Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 7, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 7, 2025

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Olivia Gibson, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter and William Runkel

March 7, 2025, 9:00pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00pm ET on March 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Russian forces conducted one of the largest ever missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 6 to 7 as Russian forces continue to adapt strike packages to overwhelm Ukraine's air defense umbrella by increasing the total number of Shahed and decoy drones in each strike. Russian forces launched the largest combined strike package against Ukraine since November 2024 on the night of March 6 to 7.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 67 missiles including 35 Kh-101/Kh-55 cruise missiles, eight Kalibr cruise missiles, three Iskander-M/Kn-23 ballistic missiles, four S-300 air defense missiles, eight Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 194 Shahed and decoy drones.[2] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 25 Kh-101/Kh-55 cruise missiles, all eight Kalibr cruise missiles, one Kh-59/69 cruise missile, and 100 Shahed and decoy drones and that 86 decoy drones and up to 10 missiles did not reach their targets, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference.

The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Ukrainian forces downed Russian targets using F-16 and Mirage-2000 aircraft and that this was the first instance of Ukrainian forces using Mirage-2000s, which arrived one month ago, to defend against Russian strikes. The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Russian forces targeted Ukrainian gas production facilities during the strike.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other official Ukrainian sources stated that Russian strikes damaged energy facilities in Odesa, Poltava, Chernihiv, and Ternopil oblasts.[4] Ternopil Oblast Military Administration reported that two Russian missiles struck a critical infrastructure facility, causing a fire.[5] Ukraine's largest private energy company DTEK stated that the strikes damaged an energy facility in Odesa Oblast.[6]

Russian forces began increasing the number of Shahed and decoy drones in strike packages in Fall 2024, likely to adapt to successful Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) innovations. ISW observed reports that Russian forces began launching between 80 and 100 (or more) Shahed and decoy drones as part of their larger strike packages in October and November 2024, and reports indicate that Russia has increased the production of Shahed drone airframes while continuing to rely on Iranian or Chinese imports for other drone components in December 2024.[7] Russia has likely leveraged the increased production of Shahed drones to increase the total number of drones launched in each strike package. Russian forces launched an average 83.4 drones per strike package in January 2025, an average of 139.3 drones per strike package in February 2024, and an average of 128.8 drones per strike package from March 1 through 7. Russian forces have only sporadically included missiles in the January, February, and March 2025 strike packages, and the 67 missiles launched in the March 6 to 7 strike series is a larger amount than in previous missile strikes this year. Russian forces likely increased the combined number of Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles and Kh-101/Kh-55 cruise missiles in the March 6 to 7 strike packages to inflict maximum damage on select targets in Ukraine while using the large number of Shahed drones, decoy drones, and Kalibr cruise missiles to detect and overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and mobile fire groups.

Russia will likely take advantage of the suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine to intensify its long-range strike campaign and deplete Ukrainian air defense missiles. US intelligence has contributed to Ukraine's early warning system against Russian strikes and its suspension will likely impact Ukraine's ability to rapidly respond to adapting Russian strike packages.[8] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) recently reported that Russia is modernizing and increasing its production of Shahed-136 drones and producing a new Geran-3 drone variant.[9] Russan forces will likely attempt to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems by increasing the number of Shahed and decoy drones per strike package in addition to increasing the number of missiles in select strike packages to destroy Ukrainian energy and defense industrial base (DIB) infrastructure. Russia also likely intends to force Ukraine into quickly depleting its supply of Patriot air defense interceptors - which Ukraine relies on to defend against Russian ballistic missiles - during the pause in US military aid and intelligence sharing to maximize the damage of subsequent strikes. Ukrainian forces will likely have to be more selective in intercepting strikes as their stock of interceptors decreases with no resupply on the horizon, and successful Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy facilities will likely have lasting effects on Ukraine's ability to generate power for DIB and civilian use.

