Africa File, July 25, 2024: Turkish Inroads in Niger; al Shabaab’s Continued SVBIED Threat

Africa File, July 25, 2024: Turkish Inroads in Niger; al Shabaab’s Continued SVBIED Threat

Author: Liam Karr

Contributors: Avery Borens and Lilya Yatim

Data Cutoff: July 25, 2024, at 10 a.m.

Editor's Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War.

The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

• Turkey. Turkey is strengthening its long-standing partnership with Niger across various sectors, which could result in Turkey competing with China and Russia over access to resources and military influence. Turkey also has opportunities to increase economic and military cooperation with Burkina Faso and Mali, but Russia’s larger presence in both countries will pose a greater obstacle.
• Somalia. The Somali Federal Government (SFG) reclaimed towns from al Shabaab in parts of central and southern Somalia. Somali forces continue to face high costs from large-scale, complex al Shabaab raids that have halted and overturned multiple SFG offensives since 2023, although Somali forces have demonstrated more resiliency to such attacks in recent months thanks to tactical adaptations.

Assessment:

Turkey

Turkey is strengthening its long-standing partnership with Niger across various sectors. Turkish ministers met with their Nigerien counterparts in Niamey, Niger, on July 17 in three separate working groups.[1] One group focused on economics and trade, another on energy and mining, and a third on foreign policy, security, and defense.[2] The Turkish delegation also met with Nigerien junta leader Abdourahmane Tiani.[3] The two countries signed an agreement to enhance cooperation to involve Turkish companies more in developing oil and gas fields in Niger.[4] The working groups also discussed intelligence cooperation, military training, and Turkish access to Nigerien uranium mines.[5]

Turkey has a strong partnership with Niger that predates the Nigerien junta taking power in July 2023, and it has been trying to grow its investments in Niger since 2012.[6] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan led a diplomatic charge in the Sahel in 2012 and 2013 that laid the foundation for much greater Turkish business investment throughout the 2010s.[7] Turkish outreach resulted in significant infrastructure, defense, and mining deals in 2019 and 2020.[8] Turkey delivered six Bayraktar TB2 drones to Niger in 2022, and French media said it was considering building a base to support the drones at the time.[9] The junta still relies on these drones to contest insurgent-controlled areas and areas where state forces are absent, and it has nearly tripled the rate of drone strikes since it took power.[10]

Turkey’s growing role in Niger could result in Turkey competing with other major players in the country, such as China and Russia, over access to resources and military influence. Russia and Turkey are interested in obtaining mining permits for two uranium mines that the junta withdrew from Western companies in July 2024. The junta withdrew the permits from French state-owned Orano and Canadian-owned GoviEx in June and July 2024 over disagreements with the firms’ proposed timelines and target areas.[11] Bloomberg reported that the Russian state-owned nuclear energy company Rosatom and Turkey are separately seeking to access to these uranium assets in Niger and are in initial talks with the Nigerien junta.[12] Turkey heavily depends on Rosatom for its own nuclear power ambitions, as it signed deals with Rosatom to build and provide fuel for the three planned power plants.[13]

Figure 1. Niger Diversifies Its Economic Partners

 

Source: Liam Karr and Avery Borens.

Turkey has also reportedly sent more than a thousand Syrian mercenaries to Niger in 2024, creating potential competition with the Kremlin and its Africa Corps.[14] The UK-based human rights watchdog Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) claimed in January 2024 that an initial batch of 300 Turkish-recruited, Turkish-trained, salaried Syrian mercenaries from the SADAT International Defense Consultancy deployed in Burkina Faso and Niger in December 2023.[15] SOHR claimed in May that this number had risen to at least 1,100 in Niger.[16] CTP cannot verify the figures in this claim, although the BBC and France24 have spoken with Syrian recruits.^[17] Russia deployed at least 100 African Corps soldiers to Niger in April 2024.[18]

Figure 2. Niger Diversifies Its Military Partners

 

Source: Liam Karr and Avery Borens.

