Africa File, July 11, 2024: Sahelian Juntas vs. ECOWAS; US Base in Côte d’Ivoire

Africa File, July 11, 2024: Sahelian Juntas vs. ECOWAS; US Base in Côte d’Ivoire

Author: Liam Karr

Data Cutoff: July 11, 2024, at 10 a.m.

The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Editor's Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War.

Key Takeaways:

West Africa. The central Sahelian juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger established a confederation that deepens their break with West Africa’s ECOWAS and aims to strengthen their domestic and regional credibility. This split from the main West Africa political and economic bloc, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), would undermine ECOWAS’s legitimacy by hampering regional economic and security integration and democratic development.

The new confederation expands the operational scope of the juntas’ alliance and will likely create more opportunities for the juntas to continue coordinating diplomatic efforts and solidifying ties with like-minded non-Western partners. The confederation could seek to add new members, which would further strengthen its power and legitimacy as an alternative regional bloc. The deteriorating security in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger poses the biggest threat to the respective regimes and broader confederation.

Côte d’Ivoire. French media reported that the Ivorian government approved the construction of a US base in northwestern Côte d’Ivoire, as the United States withdraws and relocates from Niger. The reported base will have some practical range limitations for US intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance drones compared to the previous base in northern Niger. The new base risks fomenting a popular anti-Western backlash against the Ivorian government and the United States.

Assessments:

West Africa

The central Sahelian juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger established a confederation that deepens their break with ECOWAS and aims to strengthen their domestic and regional credibility. Malian junta leader Assimi Goita, Burkinabe leader Ibrahim Traore, and Nigerien leader Abdirahmane Tchiani signed four documents that established the Confederation of Sahel States (CES), or Confédération des États du Sahel, following their first joint conference.[1] The three leaders held their meeting on July 6, a day before ECOWAS held its own scheduled conference.[2] The three countries had already been working together under the name Alliance of Sahel States (Alliance des États du Sahel, AES) since September 2023.[3]

The CES expands the operational scope of the AES from a mutual defense agreement to a body that coordinates a variety of policies. The juntas initially formed the AES in September 2023 as a mutual self-defense pact to deter a threatened ECOWAS military intervention to forcibly depose the nascent Nigerien junta.[4] The CES is a multi-sectoral alliance that coordinates diplomatic, economic, and military policy among the three member states. It also adds new supporting institutions such as a rotating presidency and parliament to implement these objectives.[5] Cabinet-level officials had discussed and recommended many of the initiatives and changes during lower-level summits in recent months.[6] Malian press said that the new confederation would have “no fundamental difference” from ECOWAS.[7]

The member countries agreed to set up a unified security force and create a joint plan for military actions.^[8] These agreements are a continuation of discussions from March, when the AES announced initial plans to increase joint counterinsurgency operations.[9] The AES states have repeatedly criticized ECOWAS for its inaction on regional security issues.[10] The AES has only carried out one such operation since March, when Burkinabe and Nigerien soldiers conducted joint patrols over a week in early June to secure a segment of the N3 road in northern Burkina Faso.[11] The AES has continued coordinating drone strikes across the borders of its member states’ territories, which have been commonplace since the inception of the AES.

Figure 1. AES Joint Operations

 

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project.

The confederation also plans to increase economic cooperation to integrate its member states’ economies and decrease reliance on external partners. The CES aims to facilitate the free movement of people, goods, and services within the AES area.[12] The AES leaders also said they wanted to “pool their resources” in strategic sectors such as agriculture, water, energy, and transport.[13] The juntas also plan to create an investment bank and stabilization fund.[14] The AES foreign affairs ministers recommended many of these initiatives during a summit in November 2023.[15] The AES did not outline any plans for developing a shared currency, although they have repeatedly signaled this as a priority in previous meetings and statements.[16]

The AES leaders frame the confederation as part of their struggle for sovereignty and a direct challenge to ECOWAS. The juntas have each based their legitimacy and popular support on pro-sovereigntist narratives since they took power.[17] Their narratives are centered on a supposed desire for more equal and transactional partnerships.[18] This push is an explicit rejection of the previous decade of Western support, which drew criticisms that Western policies were too paternalistic and involved too many strings and preconditions.[19] Western governments often predicated their assistance on democratic governance, which often failed to gain a high degree of local legitimacy, and Western-approved counterinsurgency campaigns, which local militaries viewed as soft and ineffective.[20] 

The juntas have branded ECOWAS an enemy of their sovereignty due to ECOWAS’s efforts to punish the coup regimes and enforce a return to constitutional rule. ECOWAS sanctioned each country for several months after their coups and demanded plans for all countries to return to constitutional order.[21] ECOWAS responded especially strongly to the Nigerien coup in July 2023, threatening to depose the Nigerien junta and levying harsh sanctions for over six months that severely harmed the Nigerien economy.[22]

