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Africa File, March 27, 2025: SAF Liberates Khartoum; Burundi and Rwanda Tensions
Mar 27, 2025 - ISW Press
Africa File, March 27, 2025: SAF Liberates Khartoum; Burundi and Rwanda Tensions
Authors: Kathryn Tyson, Yale Ford, and Liam Karr
Contributors: John Reece and Nick Markiewicz
Data Cutoff: March 27, 2025, at 10 a.m.
Editor's Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War.
The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.
Key Takeaways:
- Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) fully retook central Khartoum and are clearing the last pockets of Rapid Support Forces (RSF) resistance from the greater Khartoum area, marking a major military and political victory for the SAF. Russia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and other foreign actors have sent weapons to the SAF and RSF that both sides are using in the battle for Khartoum. The RSF has intensified its efforts to defeat the SAF in western Sudan as it loses Khartoum to consolidate control over the western half of the country and enforce a de facto partition.
- Democratic Republic of the Congo. Burundi and Rwanda risk miscalculating in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which could spark a wider regional war in a most dangerous scenario, despite both countries’ efforts to deescalate and avoid a direct conflict. There is a continued risk of military escalation between Burundi and Rwanda, especially given the proximity of each country’s forces in the eastern DRC and the existential threat that each perceives from the other.
Assessments:
Sudan
The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have fully retaken central Khartoum and are clearing the last pockets of Rapid Support Forces (RSF) resistance from the greater Khartoum area, marking a major military and political victory for the SAF. The SAF captured the final RSF positions in Khartoum, including the Khartoum International Airport, on March 26.[1] SAF leader Abdel Fattah al Burhan announced the recapture of the city from the RSF from the Presidential Palace in Khartoum.[2] The SAF has encircled the remaining RSF elements in southwestern Khartoum, where hundreds of RSF fighters are retreating into White Nile state across the Jebel Awliya Bridge—the RSF’s only exit out the city.[3] The RSF also maintains positions in Omdurman, Khartoum‘s twin city on the west bank of the Nile River, where the RSF has used its positions to shell and conduct drone strikes against the SAF in the greater capital area since the beginning of the civil war.[4] The SAF has captured some terrain from the RSF in Omdurman over the past week.[5]
SAF control over Khartoum bolsters the SAF political claim to be the only legitimate ruler in Sudan. Burhan outlined plans on February 8 for a new SAF-led government to take charge after the SAF captures Khartoum, and Egyptian media reported that the SAF-backed Sudanese Transitional Council is considering three candidates to appoint as prime minister to this new government.[6] Sudan’s foreign minister has also alluded to reopening the Sudanese parliament, which has been vacant since 2019 after failed elections in 2022 and the beginning of the civil war in 2023.[7]
The capture of Khartoum is also a military victory that gives the SAF control of the eastern bank of the Nile River, which the SAF can use to prepare for future offensives against the RSF center of gravity in western Sudan. Control over the eastern bank cuts RSF supply lines to the eastern side of the Nile River. The RSF will struggle to reestablish these links and positions, as the SAF controls the key bridges on the Nile River.[8] The SAF can use these bridges to cross the Nile River and support operations in western Sudan. Khartoum also has airports and military infrastructure that are better located to support operations in western Sudan than the current SAF command and logistics hub in Port Sudan, which is over 400 miles from Khartoum on the Red Sea coast.[9]
Figure 1. Area of SAF and RSF Operations in Khartoum
Source: Kathryn Tyson; Vista Maps; Thomas van Linge.
