Africa File, January 9, 2025: Islamic State Suicide Attack in Somalia; AUSSOM Dysfunction; M23 Captures District Capital in Eastern DRC

Africa File, January 9, 2025: Islamic State Suicide Attack in Somalia; AUSSOM Dysfunction; M23 Captures District Capital in Eastern DRC

Authors: Kathryn Tyson and Liam Karr

Data Cutoff: January 9, 2024, at 10 a.m.

Editor's Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War.

The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

Islamic State in Somalia. ISS carried out its most complex attack in Somalia yet on December 31. The Islamic State Somalia Province (ISS) will likely continue to prioritize its strategic aim of acting as a logistic and administrative node in support of IS’s global network rather than refocusing on carrying out additional high-profile attacks in Somalia. ISS targeted a military base where Puntland defense forces had mobilized for a counter-ISS offensive and likely conducted the attack to disrupt the planned offensive. An influx of foreign fighters to Somalia over the last several years may have bolstered ISS’s attack capabilities and helped the group carry out the attack. ISS’s increasingly international composition increases the risk that ISS develops or promotes external attack plots.

AUSSOM. AUSSOM began on January 1, 2025, but the African Union’s ongoing struggle to finalize the mission’s force composition could benefit al Shabaab. The countries that will contribute troops to the mission continued to change in the days before—and even after—the beginning of the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in (AUSSOM) in Somalia, and the current force composition remains unclear. The planned deployment of Egypt and Ethiopia could create new obstacles within AUSSOM and stir further political conflict in the region. The last-minute changes to the AUSSOM mission could create gaps for al Shabaab to exploit as the Somali Federal Government struggles to maintain pressure against al Shabaab.

DRC. Rwandan-backed M23 rebels captured a district capital in eastern DRC as part of an ongoing offensive that risks expanding the conflict between the DRC and Rwanda. M23’s advances coincided with the collapse of Angolan-mediated peace talks between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda in December due to a discrepancy over potential negotiations between the DRC and M23.

IS in Africa. The Islamic State has evolved and expanded globally since the territorial defeat of ISIS in Iraq and Syria in 2019, enabling the organization to continue to orchestrate and inspire attacks on the West. IS’s African affiliates contribute to IS external plots through the Global Directorate of Provinces and increase the risk of lone-wolf attacks by bolstering IS propaganda narratives. Recent shifts in the international counterterrorism posture in Africa risk creating security vacuums that IS can exploit to strengthen further.

Assessments:

ISS carried out its most complex attack in Somalia yet on December 31. The Islamic State Somalia Province (ISS) used a combination of suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIED) and suicide vests (SVEST) to target security force bases in the Bari region, Puntland, in northern Somalia on December 31.[1] The bases are roughly 60 km south of ISS’s support zones in the Cal Miskaad mountains.[2] ISS detonated at least two SVBIEDs to breach the perimeter of the bases before SVEST-equipped fighters subsequently entered the outposts with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades.[3] Puntland authorities said that security forces killed at least nine SVEST bombers during the attack, and Somali media reported that ISS killed 18 security forces.[4] The attack is the first ISS suicide attack in Somalia since early 2023 and the first offensive attack of this scale and sophistication by ISS since the group besieged Puntland’s regional port capital Bosaso in 2017.[5] The attack represents the first up-armored SVBIED attack in Puntland, according to SVBIED analyst Hugo Kaaman.[6]

ISS likely conducted the attack to disrupt the Puntland government’s ability to carry out a counter-ISS offensive. The Puntland government has planned an offensive against ISS since at least October 2024 and said that the offensive would target ISS fighters and havens in the Cal Miskaad mountains and other areas in the Bari region.[7] Puntland’s president said on December 22 that Puntland Security Forces (PSF) finalized preparations for the offensive, and Puntland claimed to launch the offensive on December 26.[8] The ISS attack targeted a military base where the PSF had mobilized for counter-ISS operations and showcased “thousands” of security personnel and “hundreds” of armed trucks for the offensive on December 26.[9]