The sanctions contributed to the juntas announcing their immediate withdrawal from ECOWAS in January 2024, which they reiterated following the July 6 summit. The juntas blamed their decision on ECOWAS becoming a “foreign”-dominated body that was carrying out the bidding of the displaced Western powers.[23] The AES doubled down on this rationale by framing the CES as “far removed from the stranglehold of foreign powers” and part of an “irrevocable and immediate” withdrawal from ECOWAS.[24] The juntas explicitly rejected the provision in the ECOWAS treaty that mandates a one-year withdrawal notice period during which the withdrawing parties are still responsible for their ECOWAS commitments.[25]

ECOWAS is still seeking to reconcile with the junta leaders, however. ECOWAS has said that it is disappointed with its lack of progress in returning the AES countries and would make more “vigorous” steps following the July 7 ECOWAS summit.[26] ECOWAS tasked the Senegalese and Togolese presidents to negotiate with the juntas as part of these efforts.[27] Both presidents have maintained ties with the juntas, and Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye said in late May that reconciliation was possible when he toured all three countries.[28] The ECOWAS leaders also approved plans to mobilize a 5,000-strong regional standby counterterrorism force, which is a response to AES grievances over the ineffectiveness of ECOWAS security responses.[29]

Figure 2. CES vs. ECOWAS Countries in West Africa

 

Source: Liam Karr.

The AES member states’ withdrawal from ECOWAS would undermine ECOWAS’s legitimacy by hampering regional economic and security integration and further insulating the juntas from having to return to democratic rule. Their withdrawal would eliminate free trade and visa-free living and work provisions between ECOWAS and AES countries.[30] This would significantly harm expansive cross-border economies.[31] The elimination of free trade provisions would also potentially lead to tariff barriers and other transaction costs. This would disproportionately affect AES countries’ economies, since they are import dependent and landlocked.[32]

The withdrawal would complicate economic integration, such as a shared currency. The AES did not withdraw from the West African Economic and Monetary Union that currently binds the AES countries and ECOWAS members Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Togo to the franc of the Financial Community of Africa (CFA franc).[33] However, the AES and ECOWAS have each discussed different plans to replace the CFA franc with a regional currency, which risks creating two different regional currencies.[34]

The withdrawal would also undermine efforts to combat regional insecurity. Their withdrawal would remove the three countries at the heart of the Sahelian Salafi-jihadi insurgency from any regional counterterrorism force, limiting ECOWAS to do anything but attempt to contain the spillover. It would also undermine preexisting coordination mechanisms, especially in intelligence sharing, and lead to separate bilateral agreements on intelligence sharing with individual countries.[35] The economic impact of the withdrawal on cross-border economies will also disproportionately affect already-marginalized border communities that Salafi-jihadi groups prey on.[36]

The withdrawal would remove tools that ECOWAS has to facilitate transitions to constitutional democratic rule in the AES countries, undermining ECOWAS’s efforts to defend democracy in West Africa.[37] All three states have repeatedly shown their lack of interest in such transitions by delaying elections and cracking down on civil society opposition and media in their countries.[38] However, ECOWAS was able to agree to a tentative transition plan with Guinea to hold elections by the end of 2024, showing that such tools can be useful.[39] ECOWAS also faces self-inflicted criticism as a legitimate defender of democracy due to many ECOWAS leaders manipulating their state constitutions and elections to prolong their holds on power.[40]

The new confederation will likely create more opportunities for the juntas to continue coordinating diplomatic efforts and strengthening ties with like-minded non-Western partners. All three AES regimes have already been broadly coordinating their diplomatic activity by expelling various American, French, and UN partner forces and security assistance in favor of closer cooperation with alternative “sincere partners” since taking power, such as China, Iran, Russia, and Turkey.[41] The junta leaders reaffirmed the need to continue speaking with “one voice” during the summit.[42] The creation of a rotating CES presidency and parliament will help advance this goal. Mali had already directly facilitated cooperation between Russia and the rest of the AES by either hosting meetings between Russian and Burkinabe and Nigerien officials or serving as a base area for Russian officials to travel to the neighboring AES countries.[43]

Russia has been the primary security guarantor of the AES and has used these ties to expand cooperation in nonmilitary sectors. Russia has nearly 2,000 soldiers that are part of the Ministry of Defense–controlled Wagner Group and Africa Corps in Mali, roughly 200 Africa Corps soldiers in Burkina Faso, and at least another 100 Africa Corps soldiers in Niger.[44] The forces in Mali participate in offensive operations, while the Burkinabe and Nigerien contingents are primarily training local forces and protecting the junta heads.[45] Numerous Russian private and state-owned companies have signed several agreements and memorandums of understanding on civil nuclear cooperation, military-technical cooperation, natural resource mining, gold refinery construction, and telecommunications with the AES states since September 2023.