Russia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran, and other foreign actors have sent weapons to the SAF and RSF that both sides are using in the battle for Khartoum. A US-sanctioned Russian cargo company that has previously shipped defense matériel to Africa flew from Moscow to Port Sudan—the SAF’s de facto capital since the beginning of the civil war—on March 12 and 17.[10] A weapons expert said that the RSF used a possible UAE-deployed, Chinese-made drone to destroy a grounded SAF fighter jet in the Wadi Seidna Airbase in Omdurman on March 21.[11]
Russia and the UAE have sent drones and other weapons to the SAF and RSF, respectively, since the war began. Russia initially used the preexisting relationship between the Kremlin-funded Wagner Group and the RSF to send weapons to the RSF in 2023.[12] Russia switched sides in spring 2024 and promised military aid to the SAF in exchange for the implementation of a stalled agreement for a Russian naval base on the Red Sea.[13] The UAE has backed the RSF to protect its economic and political influence in Sudan and the Red Sea through its ties with the RSF leader.[14]
Egypt, Iran, and Turkey have also separately sent weapons, including drones, to the SAF.[15] Satellite imagery shows an Egyptian-deployed, Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drone flying in eastern Khartoum in November 2024, soon after the SAF launched its offensive to retake Khartoum from the RSF in October 2024.[16] The US State Department tracked seven flights likely carrying military cargo between Iran and Sudan from December 2023 to July 2024.[17] Turkey sent at least $120 million of weapons, including Bayraktar TB2 drones, to the SAF in 2024 in exchange for considerations to copper, gold, and silver mines, as well as port access.[18]
Figure 2. External Support in Sudan’s Civil War
Source: Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson.
The RSF has intensified its efforts to defeat the SAF in western Sudan to consolidate control over the western half of the country and enforce a de facto partition. The RSF captured al Mahla—an operationally significant town approximately 110 miles (185 kilometers) north of the North Darfur capital, al Fasher—on March 20. The RSF repelled SAF-aligned Darfur Joint Forces counterattacks on March 21 and 22, but the Darfur Joint Forces are still in the area.[19] The Darfur Joint Forces are a group of Darfuri militias that allied with the SAF in November 2023.[20]
The capture of al Mahla will support the RSF efforts to defeat SAF-aligned forces throughout North Darfur, including the RSF siege of SAF-controlled al Fasher. The RSF stated on March 23 that it seeks to expel the SAF from the “northern regions,” presumably referring to North Darfur.[21] The SAF and aligned Darfur Joint Forces had reinforced al Mahla in early March and recruited additional fighters further west in North Darfur along the Sudan-Chad border.[22] The pro-SAF presence around al Mahla and other areas of North Darfur threatens RSF supply lines in western Sudan and could reinforce the SAF base in al Fasher, which the RSF has besieged since April 2024.[23] The RSF stopped the SAF’s other axis of advance toward al Fasher in February 2025, shortly after the SAF captured al Obeid—the North Kordofan state capital nearly 375 miles (607 kilometers) east of al Fasher via the B26 highway.[24]
Figure 3. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Civil War
Source: Kathryn Tyson; Thomas van Linge.
The RSF seeks to consolidate military control in Darfur to legitimize its Darfur-based parallel government and effectively partition Sudan.[25] The RSF published a video on March 26 of RSF fighters and tribal leaders ”vowing to uphold security” to civilians in al Mahla to highlight the RSF as a legitimate protection force.[26] The RSF and its allies signed a transitional constitution on March 4 for an RSF government, a month after the SAF outlined plans for a new SAF-led government in February 2025.[27] The RSF seeks to gain international support and legitimacy through the parallel government.[28]
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Burundi and Rwanda risk miscalculating in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which could spark a wider regional war in a most dangerous scenario, despite both countries’ efforts to deescalate and avoid a direct conflict. Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye made several statements warning against a Rwandan invasion of Burundi on March 24 and 25. A Congolese journalist reported on March 24 that Ndayishimiye said that Burundi would retaliate against a potential Rwandan-sponsored attack on Bujumbura—Burundi’s economic capital.[29] Ndayishimiye told the BBC in an interview released on March 25 that he believed Rwandan President Paul Kagame “has a plan to attack Burundi” based on “credible intelligence” reports.[30] Ndayishimiye has repeatedly accused Rwanda of “planning something against Burundi” since Rwandan-backed M23 rebels captured Goma—North Kivu’s provincial capital—in late January.[31]
Burundi remains highly suspect of Rwanda despite efforts between Burundi and Rwanda to deconflict their activity in the eastern DRC and decrease the risk of a wider war since February. Burundian and Rwandan defense officials have met multiple times since February to de-escalate tensions.[32] CTP previously assessed that these discussions helped avoid a potential military escalation in February after M23 rebels advanced southward along the DRC’s border with Burundi toward Uvira, which is 16 miles west of Bujumbura.[33] Ndayishimiye said on February 16 that he received assurances that Rwanda would not attack Burundi, and M23 peacefully withdrew from positions along the DRC-Burundi border over the following week, allowing Burundian army (FDNB) troops to backfill these positions.[34] The Rwandan foreign minister said on social media on March 25 that Ndayishimiye’s latest remarks to the BBC were “unfortunate” and claimed that Rwandan and Burundian defense officials are continuing to cooperate in good faith to de-escalate the conflict.[35]
Ndayishimiye’s accusations highlight the continued risk of escalation between Burundi and Rwanda, especially given the proximity of each country’s forces in the eastern DRC and the existential threat that each perceives from the other. Burundi and Rwanda have previously directly and indirectly framed each other as an existential threat. Ndayishimiye reiterated preexisting concerns in his comments to the BBC that Rwanda’s links to RED Tabara—a Burundian Tutsi rebel group—and Rwanda’s suspected efforts to undermine the Burundian government, including claims that Rwanda was involved in a 2015 coup attempt, continue to strain bilateral relations.[36] Burundi has collaborated with the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR)—a militia group in the DRC that is linked with the Rwandan genocide that the Rwandan government has labeled as a national security threat.[37] Burundi and Rwanda have used the presence of RED Tabara and the FDLR, respectively, to justify their military activities in the eastern DRC for years.
