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U.S. Army units rotating into Iraq in the fall of 2008 faced new challenges that would test their collective agility, professionalism, competence, and creativity.
In response to violent and rampant insurgent operations in the Taliban stronghold of Marjah, ISAF and the Government of Afghanistan began implementing a population-centric counterinsurgency campaign.
This map illustrates force disposition of the Afghanistan/Pakistan border.
"In May, 2007 I deployed to Iraq to become the Commanding General responsible for accelerating the growth of the Iraqi Security Forces in size, capability, and confidence. Prior to deploying, I made a series of rounds in the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill. I was met with more condolences than congratulations. The general feeling, no pun intended, was that the war was lost and it was only a matter of time before we would admit our defeat and withdraw. I am getting the same “all is lost” attitude about Afghanistan from what I read and hear around the Washington, D.C. Beltway.
"In May, 2007 I deployed to Iraq to become the Commanding General responsible for accelerating the growth of the Iraqi Security Forces in size, capability, and confidence.
Map contains information on Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs) remaining in Iraq as of September 1, 2010.
Enemy networks including both al-Qaeda-Iraq and Shi’a militias have been degraded by Iraqi and U.S. operations; however, extremists continue to seek to destabilize the country.
ISW's Marisa Cochrane Sullivan writes in The Hill's Congressional Blog about the recent cuts in the supplemental war funding bill for the Iraq war.
In 2007, after experiencing large losses and increased violence in Iraq, the U.S. adopted a new counterinsurgency strategy that included a troop increase and new emphasis on cooperation with Iraqis.
This Backgrounder analyzes the recent appointments to the Ministry of Defense and Afghan National Army.