Figure 3. Significant Cooperation Between Russia and the AES

 

Source: Liam Karr.

China has been a leading economic partner for the AES states due to China’s willingness to work with the juntas to continue expanding its preexisting investments in Mali and Niger in particular.[46] Chinese state-owned companies have invested in crude oil, uranium, and solar power projects across the AES.[47] The Nigerien junta also signed an agreement in March with a Chinese state-owned company to receive a $400 million advance on its share of future oil sales through the new Chinese-built pipeline in Niger.[48]

Turkey has been a leading security partner for the AES. All three countries rely on Turkish drones and have close personal contacts in the Turkish defense industry.[49] Turkish-funded Syrian mercenaries also began operating in at least Niger and potentially Burkina Faso in 2024 to protect crucial economic sites where the Turkish government has a shared stake, such as mines.[50] The UK-based human rights watchdog Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) first reported in January 2024 that Turkish-trained and supervised Syrian mercenaries from the SADAT International Defense Consultancy deployed to Burkina Faso and Niger.[51] SOHR claimed in May that 1,100 mercenaries had deployed to Niger since September 2023.[52] CTP cannot confirm this claim. There was no evidence to confirm SOHR’s initial claims until May 2024, which indicates that the mercenaries are not present on this scale or are unusually discrete. Turkish state media has also historically accused SOHR of being anti-Turkish.[53]

Iran has shown interest in becoming an economic and defense partner to the AES since 2023. Iranian officials met with their AES counterparts multiple times throughout 2023. The Iranian regime and affiliated media outlets have repeatedly emphasized economic issues as an area of focus in Iran-AES relations.[54] Iran has signed several agreements on energy, mining, and other sectors with Burkina Faso and Niger in 2023 and 2024 and defense deals with Mali and Burkina Faso in 2023.[55] However, CTP cannot verify if the parties have implemented any of these plans, and follow-through has previously been an issue for Iranian engagement in Africa.[56] French and US media have also reported on aspects of negotiations for a uranium-for-arms deal between Iran and Niger.[57]

The AES could seek to add new members, which would further strengthen its power and legitimacy as an alternative regional bloc. Article 11 of the original AES charter allows “any other State sharing the same geographical, political and socio-cultural realities” of the founding countries to join the alliance if all current members approve.[58]

The Chadian regime may seek to join the AES to strengthen its internal regime security. Malian officials claimed that Chad’s now-elected junta discussed joining the bloc when a Chadian delegation visited all three AES leaders in April.[59] The same source said that Malian leader Assimi Goita was enthusiastic about the discussion.[60] Russia has also made significant efforts to grow ties with Sudan in 2024. Russian President Vladimir Putin invited Chadian President Mahamat Deby to Moscow in January 2024, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Chad in June 2024.[61] CTP previously noted that aligning with the AES and Russia would help Deby address internal pressure to distance himself from France and bolster his regime’s stability.[62] Chad would also benefit from greater cooperation with the AES due to its shared border with Niger and preexisting cooperation with the Nigerien military to combat the various Salafi-jihadi groups operating in the Lake Chad Basin.[63]

The Sudanese government, backed by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), may also seek to join the AES as it fights for its survival in the Sudanese civil war. Senior SAF leaders visited Mali and Niger on June 4 for the first time since the Sudanese civil war began.[64] The SAF delegation discussed “positions to be held in regional and international organizations” and other bilateral cooperation with both countries during their meetings.[65] Russia has also sought to strengthen its ties to the SAF in 2024 as it pursues a Red Sea naval base in Port Sudan. The two countries have been negotiating an arms-for-base deal since April.[66] Working more closely with the AES and Russia would create more avenues for the SAF to gain more military support and allies in various international forums. Greater coordination with the AES would also create opportunities for the SAF to pressure Chad on its role as a rear support base for the rival Rapid Support Forces that the SAF is fighting in Sudan, either directly or through AES interlocutors.[67]

Guinea also could join the AES and renege on its planned democratic transition at the end of 2024. The Guinean junta has shown sympathy for the AES juntas and taken increasingly authoritarian measures, despite declining to join the bloc thus far and adhering to the ECOWAS transition plan.[68] The agreed transition timeline to hold elections by the end of 2024 creates a natural decision point for the Guinean junta if it wants to remain in power. Russia has maintained a solid working relationship with the Guinean junta due to its investments in Guinean bauxite mining.[69]

The deteriorating security in all three AES countries poses the biggest threat to the respective regimes and broader confederation. The regional al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates have strengthened since the juntas took power. Insurgents are gradually encircling various government-controlled cities, including national capitals; spreading to new areas; and conducting deadlier and more sophisticated attacks.[70]

Figure 4. Salafi-Jihadi Area of Operations in the Sahel

 

Note: “JNIM” is Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen. “ISSP” is Islamic State Sahel Province.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project.