Burundian troops are actively fighting Rwandan-backed M23 rebels—and Rwandan troops supporting M23—in the eastern DRC. The United Nations reported in December 2024 that Rwanda has deployed at least 4,000 soldiers to the eastern DRC, while Reuters has reported that Rwandan troop numbers may have surged to 12,000 personnel amid the latest M23 offensive in 2025.[38] Burundi has deployed several thousand soldiers to fight alongside Congolese army forces to both counter Rwanda and M23 and contain RED Tabara since late 2021.[39] The United Nations reported in June 2024 that Rwandan military leadership directed Rwanda Defense Force troops deployed in the eastern DRC to prioritize targeting FDNB soldiers.[40] M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka demanded that Burundian troops withdraw from the eastern DRC during an interview with Rwandan media in late February.[41]
M23 advances into South Kivu have increased the proximity of Rwandan forces to Burundian troops along the DRC’s border with Burundi since February. Burundian forces on the RN5 are within roughly seven miles of M23 positions in Kamanyola—the southernmost town on the DRC-Rwanda border.[42] Direct clashes between Burundian forces and M23—as well as presumably embedded Rwandan forces—have escalated on a second front in the Uvira district highlands west of the RN5 since early March, when M23 advanced south of Bukavu to the Kaziba chiefdom.[43] The Kaziba chiefdom is a key area in central South Kivu that links to highlands further southeast that can be used to attack the flank of Burundian positions defending Uvira along the RN5 or circumvent the positions en route to Uvira altogether.[44] Forested paths also connect the chiefdom to RED Tabara’s areas of operation further south in the Fizi district highlands in southern South Kivu.[45] The French state media outlet Radio France Internationale reported in early February that five of Burundi’s 16 battalions deployed in the eastern DRC are stationed in the Uvira and Fizi district highlands.[46]
Figure 4. M23 and Allies Activity in South Kivu
Source: Liam Karr and Yale Ford.
[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/26/world/europe/sudan-khartoum-war-rsf-withdrawal.html; https://x.com/Sudanis0/status/1904904345851666918
[2] https://x.com/Sudanis0/status/1904933953988944002
[3] https://x.com/ahmed_albalal/status/1904511484996296958; https://x.com/Sudanis0/status/1904534699185242473; https://x.com/ahmed_albalal/status/1904480702411796822; https://x.com/moehash1/status/1904327447648063500; https://x.com/SudaneseAF/status/1904867974386704393
[4] https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250323-paramilitary-shelling-kills-3-in-omdurman-after-sudan-army-gains-medic; https://sudantribune.com/article298974/
[5] https://x.com/Sudanis0/status/1902777416835104998; https://x.com/9Vh8ORotgphjQqk/status/1902749130759258582
[6] https://www.madamasr.com/en/2025/03/13/news/u/sudan-nashra-military-encircles-rsf-in-central-khartoum-following-constitutional-amendments-caretaker-govt-in-the-making-escalating-violence-in-south-sudan-threatens-renewed-ci/
[7] https://www.memri.org/tv/sudan-fm-ali-youssef-buy-weapons-iran-ukraine-russia-naval-base; https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-sudan-agree-red-sea-naval-base-sudanese-foreign-minister-says-2025-02-12; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c30del8dz51o
[8] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/11/sudan-army-says-its-forces-enter-wad-madani-in-push-to-retake-city-from-rsf; https://sudantribune.com/article286704/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/drone-strike-targets-eastern-sudanese-base-during-visit-by-army-chief-witnesses-2024-07-31/
[9] https://www.voanews.com/a/massive-fire-as-sudanese-factions-battle-for-control-of-arms-factory/7127618.html; https://sudantribune.com/article295719/; https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5105237-sudanese-army-announces-recapture-khartoum-refinery
[10] https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/ra-76842#3982c9ae; https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/ra-76842#396fe204; https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/ra-76842#3971fd1f; https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/ra-76842#39730718
