ISW Webcast with BG Nixon

Apr 16, 2009 - Institute for t...

In this six-part interview, ISW President Kimberly Kagan discusses MND-N with BG James C. Nixon. Nixon is the Deputy Commanding General of Operations in MND-N. During the interview Nixon gives an overview of MND-N, discusses the relationship between the different components of the area of operation such as Diyala and Mosul, the impact of this year's provincial elections in Iraq and the subsequent seating of provincial councils, the current challenges in the north related to Arab-Kurd tensions, and enemy threats.

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Transcript:

INTERVIEW OF 
 BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES C. NIXON, 
 Deputy Commanding General of Operations, 
 25th Infantry Division 
 CONDUCTED BY 
  DR. KIM KAGAN, Institute for the Study of War 
 [Transcript produced from webcast recording.]
 
 Prepared by: 
 MALLOY TRANSCRIPTION SERVICE 
 7040 31st Street, N.W. 
 Washington, D.C.  20015 
 (202) 362 6622
 
       
 [Video clip No. 1 of 6 begins.]
 
 KAGAN:  Hello.  This is Kim Kagan. 
 NIXON:  Hi, Kim.  How are you? 
 KAGAN:  I'm doing very well.  How are you doing out there? 
 NIXON:  I'm doing fine.  I apologize for the timing issue but glad to get the opportunity to talk with you tonight. 
 KAGAN:  We are pleased to have the opportunity to talk with you.  If it looks like everything is streaming and ready, I'll go ahead and start asking you some large questions and talking with you for the interview.  Everything look good on your end? 
 NIXON:  Okay.  That sounds good.  Sure does. 
 KAGAN:  Terrific.
 
 Well, this is Kim Kagan with the Institute for the Study of War, and today, we have with us Brigadier General James C. Nixon, the Deputy Commanding General of Operations for the 25th Infantry Division, which arrived in Iraq in November 2008 and assumed command of Multi National Division North on the 9th of December.
 
 General Nixon, thanks so much for joining us. 
 
NIXON:  Thank you for having me tonight, Kim. 
 
KAGAN:  We would very much like to understand and have you explain some of the situations that you face in Multi National Division North, which after all is such a complex area of Iraq. The first question I would ask of you is can you tell us about the problem set that you face in Multi-National Division North and perhaps give us an overview of who lives in MND North, and then we could perhaps go through the potential drivers of instability up there. 
 
NIXON:  Okay, I'd be happy to. 
As you know, it is a very complex area, a little bit larger than the size of Pennsylvania for the four provinces, excluding the KRG, but in the north, you've got Ninewa, which, the major city is Mosul there.  You have Salah ad Din in the center, and then to the eastern side, you have Diyala, and then above that, of course, Kirkuk.  As you know, each one of the provinces is very different.  Each one has a different subset of issues.  I can start really with Diyala, which I know the best of the four, and I will work around the area. In Diyala, it really is a microcosm of Iraq because all of the issues resident in Iraq are inside of Diyala.  It has about 55 percent Sunni and about 35 percent Shia, 15 percent or so Kurdish.  So you've got an ethnic mix.  It is bordered by Iran.  It is close to Baghdad.  It has had at times both JAM and al Qaeda influences, and then it has a disputed area up north, adjacent with Kurdistan.  It is one of our more challenging areas because it is so nuanced, and I can answer specific questions as we go forward.  In Kirkuk itself, largely stable security has very much improved since the Sons of Iraq came on board in the southern western sectors.  The combination of the Sons of Iraq, a strong police force in Kirkuk, and now the 12th IA have increased the stability, but obviously, the overriding concern in Kirkuk continues to be the Arab Kurd tensions. Again, I will be happy to go into further detail on that. 
 In Salah ad Din, probably our most progressed, progressive of the four provinces, a strong functioning provincial government, good economic base, a strong Iraqi Army leadership.  The major issue there really is disenfranchised personnel, primarily the former regime elements, and there is a large number because, as you know, Tikrit was really the center, Tikrit and Al Daur being the center of the former Baath party. 
 Then finally, our biggest issue at the moment is Mosul in the Province of Ninewa, and that still continues to be the largest threat of al Qaeda.  It has not had a very strong provincial government, although that is about to change, and also has disputed areas and Arab Kurd tensions as well. 
 I have walked around, but I guess I would like to say that across the board, what we have seen is great progress on a number of fronts, although there are clearly challenges ahead, but I would like to highlight most of those challenges are based largely on the successes that have been made in past rotations and in this rotations. 
 