Russian forces are further intensifying offensive operations in select frontline areas likely in order to capitalize on any immediate and longer-term battlefield impacts of the cessation of US aid to Ukraine. Russian forces have intensified offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Velyka Novosilka direction in recent weeks and continue efforts to expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast and seize Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces previously leveraged Ukrainian materiel shortages prompted by a delay in US aid in Spring 2024 to make significant advances in Donetsk Oblast and launch an offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast, and the Kremlin likely intends to exploit expected Ukrainian materiel shortages to make additional gains if the suspension of US military assistance persists.[10]

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated on March 5 that US weapons supplies to Ukraine will "most likely resume" but that Russia's "main task" remains "inflicting maximum damage" on Ukraine "on the ground" during this limited window.[11] Russian forces appear to be further intensifying offensive operations against Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and in the Chasiv Yar direction and likely intend to exploit the near-term impacts of the cutting of US aid, particularly intelligence sharing, to accomplish Russian operational objectives in these areas.

Russian forces recently advanced into northern Sumy Oblast for the first time since 2022 – when Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces from significant swathes of Ukrainian territory following the initial months of Russian advances. Russian forces likely intend to leverage limited advances into Sumy Oblast to completely expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast among other objectives. Geolocated footage published on March 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Basivka (northeast of Sumy City) just across the international border in Sumy Oblast.[12] Russian forces marginally advanced into northern Sumy Oblast near Zhuravka (northwest of Badivka) in mid-January 2025 as part of their efforts to bypass Nikolayevo-Darino (east of Sudzha) from the south and have continued to operate in the area over the last six weeks.[13] Russian milbloggers recently claimed that Russian forces seized Basivka and Novenke (north of Basivka), and Ukrainian sources stated on March 7 that Russian forces have been gradually advancing in the area in recent weeks.[14] A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence stated on March 7 that Russian forces are concentrating forces in Novenke, attempting to advance towards Basivka, and attacking the Sumy City-Sudzha H-07 highway near Yunakivka (south of Basivka).[15] Russian forces are currently six kilometers from the H-07 highway and nine kilometers from Yunkivka at their furthest point of advance in northern Sumy Oblast and will have to identify or establish usable crossings over the Loknya River if they intend to advance directly southeast towards the highway from the Basivka area.

The Russian military command has likely ordered Russian forces to cut the H-07 highway in order to complicate Ukrainian logistics in the Kursk salient and as part of a longer-term Russian effort to force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Kursk Oblast under the threat of envelopment. Russian forces reportedly made limited advances into Sumy Oblast south of Plekhovo (southeast of Sudzha) in early January 2025, and Russian forces may be attempting to advance along the southern flank of the Ukrainian salient and interdict Ukrainian egress routes from Kursk Oblast from the east and west.[16] Russian forces likely intend to cut Ukraine's main obvious egress route along the H-07 and force the Ukrainian military to withdraw from the Kursk salient to Ukraine via fields and smaller roads. Russian forces are likely also aiming to complicate Ukrainian logistics and troop redeployments to Kursk Oblast by interdicting the H-07 highway.

Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly conducting the attacks near Zhuravka, Novenke, and Basivka and additional elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade are reportedly operating near Plekhovo.[17] The Russian military command may have tasked these relatively more elite units to lead Russian efforts to envelop the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast from the south. Russian forces would have to close a gap of roughly 35 kilometers in order to envelop Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast, and this operation will likely be difficult should Ukrainian forces choose to defend the highway to support their remaining salient in Kursk Oblast. Russian forces are unlikely to conduct a significant offensive operation further towards Sumy City as long as Ukrainian forces hold positions in Kursk Oblast, however.

Russian forces also recently intensified offensive operations aimed at seizing Chasiv Yar and attacking Kostyantynivka – the southernmost settlement of Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on March 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the railway line and Chekhova Street in southwestern Chasiv Yar during a reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault in the area.[18] The Ukrainian brigade that repelled the assault stated that Russian forces attacked in a single column of 25 armored vehicles and that Ukrainian forces damaged and destroyed 16 of the vehicles.[19] The brigade reported that Ukrainian forces damaged several of the Russian armored vehicles at the front of the column, causing a "jam" as Russian forces crossed the Siverskyi Donets Donbas canal and forcing Russian forces to retreat under Ukrainian shelling and drone strikes. The officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported on March 6 that elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division conducted the mechanized assault.[20] Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on March 7 that Russian forces attacked from two directions and that one Russian armored group unsuccessfully attempted to advance near the Avanhard Stadium in central Chasiv Yar.[21] Zaporozhets reported that the Russian military command ordered Russian forces in the area to seize Chasiv Yar by March 1, 2025 and assessed that Russian forces may undertake increasingly desperate attacks in the coming days and weeks.