[11] https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2016/09/back-from-retirement-sudans-mig-23s.html; https://x.com/war_noir/status/1903058190826144167
[12] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/us-sanctions-companies-supplying; https://jamestown.org/program/russia-switches-sides-in-sudan-war/; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1769; https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/20/africa/wagner-sudan-russia-libya-intl/index.html
[13] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-for-the-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-in-the-horn-of-africa#Sudan; https://jamestown.org/program/russia-switches-sides-in-sudan-war/
[14] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/drones-over-sudan-foreign-powers-in-sudans-civil-war
[15] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/drones-over-sudan-foreign-powers-in-sudans-civil-war
[16] https://x.com/Dinlas3/status/1896034232675549526; https://acleddata.com/2024/10/14/turning-the-tide-the-safs-strategic-offensive-in-khartoum-and-the-rsfs-setbacks-sudan-october-2024/
[17] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/15/sudan-war-weapons-uae-iran/
[18] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/03/07/sudan-war-turkey-baykar-rsf-saf/
[19] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/rsf-captures-strategic-desert-city; https://x.com/Thug_life9_9/status/1902761517533057345; https://sudantribune.net/article298923/; https://x.com/Jsamfdarfur/status/1903392608245747855; https://x.com/Jsamfdarfur/status/1903138297301336405; https://t.me/RSFSudan/7523
[20] https://sudantribune.com/article279446/
[21] https://t.me/RSFSudan/7519
[22] https://www.darfur24 dot com/en/2025/03/02/sudanese-army-joint-forces-rsf-deploy-new-forces-in-north-darfur; https://www.darfur24 dot com/2025/02/27/%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B9
[23] https://x.com/ArkoMinawi/status/1895438545663218112; https://x.com/MmfNazar79432/status/1895348504522039742; https://sudantribune.com/article279446/; https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-army-repels-new-rsf-attack-on-famine-stricken-north-darfur-camp; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/b198-halting-catastrophic-battle-sudans-el-fasher
[24] https://sudantribune.com/article297800; https://x.com/sudan_war/status/1899051285493490131; https://x.com/sudan_war/status/1898662855827759149; https://sudantribune.com/article298366
[25] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/rsf-captures-strategic-desert-city; https://sudantribune.com/article298661/
[26] https://t.me/RSFSudan/7529
[27] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-rsf-allies-formalise-vision-parallel-government-2025-03-04/;
[28] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-february-20-2025-m23-advance-continues-unchallenged-saf-grows-partnerships-with-iran-and-russia-rsf-creates-parallel-government-in-sudan
[29] https://x.com/byobe_malenga/status/1904149150058402126
[30] https://www.bbc.com/afrique/articles/c4g716ygkpqo
[31] https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/02/01/actualite/politique/le-president-burundais-appelle-au-soutien-des-initiatives-de-larret; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250202-rdc-l-arm%C3%A9e-burundaise-un-soutien-militaire-tr%C3%A8s-important-pour-le-gouvernement-congolais; https://www.voaafrica.com/a/burundi-s-president-warns-rwanda-over-drc-conflict/7960610.html; https://www.barrons.com/news/burundi-president-warns-rwanda-against-attacking-9c80257f
[32] https://en.igihe dot com/news/article/rwanda-burundi-edge-closer-to-resolving-bilateral-tensions-says-nduhungirehe; https://x.com/SOSMediasBDI/status/1899237223809036520; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/1899584621794181359; https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2025/03/05/tshisekedi-dangles-mineral-resources-in-exchange-for-help-against-m23,110382753-eve; https://x.com/MichaelTshi/status/1897310335994134581