KAGAN:  Thank you very much. General Nixon, I understand from my team that my questions are not audible on the webcast.  So might I ask you please to repeat the questions before you answer them as we go forward? 
 
NIXON:  Absolutely.  Sure. 
 
KAGAN:  Let's begin with Diyala Province, and perhaps you can explain to us whether the majority of violent activity within Diyala and provincial instability arises from enemy groups or whether it arises from ethno sectarian tensions. 
 
NIXON:  The question was whether the majority of violence in Diyala arises from ethnic groups or enemy insurgents or terrorists, and that is a difficult question. 
 If I could re-characterize it, I would re-characterize it to say that the majority of violence that I see in Diyala right now is based on a struggle for power amongst the elites.  And some of that is manifested in ethnic groups, and some of it is manifested by insurgent organizations, either al Qaeda or, in some cases, to a lesser degree, JAM special groups, but largely al Qaeda and other Sunni insurgents. 
 I would say that the level of violence in Diyala is at its lowest level, really since 2003, and largely the population has been passive.  But based on this increased security, I think there are growing expectations, primarily for central services but also for jobs.  And the elections, having now elected a Sunni provincial government or a Sunni majority provincial government, I think unless those expectations are addressed, then there is potential for that violence to increase, unless we can get those essential services and jobs out to the population. 
 
KAGAN:  Can you tell us more about the individuals who have been elected to the provincial government?  Has the provincial council been seated, the provincial council chairman appointed and the provincial governor appointed yet? 
 
NIXON:  Well, like all things in Diyala and Iraq, it is going through the process right now.  The provincial council has met    the incoming provincial council has met a number of times, and we believe they have selected    they have met the requirements to meet post-elections or post-the announcing of the elections.  We believe they have selected a provincial governor, one deputy governor, the provincial council chairman, and deputy provincial council chairman. 
That is my understanding, both from the provincial reconstruction team, as well as those that we are seeing over the video here. 
It appears that they formed a coalition between the Tawafuq, which is a Sunni political organization, the Kurdish, as well as ISCI and Shia.  So it is a coalition, truly a coalition that expands all the ethnic groups.  Currently, my belief is the provincial governor will be from the Tawafuq party. 
 
[Video clip No. 2 of 6 begins.] 
KAGAN:  As you look at the politics in Diyala, I would be very curious for your assessment of how much the national parties influence some of these local politicians.  For example, to what extent do the KDP and PUK actually give directives to the Kurdish members of the provincial government in Diyala? 
 
NIXON:  That's really hard for me to address.  Obviously, that is not one of my primary focuses. 
 I would suggest that because of the location of Diyala, there are external influences, both from Kurdistan through the political parties as you state and from Baghdad.  It is a key area that has external influences, both from Kurdistan, Baghdad, as well as because of its location from Iran.  So there is great pressure, I believe, on the political leadership, as well as the rest of the mechanism, the security apparatus in Diyala exerted from external factors. 
 
KAGAN:  Can you explain a little bit more what interest, for example, the Prime Minister might have in the outcome of the political settlement of Diyala?  Likewise, what is the Iranian interest in Diyala Province? 
 
NIXON:  I think Diyala, one, obviously next to Iran, there has been a historic gateway over the years from Iran through Diyala into Baghdad.  That has been for hundreds of years.  So there is great interest.  There are a number of Iranian visitors that flow through that on a historic gateway to visit some of the sites there. 
 I think the interest from the Prime Minister is a number of things.  One, it is of course right outside of Baghdad.  So there is a central, close location.  There has been an ongoing struggle since 2003 between first JAM, then al Qaeda, now largely balanced and secure, but pockets of both exist inside of Diyala. 
 And then, obviously, it is also next to Kurdistan, and so you have the disputed area in the vicinity of Khanaqeen.  So there are a number of factors that make Diyala incredibly important to Baghdad, to Kurdistan, as well as Iran, and that results in interest by all the parties. 
 
