Iran Update, April 24, 2025

Iran Update, April 24, 2025

Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

Iran reportedly asked the United States during nuclear talks in Rome on April 19 to negotiate an interim deal, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran may calculate an interim deal would delay or prevent snapback sanctions or a strike.[1] Axios reported that Iran said it may not be possible to reach a final deal by US President Donald Trump's proposed 60-day deadline. Trump reportedly set a 60-day deadline to reach a new nuclear agreement and previously warned that ‘there will be a bombing’ if Iran does not agree to a new nuclear deal.[2] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff reportedly told Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi that he wants to focus on reaching a comprehensive deal within 60 days, but the two parties could reach an interim deal if both sides agree they need more time.[3] Axios previously reported on April 10 that Iran may propose that Iran and the United States first negotiate an “interim deal” prior to beginning negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear agreement.[4] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may calculate that an interim deal with the United States could delay or prevent the imposition of snapback sanctions by European JCPOA signatories or a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.[5] Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, China, France, Russia and Germany) reached an interim deal in 2013 that froze elements of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for temporary sanctions relief prior to further negotiations that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015.[6] Iran agreed to yield its 20 percent enriched uranium stockpile, refrain from operating any inactive centrifuges, halt the production and installation of new centrifuges, cease construction of the Arak heavy water reactor, and accept new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight measures.[7] It is unclear what concessions Iran would be willing to make for an interim deal in the current nuclear negotiations.

IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi continued to hold meetings on ongoing US-Iran nuclear talks. Grossi met with Witkoff on April 23 to discuss nuclear negotiations.[8] Grossi separately met with the Iranian, Russian, and Chinese permanent representatives to the UN on April 24 to discuss the Iranian nuclear program.[9] Iran, Russia, and China continue to present a unified position on US-Iran nuclear negotiations.

Senior Iranian military officials appear to be preparing for possible US or Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh visited two air defense sites responsible for protecting Iranian nuclear facilities on April 24.[10] Sabahi Fard and Hajizadeh visited the Khondab Air Defense Group site near the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor in Markazi Province to inspect military units and defense capabilities at the site. The two commanders also inspected the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) air defense site in Esfahan Province.[11]

Sabahi Fard previously inspected the Fordow air defense site near the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) on April 16.[12] These continued inspections likely reflect a broader Iranian effort to assess and reinforce air defense readiness around key nuclear facilities amid concerns about potential US or Israeli strikes.[13]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-US Nuclear Negotiations: Iran reportedly asked the United States during nuclear talks in Rome on April 19 to negotiate an interim deal, according to two unspecified sources with knowledge of the issue who spoke to Axios. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may calculate that an interim deal with the United States could delay or prevent the imposition of snapback sanctions by European JCPOA signatories or a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.
• Iranian Air Defense Inspections: Senior Iranian military officials appear to be preparing for possible US or Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

Imagery indicates Iran is constructing a large trimaran-type warship at the IRGC naval facility in Bandar-e Bahonar, Hormozgan Province.[14] An OSINT analyst reported the vessel is approximately 77 meters long and 24–27 meters wide, significantly larger than the IRGC Navy’s existing Shahid Soleimani-class missile corvettes.[15]

Syria

A northern Syria-based, anti-SDF source reported on April 23 that the SDF re-deployed to several of its positions in villages west of Tishreen Dam.[16] The source reported that SDF units returned to positions Mahshiyet al Sheikh, Hajj Hussein, and al Shash al Bubna, west of the dam.[17] The SDF had previously withdrawn from these positions on or before April 14, and the Syrian army’s 60th Division has deployed to the area to remove unexploded ordnance.[18] The Syrian transitional government has not yet asserted full control over Tishreen Dam, however.[19] The SDF’s handover of Tishreen Dam to the Syrian government is a critical step towards integrating the SDF into the Syrian state. Possible SDF re-deployments to former positions west of the dam may threaten the dam’s successful handover. CTP-ISW cannot corroborate the report that claims that the SDF deployed west of the dam with other sources, but new SDF deployments west of the dam would be notable given the agreement to hand over the Tishreen Dam to the transitional government.

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Nechirvan Barzani met with SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi in Erbil on April 23 to discuss SDF integration and the unification of Syrian Kurdish political parties.[20] The two leaders discussed the necessity of “unity and harmony” between Kurdish parties and forces in Syria.[21] This refers to the upcoming Kurdish unity conference on April 26, in which several Kurdish political parties will convene to present a unified Kurdish stance for future negotiations with Damascus.[22] The Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council (KNC) —two longtime rivals—will produce a united position at the conference.[23] The PYD and KNC’s rare unity follows significant pressure from Barzani’s party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), to pressure the SDF to cooperate with minority Syrian Kurdish political parties in negotiations with the Syrian government.[24] The KDP has historically aligned itself with the KNC, while the PYD dominates the SDF.

Foreign governments and international institutions continue to lift sanctions and restrictions on Syria, which will help improve the Syrian economy. The United Kingdom lifted Assad-era sanctions on the Syrian interior and defense ministries.[25] The United Kingdom also removed sanctions on former regime intelligence agencies and former regime-affiliated Syrian news outlets.[26] The Assad regime's intelligence services no longer exist.[27] The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank officials also offered support to rebuild Syrian institutions during a meeting with Syrian officials on April 23.[28] Several European countries also announced a series of sanctions relief and economic assistance programs for Syria during the 9th Brussels Donor Conference in March.[29] These announcements to lift sanctions from Syria come as the United States continues to debate offering partial sanctions relief to Syria. The United States has listed a series of conditions for the Syrian government to secure a partial sanctions relief, including the removal of foreign fighters' influence within state institutions and the cessation of Palestinian activities in Syria.[30] International aid and sanctions relief play a critical role in helping the transitional government restore Syria’s public sector. Increased support from the international community also boosts Shara’s legitimacy and international image.