This trajectory threatens the legitimacy of the juntas, who came to power promising to address insecurity with their new strategies and partners.[71] Growing insecurity is at odds with this promise and creates a credibility and legitimacy deficit for the juntas. Growing discontent among soldiers has led to multiple coup scares since September 2023.[72] French media reported that Mali and Russia even sent soldiers to protect Traore amid the latest scare in June 2024, highlighting the preexisting regime security functions of the AES.[73]

Russia may face similar popular criticisms that partner countries previously leveled at the West due to its visible role if it fails to help the regimes solve the insurgencies or boost their economic development.[74] CTP has already assessed that Russian security assistance is primarily geared at regime security and will not address the broader insecurity many African partners are facing.[75] Russia also cannot significantly increase development or military investment in Africa due to its economic constraints, which its invasion of Ukraine has compounded by adding more domestic demands.[76]

Côte d’Ivoire

French outlet Le Monde reported that the Ivorian government approved the construction of a US base in northwestern Côte d’Ivoire, as the United States withdraws and relocates from Niger. Le Monde said that its sources could not confirm any details about the base beyond its location near the town of Odienne.

US forces are currently withdrawing from Niger and will be out of the country by September 2024. The Nigerien junta annulled its defense agreements with the United States in March, following a breakdown in relations after tense meetings with US officials over Niger’s growing ties with Russia and Iran.[77] US soldiers completed their withdrawal from Niamey Air Base on July 7 and will leave their second base in northern Niger by September 15.[78] The US built the $110 million drone base in northern Niger in 2019 for its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities to support counterterrorism operations against the West African al Qaeda and IS affiliates.[79] US Africa Command Commander Gen. Michael Langley warned that the loss of US basing in the Sahel would “degrade our ability to do active watching and warning, including for homeland defense.”[80]

The United States has been discussing constructing new bases with Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana as alternatives to Niger since at least January 2024.[81] This shift aligns with other US nonmilitary efforts that aim to contain the Sahelian Salafi-jihadi insurgency from spilling over and consuming the littoral states, such as the 2019 Global Fragility Act.[82] The new base would be positioned well to support bilateral and regional coordination efforts, such as ECOWAS’s proposed counterterrorism force.[83] Langley met with top civilian and military leaders, including presidents and defense chiefs, in Côte d’Ivoire in late April and announced that the US Africa Command would be investing $65 million in Côte d’Ivoire in 2024.[84]

The reported base in Côte d’Ivoire will have some practical range drawbacks compared to the base in northern Niger. American forces in Niger use MQ9 Reaper drones, which have a 1,150-mile range.[85] Most of the Sahelian-based Salafi-jihadi areas of operations are within this range from Odienne. However, Odienne is farther from the epicenter of the insurgency near the Burkinabe, Malian, and Nigerien tri-border area, which will add transit time to drone rotations. Russia has also supplied at least Niger with antiair systems that can shoot down US drones if they do not secure overflight permission.[86] Odienne is also crucially out of range of the Lake Chad Basin, limiting the resources available to monitor IS’s West Africa Province, which hosts the regional IS administrative office. Newer variants of the MQ9B “SkyGuardian” Reaper have unspecified extended ranges that could help mitigate some of these issues.[87]

Figure 5. The Current and Prospective Range of United States Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Drone Capabilities in West Africa

 

Source: Liam Karr.

Note: US forces will withdraw from Agadez Air Base by September 15. Le Mondereported on July 9 that the US had agreed to build a new base in Odienne, Côte d’Ivoire, but said it is unclear when the base would be operational.

The creation of the new base could foment popular anti-Western backlash against the Ivorian government and the United States. Anti-Western sentiment, especially anti-French sentiment, is salient across Francophone West Africa, including in Côte d’Ivoire.[88] France is actively drawing down its presence in Côte d’Ivoire in response to these concerns.[89]

Opposition groups have strongly criticized Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara for being too pro-West and having questionable democratic credentials. Detractors have labeled Ouattara a Western puppet due to his strong relationships with France and the West that date back to when he entered the presidency in 2010 and continue to the present.[90]

France and the UN militarily supported pro-Ouattara rebels in northern Côte d’Ivoire in the Second Ivorian Civil War who were fighting against the previous president after he refused to leave office following an election loss to Ouattara.[91] Opposition groups have also boycotted the most recent presidential elections, which Ouattara won in 2020 after he exploited a legal loophole to run for a constitutionally illegal third term.[92] Ouattara’s party is planning to support him for a fourth term in October 2025, when he will be 83.[93]

 

[1] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/07/06/niger-s-military-leader-states-niger-mali-burkina-irrevocably-turned-backs-on-ecowas_6676875_4.html; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240706-sommet-de-l-aes-nos-peuples-ont-irr%C3%A9vocablement-tourn%C3%A9-le-dos-%C3%A0-la-c%C3%A9d%C3%A9ao