Turkey and Russia’s alleged troop deployments pursue similar objectives for both contributors but address different needs for the junta, making competition unlikely. Both Turkey and Russia are attempting to increase defense ties to boost military sales that bolster their domestic economies and improve their geopolitical position by filling the vacuum left by Western disengagement with the region.[19] However, the batch of Africa Corps troops serves as a training force and a praetorian guard for the junta, while the Syrian mercenary contingent reportedly protects vital economic sites where the Turkish government has a shared stake, such as mines.[20] SOHR and Syrian recruits even told the BBC that Sadat put some mercenaries under the command of Russian advisers.[21]

Turkish companies’ growing role in developing Nigerien oil and gas fields could put Turkey in competition with China, which currently dominates Niger’s oil sector. Niger has had a joint petroleum production agreement with China since 2008.[22] China owns a majority stake in crucial Nigerien facilities, such as Niger’s largest oil field, its lone refinery, and a newly built oil pipeline to Benin.[23] The Nigerien junta signed an agreement in March with a Chinese state-owned company to receive a $400 million advance on its share of future oil sales through the pipeline in Niger.[24] The junta reportedly plans to use the money to repay part of its regional debt.[25] China is also working on several infrastructure projects in Niger.[26]

The Nigerien junta may favor partners that can keep mining operations running despite growing insecurity because it seeks to avoid disruptions to its revenue. The junta is facing significant economic shortfalls after the regional West African economic bloc lifted sanctions in February 2024, and it has repeatedly used its natural resources to secure quick access to cash and weapons.[27] The junta suspended the Western mining companies’ uranium permits because their production and operation timelines did not meet the junta’s expected revenue standards.[28] China suspended construction at an oil field in northeastern Niger due to insecurity on July 21.[29] Turkey uses of mercenaries to mitigate the impact of insecurity on its operations.

Turkey also has opportunities to increase economic and military cooperation with Burkina Faso and Mali. Turkey has substantial ties to Burkina Faso and Mali, although Niger has historically been its strongest partner in the region.[30] Burkina Faso and Mali rely on Turkish drones and have significant personal and business partnerships with the Turkish defense industry.[31] Turkey and Turkish businesses have also invested in Mali and Burkina Faso’s agriculture, education, economic, military, and mining sectors since 2010, although this has not resulted in landmark deals as it did with Niger.[32]

Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have been broadly coordinating their diplomatic activity since Niger’s junta came to power and they formed the Alliance of Sahel States in September 2023.[33] All three countries expelled various American, French, and UN partner forces and security assistance in favor of closer cooperation with alternative partners.[34] The three countries agreed to form a formal confederation on July 6, 2024, to further enhance diplomatic, economic, and military coordination.[35] The Malian junta head said that the confederation aimed to increase coordination with “sincere partners such as Russia, China, and Turkey.” [36]

Russia will likely pose a greater obstacle to increased Turkish involvement in mining in Mali and Burkina Faso than in Niger. Burkina Faso and Mali each generate at least 70 percent of their export revenue from gold mining, and both have manganese deposits.[37] Mali also has iron, lithium, and uranium deposits and unexplored natural gas and oil deposits, and Burkina Faso also has zinc.[38] Russia and Mali have already signed several agreements on exploring Mali’s oil, gas, uranium, and lithium reserves since March 2024.[39] Burkina Faso and Russia have also discussed expanding cooperation in the mining and natural resource sectors.[40] Chinese- and Western-owned companies still control many mines in Mali, further decreasing the opportunity for substantial Turkish access.[41] Turkey also suffered a setback to its mining ambitions in Burkina Faso when the junta withdrew a Turkish mining company’s permits to separate gold and manganese mines in March 2024 due to payment issues that it had acquired only in April 2023.[42]

Somalia

The Somali Federal Government reclaimed towns from al Shabaab in parts of central and southern Somalia. The Somali National Army (SNA) and Jubbaland State Forces peacefully secured three crucial towns in southwestern Somalia in early July after al Shabaab militants withdrew in advance of their arrival.[43] Somali officials said the operations were the beginning of a broader offensive to clear the road between the SFG-controlled cities Kismayo and Afmadow and disrupt al Shabaab’s supply lines and communications networks between its strongholds in the Middle Jubba region and the al Shabaab–controlled district Badhadhe.[44] The Somali Federal Government (SFG) and allied clan militias in central Somalia also retook the initiative in central Somalia’s Galgudud region in July for the first time since August 2023 and began re-clearing areas that al Shabaab captured in 2023.[45] The SFG and international partners had been setting conditions for the offensive since April through political efforts to rally clan support and intensified drone strikes on al Shabaab support zones.[46]

Figure 3. Somali Forces and al Shabaab Contest the Lower Jubba Region

 

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project.

Figure 4. Somali Forces and al Shabaab Contest Central Somalia

 

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project.

Somali forces continue to face high costs from large-scale, complex al Shabaab raids that have halted and overturned multiple SFG offensives since 2023. Al Shabaab has repeatedly shown that it can defend its havens in Somalia from government forces and international partners.[47] The group has continually withdrawn from key towns to avoid conventional engagements with Somali forces before launching large attacks involving suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) targeting the makeshift Somali bases, often overrunning them, inflicting severe casualties, and forcing Somali forces to withdraw.[48] This tactic has stymied SFG offensives against al Shabaab’s remaining havens in southern Somalia in early 2023 and central Somalia in January, April, and August 2023 and January 2024.[49]

Al Shabaab tried to disrupt the SFG’s plans in central Somalia in June with these tactics. Al Shabaab also launched a complex attack involving SVBIEDs, targeting the district capital El Dheere in central Somalia’s Galgudud region on June 8.[50] The attack commenced with SVBIEDs followed by infantry assaults targeting the two army bases in the town.[51] Al Shabaab initially overran at least one of the camps, but defending forces received reinforcements from nearby towns and air support that helped repel the attack and mop up retreating militants.[52] The SFG claimed to kill 47 militants, while al Shabaab claimed to kill 57.[53] Security forces retook the Run Nirgood area that al Shabaab had used to stage such attacks since August 2023 on June 9.[54]

Al Shabaab also conducted three complex and coordinated attacks on the makeshift SNA bases in the recently liberated towns in southwestern Somalia on July 22, 2024.[55] The al Shabaab attacks involved large numbers of fighters and up to four suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.[56] Another group of al Shabaab fighters also attacked a separate Somali base farther south to disrupt potential reinforcements.[57] Al Shabaab claimed to overrun all three bases and kill at least 71 soldiers, while Somali state and federal officials claimed to repel all three attacks and kill anywhere between 80 to 135 militants.[58] Somali forces published videos showing dead al Shabaab militants, a thwarted SVBIED, and prisoners of war.[59] Al Shabaab also posted a video showing militants overrunning one of the bases but has not provided any additional evidence.

Somali forces have demonstrated more resiliency to the al Shabaab attacks in recent months thanks to tactical adaptations. Somali forces dug a trench around one of the bases in southern Somalia that trapped at least one of the SVBIEDs.[60] Nearby reinforcements also reached the defending forces in central Somalia to help repel the attack.[61] However, al Shabaab is also adapting and specifically attempted to stop reinforcements from reaching target areas in July 22 attack in southern Somalia, increasing the risk that defending forces were overwhelmed.[62]

 

[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/turkey-niger-agree-enhance-energy-defence-cooperation-2024-07-18

[2] https://trtafrika dot com/africa/top-turkish-officials-discuss-fight-against-terrorism-during-niger-visit-18184986

[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/turkey-niger-agree-enhance-energy-defence-cooperation-2024-07-18

[4] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/turkey-niger-agree-enhance-energy-defence-cooperation-2024-07-18

[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/turkey-niger-agree-enhance-energy-defence-cooperation-2024-07-18; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-17/turkey-top-envoy-goes-to-niger-in-bid-to-secure-uranium-supplies

[6] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/turkey-sahel; https://issafrica.org/iss-today/west-africa-and-turkey-forge-new-security-relations; https://www.clingendael.org/publication/unravelling-turkish-involvement-sahel

[7] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/turkey-sahel; https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/02/niger-coup-russia-wagner-china-france-turkey-uae

[8] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/turkey-sahel; https://issafrica.org/iss-today/west-africa-and-turkey-forge-new-security-relations; https://www.clingendael.org/publication/unravelling-turkish-involvement-sahel; https://www.dailysabah dot com/business/2020/01/20/turkey-to-conduct-mineral-exploration-activities-in-niger

[9] https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/06/01/turkey-bayraktar-drones-niger; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20220524-la-turquie-livre-six-drones-bayraktar-tb2-au-niger

[10] Armed Conflict Location and Event Project Database (ACLED), available at www.acleddata.com

[11] https://apnews.com/article/mining-uranium-niger-france-junta-orano-ef4878557b0ec558c36639ed7464d7e3l; https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/07/05/le-niger-retire-le-permis-d-exploitation-d-un-important-gisement-d-uranium-au-canadien-goviex_6247153_3212.html; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1584966/economie-entreprises/apres-orano-le-niger-cible-le-canadien-goviex; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1578763/economie-entreprises/comment-le-general-tiani-contrarie-les-plans-du-francais-orano-dans-luranium

[12] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-03/russia-said-to-seek-takeover-of-france-s-uranium-assets-in-niger; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-17/turkey-top-envoy-goes-to-niger-in-bid-to-secure-uranium-supplies