ISS will likely limit the frequency of high-profile, complex attacks against PSF as the group primarily operates under the radar as a command-and-control node for IS in Africa. ISS plays an outsized role in the regional and global Islamic State network despite its relatively small size and infrequent attack rate. ISS hosts the regional East Africa IS office, al Karrar, which oversees financing, training, and other support for the group’s personnel in East and South Africa and the global IS network.[10] ISS generates millions of dollars per year in extortion and illegal taxes and takes advantage of ungoverned, mountainous areas in northern Somalia to act as a logistic node and disperse funding and trainers around the world, including to IS affiliates in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mozambique, and Yemen.[11] ISS funding for IS Khorasan Province in Afghanistan is particularly dangerous given ISKP’s prominent role in external attack plots against the West.[12]

Figure 1. The Islamic State Somalia Province’s Financial Network

 

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

High-profile attacks undermine ISS’s ability to carry out its administrative functions by drawing unwanted attention and retaliation against the group. The group has conducted primarily defensive attacks against PSF in the past, such as remotely detonated improvised explosive devices. ISS has also gradually decreased its overall number of attacks in recent years. The decrease in attacks and the defensive nature of most ISS operations indicates that the group aims to avoid attracting attention while keeping security forces out of its support zones. The offensive nature of the December 31 attack is a shift from this ISS attack pattern but remains aligned with ISS’s operational goal of defending its support zones against security forces.

Figure 2. ISS Decreases Attacks While Developing Role as IS Administrative Hub

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

ISS’s small size and the ongoing Puntland operations against ISS are limiting factors for future complex attacks. ISS likely lacks the resources to replenish VBIEDs frequently and cannot afford to lose significant numbers of fighters to suicide attacks. Puntland has degraded some ISS supply lines as part of its counteroffensive. Somali media reported on January 5 that PSF secured two areas in the Bari region, including a key node on an ISS supply route, and that security forces are working with local populations to isolate ISS from potential sources of support.[13]

The influx of foreign fighters to Somalia may have bolstered ISS’s attack capabilities and helped the group carry out the attack on December 31. IS published evidence that foreign fighters from seven different countries in North Africa, East Africa, and the broader Middle East participated in the December 31 attack.[14] No Somali nationals participated in the attack. Foreign fighters with diverse backgrounds and expertise historically have helped Salafi-jihadi groups expand their attack capabilities. Foreign fighters in al Qaeda with experience in Afghanistan helped introduce suicide attacks to al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate al Shabaab and played a major role in training al Shabaab members in the use of improvied explosive devices in the late 2000s.[15]

US military officials and UN experts expressed concern in 2024 that ISS has grown in size and has been boosted by foreign fighters. US AFRICOM commander General Michael Langley said in October 2024 that the US military is concerned about ISS’s growing numbers.[16] The UN reported in October 2024 that ISS has approximately 600 to 700 fighters compared with 200 to 250 fighters in 2023.[17] The UN said in the same report that there are “significant” numbers of foreign fighters in ISS and that many ISS trainers are from the Middle East.[18] Puntland authorities have arrested dozens of foreign fighters from Ethiopia, Morocco, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen since 2023.[19]

ISS’s increasingly international composition increases the risk that ISS could develop external attack plots.[20] The presence of foreign fighters has historically led to an increase in Salafi-jihadi groups’ external attack plots.[21] Many foreign fighters are hardened ideologues who ascribe to transnational Salafi-jihadism and demonstrate interest in returning to their countries of origin to organize attack plots after being further radicalized in an active conflict theater.^[22] Swedish authorities linked a shooting targeting the Israeli embassy in Sweden in May 2024 to an ISS-associated cell in the country.[23] The US charged a Somali-American in February 2024 for his prior involvement in ISS and encouraging others online to conduct acts of terror in New York.[24]

AU Support and Stabilization Mission (AUSSOM).

The new African Union (AU) mission in Somalia began on January 1, 2025, but the AU’s ongoing struggle to finalize the mission’s force composition could benefit al Shabaab.[25] The AU Support and Stabilization Mission (AUSSOM) replaced the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which ended on December 31, 2024.[26] The new AUSSOM mission prioritizes peace-building measures and combating al Shabaab while deferring state-building efforts to international partners and the Somali Federal Government (SFG).[27] The new mission’s security goals carry over directly from the ATMIS mandate and AUSSOM force size is similar to that of the former ATMIS mission at 11,911 personnel.[28]

The countries that will contribute troops to the mission continued to change in the days before—and even after—the start of AUSSOM, and the current force composition remains unclear. Burundi pulled out of the new AUSSOM mission on December 23 due to a disagreement with the SFG over a discrepancy in allocated troop numbers.[29] Somalia allocated Burundi 1,000 soldiers to the mission, but Burundian officials said that it needed at least 2,000 soldiers to ensure adequate force protection.[30] The SFG accepted Burundi’s withdrawal on December 26.[31] The SFG has not publicly specified what troops, if any, will replace the Burundian forces.