KAGAN:  We have read over the past weeks about an Iraqi led military operation in Diyala Province in the vicinity of Balad Ruz and Turki Village.  Would it be possible for you to describe the purpose of those operations, as well as their conduct and their result? 
 
NIXON:  Sure.  When we arrived back into Iraq on this latest rotation, about five months ago, one of the things that was most surprising to me was a pretty significant support zone, al Qaeda's or ISI support zone, south of Balad ruz and the Turki Bowl region. It was defended by a belt of IEDs, and then we had some significant reporting that led us to believe they had set up a long term support zone.  Of course, that sits along lines of communication from Iran into Baghdad but, most importantly, sits right outside of Baghdad. 
So we began an operation in complete partnership with the Iraqi Army to deliberately clear that area, to hold it, to bring back displaced personnel, because there was a number of villages that al Qaeda and ISI had forced the villagers out, and we were in the process of building that location. 
 It has been an ongoing operation for a number of months, and it has been extremely successful, extremely well coordinated between the Coalition Forces and our Iraqi Army partners. 
 
KAGAN:  What effect do you think that those operations will have on AQI and ISI's ability to continue the fight in Diyala Province?  How have they reacted to these operations? 
 
NIXON:  I think we have significantly disrupted al Qaeda and ISI operations inside of Diyala.  The support zones and the safe locations that they have to really hide are becoming reduced daily because we are systematically clearing those, and we are holding them. We now have the capacity in the Iraqi Army to push those forces forward.  We have built the capacity in the Iraqi police then to establish police stations, and that is leading us to what really the main effort in Diyala is, getting displaced personnel back into their homes and then rebuilding the destruction that has really occurred over the last four or five years inside of Diyala. That over time will separate the few hard line terrorists from the population, and then, frankly, it is just a matter of time, al Qaeda and ISI, that we continue to defeat that organization inside of Diyala. 
 
KAGAN:  In past years, particularly in 2007 and early 2008, when the ISF and Coalition Forces have conducted operations in Diyala Province.  AQI and ISI have moved from central locations in Diyala to remote areas, like Lake Hamrin or to the border of Salah ad Din Province.  Have you seen the enemy being able to move and re-concentrate elsewhere outside of Diyala? 
 
NIXON:  Well, clearly, there are indications of them moving.  They do not have the safe locations that they've had in the past, to the same magnitude, because of the increased capacity of the Iraqi Army. 
 So the luxury that we really have in Diyala now that we didn't have in the past was the ability to hold the population centers with the Iraqi police in partnership with Coalition Forces and then the increased capacity of the Iraqi Army to go out and clear those type of support zones, again, in conjunction with Coalition Forces, and then stay, hold that terrain, bring the personnel back in, and then ultimately build it.  Frankly, that was mostly a matter of capacity early on.  The increased security and increased capacity of the Iraqi Army has allowed us to do it during this rotation. 
 
KAGAN:  I have a question that I am not sure that you can answer, and if you can't, just tell me, but you referred to the lines of communication from Iran running into Diyala Province, and you spoke about  the enemy in Diyala being mainly AQI and ISI.  The implication is that these Iranian lines are supporting in some way AQI and ISI activity.  Is that the case, and if so, what kind of support do you see for Sunni groups coming in from Iran? 
 
NIXON:  I don't want to get into the specifics of lines of communication or support. I would say overall that there continues to be indicators of Iranian influence on a number of levels inside of Diyala. 
 
KAGAN:  Now, as we started to look at the ongoing operations in MND North, we noticed last week or the week before, an uptick in activities in Dalouiya which, of course, lies along the border, relatively, between Diyala and Salah ad Din Provinces. 
 Can you tell us more about what's been happening in that part of Salah ad Din and whether it is connected to the Diyala operation? 
 
NIXON:  Well, I think one of the things that MND North obviously brings to the fight is the ability to synchronize operations across the provinces, and there clearly is a scene that has developed, that had developed over time between Salah ad Din and Diyala.  So we are working both in Diyala and Salah ad Din to bring forces together, again, to clear those areas and then ultimately to hold them.  So that is a supporting effort into the larger operation that we have got going inside of Diyala. 
 