The March 6 Russian mechanized assault is part of an ongoing Russian effort to seize and break out of Chasiv Yar, advance on the northeastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka, and pressure Ukraine's "fortress belt" – a 50-kilometer-long line of four major cities that forms the backbone of Ukraine's defenses in Donetsk Oblast.[22] ISW previously assessed that a multi-axis campaign against Ukraine's "fortress belt" would take Russian forces several years to complete, but this assessment is highly dependent on the provision of Western aid.[23] Any long-term pauses or the cessation of US aid to Ukraine will likely significantly impact Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian advances and frontline strikes in the Kostyantynivka direction and will advantage Russian offensive operations along the entire frontline.

Russian officials continue to explicitly reject making any concessions in future peace negotiations or accepting any US, European, or Ukrainian peace proposals. Bloomberg, citing people familiar with the matter in Moscow, reported on March 7 that Russian officials told US officials in a bilateral meeting in Riyadh on February 18 that "Russia is willing to discuss a temporary truce in Ukraine provided there is progress toward a final peace settlement."[24] Bloomberg, citing those familiar with the issue, reported that Russia will insist on establishing a clear understanding of the principles and parameters of an eventual peacekeeping mission as part of the final peace accord. Russian officials have since repeatedly and explicitly articulated Russia's unwavering demand that Ukraine concede to Moscow's pre-war demands – showcasing Russia's long-standing two-fold effort to portray itself as open to negotiations while remaining unwilling to make concessions in future negotiations with the United States, Ukraine, and Europe.[25] Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on March 6 that Russia does not intend to "give in to anyone" or make any compromises in future peace negotiations, and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova rejected the possibility of a negotiated ceasefire and the deployment of European troops to Ukraine on March 6 and claimed that Russia considers any proposal that gives Ukraine a "respite" along the frontline is unacceptable.[26] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated in February that "a direct military conflict between NATO and Russia will be inevitable if Western troops are sent to Ukraine."[27] Russian Ambassador to the United Kingdom Andrei Kelin stated in an interview published on March 6 that Russia's territorial advances in Ukraine "should be recognized" as part of any peace deal and that Ukraine should be "a neutral, non-nuclear state," underscoring Russia's ongoing demands for regime change and de-militarization in Ukraine.[28] Russia violated the agreement under which Ukraine returned its Soviet-era nuclear weapons stockpile to Russia and became a nuclear-free state by invading in 2014 and again in 2022. That treaty obliged Russia to respect Ukraine's pre-2014 borders and to refrain from any sort of coercion against Ukraine.[29]

Lithuania's intelligence services assessed that Russia may have the capabilities to conduct a limited campaign against one or several NATO countries within three to five years, an assessment that is consistent with ISW's assessments about Russian efforts to restructure and prepare its military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term. The Lithuanian State Security Service (VSD) and Second Department of Operational Services (AOTD) published a declassified National Threat Assessment on March 6 and assessed that Russia's further development of military capabilities may encourage Russian leadership to use military force if Russian officials calculate that the NATO alliance is sufficiently ill-equipped to react decisively such that Russia could localize an attack on a NATO member state and obtain a swift and decisive victory.[30] The VSD and AOTD assessed that a diplomatic solution to the war in Ukraine is unlikely in the short term as Russia's main objective to subjugate Ukraine has not changed. The VSD and AOTD assessed that Russia has enough domestic political support to continue its war in Ukraine for "years."

Lithuania's assessment largely coheres with ISW's long-standing assessment that Russia is uninterested in a peace agreement to end the war in Ukraine in the near-term and Western estimates for the timeline of a Russian attack on a NATO member state correlate closely with ongoing Western sanctions limiting Russia's defense industrial capabilities. Any effort by Western powers to alleviate sanctions pressure on the Russian regime will accelerate Russia's capacity to optimize its military and further embolden Russian leadership, as Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) remains constrained by financial mechanisms in the medium- to long-term.