[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/west-africas-ecowas-decries-lack-progress-with-junta-states-2024-07-08

[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-niger-burkina-faso-sign-sahel-security-pact-2023-09-16

[4] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-niger-burkina-faso-sign-sahel-security-pact-2023-09-16

[5] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240706-sommet-de-l-aes-nos-peuples-ont-irr%C3%A9vocablement-tourn%C3%A9-le-dos-%C3%A0-la-c%C3%A9d%C3%A9ao; https://www.actuniger dot com/politique/20241-confederation-des-etats-du-sahel-le-mali-designe-pour-assurer-en-premier-la-presidence-tournante-adoption-de-la-declaration-de-niamey.html

[6] https://bamada dot net/alliance-des-etats-du-sahel-aes-les-ministres-des-affaires-etrangeres-du-mali-niger-et-burkina-faso-proposent-la-creation-dune-confederation; https://burkina24 dot com/2023/11/25/vers-la-creation-dune-compagnie-aerienne-commune-aux-etats-de-lalliance-des-etats-du-sahel-aes

[7] https://www.maliweb dot net/editorial/edito-la-confederation-aes-est-nee-adieu-a-la-cedeao-3069454.html

[8] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240706-sommet-de-l-aes-nos-peuples-ont-irr%C3%A9vocablement-tourn%C3%A9-le-dos-%C3%A0-la-c%C3%A9d%C3%A9ao

[9] https://westafricareport dot com/2024/03/07/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-the-creation-of-aes-joint-anti-jihadist-force; https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/07/06/niger-s-military-leader-states-niger-mali-burkina-irrevocably-turned-backs-on-ecowas_6676875_4.html

[10] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/07/06/niger-s-military-leader-states-niger-mali-burkina-irrevocably-turned-backs-on-ecowas_6676875_4.html; https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/07/06/le-burkina-faso-le-mali-et-le-niger-s-unissent-au-sein-d-une-confederation-des-etats-du-sahel_6247402_3212.html; https://pscc.fes.de/fileadmin/user_upload/images/publications/2024/FES-PSCC-NoteAnalyse02-A4-EN-LowRes.pdf

[11] Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project database, available at https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool

[12] https://www.actuniger dot com/politique/20241-confederation-des-etats-du-sahel-le-mali-designe-pour-assurer-en-premier-la-presidence-tournante-adoption-de-la-declaration-de-niamey.html

[13] https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/07/06/le-burkina-faso-le-mali-et-le-niger-s-unissent-au-sein-d-une-confederation-des-etats-du-sahel_6247402_3212.html

[14] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240706-sommet-de-l-aes-nos-peuples-ont-irr%C3%A9vocablement-tourn%C3%A9-le-dos-%C3%A0-la-c%C3%A9d%C3%A9ao

[15] https://bamada dot net/alliance-des-etats-du-sahel-aes-les-ministres-des-affaires-etrangeres-du-mali-niger-et-burkina-faso-proposent-la-creation-dune-confederation

[16] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1529937/economie-entreprises/lalliance-des-etats-du-sahel-peut-elle-vraiment-creer-sa-propre-monnaie; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1524779/economie-entreprises/mali-burkina-niger-une-monnaie-commune-est-elle-credible

[17] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp38v5p6g35o; https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/07/06/niger-s-military-leader-states-niger-mali-burkina-irrevocably-turned-backs-on-ecowas_6676875_4.html; https://www.actuniger dot com/politique/20241-confederation-des-etats-du-sahel-le-mali-designe-pour-assurer-en-premier-la-presidence-tournante-adoption-de-la-declaration-de-niamey.html

[18] https://www.clingendael.org/publication/sahels-new-geopolitics

[19] https://www.clingendael.org/publication/sahels-new-geopolitics

[20] https://www.clingendael.org/publication/sahels-new-geopolitics

[21] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/junta-led-sahel-states-rule-out-return-west-african-economic-bloc-2024-07-06; https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240225-%F0%9F%94%B4-west-african-bloc-ecowas-lifts-its-economic-sanctions-against-guinea-statement; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/west-african-ecowas-bloc-mulls-new-strategy-towards-junta-states-2024-02-24; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/africa/ecowas-lifts-sanctions-on-niger-burkina-faso-mali/3146935

[22] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/ecowas-nigeria-and-niger-coup-sanctions-time-recalibrate; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-cuts-2023-budget-by-40-post-coup-sanctions-bite-2023-10-07; https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/niger/overview; https://africacenter.org/spotlight/niger-coup-reversing-hard-earned-gains

[23] https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20240129-afrique-de-l-ouest-pourquoi-mali-niger-et-burkina-faso-divorcent-ils-de-la-c%C3%A9d%C3%A9ao; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas; https://globalvoices.org/2024/02/27/local-reactions-to-the-withdrawal-of-burkina-faso-mali-and-niger-from-ecowas

