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The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has committed numerous war crimes as the group has intensified its efforts to consolidate control over western Sudan since losing Khartoum in March 2025.
The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have fought a civil war in Sudan since April 2023. Countries such as Iran, Russia, and the UAE are fueling the war to the detriment of US interests in the Red Sea
The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have highly publicized their campaign against the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in northern Sudan to boost RSF morale following its defeat in Khartoum, as the actual military campaign has limited strategic value.
Russia is consolidating its strategic relationships with the Sahelian juntas to entrench itself in the region. The foreign ministers from the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—traveled to Moscow to meet with Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov on April 3 and 4 as part of the first sessions of “AES-Russia consultations.” A joint AES statement announced that the meeting aims to establish strategic relations in areas of common interest.
The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) fully retook central Khartoum and are clearing the last pockets of Rapid Support Forces (RSF) resistance from the greater Khartoum area, marking a major military and political victory for the SAF. Russia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and other foreign actors have sent weapons to the SAF and RSF that both sides are using in the battle for Khartoum. The RSF has intensified its efforts to defeat the SAF in western Sudan as it loses Khartoum to consolidate control over the western half of the country and enforce a de facto partition.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) remains unlikely to accede to M23’s and Rwanda’s maximalist negotiating demands despite nominally conceding to Angolan-mediated direct talks with M23. The DRC, M23, and Rwanda may be open to short-term ceasefires as they seek to reset and set conditions for future offensives. M23 has continued to advance in several areas of eastern DRC since the beginning of March.
A violent power struggle in northern Ethiopia’s Tigray region risks sparking another civil war in Ethiopia, which could, in turn, expand quickly to include Eritrea. Renewed conflict in Tigray or between Ethiopia and Eritrea would generate an economic, humanitarian, and security crisis that would have reverberations across Africa and even into Europe.
The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are advancing in south-central Sudan and setting conditions for an offensive into Rapid Support Forces (RSF) strongholds in Darfur. The SAF captured el Obeid—a state capital in south-central Sudan that will likely support SAF offensives into Rapid Support Forces (RSF) strongholds in Darfur—on February 20.
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rwandan-backed M23 captured the South Kivu provincial capital, Bukavu, and continued to advance on several axes in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). M23’s advances have set conditions for the group to expand its campaign into the interior of the DRC by strengthening its supply lines with Rwanda and securing access to roads that connect to adjacent regions of the DRC. M23’s control of Bukavu and Lake Kivu also gives M23 and Rwanda significant economic benefits.
The leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) outlined plans for a new government that likely aims to legitimize the SAF as the sole governing power in Sudan after it captures the Sudanese capital, Khartoum. The SAF is advancing on the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) last positions in central Khartoum, and the SAF capture of Khartoum would further support the SAF’s grand strategic aim of establishing itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan.