Iran Update, May 27, 2024

 

Iran Update, May 27, 2024

Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Kathryn Tyson, Kelly Campa, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Iranian journalists reported that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed his policy adviser, Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, in March 2024 to lead nuclear negotiations with the United States.[1] The publication of this information could be meant to boost the political standing of Shamkhani ahead of the Iranian presidential election in June 2024. Shamkhani assumed responsibility of negotiations from the Foreign Affairs Ministry, which had led negotiations under the Ebrahim Raisi administration. Shamkhani is a trusted adviser to Khamenei and a seasoned diplomat, who served as secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council from 2013 to 2023.[2] Shamkhani in this capacity played a prominent role in negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and Iran-Saudi Arabia rapprochement.[3] Khamenei has previously delegated responsibility for international talks to his inner circle, making it unsurprising that Khamenei has involved Shamkhani in nuclear negotiations again. The publication of this news could be meant to position Shamkhani to run for president or receive a position in the next presidential administration by framing him as a capable and trusted diplomat.

Iranian politicians are continuing to maneuver and prepare for the Iranian presidential election in June 2024. Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi announced the official start of Iranian presidential campaign season on May 26.[4] Registration for presidential candidates will open on May 30 and close on June 3. Iran will hold elections on June 28.[5]

Prominent hardliner Saeed Jalili has since announced his candidacy.[6] The Guardian Council—a regime body responsible for reviewing presidential candidates before candidates are permitted to run—previously approved Jalili’s candidacy in the 2013 and 2021 presidential elections, which suggests that the council will likely approve his candidacy in this election. Jalili withdrew from the 2021 race to back Ebrahim Raisi.[7] Jalili’s candidacy is particularly noteworthy following reports from an anti-regime outlet that some Iranian officials warned Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei against allowing Jalili to run. These officials included moderates like Ali Larijani and several hardliners such as Expediency Discernment Council Chairman Sadegh Amoli Larijani, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and adviser to the supreme leader Rear Adm. Ali Shamkhani.[8]

Jalili currently serves as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative to the SNSC and previously served as the SNSC secretary from 2007 to 2013.[9] Jalili also holds roles within Iran’s Expediency Discernment Council (EDC)—a board that advises Khamenei on policy decisions and mediates conflicts between Parliament and the Guardian Council—and a foreign relations council that advises Khamenei.[10] Jalili’s prominence within the regime suggests that he continues to hold Khamenei's trust. Jalili has criticized the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for abandoning “a hundred (of Iran’s) inalienable rights.” He has made similar remarks about subsequent nuclear negotiations, making such negotiations less likely under a potential Jalili administration.[11]

Other rumored presidential candidates include:

• Mehrdad Barzpash:[12] Roads and Urban Development Minister in the hardline Raisi administration. Barzpash previously served as a parliamentarian from 2012 to 2016 and was the CEO of well-known Iranian automakers SAIPA and Pars Khodrow.[13]
• Parviz Fattah:[14] Head of the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO), a parastatal organization directly controlled by the supreme leader. Fattah’s role within the EIKO underscores his loyalty to Khamenei. Loyalty to Khamenei is a critical metric of whether a presidential candidate is permitted to run.[15]
• Ali Larijani:[16] Prominent moderate politician and current EDC member. Larijani formerly served as parliament speaker from 2008 to 2020 and was SNSC Secretary from 2005 to 2007.[17] Khamenei has increasingly marginalized Larijani since 2019 and the Guardian Council notably denied his presidential candidacy in 2021.[18] A freelance journalist claimed on May 26 that Khamenei greenlit Larijani’s candidacy in the upcoming elections and that Larijani‘s team is “assessing the situation.”[19]Approval of Larijani would be noteworthy and may indicate that Khamenei is attempting to make Iranian presidential elections appear politically diverse.
• Mohammad Mokhber:[20] Interim President and hardline member of Raisi’s cabinet. Mokhber formerly served as the EIKO and Mostazafan Foundation head, a separate regime business conglomerate that contributes to regime self-enrichment.
• Ali Reza Zakani:[21] Tehran Mayor and hardline politician. Zakani previously ran in the 2021 presidential elections before withdrawing to support Ebrahim Raisi.[22] The Guardian Council denied Zakani’s candidacy in the 2013 and 2017 election cycles.[23]

Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, are reportedly considering resuming attacks targeting US forces.[24] A Lebanese outlet close to Hezbollah reported on May 25 that unspecified sources close to the Iraqi militias said that the militias have “begun reconsidering their agreement with the [Iraqi federal] government to halt their military operations against US military bases.”[25] The sources said that the militias were considering resuming attacks because the militias believe that the Iraqi government is “procrastinating” a decision to remove US forces from Iraq. Senior Iraqi militia leaders met with IRGC Quds Force Commander Brig. Gen. Esmail Ghaani, IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami, and other Axis of Resistance (AoR) leaders in Tehran on May 23 on the sidelines of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s funeral.[26] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harkat Hezbollah al Nujaba’s spokesperson said that the AoR factions at the meeting discussed “collective resolve” to maintain pressure on Israel.[27] The spokesperson highlighted that the meeting on May 23 was part of the Joint Operations Room that Iran founded in summer 2023 to counter the United States and Israel.[28] Iran and its partners have used the Joint Operations to coordinate operations during the current war. It is notable that Iranian-backed groups discussed the war and their military operations two days before the Lebanese report that some Iraqi groups are considering resuming attacks against US forces.

IRGC Quds Force Commander Brig. Gen. Esmail Ghaani ordered Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, to suspend attacks targeting US forces in January 2024 after a one-way drone attack killed three US personnel in northeastern Jordan.[29] Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba “fiercely resisted” Ghaani’s order to stop attacks but ultimately complied.[30]

The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have not altered their long-standing strategic objective to remove US forces from Iraq and these militias retain the capabilities to resume attacks at any time and for any reason. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could use Israeli operations in Rafah as an excuse to resume their attack campaign targeting US forces. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—established a joint operations room and claimed its first attack targeting US forces during the Israel-Hamas war on October 18, 2023, one day after the explosion at the al Ahli hospital in the Gaza Strip.[31] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq could similarly use Israeli operations in Rafah to justify resuming attacks targeting US forces.

Iraqi officials are continuing to promote greater cooperation with Russia. Shia cleric Ammar al Hakim met with Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev on May 26 to discuss Iraqi political affairs and stability.[32] Hakim previously called for greater foreign investment in Iraq during a meeting with Kutrashev in late January 2024.[33] The Iraqi federal government granted Russian state-owned oil company Gazprom a contract to develop the Nasiriyah oil field in Dhi Qar Province in early February 2024, days after a member of Hakim’s political party became the governor of Dhi Qar Province.[34]

Iraqi Federal Supreme Court President Jassim Mohammad Abboud and Russian Constitutional Court President Valery Zorkin separately signed a memorandum of understanding in St. Petersburg, Russia, on May 27 to increase judicial cooperation.[35] Iraqi Federal Integrity Commission Chairman Haider Hanoun, who is affiliated with the Badr Organization, and Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov previously signed a memorandum of understanding for anti-corruption coordination and training in February 2024.[36] The Iraqi Federal Integrity Commission is the judicial body responsible for investigating corruption cases and drafting appropriate legislation. CTP-ISW assessed that the Federal Integrity Commission weaponized corruption legislation under Hanoun’s chairmanship to bar candidates from running for office in the Iraqi provincial elections in December 2023.[37]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck and killed two Hamas West Bank senior officials in Tel al Sultan, Rafah on May 26.[38] The strike targeted the Hamas West Bank chief of staff Yassin Rabia and his deputy Khaled Najjar.[39] The IDF said that the Hamas headquarters was “responsible for directing, financing and supporting” militia attacks in the West Bank.[40] Rabia managed all Hamas West Bank militias, directed attacks, and financed operations.[41] Najjar similarly directed small arms attacks against Israeli targets in the West Bank.[42] Both men conducted attacks that killed Israeli soldiers in the early 2000s.[43]