Ethiopia agreed to contribute an unspecified number of troops to AUSSOM in early January 2025 but did not specify how many troops it would deploy. Ethiopia and Somalia separately issued statements on January 2 and 3 that the two countries had agreed to collaborate on the AUSSOM mission and strengthen bilateral relations after a visit by a high-level Ethiopian delegation to Somalia.[32] Ethiopia’s and Somalia’s agreement on AUSSOM comes after Turkey mediated the Ankara Declaration in December 2024.[33] The agreement eased a yearlong dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia over a naval port deal that Ethiopia signed with the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region in January 2024.[34] Somali officials said throughout 2024 that Ethiopia would not be included in AUSSOM, called for the expulsion of Ethiopian forces from Somalia, and signed deals with Egypt in August 2024 for Egyptian troops to replace Ethiopian troops in the AU mission and on a bilateral basis.[35]

Figure 3. Ethiopia-Somalia Dispute: 2024 Timeline

 

Source: Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson.

Egyptian officials have said that Egypt still plans to contribute troops to AUSSOM. The Egyptian foreign minister said in December 2024 that Egypt will contribute troops to the AUSSOM mission and said that the contribution is “based on the Somali government’s request.”[36] The Egyptian foreign minister reiterated Egypt’s intentions to send troops on January 5 in a phone call with the Somali foreign minister.[37] The number of troops that Egypt will contribute remains unclear, but Egypt already has several thousand troops stationed in Somalia.[38] Somali officials announced on January 7 that Egypt and Somalia will hold talks between January 15 and 17 to discuss Egypt’s troop contributions.[39]

Egypt and Ethiopia are at odds over Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, and the planned deployment of both Egyptian and Ethiopian forces could create obstacles within AUSSOM and stir further political conflict in the region. The August 2024 defense deals between Egypt and Somalia allowed for nearly 10,000 Egyptian troops to deploy to Somalia, ostensibly to combat al Shabaab.[40] Egypt has sent three shipments of weapons to Somalia since August.[41] Ethiopia views Egypt’s military presence on its border in Somalia as a national security risk and has warned against Egyptian military participation in the new AU mission, however, due to Egypt’s threats against Ethiopia over the dam.[42] The UK-based outlet al Araby al Jadid reported in September 2024 that the Ethiopian government sent a backchannel message to Egypt via Djibouti that “any Egyptian military forces that harm Addis Ababa’s interests in Somalia will not be immune from dealing with them.” [43] Egypt reportedly responded that “it is ready to escalate and respond forcefully to any attempt to harm the Egyptian presence in Somalia or Somali interests, in implementation of the military protocol signed with Mogadishu.” [44]

The changes to the AUSSOM mission could create gaps for al Shabaab to exploit as the SFG struggles to maintain pressure against al Shabaab. Anonymous US defense officials told Voice of America in June 2024 that al Shabaab had “reversed all” the gains the SFG had made in central Somalia since its 2022 offensive stalled.[45] CTP has warned about notable al Shabaab gains in crucial areas of central Somalia throughout 2024.[46] The SFG was unable to expand its 2022 offensive against al Shabaab in central Somalia to the group’s main havens in southern Somalia, where clan rivalries and grievances against al Shabaab have not mobilized locals to combat the group.[47] Al Shabaab also launched several large-scale attacks in 2023 to overrun Somali bases designated for operations into the Middle Jubba region, which is al Shabaab’s center of gravity.[48] The SFG separately warned that a “hasty drawdown of ATMIS personnel will contribute to a security vacuum,” in March 2024 and requested to delay the drawdown of ATMIS troops in May 2024.[49]

Figure 4. Al Shabaab’s Area of Operations in Somalia

 