[24] https://www.actuniger.com/politique/20241-confederation-des-etats-du-sahel-le-mali-designe-pour-assurer-en-premier-la-presidence-tournante-adoption-de-la-declaration-de-niamey.html

[25] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-says-it-will-not-respect-ecowas-treatys-withdrawal-notice-period-2024-02-07; https://issafrica.org/iss-today/proposed-ecowas-exits-leave-west-africa-at-a-crossroads; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/es/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)762295

[26] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/west-africas-ecowas-decries-lack-progress-with-junta-states-2024-07-08

[27] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/west-africas-ecowas-decries-lack-progress-with-junta-states-2024-07-08; https://apnews.com/article/westafrica-ecowas-abuja-faye-coups-9901fe84923fb57b24819ed2b346766d

[28] https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20240530-senegal-s-faye-makes-first-visit-to-military-ruled-mali-and-burkina-faso; https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/07/06/niger-s-military-leader-states-niger-mali-burkina-irrevocably-turned-backs-on-ecowas_6676875_4.html

[29] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/07/06/niger-s-military-leader-states-niger-mali-burkina-irrevocably-turned-backs-on-ecowas_6676875_4.html; https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/07/06/le-burkina-faso-le-mali-et-le-niger-s-unissent-au-sein-d-une-confederation-des-etats-du-sahel_6247402_3212.html; https://pscc.fes.de/fileadmin/user_upload/images/publications/2024/FES-PSCC-NoteAnalyse02-A4-EN-LowRes.pdf

[30] https://apnews.com/article/westafrica-ecowas-abuja-faye-coups-9901fe84923fb57b24819ed2b346766d; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce782jzyl76o

[31] https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099060624234213175/p168113143899b0ce19278117d819b5018a; https://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/426931590681026830/West-Africa.pdf; https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/incentives-and-constraints-of-informal-trade-between-nigeria-and-its-neighbours_7aa64379-en

[32] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)762295

[33] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1494379/economie-entreprises/coups-detat-sanctions-desunions-luemoa-prete-a-craquer

[34] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1585975/economie-entreprises/sortie-du-franc-cfa-la-cedeao-a-t-elle-reellement-remis-leco-sur-les-rails; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1529937/economie-entreprises/lalliance-des-etats-du-sahel-peut-elle-vraiment-creer-sa-propre-monnaie; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1524779/economie-entreprises/mali-burkina-niger-une-monnaie-commune-est-elle-credible

[35] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce782jzyl76o; https://pscc.fes.de/e/the-aes-countries-exit-from-ecowas-and-the-building-of-regional-security.html

[36] https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099060624234213175/p168113143899b0ce19278117d819b5018a; https://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/426931590681026830/West-Africa.pdf; https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/incentives-and-constraints-of-informal-trade-between-nigeria-and-its-neighbours_7aa64379-en

[37] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240708-cr%C3%A9ation-conf%C3%A9d%C3%A9ration-%C3%A9tats-du-sahel-inqui%C3%A9tant-pour-les-populations-de-ces-pays

[38] https://www.theafricareport.com/346803/elections-in-mali-and-burkina-faso-postponed-for-forever-and-a-day; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-extends-junta-rule-by-five-years-2024-05-25; https://apnews.com/article/mali-opposition-crackdown-sahel-junta-559a9df7b7295fb691ed05bfe8dde326; https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/28/world/africa/burkina-faso-military-conscription.html; https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/02/27/burkina-faso-abductions-used-crack-down-dissent; https://cpj.org/2023/07/burkina-faso-suspends-third-french-media-outlet-in-under-8-months; https://www.voanews.com/a/burkina-faso-suspends-more-foreign-media-over-hrw-report/7588551.html

[39] https://africacenter.org/spotlight/2024-elections/guinea; https://issafrica.org/iss-today/ecowas-support-remains-crucial-for-guineas-peaceful-transition

[40] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240707-ouverture-du-sommet-de-la-c%C3%A9d%C3%A9ao-pr%C3%A9c%C3%A9d%C3%A9e-par-un-huis-clos

[41] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/07/06/niger-s-military-leader-states-niger-mali-burkina-irrevocably-turned-backs-on-ecowas_6676875_4.html

[42] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240706-sommet-de-l-aes-nos-peuples-ont-irr%C3%A9vocablement-tourn%C3%A9-le-dos-%C3%A0-la-c%C3%A9d%C3%A9ao

[43] https://x.com/SimNasr/status/1686725855408496640; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/97667; https://t.me/rybar/51962; https://t.me/africaintel/5728; https://x.com/casusbellii/status/1687853482588372998

[44] https://pism.pl/publications/africa-corps-a-new-iteration-of-russias-old-military-presence-in-africa; https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/07/06/la-brigade-bear-nouvel-outil-du-kremlin-en-afrique_6247284_3212.html