Forces affiliated with the transitional government conducted a search operation in al Rayan, Homs Province, on April 24.[31] Footage circulated on Syrian media showed Syrian transitional government forces arriving in al Rayan.[32] Syrian media claimed that the forces in al Rayan were the Zubair bin al Awan Brigade, which the transitional government had reflagged as General Security Service forces.[33] Social media videos showed a uniformed fighter pointing his weapon at the cameraman in a manner that suggested the fighter was attempting to control the crowd.[34] Locals claimed that transitional government forces ”attacked” civilians who attempted to leave their homes and stole property.[35]

Search operations targeting criminals or insurgents can often appear random to local civilians, regardless of whether the search is conducted based on valid intelligence or not. Aggressive behavior by the security forces during these searches can increase tension between local communities and government forces, which could undermine the credibility and reliability of the transitional government over time. The government has not acknowledged this operation, and it is unclear what it was targeting.

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
• Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent

Nothing significant to report.

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 27 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on April 23.[36] CENTCOM conducted at least two airstrikes targeting Houthi facilities in Sirwah District, Marib Governorate, which is less than 50 km behind the frontlines in Marib Governorate.[37] CENTCOM also conducted at least six airstrikes targeting Houthi sites in al Tuhayta District, Hudaydah Governorate, which is approximately 50 km behind the frontlines in Hudaydah Governorate.[38] CENTCOM reportedly struck a site in a residential area in northern Sanaa City, likely targeting Houthi leadership.[39] CENTCOM has previously conducted airstrikes in residential areas to target Houthi leaders.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
• Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Nothing significant to report.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

[1] https://www.axios.com/2025/04/24/iran-us-interim-nuclear-deal

[2] https://www.mako.co dot il/news-diplomatic/2025_q2/Article-9c5624fb7461691026.htm ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-9-2025 ; https://www.axios.com/2025/03/30/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-bombing

[3] https://www.axios.com/2025/04/24/iran-us-interim-nuclear-deal

[4] https://www.axios.com/2025/04/10/iran-nuclear-deal-us-interim-agreement

[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-11-2025

[6] https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2013/11/why-the-iranian-nuclear-agreement-is-a-good-deal?lang=en ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kerry-in-geneva-raising-hopes-for-historic-nuclear-deal-with-iran/2013/11/23/53e7bfe6-5430-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html

[7] https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2013/11/why-the-iranian-nuclear-agreement-is-a-good-deal?lang=en ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kerry-in-geneva-raising-hopes-for-historic-nuclear-deal-with-iran/2013/11/23/53e7bfe6-5430-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html

[8] https://www.axios.com/2025/04/24/iran-us-interim-nuclear-deal

[9] https://x.com/Amb_Ulyanov/status/1915349689852977180

[10] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1404020402656

[11] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1404020402656

[12] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/738881

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-7-2025 ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-14-2025 ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-16-2025 ;

[14] https://www.newsweek.com/satellite-images-iran-building-new-warship-2063059

[15] https://x.com/SprinterObserve/status/1914981125027467411

[16] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1915084286585164234

[17] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1915084286585164234

[18] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1911650518092439553; https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1914733641667690810 ; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1912218465861054918

[19] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1913616747480928651 ; https://t.me/nahermedia/46838

[20] https://npasyria dot com/211345/

[21] https://npasyria dot com/211345/

[22] https://x.com/diaa_audi/status/1914600824644194307 ; https://npasyria dot com/208580/

[23] https://x.com/diaa_audi/status/1914600824644194307 ; https://npasyria dot com/208580/

[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-16-2025

[25] https://www.reuters.com/world/uk-lifts-sanctions-against-syrias-defence-ministry-intelligence-agencies-2025-04-24/ ; https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6809ea4d2a86d6dfb2b527a2/Notice_Syria_240425.pdf

[26] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6809ea4d2a86d6dfb2b527a2/Notice_Syria_240425.pdf

[27] https://www.barrons.com/news/syria-s-new-intel-chief-vows-reforms-to-end-abuses-0925783f ; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1915340957756621028

[28] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/imf-help-syria-rebuild-institutions-re-enter-world-economy-georgieva-says-2025-04-24/ ; https://www.worldbank.org/en/meetings/splash/spring ; https://x.com/ousmanedione/status/1914799124420972659

[29] https://apnews.com/article/syria-europe-donors-sanctions-aid-conference-f62ed91a11dc33fe27f05265ed8abd36

[30] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/04/17/syria-us-military-withdrawal-trump/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/us-gave-syria-list-conditions-partial-sanctions-relief-sources-say-2025-03-25/

[31] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=679617344758456 ; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1065615405621554 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=4011486902432010 ; https://x.com/meme_syr3/status/1915182107678183459

[32] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=679617344758456 ; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1065615405621554 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=4011486902432010 ; https://x.com/meme_syr3/status/1915182107678183459

[33] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=679617344758456 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=4011486902432010 ; https://x.com/meme_syr3/status/1915182107678183459

[34] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1065615405621554

[35] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=679617344758456 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=4011486902432010 ; https://x.com/meme_syr3/status/1915182107678183459

[36] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915073131061948908 ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915153052023063016 ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915164293458182211 ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915189172890988650 ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915195959484567832 ; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1915199692956160189

[37] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1915199692956160189

[38] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1915199692956160189

[39] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915195959484567832 ; https://x.com/VleckieHond/status/1915365282102628722