Source: Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson

DRC

Rwandan-backed M23 rebels captured a district capital in eastern DRC as part of an ongoing offensive that risks expanding the conflict between the DRC and Rwanda. M23 launched concerted offensives toward two district capitals, Lubero and Masisi, at the beginning of December. CTP previously reported that M23 made several operationally significant breakthroughs in the Lubero district—districts are formally called territories in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)—in mid-December.[50] Congolese forces eventually halted the M23 advance in Lubero district near Mambasa on December 24, less than 15 miles south of Lubero town, and launched a limited counteroffensive on December 27 that has failed to regain any operationally significant areas so far.[51] Pro-government militias halted the M23 offensive on the other axis in the Masisi district by mid-December.[52] M23 relaunched its offensive in Masisi district on January 2, however, and quickly captured Masisi town on January 4.[53]

Figure 5. M23 Offensive Across the Eastern DRC

 

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

M23 is a Rwandan-controlled rebel group that has made significant gains against the Congolese army and consolidated control over significant portions of eastern DRC’s North Kivu region since the group reemerged with Rwandan support in 2021.[54] UN experts reported in 2024 that Rwanda has deployed 3,000 to 4,000 troops to the eastern DRC fight alongside M23 and that these Rwandan forces “de facto control” and direct M23 operations and provide advanced military equipment.[55] The United States condemned Rwanda for providing artillery, reinforcements, and resupply convoys to support the latest M23 offensive.[56] M23’s stated demands also mirror the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan government’s public statements about ending violence against Tutsi communities in the eastern DRC.[57]

M23’s capture of Masisi risks expanding the conflict in the eastern DRC. Masisi is the gateway to Walikale town, the westernmost district capital in the North Kivu region that serves as the gateway to the interior of the DRC along the RN3 highway. M23’s advances also give it increased access to valuable minerals such as coltan, gold, and tin ores that will help fund its war machine. The UN estimates that M23 generates around $800,000 in monthly taxes on coltan production, and areas around Masisi town and southern Masisi district have more coltan mines.[58] Walikale district has numerous cassiterite and gold mines as well as some coltan deposits.[59] Cassiterite and coltan are tin and tantalum ores, respectively. The United States designates both tantalum and tin as critical minerals due to their use in electronics.[60] M23 has maintained pressure around Pinga since October 2024, a garrison town in Walikale district 30 miles north of Masisi that lies on an alternative route toward Walikale.[61]

Figure 6. M23 Activity in Mineral Rich Areas of the Eastern DRC

 

Source: Liam Karr; International Peace Information Service.

M23’s advances coincided with the collapse of Angolan-mediated peace talks between the DRC and Rwanda in December due to a discrepancy over potential negotiations between the DRC and M23. All parties called off a summit planned for December 15 with DRC President Félix Tshisekedi, Rwandan President Paul Kagame, and Angolan President João Lourenço after lower-level officials failed to agree on fundamental aspects of negotiations. The DRC presidential spokesperson said that talks reached an impasse due to Rwanda’s insistence that the DRC “hold a direct dialogue with the M23.”[62] Rwandan Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe had said on December 13 that Rwanda wanted “a firm commitment from the DRC to resume direct talks with the M23 within a well-defined framework and timeframe.”[63] Congolese officials have repeatedly called the Rwandan-backed M23 “terrorists,” refused to negotiate directly with its representatives, and claimed that that Rwanda supports M23 to expropriate the eastern DRC’s mineral resources.[64] The Angolan-mediated peace talks had established a UN-backed ceasefire in August and a concept of operations to dismantle a DRC-based Rwandan Hutu militia that contributes to the regional violence but had not addressed the role of M23.[65]

The international community has expressed concern at the M23’s recent advances and increased pressure on M23 and Rwanda to uphold the ceasefire and resume peace talks. The US ambassador to the UN condemned Rwandan support for the M23’s latest advances, blamed Rwandan President Paul Kagame for scuttling the December summit, and urged a resumption of the Luanda process during a statement at the UN Security Council session on December 20.[66] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken commended the DRC’s commitment to the Luanda process and reiterated that the United States demands that M23 and Rwandan forces respect the ceasefire and withdraw from their positions during a phone call with DRC President Tshisekedi on December 27.[67] The United States again condemned M23’s “brazen ceasefire violations” and repeated calls for Rwanda to withdraw its troops and equipment from the DRC in a statement on January 6.[68] The EU and UN released separate statements on January 6 that condemned the M23 advance and called for a return to the ceasefire.[69] US-based tech company Apple unrelatedly told its suppliers to stop purchasing minerals—including gold, tantalum, and tin—from both the DRC and Rwanda on December 17 following a criminal complaint by the Congolese government that accused Apple of using conflict minerals.[70]