The United Kingdom (UK) issued Ukraine's first tranche of revenue generated from frozen Russian assets. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal reported on March 7 that the UK issued Ukraine the first tranche of funds with revenue generated from the proceeds of frozen Russian assets worth nearly $1 billion.[31] Shmyhal stated that Ukraine will use the funds to strengthen Ukraine's defense capabilities.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted one of the largest ever missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 6 to 7 as Russian forces continue to adapt strike packages to overwhelm Ukraine's air defense umbrella by increasing the total number of Shahed and decoy drones in each strike.
• Russian forces began increasing the number of Shahed and decoy drones in strike packages in Fall 2024, likely to adapt to successful Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) innovations.
• Russia will likely take advantage of the suspension of US military aid to and intelligence sharing with Ukraine to intensify its long-range strike campaign and deplete Ukrainian air defense missiles.
• Russian forces are further intensifying offensive operations in select frontline areas likely in order to capitalize on any immediate and longer-term battlefield impacts of the cessation of US aid to Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced into northern Sumy Oblast for the first time since 2022 – when Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces from significant swathes of Ukrainian territory following the initial months of Russian advances. Russian forces likely intend to leverage limited advances into Sumy Oblast to completely expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast among other objectives.
• Russian forces also recently intensified offensive operations aimed at seizing Chasiv Yar and attacking Kostyantynivka – the southernmost settlement of Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian officials continue to explicitly reject making any concessions in future peace negotiations or accepting any US, European, or Ukrainian peace proposals.
• Lithuania's intelligence services assessed that Russia may have the capabilities to conduct a limited campaign against one or several NATO countries within three to five years, an assessment that is consistent with ISW's assessments about Russian efforts to restructure and prepare its military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term.
• The United Kingdom (UK) issued Ukraine's first tranche of revenue generated from frozen Russian assets.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Borova, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
• The Kremlin continues to leverage its "Time of Heroes" program to fill government positions with veterans of its war in Ukraine as part of a long-term effort to militarize Russian society and form a new cadre of loyal Russian officials.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 7 indicates that Russian forces, reportedly including elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), seized Staraya Sorochina (northwest of Sudzha).[32] Geolocated footage published on March 7 indicates that Russian forces advanced southeast of Nikolayevo-Darino (northwest of Sudzha).[33]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Novaya Sorochina (northwest of Sudzha) and that Russian forces advanced seized Nikolayevka and Viktorovka and advanced near Malaya Loknya (all northwest of Sudzha).[34] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced near Kurilovka and Guyevo (both south of Sudzha).[35]

A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kursk direction stated that Russian forces attack weak points in Ukrainian defenses in small infantry groups and occasionally conduct mechanized assaults.[36]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[37]

See topline text for updates in Sumy Oblast.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 7 but did not advance.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 7 but did not make any confirmed advances.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are in Kupyansk on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River.[39]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone crew operating in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions reported on March 7 that the intensity of Russian attacks has decreased in these directions.[40] The commander reported that Russian forces have begun using nets to catch Ukrainian first-person-view (FPV) drones and are deploying a significant number of Russian FPV and fiber-optic drones to strike Ukrainian logistics routes in the area.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 6 indicates that Russian forces advanced in western Zahryzove (northeast of Borova).[41]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 7 that Russian forces crossed the Oskil river in the Kruhlyakivka area and landed in Senkove (both northeast of Borova).[42]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove on March 6 and 7.[43]

A Ukrainian spokesperson of a brigade operating in Kharkiv Oblast stated on March 7 that Russian forces are conducting fewer mechanized assaults in Kharkiv Oblast (possibly referring to the Borova direction) as a result of successful Ukrainian drone usage.[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 7 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman in the direction of Nove and northeast of Lyman near Novomykhailivka, Ivanivka, Balka Zhuravka, Yampolivka, and Torske on March 6 and 7.[45]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction on March 7, said that Russian forces are constantly attacking in the Lyman direction and occasionally advancing during mechanized assaults.[46] The spokesperson noted that the Russian forces typically deploy infantry first in pairs after which groups of 10 to 15 soldiers attack Ukrainian positions.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka on March 7 but did not advance.[47]

See topline text for updates in the Chasiv Yar direction.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 5 and 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern, central, and southern Toretsk.[48]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces made additional advances in northern, western, and southern Toretsk and in Sukha Balka (southwest of Toretsk).[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced near the Toretska Mine in northern Toretsk and near Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[50]

Fighting continued near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk near Ozarynivka; north of Toretsk near Krymske, Dachne and Dyliivka; east of Toretsk near Druzhba; and southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka on March 6 and 7.[51]

Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on March 7 that Russian forces are using motorcycles to transport personnel into central Toretsk and have transferred a new artillery element to the area.[52] Zaporozhets assessed that the new artillery element is likely from the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]). ISW has recently observed elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) operating near Toretsk.[53]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[54]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northeastern Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have seized most of Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk) and Pishchane (south of Pokrovsk) and gained a foothold in northern Shevchenko, Zelene, and Novyi Trud (all south of Pokrovsk).[56]

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka and Promin; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske, Shevchenko, and Pishchane; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Nadiivka, Kotlyarivka, and Preobrazhenka on March 6 and 7.[57] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Yelyzavetivka, Pishchane, Shevchenko, and Kotlyne.[58]

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on March 7 that Russian forces have retreated from some positions in the Pokrovsk direction due to Ukrainian counterattacks and ongoing Russian communication and logistic issues in the area.[59]

A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed on March 7 that Ukrainian forces have fire control over the Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) leading to Shevchenko with drones and that Ukrainian forces have superior drone operations in the area.[60]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1453rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Shevchenko.[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 7 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Andriivka (west of Kurakhove).[62]

Russian forces continued assault west of Kurakhove near Ulakly, Andriivka, Kostyantynopil, Oleksiivka, and Bahatyr and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on March 7 and 8.[63]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynopil.[64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on March 7 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 300 meters near Skudne (north of Velyka Novosilka).[65]

Russian forces continued assaults north of Velyka Novosilka near Skudne and Dniproenerhiya and northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne, Vilne Pole, Burlatske, Novosilka, and Shevchenko on March 6 and 7.[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces occasionally counterattack near Skudne and Burlatske.[67]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction (likely referring to the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area).[68]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka and northwest of Robotyne near Stepove, Shcherbaky, Nesteryanka, Pyatykhatky, Kamyanske, and Mali Shcherbaky on March 6 and 7.[69]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction reported on March 7 that Russian forces are using stolen civilian vehicles for transportation and are mainly assaulting Ukrainian positions on foot in the Orikhiv direction.[70] The spokesperson added that Russian forces stopped using military vehicles at frontline positions.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne); and elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Pyatykhatky.[71]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Kherson direction on March 7.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 81st Artillery Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th CAA, SMD) and drone operators of the “Klever” Group are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[72]

Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces launched at least 29 drones at occupied Crimea on March 6.[73] A Ukrainian source reported on March 6 that there were explosions at a Russian military training ground where Russian forces launch Shahed drones in occupied Cape Chauda.[74]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin continues to leverage its "Time of Heroes" program to fill government positions with veterans of its war in Ukraine as part of a long-term effort to militarize Russian society and form a new cadre of loyal Russian officials. Russian authorities appointed "Time of Heroes" participant Alexander Zagaynov as Chief Advisor to the Russian Presidential Representative's Office in Urals Federal District and Ilya Shalita as Acting Director of the Kurgan Oblast Public Safety Department.[75] Zagaynov will reportedly oversee programs for Time of Heroes participants in the Ural Federal District and Shalita will reportedly supervise coordination between federal and regional law enforcement agencies.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to support improving social services for Russia's veterans, likely in an effort to mitigate against the risk of veterans emerging as a political cleavage that could erode Putin’s regime stability. Putin stated on March 6, during a meeting with Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation employees, that he will accelerate government efforts to approve a draft amendment that would grant veteran status to Russian penal recruits in the "Storm-Z" detachments.[76] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is concerned about the risk and challenges associated with reintegrating veterans into Russian society at scale.[77]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

 

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-17-2024

[2] https://t.me/kpszsu/30161

[3] https://t.me/kpszsu/30161

[4] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13489 ; https://t.me/suspilneodesa/45398 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/8891 ; https://t.me/ternopilskaODA ; https://t.me/suspilneodesa/45398

[5] https://t.me/ternopilskaODA/13304

[6] https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1730255497753810&id=100023081305722&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=MV3Lpx5iw4iSytPm

[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2024

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030525

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2025

[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2025

[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2025

[12] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8557; https://t.me/DPSUkr/25120

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-30-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2025

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2025 ; https://www.pravda.com dot ua/news/2025/03/7/7501734/ ; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21425

[15] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21425

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2025

[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2025 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24908 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2025

[18] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1897732793805005194; https://t.me/official24ombr/984; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/26197 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1897744141640958445; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1897745269896138858