[33] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-march-6-2025-burundi-and-rwanda-truce-in-eastern-drc-despite-m23-advance-saf-targets-rsf-supply-lines-in-darfur-sahelian-jihadists-tap-trans-saharan-networks#DRC
[34] https://x.com/GeneralNeva/status/1891002162223661342; https://afrikarabia dot com/wordpress/le-m23-entre-a-bukavu-tshisekedi-plus-fragilise-que-jamais; https://www.barrons.com/news/burundi-troops-deploy-in-east-drc-as-uk-pauses-most-aid-6a8d306f?refsec=topics_afp-news
[35] https://x.com/onduhungirehe/status/1904504999213760819; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burundi-says-rwanda-has-plan-attack-it-rwanda-calls-calm-2025-03-25
[36] https://www.bbc.com/afrique/articles/c4g716ygkpqo; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AFN7YldNFRs; https://actualite dot cd/2025/03/13/rdc-dans-les-hauts-plateaux-duvira-lafcm23-prend-le-controle-des-villages-apres; https://actualite dot cd/index.php/2025/03/17/au-sud-kivu-les-miliciens-wazalendo-sont-de-nouveau-kaziba-et-kigarama-les-rebelles-de; ; https://x.com/byobe_malenga/status/1901871794954375568; https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf; https://africanarguments.org/2017/10/burundi-newest-biggest-rebel-group; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo/fall-drcs-goma-urgent-action-needed-avert-regional-warhttps://x.com/michombero/status/1901920706742436263; https://x.com/byobe_malenga/status/1901871794954375568; https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf; https://africanarguments.org/2017/10/burundi-newest-biggest-rebel-group; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo/fall-drcs-goma-urgent-action-needed-avert-regional-war
[37] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo/fall-drcs-goma-urgent-action-needed-avert-regional-war
[38] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf; https://www.reuters.com/graphics/CONGO-SECURITY/MAPS/movaykzaava
[39] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burundi-sends-troops-into-congo-part-east-african-force-2022-08-15; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/over-1000-burundian-soldiers-covertly-deploy-eastern-congo-internal-un-report-2023-12-30; https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-burundi-afford-to-pull-its-troops-out-of-somalia; https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/118/80/pdf/n2411880.pdf; https://cic.nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/The-Resurgence-of-the-M23-EN.pdf
[40] https://docs.un.org/en/s/2024/432
[41] https://x.com/Kivuinfo24/status/1895367644737609832
[42] https://www.barrons.com/news/burundi-troops-deploy-in-east-drc-as-uk-pauses-most-aid-6a8d306f?refsec=topics_afp-news
[43] https://actualite dot cd/2025/03/11/sud-kivu-les-rebelles-de-lafcm23-occupent-kaziba-centre-walungu; https://actualite dot cd/2025/03/10/sud-kivu-affrontements-entre-fardc-et-m23-signales-kaziba-ce-lundi; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/03/11/actualite/securite/poursuite-des-combats-entre-le-m23afc-les-fardc-et-ses-allies-walungu; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/1899175593788256408; https://actualite dot cd/2025/03/13/rdc-dans-les-hauts-plateaux-duvira-lafcm23-prend-le-controle-des-villages-apres; https://actualite dot cd/index.php/2025/03/17/au-sud-kivu-les-miliciens-wazalendo-sont-de-nouveau-kaziba-et-kigarama-les-rebelles-de; https://x.com/michombero/status/1901920706742436263; https://x.com/byobe_malenga/status/1901871794954375568
[44] https://x.com/Delphino12/status/1899430440475283819
[45] https://actualite dot cd/2025/03/11/sud-kivu-les-rebelles-de-lafcm23-occupent-kaziba-centre-walungu; https://actualite dot cd/2025/03/10/sud-kivu-affrontements-entre-fardc-et-m23-signales-kaziba-ce-lundi; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/03/11/actualite/securite/poursuite-des-combats-entre-le-m23afc-les-fardc-et-ses-allies-walungu; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/1899175593788256408; https://actualite dot cd/index.php/2025/03/17/au-sud-kivu-les-miliciens-wazalendo-sont-de-nouveau-kaziba-et-kigarama-les-rebelles-de
[46] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250207-le-burundi-envoie-des-soldats-en-renfort-pour-aider-kinshasa-dans-l-est-de-la-rdc