Terrorist Networks Project

The leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) outlined plans for a new government that likely aims to legitimize the SAF as the sole governing power in Sudan after it captures the Sudanese capital, Khartoum. The SAF is advancing on the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) last positions in central Khartoum, and the SAF capture of Khartoum would further support the SAF’s grand strategic aim of establishing itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan.

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) is poised to secure a major victory by recapturing Khartoum and pushing the RSF west of the Nile. Securing these objectives would support the SAF’s grand strategic aim of establishing itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan. SAF control over Khartoum would allow the SAF to consolidate control over the eastern bank of the Nile River and prepare for future offensives that aim to defeat the RSF in its strongholds in western Sudan.

Rwandan-backed M23 rebels captured Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu, which marks the most significant escalation in the conflict in the eastern DRC since the group last seized Goma in 2012. The group will seek to consolidate control over Goma, nearby mineral-rich areas, and the surrounding supply lines. The war in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) will likely continue to escalate in the short term because M23’s military gains have not forced the DRC to agree to negotiations with M23, and Rwanda is better positioned to deter potential sanctions that caused it to cut its vital support for M23 in 2012.

Russia has continued to strengthen and expand its military presence in Libya and Mali as it withdraws assets from Syria. The Kremlin’s equipment buildup in Mali is likely unrelated to the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and instead part of the Kremlin’s plans to continue to consolidate control of the Russian military presence in Mali under the Ministry of Defense–controlled Africa Corps.

The SAF recaptured Wad Madani from the RSF on January 11, an operationally significant district capital in central Sudan that will help to set conditions for the SAF to achieve its strategic objective of retaking the Sudanese capital, Khartoum. The capture of Wad Madani is part of the Sudanese Armed Forces’ (SAF) effort to encircle the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Khartoum and ultimately dislodge the RSF from the capital. The recapture of Khartoum is a strategic objective for the SAF that supports the SAF’s grand strategic aim of establishing itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan. The SAF capture of Khartoum could affect external support for the SAF and RSF from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, respectively.

Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) carried out its most complex attack in Somalia yet on December 31. ISS will likely continue to prioritize its strategic aim of acting as a logistic and administrative node in support of IS’s global network rather than refocusing on carrying out additional high-profile attacks in Somalia. ISS targeted a military base where Puntland defense forces had mobilized for a counter-ISS offensive and likely conducted the attack to disrupt the planned offensive.

The Islamic State has evolved and expanded globally since the territorial defeat of IS in Iraq and Syria in 2019, enabling the organization to continue to orchestrate and inspire attacks on the West.

Russia is reinforcing its positions in Libya and sub-Saharan Africa as it continues to consolidate in and withdraw some of its forces from Syria.

Ethiopia and Somalia agreed on December 11 to work toward securing Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea as part of a Turkish-mediated deal that will likely benefit Ethiopia and Turkey and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy. Ethiopia will likely withdraw from or at least pause its controversial naval base agreement with the breakaway Somaliland region because of the new agreement with Somalia, which is known as the Ankara Declaration.

The ongoing election dispute between Jubbaland and the SFG sparked a brief firefight in late November and continues to pose a heightened threat of further internal political violence and a direct or proxy conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia. Ethiopia could take advantage of the escalating dispute between Jubbaland and the Somali Federal Government (SFG) to increase its presence in the region in the context of Ethiopia’s own disputes with the SFG and Egypt.