 [Video clip No. 3 of 6 begins.] 
 KAGAN:  Now, we have spoken about AQI, ISI, and JAM for a little bit.  Can you tell us whether there are other enemy groups within MND North that continue to have legs?  For example, do you see the Naqshabandi group, Ansar al Sunnah, or the former Baathist elements continuing the fight within MND North? 
 
NIXON:  Well, I think there are a number of groups that are out there that will continue to fight, and there is some tactical level of coordination between the pipe swingers, if you will. 
 Probably, the one that I personally see as having the biggest legs right now is the Jaish Al Naqshabandi, or JRTN, just from a standpoint of organization and their information operations and then their linkage back into the former regime elements.  That is one we take very seriously.  Obviously, they are focused on Coalition Forces, and we are very focused on the disruption and defeat of that network, but that is one that I am personally focused on. 
 
KAGAN:  Can you talk about the new provincial council forming in Salah ad Din Province?  That was one of the provinces, obviously, where the elections did not have a clear and specific outcome.
NIXON:  In Salah ad Din? 
 
KAGAN:  Mm hmm. 
 
NIXON:  I have a little bit less visibility on Salah ad Din, but the provincial council has met and formed and picked, I believe, or at least announced that Abu Mazan, a businessman, will take the lead. There has been a little bit or at least reporting of a little bit of turmoil over that, but the reporting that I am receiving is that they are on track. I expect, based on the effectiveness of the last provincial council, that the transition in Salah ad Din will actually be one of the more efficient across the provinces that we are focused on, but, again, I have a little bit less visibility in that area right now.
KAGAN:  Can we talk a little bit about Ninewa Province?  I would certainly be interested in your assessment of the rise of a new Sunni party. 
 
NIXON:  I'm sorry.  You were cut off. 
 
KAGAN:   All right.  Can you tell me about al Hadba and the formation of that party within Ninewa Province?  To what extent were you able to watch it originate at the beginning of your tour, and what is that party's leadership?  Who are they? 
 
NIXON:  Well, the al Hadba, we have watched it kind of as it developed.  We expected al Hadba to win.  We probably didn't expect them to win to the level that they did there.  Al-Nujaifi has been identified as the governor.  He has been pretty outspoken in some of his anti Coalition force rhetoric, although I think he is more pragmatic than that. 
 The scope that al Hadba won the rhetoric associated with the Coalition Force rhetoric associated with anti Kurd could create tensions up there, and there's going to be some challenges that we have to work through. 
 On the same level, on the same line, though, there may be opportunities in that to reach out to a number of the elements that continue to cause problems there, and he may be able to improve the security situation.  So that is one that my counterpart, General Brown, the other deputy commander, is working very hard. 
 I think we have tracked it pretty closely from the beginning.  We are working closely with them now, and we will continue to see how it will work out as the government is actually seated.  That will be one of, obviously, the key topics as we get out of the city discussion in June and what the security situation is there and whether the government of Iraq wants us to actually continue operations inside of Mosul or not. 
 
KAGAN:  General Odierno raised that issue in several interviews over the end of last week and this weekend, and I obviously do not want you to comment on something that is a decision that will be taken at force level, but I would like your assessment of the security situation within Mosul proper, likewise in Baquba.  Can you tell us what kinds of challenges remain in those cities that keep you and perhaps your superiors concerned? 
 
NIXON:  Let me start with Baquba, and then I will work to Mosul. 
 In Baquba, again, the security challenges in Baquba are largely struggles for power, and I think we can continue to work through those.  As we are seating the provincial government, it will be one of the key pieces to that, and then getting essential services out to the population, I think to meet some of their expectations, and then finally to continue to work to professionalize the police force.  That is largely secure in Baquba right now. 
 So, overall, if we can get at those three pretty tough hurdles, I am very confident that Baquba will continue to improve. 
 In Mosul, as you know, we've got a pretty significant operation in conjunction with the Iraqi security forces, both IA and IP, to clear, hold, and then build in Mosul.  Again, the difference    and I would characterize the difference between Baquba and Mosul    is that the population is not passive in Mosul, and their views match the same views as some of the elites there.  So, until we are able to get to the level of security there that we can separate terrorists or the elites that are struggling for power in Mosul from the population, I think that will be a much more significant challenge. 
 