IS in Africa

The following text is adapted from “The Islamic State’s Global Long Game and Resurgence in Syria Poses an Evolved Threat to the West,” by Liam Karr and Brian Carter

The Islamic State has evolved and expanded globally since the territorial defeat of ISIS in Iraq and Syria in 2019, enabling the organization to continue to orchestrate and inspire attacks on the West. ISIS lost control of 95 percent of the territory that it seized between 2014 and 2017 and lost control of its final territories in Iraq and Syria in 2017 and 2019, respectively.[71] IS has continued to expand across the globe since 2019, however. IS claimed its first attacks in the DRC and Mozambique in 2019 under the newly founded IS Central Africa Province (ISCAP).^[72] IS also recognized smaller and less active provinces in India, Pakistan, and Turkey in 2019.^[73] IS eventually recognized ISMP as a distinct province separate from the Democratic Republic of the Congo–based ISCAP in 2022.^[74] IS also formally recognized IS Sahel Province as distinct from the Nigeria-based Islamic State West Africa Province in 2022.^[75]

IS has substantially restructured its General Directorate of Provinces—formerly known as the Administration of Distant Provinces until 2020—since the fall of its territorial statelet in the Middle East.[76] The directorate provides operational guidance and coordinates funding to all of IS’s global affiliates, plays a central role in external attack operations, and oversees internal administrative high-level affairs within provinces.^[77] IS created regional offices to oversee this support across its various provincial affiliates and its traditional core territories in Iraq and Syria around 2019.[78] This decentralized system helps coordinate financing, directives, and other support between the group’s personnel in local theaters, the global IS network, and central IS leadership despite IS’s weakened position in the Middle East.[79]

Figure 7. Overview of the ADP/GDP structure

 

Note: Maktab al Anfal is now defunct and has been subsumed under Maktab al Furqan.

Source: Tore Hamming.

IS has taken advantage of weak states and poor governance in Africa to establish growing affiliates that control territory, support the IS global network, and bolster IS propaganda narratives. The Islamic State has five highly active provinces in Africa: ISCAP, IS Mozambique Province (ISMP), IS Sahel Province (ISSP), ISS, and Nigeria-based IS West Africa Province (ISWAP). Many African states experience severe governance challenges, including long-standing ethnic violence, poor public services, and security forces that are abusive, ineffective, or undersized.[80] IS’s African affiliates have capitalized on these gaps to establish themselves in ungoverned areas and exploit local grievances to co-opt local populations.[81]

Figure 8. Islamic State Affiliates and Pro-Islamic State Groups in Africa Pledge Allegiance to a New Leader: December 2022

 

Source: Kathryn Tyson; Liam Karr.

ISSP and ISWAP—and ISCAP, ISMP, and ISS to a lesser extent—control and govern more territory in their respective areas of operations than most other IS affiliates. For example, ISSP and ISWAP systematically levy taxes, enforce strict shari’a law, and otherwise control local economies and populations in parts of West Africa.[82] The other IS African affiliates conduct these activities on a more sporadic basis and otherwise attempt to proselytize local communities.^[83]

ISS and ISWAP play critical roles in IS’s global administrative network. ISS hosts the East Africa IS office, al Karrar, and ISWAP hosts the West Africa office, al Furqan. The al Furqan office has sent funds, fighters, and guidance from ISWAP territories to ISSP, especially since ISSP’s expansion in 2022 and 2023. A UN report in June 2024 stated that ISWAP established facilitation cells and networks in northwestern Nigeria to move weapons, fuel, equipment, and fighters in support of ISSP operations at the behest of IS core leadership.^[84] Field researcher Vincent Foucher reported that ISWAP defectors previously claimed that ISWAP and ISSP sent cadres back and forth to each other, and IS supporters claimed that ISWAP fighters traveled to Mali to support an ISSP offensive against al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate in 2022.^[85]

Figure 9. Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation across West Africa

 

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

Africa has also become a haven for high-ranking IS leadership and a bridge between Africa and the Middle East. US officials said in 2024 that IS had elevated ISS Emir Abdulqadir Mumin to become IS’s “global leader.”^[86] CTP and multiple analysts have assessed that Mumin is likely the GDP head and not the official IS caliph.^[87] Voice of America reported an uncorroborated claim initially made by Middle East Institute scholar Guled Wiliq that presumed IS caliph Abu Hafs al Hashemi al Qurayshi arrived in Somalia from Yemen in June 2024.^[88] Nigeria-based open-source reporting network Zagazola claimed in January 2024 that the IS Shura Council was considering setting up a base for core leadership in Niger.^[89] CTP cannot verify either claim, and such relocations would risk undermining IS’s legitimacy by effectively admitting at least temporary defeat in its historical and religious heartland, the Middle East.

