Iran Update, June 14, 2023

Iran Update, June 14, 2023

Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Andie Parry, Ashka Jhaveri, and Kitaneh Fitzpatrick

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched a new interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions.

1. CTP has observed several developments that indicate the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) is expanding its military capabilities and broadening its civil role in Iraq along the lines of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Iran.
2. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike on three Iranian and Syrian Arab Army (SAA) military positions in Damascus, Syria on June 13.
3. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Secretary General Ziyad al-Nakhalah in Tehran on June 14, underscoring Iran’s commitment to expanding Axis of Resistance operations in the West Bank.

Iranian Activities in Iraq

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout Iraq. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

CTP has observed several developments that indicate the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) is expanding its military capabilities and broadening its civil role in Iraq along the lines of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iran. These developments include drone production and state construction projects.[1] [2] The PMF has some support in the Iraqi government for these new roles. Iraqi President Abdul Latif Rashid’s spokesperson, for example, stated on June 14 for the PMF’s ninth anniversary that the Iraqi state should support, arm, and equip the PMF in addition to caring for martyr’s families.[3]

The PMF announced that it “reverse engineered” the Iranian-made Mohajer-6 drone in Iraq.[4] The Mohajer-6 is a multirole drone with a 200 kilometer range that can carry a multispectral surveillance package and/or guided anti-tank missiles or Ghaem glide bombs.[5] The PMF displayed an Iranian-made Mohajer-6 drone during a military parade in 2021 but did not then claim to have the resources or capabilities to produce it.[6] The PMF, like the IRGC, would need to procure foreign parts to produce the Mohajer-6, as Iranian drones are comprised partly of Western-made components.[7]

Iraqi PMF Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh released a statement announcing that the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)-controlled Muhandis General Company will begin constructing housing for martyrs’ families.[8] The Baghdad Municipalities office announced that the city is converting 20,000 plots of agricultural land to residences.[9] The statement did not specify which construction company would develop the land. The Iraqi government previously awarded the Muhandis Company with 1.2 million acres of inarable land along the Jordanian and Saudi Arabian border and 67 million USD to plant palm trees.[10] The Muhandis Company is modeled after the IRGC’s parastatal-organization Khatam ol Anbiya Construction headquarters, an engineering and development firm that oversees large-scale civil-military construction projects and helps Iran circumvent sanctions.

The PMF also will be the recipient of foreign loans to Iraq through the country’s 2023-2025 budget. Independent Iraqi news outlet Shafaq released a copy of the Iraqi budget that shows 11 million USD in foreign loans has been allocated to the PMF.[11] Versions of the budget circulating on Iraqi media are missing appendices that would clarify any additional budget allocations for the PMF.[12] A May 2023 draft of the budget showed that the PMF would receive an additional 457 million USD for employee salaries compared to the 2021 budget.[13] CTP will continue to monitor and report as information on the Iraqi 2023-2025 budget becomes available.

Iranian Activities in the Levant

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant and especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike on three Iranian and Syrian Arab Army (SAA) military positions in Damascus, Syria on June 13.[14] Local anti-Syrian regime media Eye of Euphrates reported the airstrike destroyed Iranian-affiliated air defense equipment, including an Iranian-made monitoring device and a 23 mm anti-aircraft gun.[15] Israel-based research center Israel Alma reported the strike targeted storage facilities for Iranian weapons.[16] Iran transfers conventional air defense weapons to Syria to bolster its military entrenchment and defensive capabilities.[17] The IRGC Quds Force maintains several command centers and weapons storage installations in the vicinity of Damascus, as CTP previously reported.[18]

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Secretary General Ziyad al-Nakhalah in Tehran on June 14, underscoring Iran’s commitment to expanding Axis of Resistance operations in the West Bank. Khamenei praised Palestinian resistance groups for their operations against Israel in the Gaza strip from May 9-13 and emphasized the importance of strengthening groups in the West Bank.[19] Khamenei last met with PIJ leadership in December 2016, during which he similarly praised Palestinian resistance efforts.[20]

The June meeting between Khamenei and Nakhalah took place following regime calls to arm groups in the West Bank and an increase in kinetic activity in the West Bank during the past year. IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami previously endorsed arming resistance groups in the West Bank to target Israel from multiple directions in an interview with the Supreme Leader’s website in August 2022.[21] The Supreme Leader’s website infrequently publishes interviews with senior Iranian officials, making Salami’s statements a noteworthy articulation of how the regime seeks to weaken Israel.[22] Iran-backed Palestinian militants recently conducted large-scale rocket attacks into Israel in early April, possibly as part of the larger pattern of escalation between Iran and Israel occurring throughout 2023. It is unclear if the June meeting between Khamenei and Nakhalah is related to the escalation in April, however.[23]