KAGAN:  Looking at the political elites within Ninewa Province, can you tell me to what extent the new    the leadership that is struggling for power is a tribal leadership and to what extent it is a leadership more connected either with the urban centers or overarching political parties? 
 
NIXON:  I don't know, and I really am not that latched into Mosul that I would like to comment. 
 I mean, obviously, the tribes continue to be one of the major fabrics or major pieces of the fabric in Iraq, and I think the successful transition of Iraq, the tribes will be an important part of that, but as it relates to the specifics of Ninewa, I am really not that closely aligned to that. 
 
 [Videotape No. 4 of 6 begins.] 
 KAGAN:  What about in Diyala?  Can you help us understand the tribal situation in Diyala, its connection with the political apparatus, and perhaps whether there is still an overlap of    
 
NIXON:  The tribal    I'm sorry. 
 
KAGAN:  Between enemy groups and tribal groups. 
 
NIXON:  Yeah.  The tribal situation in Diyala is a little bit different than any of the other tribal    or any of the other provinces, mainly because of the number of tribes.  There is a large number of tribes inside of Diyala, a 100 plus, and many of the smaller villages will have ten to fifteen different tribes in those villages that don't work necessarily closely together.  So that has made it easier for extremist groups to really be able to take over some of those villages.  So that is one of the dynamics in Diyala. 
 I think there are a number of significant, both Sunni and Shia tribes that we are working very hard with on the reconciliation, to try and work the reconciliation not only with the Central Government but through the paramount sheikhs of the tribes there, both as detainees return, as Sons of Iraq are being transitioned, as we continue to try and meet the expectations.  We have taken a very active role with the Diyala operations commander in reaching out to all of the paramount sheikhs to help take a lead in that. 
 
KAGAN:  Just on a question of fact, who is the Diyala operations commander right now, the center commander? 
NIXON:  Staff Major General Tariq has been    came in as the Diyala operations commander about 90 days ago.  I'm sorry.  About two months ago. 
KAGAN:  And likewise, as a point of information, who is the PDOP in Diyala? 
NIXON:  Staff Major General Damouk is the PDOP in Diyala. 
 
KAGAN:  Super.  Now, looking at these dynamics within Diyala, you mentioned that Sons of Iraq is one of the preeminent tests of the reconciliation process, and I wonder if you can tell me how the Sons of Iraq in Diyala have responded to some of the recent arrests of Sons of Iraq leaders in Baghdad, obviously using Iraqi warrants and Iraqi judges. 
 
NIXON:  I think the arrests in Baghdad have not been that significant in and of themselves.  I talk with a number of the SOI leaders shortly after that.  I mean, there is an understanding that there are    like anything else, there are some Sons of Iraq leaders out there that are not doing the right thing.  So I don't think that they were that surprised that some were arrested. 
 I do think there continues to be concern amongst the Sons of Iraq leaders that the Central Government of Iraq will not honor the commitment of doing the full transition and transfer, and that is what we continue to work really side by side, every day, with our Iraqi Army partners to facilitate the transition and then ultimately the transfer of those Sons of Iraq. 
 As you know, we have already transitioned them from control of the Coalition Force to control of the Central Government of Iraq through the Iraqi Army.  We are in the process of transitioning the pay from the Coalition Force to the Government of Iraq, and they have picked up the payments for those.  And then we are working with them to, one, transition twenty percent into the Iraqi security forces and then find suitable employment for the other 80 percent. 
 It is a difficult task.  It is challenging because, frankly, some people don't want it to happen, and bureaucracy is bureaucracy, but at the leadership level what I have seen is a full commitment both in IFCNR and in the Iraqi Army units to receive and transition the Sons of Iraq. 
 
KAGAN:  One of the other contentious subjects in MND North, of course, is the tension between Arabs and Kurds, and I would like to focus now on this question, both in Kirkuk and in Diyala. The first question I would have for you is to what extent do you actually think that there are ethnic tensions on the ground in Kirkuk city and Diyala Province that are driving some of the dispute. 
 