[45] https://pism.pl/publications/africa-corps-a-new-iteration-of-russias-old-military-presence-in-africa; https://static.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Unconventional-Weapons-final-web.pdf

[46] https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/china-regional-snapshot-sub-saharan-africa

[47] https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/deconstructing-chinas-interest-in-the-niger-benin-rapprochement; https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3251351/china-tipped-keep-mali-ties-strictly-economic-un-peacekeeping-mission-wraps 

[48] https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/niger-china-sign-crude-oil-mou-worth-400-mln-says-niger-state-tv-2024-04-13; https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3259074/chinese-state-firm-agrees-us400m-loan-niger-junta-return-oil; https://x.com/ighazer/status/1775270770065002551?s=20

[49] https://www.turkiyetoday dot com/turkiye/malian-army-chief-visits-turkiyes-defense-industries-presidency-24043

[50] https://youtu.be/5ntFZari2s0?si=4Z4KR8-M9XoGPPpo; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1809901906573103486

[51] https://www.syriahr.com/en/324012

[52] https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-sends-syrian-mercenaries-to-niger-to-secure-strategic-interests-/7616771.html

[53] https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/anadolu-post/analysis-western-medias-principles-blinded-by-anti-turkey-bias/637432

[54] https://www.barrons.com/news/iran-says-ready-to-cooperate-with-new-niger-regime-8711888b

[55] https://www.barrons.com/news/iran-says-ready-to-cooperate-with-new-niger-regime-8711888b; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1529563/politique/liran-tend-la-main-au-niger-pour-surmonter-les-sanctions; https://www.ecofinagency dot com/public-management/1010-44934-burkina-faso-reaches-new-cooperation-deals-with-iran; https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/489815/Iran-Burkina-Faso-sign-8-cooperation-MOUs; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1529563/politique/liran-tend-la-main-au-niger-pour-surmonter-les-sanctions; https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/01/09/au-sahel-l-iran-en-pleine-offensive-diplomatique_6209852_3212.html

[56] https://www.barrons.com/news/turkey-iran-morocco-joust-for-greater-role-in-sahel-e9b6da85

[57] https://www.africaintelligence.fr/afrique-ouest/2024/04/30/sous-l-oeil-de-washington-teheran-negocie-avec-niamey-l-acquisition-de-300-tonnes-d-uranium,110220992-ge0; https://x.com/africa_in_fr/status/1785968816662425650?s=46&t=3jADKce4MtZBKDyf5P9itQ; https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/05/10/l-uranium-du-niger-au-c-ur-de-negociations-clandestines-avec-l-iran_6232514_3212.html; https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/niger-once-key-u-s-counterterrorism-ally-ends-military-ties-7db66dbe

[58] https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/sahel2023.htm

[59] https://www.maliweb dot net/contributions/les-trois-pays-de-lalliance-du-sahel-donnent-le-feu-vert-au-tchad-pour-rejoindre-lalliance-3059822.html; https://twitter.com/AESinfos/status/1778007403998388444

[60] https://www.maliweb dot net/contributions/les-trois-pays-de-lalliance-du-sahel-donnent-le-feu-vert-au-tchad-pour-rejoindre-lalliance-3059822.html

[61] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/putin-meets-chad-junta-leader-russia-competes-with-france-africa-2024-01-24; https://www.voanews.com/a/chad-sahel-states-receive-russia-s-foreign-and-defense-ministers/7643917.html

[62] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-april-18-2024-chad-is-the-kremlins-next-target-in-the-sahel-al-qaedas-sahelian-affiliate-weaponizes-drones#Chad

[63] https://mnjtffmm.org

[64] https://sudantribune.com/article286552

[65] https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/Sudan-after-Mali-the-military-junta-strengthens-relations-with-Niger

[66] https://sudantribune.com/article286105; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-26/sudan-s-army-deepens-ties-with-russia-iran-as-civil-war-rages; https://www.reuters.com/world/russian-envoy-meets-sudans-army-commander-show-support-2024-04-29

[67] https://sudantribune.com/article287511

[68] https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/why-restoring-democracy-in-guinea-is-important; https://www.barrons.com/news/guinea-junta-leader-s-ex-deputy-dies-in-detention-d8e336a4; https://www.csis.org/analysis/will-sahel-military-alliance-further-fragment-ecowas

[69] https://www.theafricareport.com/178750/guinea-russia-moscows-ties-with-doumbouya

[70] https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2024/sahel; https://africacenter.org/spotlight/burkina-faso-crisis-continues-to-spiral; https://africacenter.org/spotlight/niger-coup-reversing-hard-earned-gains; https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mali-catastrophe-accelerating-under-junta-rule; https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mig2024-deaths-militant-islamist-violence-africa-rise; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1578154/politique/au-burkina-faso-une-hecatombe-pour-larmee-a-mansila; https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230826-islamic-state-group-doubled-controlled-territory-in-mali-in-under-a-year-un-experts-say; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-may-31-2024-russian-red-sea-logistics-center-in-sudan-jnim-strengthens-along-the-burkinabe-nigerien-border#Sahel