IS’s African affiliates contribute to IS external plots through the Global Directorate of Provinces and increase the risk of lone-wolf attacks by bolstering IS propaganda narratives. The UN and United States have confirmed that the al Karrar office has used operatives in South Africa to transfer money to ISKP.^[90] Swedish police have disrupted multiple attack and recruitment cells linked to ISS, and the former ISS emir’s alleged role as the GDP head would further connect ISS to external attack planning.^[91] ISS also hosts a significant number of foreign fighters, which increases the risk of external attack plots.^[92] Many foreign fighters are hardened ideologues who adhere to transnational Salafi-jihadism and demonstrate an interest in returning to their countries of origin to organize attack plots after being further radicalized in an active conflict theater.^[93] IS Sahel Province has set up facilitation networks between Europe and the Sahel to move foreign fighters, and Spain disrupted an IS cell based in of Morocco and Spain in 2021 that had links to IS Sahel Province, ISKP, ISIS, and IS cells in Europe.^[94]

IS’s African affiliates support IS propaganda that inspires and radicalizes lone-wolf attackers.^[95] IS African affiliates have claimed more attacks every year than all other IS provinces combined since 2023.^[96] IS’s African affiliates accounted for nearly 70 percent of all IS-claimed attacks in 2024 and 64 percent of all IS-claimed casualties according to the Washington Institute scholar Aaron Zelin’s Islamic State Worldwide Activity Map.^[97] IS media features on its African affiliates also highlight governance and religious efforts[98] This propaganda activity is critical to the Islamic State’s legitimacy as a governing power. IS media covers this activity to demonstrate its persisting strength around the globe despite the fact that it no longer controls a territorial caliphate in the Middle East.^[99]

Figure 10. Islamic State’s African Affiliates Dominate Global Activity in 2024

 

Note: Data period ends on December 19, 2024.

Source: Liam Karr; Aaron Zelin, Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Recent shifts in the international counterterrorism posture in Africa risk creating security vacuums that IS can exploit to strengthen further. Political upheaval in the Sahel led to the withdrawal of Western forces from the region between 2022 and 2023 and created a vacuum for ISSP to exploit. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger experienced several coups between 2021 and 2023 that installed anti-Western juntas.[100] These juntas expelled Western security partners and replaced them with much smaller groups of Russian forces.[101] The Sahelian juntas and their Russian backers adopted highly militarized counterinsurgency strategies that have failed to address lingering issues already present in the Western-backed approach and simultaneously spread indiscriminate violence and abuses against civilians that further fuel the insurgencies.[102] These shifts have allowed ISSP to cultivate a strengthening and expanding hub along the borders of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.[103]

Figure 11. Salafi-Jihadi Area of Operations in the Sahel

 

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

The incoming Trump administration has signaled that it will take a different approach to US policy in Somalia. Incoming US President Donald Trump withdrew the 700 US forces in Somalia at the end of his first term in 2020 without changing the objectives of US forces combating Salafi-jihadi militants in the Horn of Africa.[104] US President Joe Biden redeployed 500 US soldiers to Somalia in 2022.[105] Trump-aligned policymakers have unrelatedly voiced support to give US recognition to the de facto independent breakaway region in northern Somaliland.[106] Such a move would anger the SFG.