[13] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-17/turkey-top-envoy-goes-to-niger-in-bid-to-secure-uranium-supplies

[14] https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-sends-syrian-mercenaries-to-niger-to-secure-strategic-interests-/7616771.html

[15] https://www.syriahr dot com/en/324012

[16] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20220524-la-turquie-livre-six-drones-bayraktar-tb2-au-niger; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjer5ewr34jo; https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-sends-syrian-mercenaries-to-niger-to-secure-strategic-interests-/7616771.html

[17] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjer5ewr34jo; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ntFZari2s0&feature=youtu.be

[18] https://t dot me/africaninitiative/2979

[19] https://www.clingendael.org/publication/unravelling-turkish-involvement-sahel; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-update-special-edition-western-failures-military-coups-and-kremlin-gains-undermine-us-geostrategic-and-counterterrorism-interests-in-the-sahel; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlins-campaign-africa

[20] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjer5ewr34jo; https://x.com/stopwagnergroup/status/1752745385943093638; https://x.com/WamapsENG/status/1754454167676957165; https://t.me/KorpusAfrica/252; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1441784/politique/ibrahim-traore-a-t-il-fait-de-mahamadou-bonkoungou-le-maillon-fort-de-sa-strategie-turque

[21] https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c99wv144j9jo

[22] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3257165/niger-cosies-new-friends-china-and-russia-just-days-after-sending-us-military-packing

[23] https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/chinas-oil-uranium-business-niger-2023-07-31; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/niger-aims-start-oil-exports-benin-pipeline-january-leader-says-2023-12-11

[24] https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/niger-china-sign-crude-oil-mou-worth-400-mln-says-niger-state-tv-2024-04-13; https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3259074/chinese-state-firm-agrees-us400m-loan-niger-junta-return-oil; https://x.com/ighazer/status/1775270770065002551

[25] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-22/niger-to-use-oil-advance-to-pay-off-600-million-regional-market-debt

[26] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigeria-secures-13-bln-funding-rail-link-niger-republic-2024-03-13; https://twitter.com/AESinfos/status/1771659573025226796

[27] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/ecowas-nigeria-and-niger-coup-sanctions-time-recalibrate; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-cuts-2023-budget-by-40-post-coup-sanctions-bite-2023-10-07; https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2024/2/19/niger-defaults-on-debt-payments-again-as-post-coup-woes-pile; https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/niger/overview; https://africacenter.org/spotlight/niger-coup-reversing-hard-earned-gains

[28] https://apnews.com/article/mining-uranium-niger-france-junta-orano-ef4878557b0ec558c36639ed7464d7e3l; https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/07/05/le-niger-retire-le-permis-d-exploitation-d-un-important-gisement-d-uranium-au-canadien-goviex_6247153_3212.html; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1584966/economie-entreprises/apres-orano-le-niger-cible-le-canadien-goviex; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1578763/economie-entreprises/comment-le-general-tiani-contrarie-les-plans-du-francais-orano-dans-luranium

[29] https://apnews.com/article/niger-benin-oil-pipeline-china-agadem-coup-01891707e30450361eeaedbb3daf7bce#; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1581454/politique/quest-ce-que-le-fpj-nouvel-ennemi-de-la-junte-au-niger; https://x.com/ighazer/status/1815133951536832700

[30] https://www.clingendael.org/publication/unravelling-turkish-involvement-sahel

[31] https://www.clingendael.org/publication/unravelling-turkish-involvement-sahel

[32] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/turkey-sahel; https://www.clingendael.org/publication/unravelling-turkish-involvement-sahel

[33] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2023/9/16/mali-niger-and-burkina-faso-establish-sahel-security-alliance

[34] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/07/06/niger-s-military-leader-states-niger-mali-burkina-irrevocably-turned-backs-on-ecowas_6676875_4.html

[35] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/junta-led-sahel-states-rule-out-return-west-african-economic-bloc-2024-07-06; https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/07/06/niger-s-military-leader-states-niger-mali-burkina-irrevocably-turned-backs-on-ecowas_6676875_4.html

[36] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1581496/politique/nos-destins-sont-lies-assimi-goita-et-ibrahim-traore-scellent-lalliance-des-etats-du-sahel

[37] https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/mali-mining; https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/burkina-faso-market-overview

[38] https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/mali-mining; https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/burkina-faso-market-overview