[19] https://t.me/official24ombr/984

[20] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/06/tehniku-zastosovuyut-arhayichnymy-metodamy-v-chasovomu-yaru-palyly-vorozhi-kolony/

[21] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8 ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/965047-zsu-vidbili-rosijskij-sturm-u-casovomu-aru-de-bula-zalucena-bronetehnika/

[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625

[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625

[24] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-07/russia-s-putin-is-said-to-be-ready-to-agree-to-ukraine-truce-with-conditions

[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-annexation-occupied-ukraine-putin%E2%80%99s-unacceptable-%E2%80%9C-ramp%E2%80%9D ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-kremlins-fake-de-escalation-donbas

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-6-2025

[27] https://tass dot ru/politika/20093637

[28] https://news.sky.com/story/russia-wants-quick-peace-in-ukraine-and-london-is-head-of-those-resisting-it-ambassador-to-uk-tells-sky-news-13322750

[29] https://policymemos.hks.harvard.edu/files/policymemos/files/2-23-22_ukraine-the_budapest_memo.pdf?m=1645824948

[30] https://www.vsd dot lt/en/reports/national-threat-assessment-2025/

[31] https://x.com/Denys_Shmyhal/status/1897972916177838438

[32] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33126; https://t.me/attentionskiba/311; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8555; https://t.me/yurasumy/21610; https://t.me/dva_majors/66061; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87441; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/156898

[33] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8557; https://t.me/DPSUkr/25120

[34] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87441 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87441 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66037 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/156898 ; https://t.me/swodki/469965 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62664 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33143 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21610

[35] https://t.me/dva_majors/66037 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66049 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62650 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/143381

[36] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/07/ranishe-buly-korejczi-morpihy-desantnyky-ta-speczpryznachenczi-na-kurshhyni-vorog-zakyduye-myasom/

[37] https://t.me/milinfolive/143367

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u3SDz6PArFg4XxH37LtiwfHMHhBP8AqHNBQ5gvTwh9mN9a1xGn7E3Bbuc7Deimr1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035XxGwNWL8YrqeZp6FAnXRwrsRoa1yPynGGdCCThbCJaevFc1Swz22xTbSk59mrzul; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AuK5MAWrWSGMNcEZWMfEWJYFqitAyQyVmg2qhpDbZPRYrZxvHWfGn2DiGczjUsMkl; https://t.me/otukharkiv/4789 ; https://t.me/synegubov/13381

[39] https://t.me/dva_majors/66037

[40] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/07/ty-zhyva-czil-dlya-drona-rosiyan-pryrikayut-na-smert-za-vidmovu-shturmuvaty/

[41] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1897756265268625586; https://t.me/osb878/299; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/26209

[42] https://t.me/dva_majors/66037

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u3SDz6PArFg4XxH37LtiwfHMHhBP8AqHNBQ5gvTwh9mN9a1xGn7E3Bbuc7Deimr1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035XxGwNWL8YrqeZp6FAnXRwrsRoa1yPynGGdCCThbCJaevFc1Swz22xTbSk59mrzul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AuK5MAWrWSGMNcEZWMfEWJYFqitAyQyVmg2qhpDbZPRYrZxvHWfGn2DiGczjUsMkl

[44] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/07/bronovani-shturmy-zaminyly-dronovymy-na-harkivshhyni-v-nebi-zgrayi-vorozhyh-bezpilotnykiv/

[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u3SDz6PArFg4XxH37LtiwfHMHhBP8AqHNBQ5gvTwh9mN9a1xGn7E3Bbuc7Deimr1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035XxGwNWL8YrqeZp6FAnXRwrsRoa1yPynGGdCCThbCJaevFc1Swz22xTbSk59mrzul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AuK5MAWrWSGMNcEZWMfEWJYFqitAyQyVmg2qhpDbZPRYrZxvHWfGn2DiGczjUsMkl

[46] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/06/ne-z-dvoh-do-chotyroh-abo-z-shesty-do-vosmy-ataky-metodom-na-zhyvczya-tryvayut-uves-den/

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u3SDz6PArFg4XxH37LtiwfHMHhBP8AqHNBQ5gvTwh9mN9a1xGn7E3Bbuc7Deimr1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035XxGwNWL8YrqeZp6FAnXRwrsRoa1yPynGGdCCThbCJaevFc1Swz22xTbSk59mrzul