NIXON:  Well, one, that's a great question. 
 When you talk to the local population, whether it's in Khanaqeen or Jalula in Diyala or whether it's in Kirkuk city or Laylan or Dibis in Kirkuk Province, the population have gotten    they have lived together for a long time.  They get along at that level, and they have continued to get along at the local level. There clearly is a struggle for the disputed areas that has continued to manifest itself between the KRG and the Central Government.  It has not yet spilled over into the local population that I have seen.  There also are some opportunists, I think, in particular terrorists, that are trying to exploit that scene in an attempt to inflame the population. 
So, to answer your question directly, I don't see it at the local level.  I am concerned that if there continues to be spectacular attacks by terrorists and there continues to be pressure, external pressure placed on them, then you can start to see it manifest itself more than it has at the local level. 
 
KAGAN:  Can you explain, then, what these tensions look like perhaps in terms of the tensions between the Peshmerga forces and the Iraqi Army division, for example?  To what extent do you see in your area, a competition between Kurdish and other Iraqi forces for control of territory? 
 
NIXON:  I think what I have seen in both Diyala and Kirkuk is great professionalism, frankly, on both sides, by the Iraqi Army soldiers, as well as the Peshmerga soldiers.  So they are in the same battle space. 
 As you know, we brought them together to create a combined security arrangement to achieve the provincial elections without incident and very successfully executed that.  So I have been very happy with the restraint shown by both the Iraqi Army and the Peshmerga side. They are ultimately soldiers and ultimately, I believe, will do what they are directed to do, but what I have seen is they understand the stakes of the issues at hand, and there has been great efforts by the leadership on almost a daily basis to ensure that we don't incite tension or conflict, that we do everything we can to reduce it. 
 
[Video clip No. 5 of 6 begins.] 
KAGAN:  Is the Iraqi Army or, indeed, are the Peshmerga forces able to use soft power in Diyala and Kirkuk?  Are they able to engage in any sort of reconstruction, or are they, in a certain sense, frozen from engaging in these other non combat issues? 
 
NIXON:  Well, I think that is actually one of the challenges right now because there is such great concern that whatever either side does will be overreacted to by the other side, in some cases, it is almost like being stuck in time.  So you will get a number of complaints from those villages that they are not being supported by either side, they are not getting the essential services that they need, they are not getting the influx of money that they need.  That is, I believe, one of the reasons.  Obviously, there are many others, but one of the reasons that we need to continue to work to resolve this. 
 We are taking a larger role from a Coalition Force standpoint on assisting with some of the essential services along the disputed areas and trying to get those projects in, particularly some of the outlying    not the major cities but the outlying areas. 
 
KAGAN:  Can you simply explain why the coalition is taking a more active role? 
 
NIXON:  I think we are committed to do everything that we can do try and reduce the tension in those areas, in the effort to allow the political process to work.  So that is the primary focus that I have gotten, whether it has been in resources, whether it's time, energy, or money, to ensure that we give it very opportunity for the political apparatus to work to a solution. 
 
KAGAN:  And can you describe a little bit more what that political apparatus might be?  For example, do you see the resolution of these issues occurring at the provincial level, the regional level, or at the national level within Iraq? 
 
NIXON:  I think my personal opinion - ultimately it is going to be a national level decision.  I mean, it is clearly nested in Article 23 for the power sharing at the provincial level within Kirkuk, but it is really the larger Article 140 discussion that addresses the disputed areas as part of the constitution. So I think it will ultimately be resolved at the national level.  I think maintaining the personal relationships, maintaining the level of calm, reducing tensions, it occurs at the local and provincial level, but the ultimate solution will be at the national level. 
 
KAGAN:  Of course, Kirkuk did not actually hold provincial elections in January.  Are those elections now scheduled, and are there processes for undertaking those elections underway? 
 
NIXON:  They are not.  That continues to be a moving timeline. 
 I think they look to do those elections in the summer, but they have not accomplished the preparation, I don't believe, yet to do those elections on schedule.  So I think they appear to be continuing to slip to the right. 
 
KAGAN:  Is that a major subject for concern for either the officials within the KRG or for the people of Kirkuk? 
 
NIXON:  I'm sorry, Kim.  I couldn't understand the first part of your question. 
 
KAGAN:  Is the slipping of the elections to the right, a major cause for concern, either for the KRG leadership or for the people of Kirkuk? 
 
