Publications

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 19, 2023

The major phase of Russian offensive operations in Luhansk Oblast is underway, and Russia likely lacks sufficient uncommitted reserves to dramatically increase the scale or intensity of the offensive this winter. Russian conventional ground forces are generally deploying and fighting in normal doctrinal formations and units rather than in battalion tactical groups or other ad hoc structures. The observed absence of several critical tank units suggests that the Russian military continues to struggle to replace equipment, especially tanks, lost during previous failed offensive operations. Russian forces almost certainly still have some reconstituted mechanized units in reserve, but the commitment of these limited reserves to the Luhansk Oblast frontline is unlikely to change the course of the ongoing offensive dramatically. The Russian offensive will very likely continue for some time and may temporarily gain momentum as the final reserves are committed—if they are—but will very likely culminate well short of its objectives and likely short of achieving operationally significant gains.

Iran Update, February 17, 2023

Actors from across the Iranian political spectrum are publicly acknowledging Mir Hossein Mousavi’s February 4 call for “foundational change” in the Islamic Republic. Mousavi discussed holding a referendum on whether to maintain the Islamic Republic and suggested drafting a new constitution on February 4, as CTP previously reported. Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid expressed support for a referendum on the “regime and system” during his weekly Friday prayer sermon in Zahedan, Sistan, and Baluchistan Province on February 17. Abdol Hamid did not explicitly reference Mousavi, but his use of the term “referendum” demonstrates that he is likely seeking to keep Mousavi’s idea of “foundational change” at the forefront of Iran’s internal political debate.

Iran is reportedly taking advantage of humanitarian aid convoys to move rockets or missiles into eastern Syria. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that Iran-backed militants deposited two weapons shipments at a warehouse in Abu Kamal and a third at a warehouse in Deir Ezzour, Syria. Shipments to Abu Kamal and Deir Ezzour allegedly included munitions and unspecified logistical equipment according to SOHR. Iran-backed militias transported weapons shipments in humanitarian aid convoys for earthquake victims as CTP previously reported.

Iran targeted an Israeli-owned oil tanker in the Arabian Sea on February 10, according to Western reports. A BBC journalist announced on February 17 that Iranian drones had targeted the commercial Campo Square ship but caused no serious damage or casualties, citing a US military official. The source stated that the attack involved several Iranian ships and likely a Shahed-136 drone, one of the UAVs Russia has been using in its invasion of Ukraine. The February 10 attack on the Campo Square may be a retaliation to the Israeli drone strike on a military munitions factory near Esfahan City, Esfahan Province on January 28.

Iran Update, February 16, 2023

Iran and its proxies may be preparing for a major effort with military elements in northern Syria. Senior officers from the IRGC Quds Force, its Iraqi proxies, the Assad regime, and possibly Russian forces have participated in a flurry of meetings throughout Syria in recent days. These meetings are noteworthy given their frequency and the seniority of their participants. Local media has framed many but not all of these meetings as ostensibly related to earthquake relief. That explanation is improbable considering that most participants lead or represent military and paramilitary groups but do not include the officials who would normally be involved in delivering humanitarian assistance and because of reports that Iran is moving fighters and weapons in ostensibly humanitarian convoys.

Salafi-Jihadi Movement Weekly Update, February 15, 2023

Somalia. Several large-scale al Shabaab attacks on military bases across Somalia highlight that Somali counterterrorism efforts have not weakened the group’s attack capabilities. Meanwhile, al Shabaab is also well positioned to take advantage of a festering clan-based conflict in northern Somalia’s disputed regions. A prolonged battle would reduce counterterrorism pressure on al Shabaab and Islamic State havens in northern Somalia.

Mali. The Malian junta appointed several pro-Russian figures to high-ranking military positions, indicating growing Russian influence over the Malian government. The junta could be planning to leverage Russian assistance in a northern Mali offensive in a highly unlikely but dangerous scenario. Any such offensive would likely increase links between militia groups and al Qaeda’s Sahelian branch without having long-term success.

Afghanistan. Taliban Minister of Interior and Haqqani Network leader Sirajuddin Haqqani issued a rare public criticism of the Taliban leadership, indicating escalating tensions in the Taliban government. Tension in the Taliban movement will continue to build but is unlikely to result in an intra-Taliban civil war in the short run. However, the Taliban supreme leader’s unwillingness to compromise will alienate important Taliban leaders and raise the risk of fracturing the Taliban movement over time.