[71] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-update-special-edition-western-failures-military-coups-and-kremlin-gains-undermine-us-geostrategic-and-counterterrorism-interests-in-the-sahel; https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/12/after-two-coups-mali-needs-regional-support-bolster-democracy; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57368536; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/17/burkina-faso-death-toll-security-post-attack-jumps-to-53; https://www.voanews.com/a/al-qaida-branch-claims-attack-on-burkina-faso-convoy-dozens-killed-/6775975.html; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/07/28/niger-coup-tchiani-bazoum

[72] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-junta-says-it-thwarted-coup-attempt-tuesday-2023-09-27; https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/06/19/au-burkina-faso-la-grogne-des-soldats-s-amplifie-contre-le-regime-militaire_6241373_3212.html

[73] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240618-burkina-faso-des-soldats-maliens-et-des-mercenaires-russes-de-wagner-sont-arriv%C3%A9s-%C3%A0-ouagadougou

[74] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-russias-africa-corps-arrives-in-niger-whats-next

[75] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-russias-africa-corps-arrives-in-niger-whats-next

[76] https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-still-progressing-africa-whats-limit; https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/05/russia-using-soviet-playbook-global-south-challenge-west-and-it-working; https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/russia-africa-wagner; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20-%20The%20Kremlin%20Campaign%20in%20Africa%20-%20August%202019.pdf

[77] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/16/niger-junta-end-us-military; https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/niger-once-key-u-s-counterterrorism-ally-ends-military-ties-7db66dbe; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1548848/politique/entre-le-niger-et-les-etats-unis-les-raisons-de-la-rupture

[78] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-troops-pull-out-nigers-air-base-101-2024-07-07

[79] https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2019/11/14/this-obscure-costly-air-base-is-the-new-front-in-the-battle-against-violent-extremism

[80] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/16/niger-junta-end-us-military

[81] https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/u-s-seeks-drone-bases-in-coastal-west-africa-to-stem-islamist-advance-21282861

[82] https://www.state.gov/the-u-s-strategy-to-prevent-conflict-and-promote-stability-10-year-strategic-plan-for-coastal-west-africa; https://www.state.gov/stability-strategy; https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/mar-27-2023-joint-10-year-plans-us-strategy-prevent-conflict-and-promote-stability; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/24/fact-sheet-president-biden-submits-to-congress-10-year-plans-to-implement-the-u-s-strategy-to-prevent-conflict-and-promote-stability

[83] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/07/06/niger-s-military-leader-states-niger-mali-burkina-irrevocably-turned-backs-on-ecowas_6676875_4.html; https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/07/06/le-burkina-faso-le-mali-et-le-niger-s-unissent-au-sein-d-une-confederation-des-etats-du-sahel_6247402_3212.html; https://pscc.fes.de/fileadmin/user_upload/images/publications/2024/FES-PSCC-NoteAnalyse02-A4-EN-LowRes.pdf

[84] https://www.africom.mil/article/35459/africom-strengthens-partnerships-with-cote-divoire

[85] https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/22/us/politics/drone-base-niger.html; https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104470/mq-9-reaper

[86] https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-has-sent-military-instructors-niger-says-niger-state-tv-2024-04-11

[87] https://www.ga-asi.com/remotely-piloted-aircraft/mq-9b-skyguardian; https://www.airandspaceforces.com/weapons-platforms/mq-9

[88] https://disinfo.africa/new-pro-russian-pan-africanist-group-emerges-in-c%C3%B4te-divoire-f64fe8dd5290

[89] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/01/31/france-begins-drastic-downsizing-of-its-military-bases-in-west-africa_6480050_4.html; https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20240617-france-reduce-military-footprint-west-and-central-africa-600-troops-say-sources

[90] https://disinfo.africa/new-pro-russian-pan-africanist-group-emerges-in-c%C3%B4te-divoire-f64fe8dd5290; https://africainterest.org/alassane-ouattara-french-groomed-installed-sustained-now-weaponized; https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20231122-ivorian-president-ouattara-in-france-to-discuss-partnership-and-security-issues

[91] https://www.france24.com/en/20110412-close-ties-paris-could-spell-trouble-ouattara-ivory-coast; https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/2417075/in-the-ivory-coast-france-does-regime-change; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/cote-divoire/b192-keeping-jihadists-out-northern-cote-divoire

[92] https://www.reuters.com/article/world/ivory-coast-council-approves-president-ouattara-for-third-term-bid-idUSKBN2652OK; https://freedomhouse.org/country/cote-divoire/freedom-world/2024

[93] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-08/ivory-coast-elections-ruling-party-signals-it-wants-ouattara-to-run