[48] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1897936631987834893; https://t.me/voron1OO/129; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1897936995621486746 ; https://t.me/voron1OO/129 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1897747448883290578 ; https://t.me/ua_42nd_ombr/839

[49] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33128 ; https://t.me/rybar/68576

[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24929

[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u3SDz6PArFg4XxH37LtiwfHMHhBP8AqHNBQ5gvTwh9mN9a1xGn7E3Bbuc7Deimr1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035XxGwNWL8YrqeZp6FAnXRwrsRoa1yPynGGdCCThbCJaevFc1Swz22xTbSk59mrzul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AuK5MAWrWSGMNcEZWMfEWJYFqitAyQyVmg2qhpDbZPRYrZxvHWfGn2DiGczjUsMkl ; https://t.me/rybar/68576 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66037

[52] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/964783-armia-rf-aktivnise-zastosovue-motocikli-na-toreckomu-napramku/

[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2025

[54] https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1897951938836414618; https://t.me/moment_war/351;

[55] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62641

[56] https://t.me/yurasumy/21587

[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u3SDz6PArFg4XxH37LtiwfHMHhBP8AqHNBQ5gvTwh9mN9a1xGn7E3Bbuc7Deimr1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035XxGwNWL8YrqeZp6FAnXRwrsRoa1yPynGGdCCThbCJaevFc1Swz22xTbSk59mrzul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AuK5MAWrWSGMNcEZWMfEWJYFqitAyQyVmg2qhpDbZPRYrZxvHWfGn2DiGczjUsMkl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66037 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62641

[58] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62641 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25138 ; https://t.me/svarkapogruzka/5234 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24927 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62662 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/156797

[59] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/07/rosiyany-vydyhlysya-i-cze-ustalenyj-fakt-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-vorog-strazhdaye-vid-kilkoh-problem/

[60] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2173

[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33148

[62] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31023

[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u3SDz6PArFg4XxH37LtiwfHMHhBP8AqHNBQ5gvTwh9mN9a1xGn7E3Bbuc7Deimr1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035XxGwNWL8YrqeZp6FAnXRwrsRoa1yPynGGdCCThbCJaevFc1Swz22xTbSk59mrzul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AuK5MAWrWSGMNcEZWMfEWJYFqitAyQyVmg2qhpDbZPRYrZxvHWfGn2DiGczjUsMkl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66037 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25128 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24939

[64] https://t.me/voin_dv/13753 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33151

[65] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24934 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/156797

[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u3SDz6PArFg4XxH37LtiwfHMHhBP8AqHNBQ5gvTwh9mN9a1xGn7E3Bbuc7Deimr1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035XxGwNWL8YrqeZp6FAnXRwrsRoa1yPynGGdCCThbCJaevFc1Swz22xTbSk59mrzul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AuK5MAWrWSGMNcEZWMfEWJYFqitAyQyVmg2qhpDbZPRYrZxvHWfGn2DiGczjUsMkl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62646

[67] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62646

[68] https://t.me/ZA_FROHT/39472

[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u3SDz6PArFg4XxH37LtiwfHMHhBP8AqHNBQ5gvTwh9mN9a1xGn7E3Bbuc7Deimr1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035XxGwNWL8YrqeZp6FAnXRwrsRoa1yPynGGdCCThbCJaevFc1Swz22xTbSk59mrzul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AuK5MAWrWSGMNcEZWMfEWJYFqitAyQyVmg2qhpDbZPRYrZxvHWfGn2DiGczjUsMkl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66037 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25128 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24921

[70] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/07/dijty-okupantam-v-polon-duzhe-vazhko-na-pivdni-rosijskyh-shturmovykiv-ganyayut-stepom-vampiry/

[71]https://t.me/ZA_FROHT/39472 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87422 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24921

[72] https://t.me/dva_majors/66015 ; https://t.me/clovergroup_rus/34/

[73] https://t.me/mod_russia/49721 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/34421 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66037

[74] https://t.me/andriyshTime/34412 ; https://t.me/sprotyvpivden/1378

[75] https://t.me/vremyageroev2024/924 ; https://t.me/vremyageroev2024/927

[76] https://ria dot ru/20250306/veteran-2003496571.html ;

[77] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-unlikely-demobilize-event-ceasefire-because-he-afraid-his-veterans