NIXON:  I can't speak to the KRG leadership. I think there is some concern at the local level in Kirkuk just because they have not had the election, the provincial powers, laws that became a part of the other provinces based on the elections have not been effected yet inside of Kirkuk.  So I think there is a desire by the leadership in Kirkuk to hold the elections as rapidly as possible, at least by some aspects of leadership there. 
 
KAGAN:  And what is it about the new provincial powers that benefits provincial communities? 
 
NIXON:  Well, the Provincial Powers Law    and I am obviously not an expert in it, but the provincial powers law does provide more power down to the provincial leadership than existed prior to the elections as it relates to budgeting, as it relates to control of the local police.  So it delineates those responsibilities and authorities at the provincial level and those in the Central Government and provides more authorities to the provincial level than existed prior to the elections. 
 
KAGAN:  Can you tell us about the role that the United Nations played within the disputed territories and within Kirkuk?  What specifically is the UN trying to do, and how does that interact with your own operations on the ground? 
 
NIXON:  Well, as you know, the United Nations have been doing a study on the disputed areas for a period of time.  It is, in my understanding, the most extensive study that has been done on the disputed areas, and there is an expectation that that study will be released in the near future, although I don't know the exact date. 
 So I don't know that    my understanding is that it will not be binding, but it will provide more detail, I think, and more background than has been done before.  So I think from our standpoint, the effort that they put into it, the research that they have done will help provide a foundation that the political parties can use to reach a resolution of an issue. 
 
KAGAN:  Now, within the Kurdish political parties, we have seen some churn, shall we say, in the politics between the KDP and the PUK over the past several months?  What kinds of insight can you provide us into what the differences are between the two Kurdish parties and how they are manifested in either their goals or their actions in national and provincial politics? 
 
NIXON:  That is difficult for me because the area that I deal with is largely the PUK, and largely the KDP tends to work in the area that General Brown is at. There has been some turmoil there, that we have seen some of that manifest itself in the individuals that we deal with. I know there is an effort to consolidate many of the separate functions under one function, and I believe they are moving towards that. 
 So I don't really have enough depth of knowledge to compare and contrast the KDP and the PUK.  I would say it is important to understand that the KRG is not monolithic, and there are competing factions within it, and that complicates, in some cases, an already complicated situation. 
 
KAGAN:  Would you feel comfortable talking about what you see of the PUK?  That is to say, what that party's goals and objectives are and how its leadership has been changing or interacting with the situation on the ground? 
 
NIXON:  You know, I don't    
 
KAGAN:  You don't have to. 
 
NIXON:  Yeah.  I would if I felt like I could put any insight on it, but I really deal with it at the security level, and I understand how it impacts it, but I'd prefer not to get into the inner workings of the PUK. 
 
[Video clip No. 6 of 6 begins.] 
KAGAN:  That is absolutely fine. 
 Why don't we zoom out just a little bit, and let me ask you whether you found that the provincial council elections in Ninewa changed the focus of the national leadership on Kurdish Arab tensions, and did it actually, in a certain sense, shift a center of gravity from Mosul to Kirkuk? 
 
NIXON:  I don't know.  That's an interesting question. 
 I think I still consider the decisive point or the center of gravity of that discussion as being Kirkuk, but there are at least indicators on a number of sides that there may be more concern on Mosul now.  So I have always really considered Kirkuk to be the center or gravity, but it seems like there is, frankly, more concern on Mosul, partly because of the provincial elections there. 
 
KAGAN:  Can you tell us more about the former Baath party elements throughout MND North?  You mentioned at the beginning of the interview that MND North had traditionally been the heart of the old Baath party.  To what extent do you see foreign support for old Baath party members?  To what extent do you see former Baath institutions still in place, and to what extent do you see even some of the new political parties reaching out to their former Baath roots? 
 
