media/952705-zelenskij-zustrinetsa-iz-kellogom-francia-bere-vidpovidalnist-za-mir-v-evropi-1093-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1740032726&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4187; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/952781-kiiv-vnoci-atakuvali-rosijski-droni-aki-naslidki/ ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/38498 ; https://t.me/ukrainian_navy/11620 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/952717-armia-rf-drugij-den-pospil-atakuvala-odesu-dronami-e-travmovanij/ ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02Zp4efZDq2SRfMDigWLG3Kt2Ki4nvxqGbqgzaNHubAm4ogCcSnEyKaxzPQWh34WWWl ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/8668; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/952799-v-odesi-trivae-likvidacia-naslidkiv-atak-vidnovili-robotu-dvoh-kotelen/; https://t.me/truonline/4464 ; https://www.facebook.com/dtekoem/posts/pfbid0214MUn9cC3AcRSE9Qjjf1TLEbByJkkiK5u5EER7Wcoeivr8mjDNXbPQWuCnjpfJVhl?ref=embed_post; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/952777-rf-znovu-atakuvala-energeticnij-obekt-dtek-na-odesini/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/74884 ;

[66] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/18/rosijski-vijska-atakuvaly-34-naseleni-punkty-hersonshhyny-ye-postrazhdali/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/20/herson-zdrygnuvsya-vid-prylotu-aviabomby-rf-vluchyly-u-desyatypoverhivku/ ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12110 ; https://t.me/astrapress/74903 ; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/6366

[67] https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/953193-somij-den-trivae-likvidacia-naslidkiv-rosijskoi-ataki-na-cornobilsku-aes/

[68] https://static.rusi.org/tactical-developments-third-year-russo-ukrainian-war-february-2205.pdf; https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/tactical-developments-during-third-year-russo-ukrainian-war

[69] https://t.me/DIUkraine/5396

[70] https://belta dot by/society/view/minoborony-uchenija-zapad-2025-projdut-v-seredine-sentjabrja-697220-2025/