[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/islamic-state-claims-responsibility-attack-somalias-puntland-military-base-2025-01-01/; SITE Intelligence Group, “IS Claims Major Suicide Raid Involving Fighters of 7 Nationalities on Somali Military Camp in Puntland,” January 1, 2025, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com; https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/05/islamic-state-claims-suicide-bombing-in-somalia.php

[2] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-april-25-2024-is-somalia-expansion-benefits-is-global-network-togo-constitutional-changes#Somalia

[3] SITE Intelligence Group, “IS Claims Major Suicide Raid Involving Fighters of 7 Nationalities on Somali Military Camp in Puntland,” January 1, 2025, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com; https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/12/analysis-puntland-forces-repel-islamic-state-suicide-assault.php

[4] SITE Intelligence Group, “IS Claims Major Suicide Raid Involving Fighters of 7 Nationalities on Somali Military Camp in Puntland,” January 1, 2025, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com; https://shabellemedia dot com/death-toll-from-deadly-isis-attack-in-puntland-rises-to-18-injuries-climb-to-30/

[5] https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/05/islamic-state-claims-suicide-bombing-in-somalia.php

[6] https://x.com/HKaaman/status/1874857811987124380

[7] https://horseedmedia dot net/puntland-mobilizes-to-counter-isis-threat-in-northeastern-somalia/396371/; https://www.hiiraan dot com/news4/2024/Dec/199544/puntland_prepares_for_major_military_operation_against_isis_militants_in_bari_region.aspx; https://garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/somalia-puntland-president-in-bosaso-to-oversee-war-on-al-shabaab-and-isis

[8] https://garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/somalia-s-puntland-announces-readiness-for-offensive-against-extremist-groups; https://en.kaabtv dot com/puntland-launches-massive-military-operation-against-isis-and-al-shabaab

[9] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-security-forces-repulse-suicide-attack-by-islamic-state-2024-12-31/; https://thesomalidigest dot com/puntland-unleashes-hilac-offensive-targeting-is-somalia-and-al-shabab

[10] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-general-directorate-of-provinces-managing-the-islamic-states-global-network; https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/013/48/PDF/N2101348.pdf?OpenElement;%20https://extremism.gwu.edu/islamic-state-congo-growing

[11] https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/12/analysis-puntland-forces-repel-islamic-state-suicide-assault.php

[12] https://www.voanews.com/a/us-general-islamic-state-afghan-affiliate-closer-to-attacking-western-targets/7008633.html; https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_eds/2024/06/10/iskps-transnational-reemergence/

[13] https://thesomalidigest dot com/puntland-forces-secure-timirshe-cut-off-isis-routes-to-ballidhidin/

[14] SITE Intelligence Group, “IS Claims Major Suicide Raid Involving Fighters of 7 Nationalities on Somali Military Camp in Puntland,” January 1, 2025, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com

[15] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/foreign-technology-or-local-expertise-al-shabaabs-ied-capability/

[16] https://www.voanews.com/a/exclusive-africom-chief-says-islamic-state-doubles-size-in-north-somalia/7805706.html

[17] https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2F2024%2F748&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False

[18] https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2F2024%2F748&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False

[19] https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2F2024%2F748&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False

[20] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/islamic-state-somalia-a-growing-global-terror-concern/; https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2F2024%2F748&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False

[21] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/islamic-state-march-africa

[22] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-islamic-states-external-operations-and-the-french-belgian-nexus; https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-05/Sep__Foreign-Fighter-Returnees.pdf

[23] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/islamic-state-somalia-a-growing-global-terror-concern/

[24] https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-citizen-charged-providing-material-support-isis-and-receiving-military-type-training-isis

[25] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/un-security-council-authorizes-new-somalia-peacekeeping-mission-2024-12-27/

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[36] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypt-troops-join-african-union-somalia-mission-foreign-minister-says-2024-12-23/

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[102] https://hir.harvard.edu/how-france-failed-mali-the-end-of-operation-barkhane; https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2024/sahel; https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/03/28/mali-army-wagner-group-atrocities-against-civilians; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/07/rights-abuses-often-tipping-point-for-extremist-recruitment-un-study-finds; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/how-the-wagner-group-is-aggravating-the-jihadi-threat-in-the-sahel

[103] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-one-year-after-nigers-coup#ISSP; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-areas-of-operation-in-the-sahel https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-one-year-after-nigers-coup#ISSP

[104] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/04/world/africa/trump-somalia-troop-withdrawal.html

[105] https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2022/03/15/us-troops-commuting-to-somalia-is-inefficient-and-risky-top-africa-general-says; https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/16/us/politics/biden-military-somalia.html

[106] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somaliland-votes-with-leaders-seeing-international-recognition-reach-2024-11-13; https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/10402; https://www.semafor.com/article/12/10/2024/somaliland-trump-white-house-looks-set-to-recognize-the-region