NIXON:  Well, it is very difficult to separate all those because you've got so many what I'll call "disenfranchised" that were in the Baath party because that was the predominant party and that's where they're at, and they have no opportunity to reconcile as they go through. 
 I think if they can figure out how to separate those that are prepared to move on to a new way of business and then reconcile them back in the government, there is great expertise, experience that is sitting out there, I think, ready to do that, but it is so intertwined, as you say, with other individuals that continue to believe that the right solution is to go back to the Baath party, best exhibited by Izzat al Douri brand, that I think it is difficult for all of us.  It is difficult for us as Coalition Forces to separate that, and to a degree, it is difficult for the Central Government to separate that. 
 So I believe it will continue to be a challenge to work through, but it is absolutely needed to work through and be able to separate the different bins of former Baathists that are out there, those that are terrorists that we still need to detain, those that    from those that want to be a part of really working and living in the new Iraq. 
 I know that didn't answer your question directly, but it is one of the more nuanced areas that we are continuing to try and sort ourselves through. 
 
KAGAN:  Over the past few months, obviously, we have begun to structure our coalition operations under the framework of the security agreement that the United States and Iraq have signed, and I wonder whether you feel that the implementation of that security agreement has constrained what you're able to do in MND North, and secondly, how it is    how well the implementation is going, finally perhaps, how do you mitigate any constraints that that agreement places on you? 
 
NIXON:  That's a great question. 
 First, I would just say this.  The security arrangement, I think, was absolutely a step in the right direction and really continues to enhance the sovereignty of Iraq and moves us towards a transition much quicker. 
 We are doing the same mission that we were doing before it was signed.  We are doing it differently, and the way that we're doing it now is really in complete coordination with our Iraqi partners. 
 It has forced us to partner much closer.  It has forced us to combine ops and intel functions, so that they understand what we are doing and we understand what they are doing, and it has forced us to understand our objectives much clearer. 
 So, from my standpoint, you have to work harder than we had to before, but it is an improved product, and it really has allowed the Iraqi Army, I believe, and the Iraqi Security Force to move to the next level. 
 So, from that standpoint, I am very optimistic.  I haven't seen it to this point really constrain us from doing any mission that we were doing before, and the way that we have really continued that is by our closer and closer partnership with the Iraqis. 
 
KAGAN:  We are running out of time, and so I have two final questions for you.  First, if you could just let us know for our own frame of reference, what you see as the main effort within MND North and what you see as the supporting effort, and then secondly, I would ask you whether you have any comments that you would like to make at the end of this interview regarding MND North. 
 
NIXON:  Oh, I'm sorry. 
 I think geographically, our main effort continues to be Ninewa and then followed closely by Diyala.  Our most dangerous course of action continues to be Arab Kurd tensions. Functionally, our main effort continues to be building the Iraqi Security Forces' capability, and this is more about capability than capacity because I think that is the thing that will continue to bridge the gap and make them successful as we conduct the responsible drawdown. 
 I would just like to make a couple of comments at the end.  I think, as you know, the conditions change rapidly here.  This is, without a doubt, the most complex environment that I've operated in, and I've operated in a number of wars, but because of where we're at and the partnership with the security agreement, it really means that you're talking about multiple enemies and multiple friends and the population, as the terrain.  So it is an extremely complex operating environment, and frankly, we're doing it with diminishing influence because there is an end state as we go through. 
 Where before we were at the center of the page, we are no longer at the center of the page, either for the problem or the solution, and we are rapidly moving off the page.  That requires us to partner closer than we ever have in the past, and it requires us to ask the deeper questions than we have in the past, on both sides. 
 And then, finally, I think the timeline has gotten us to a stage of those things that we must do because we know the clock is ticking, and to bridge the gap and to allow the successful transition that we've paid for on all sides with a lot of blood, sweat, and tears, there are things that we still need to get accomplished. 
 Having said all that, I continue to be humbled to work around the patriots, both American and Iraqi, that are sacrificing each and every day, and I have the utmost respect for them and their families that support their efforts. 
 That's really all I wanted to say, and I do appreciate the opportunity to talk with you tonight. 
 
KAGAN:  General Nixon, thank you so much for talking with me and with the Institute for the Study of War today, and thank you also to all of the soldiers of the 25th Infantry Division for all of the hard work that you are engaged in, in these truly complex circumstances.  We wish all of you the very best, and I believe the proper way to close this interview, then, would be for me to give you a big tropic lightning. 
 [Laughter.] 
 
NIXON:  Well, tropic lightning to you too. 
KAGAN:  Thank you very much.

ISW Webcast with BG Nixon

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