[39] https://twitter.com/AESinfos/status/1774454160919847047j; https://twitter.com/sputnik_afrique/status/1774730443373314543; https://x.com/SahelLeaks/status/1813370963355906397

[40] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/11/18/burkina-faso-is-strengthening-its-alliance-with-russia_6266977_124.html ; https://tass dot com/economy/1820753

[41] https://www.maliweb dot net/economie/mines-dor-societes/mali-secteur-des-mines-les-perspectives-sont-tres-bonnes-3053369.html; https://www.mining.com/kodal-minerals-remains-on-track-to-produce-lithium-at-bougouni-in-q4; https://twitter.com/AESinfos/status/1774055026899521853; https://minesactu.info/en/2023/08/23/lithium-mining-in-mali-the-government-demands-that-the-first-processing-take-place-locally; https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/projects/falea-polymetallic-project; https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/projects/falea-polymetallic-project

[42] https://www.agenzianova dot com/en/news/Burkina-Faso-the-junta-withdraws-from-the-Turkish-company-Afro-Turk-the-exploration-rights-in-the-country%27s-two-main-mines/#:~:text=After%20selling%20its%20mining%20assets,areas%20of%20these%20mining%20sites

[43] https://www.garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/somalia-govt-forces-advance-towards-al-shabaab-strongholds-in-jubaland

[44] https://www.garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/somalia-govt-forces-advance-towards-al-shabaab-strongholds-in-jubaland

[45] https://x.com/MoDSomaliya/status/1813528263203176558; https://x.com/MoDSomaliya/status/1813528263203176558; https://x.com/SONNALIVE/status/1812910360099496435

[46] https://acleddata.com/2024/05/31/somalia-situation-update-march-2024-renewed-counter-insurgency-operations-expected-as-al-shabaab-regroups; https://www.hiiraan dot com/news4/2024/May/196250/nisa_director_federal_lawmakers_start_al_shabab_meetings_in_beledweyne_town.aspx; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=451247300784682

[47] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-february-1-2024

[48] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-october-4-2023#SOM20231004; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-april-27-2023#Somalia20230427

[49] SITE Intelligence Group, “UPDATE: Shabaab Claims 110+ Casualties in Suicide Bombings, Major Offensives on Multiple Bases in Southern Somalia,” February 11, 2023, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com; SITE Intelligence Group, “Shabaab Claims 89 Killed in Major Offensive on Base of U.S.- and UAE-Trained and Backed Forces Outside Kismayo,” March 7, 2023, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com; https://www.caasimada dot net/al-shabab-launches-surprise-attack-on-somali-military-base; SITE Intelligence Group, “Shabaab Claims Over 159 Killed in Raid on Danab Special Forces Base in Galguduud,” January 20, 2023, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com; SITE Intelligence Group, “Shabaab Video Documents Aftermath of Major Operation in Budbud Inflicting 50+ Casualties,” April 24, 2023, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com; https://www.voanews.com/a/7245333.html; https://x.com/HussienM12/status/1750893221629026737?s=20; https://thesomalidigest dot com/al-shabab-seizes-caad-casualties-reported

[50] https://www.bbc.com/somali/articles/cyddgm630p3o

[51] https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1799430357470585149

[52] https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1799493023153172892 ; https://garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/somalia-el-dheer-still-in-under-sna-despite-al-shabaab-upset

[53] https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1799483743364661267 ; https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1799430357470585149

[54] https://acleddata.com/2024/06/28/fighting-deepens-around-el-fasher-in-sudan-al-shabaab-loses-territory-in-somalia-and-police-crack-down-on-tax-related-protests-in-kenya-june-2024

[55] https://www.voanews.com/a/somali-forces-kill-dozens-of-militants-following-attack-/7708431.html

[56] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/scores-killed-clashes-between-somali-forces-al-shabaab-2024-07-22

[57] https://www.garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/somali-army-records-multiple-successes-against-al-shabaab

[58] https://www.voanews.com/a/somali-forces-kill-dozens-of-militants-following-attack-/7708431.html

[59] https://x.com/huda_farhhan/status/1815469849969078545; https://x.com/dhoorebbc/status/1815368490682876003; https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1815471927999246579

[60] https://thesomalidigest dot com/jubaland-reports-major-al-shabab-loss-in-triple-attack; https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1815471927999246579

[61] https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1799493023153172892; https://garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/somalia-el-dheer-still-in-under-sna-despite-al-shabaab-upset

[62] https://www.voanews.com/a/somali-forces-kill-dozens-of-militants-following-attack-/7708431.html