The Tel al Sultan strike caused a fire that also killed 35 Palestinian civilians, according to Palestinian health and civil emergency service officials.[44] An independent IDF body is conducting a review of the strike, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the strike a “tragic mishap.”[45] The IDF acknowledged that the strike caused a fire and injured “a number of non-involved people” but noted that the attack complied with international law.[46] The IDF also said that it had called for Palestinians to evacuate the strike area and that it had not struck inside of the al Mawasi humanitarian zone.[47] The IDF Arabic spokesperson said on May 22 that the “humanitarian services zone” extended to the numbered block where the strike occurred, however.[48] Hamas claimed that the IDF had declared the strike location “a safe area.”[49]

The IDF 98th Division assesses that it is fighting three Hamas battalions in Jabalia camp, which is an indicator of Hamas reconstitution in the northern Gaza Strip.[50] IDF officials previously anticipated that Israeli forces would have to defeat a single Hamas battalion in previously uncleared areas of Jabalia camp, according to Israeli media.[51] The IDF realized as it began operating in Jabalia in mid-May that two additional Hamas battalions had reconstituted and would participate in the defense of Jabalia.[52] The IDF assessed two weeks into the current Jabalia operation that it has dismantled one of three Hamas battalions. Israeli War Cabinet members have said repeatedly that the IDF has “dismantled” all 12 Hamas Battalions in Gaza City and the northern Gaza Strip.[53]

The requirement to re-“dismantle” some Hamas battalions underscores the requirement for a sustainable political and military end state in the Gaza Strip that results in the defeat of Hamas’ military and political wings. The IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi said in mid-May that current Israeli re-clearing operations are a “Sisyphean task” unless the political echelon established a political end state.[54] CTP-ISW has reported extensively on how Hamas and other Palestinian militias have exploited the withdrawal of Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip to infiltrate and rebuild their networks there.[55] Hamas infiltrated and began reconstituting itself in the northern Gaza Strip after the Israeli drawdown in the strip that began in December 2023, as CTP-ISW has previously reported.[56]

Israeli and Egyptian forces exchanged small arms fire at the Rafah border crossing on May 27.[57] A spokesperson for Egypt’s military said that a “shooting incident” killed one Egyptian soldier.[58]Unspecified Egyptian and Israeli officials have blamed the opposing side for opening firing first.[59] CTP-ISW cannot verify what prompted the clash. Senior Egyptian and Israeli officials are conducting a joint investigation into the incident.[60] Egypt–Israel relations have been strained over the last several weeks after the IDF began clearing operations in Rafah and seized the Rafah border crossing.[61]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Elections: The Iranian supreme leader reportedly appointed his policy adviser, Rear Adm. Ali Shamkhani, in March 2024 to leader nuclear negotiations with the United States. The publication of this information now may be meant to boost Shamkhani’s political position ahead of Iran’s presidential election.
• Iranian Presidential Candidates: Prominent Iranian hardliner Saeed Jalili announced his candidacy for the Iranian presidential elections in June 2024. Iranian journalists reported that several other prominent political figures are planning to run.
• Iranian-backed Militias in Iraq: Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are reportedly considering resuming attacks on US forces days after a meeting between Iranian-backed militia leaders from throughout the region and the IRGC in Tehran.
• Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF is fighting three Hamas battalions that are defending Jabalia camp. Two of the battalions were previously “dismantled,” which underscores the requirement for a sustainable political and military end state in the Gaza Strip.
• Israeli Strike in Rafah: An IDF airstrike killed two Hamas officials in Rafah on May 26, but the strike also caused a fire that killed 35 Palestinian civilians.
• Rafah Border Crossing: Israeli and Egyptian forces exchanged small arms fire at the Rafah border crossing.
• Lebanon: A Likud minister said that Israel will conduct a military operation targeting Hezbollah to return displaced residents from northern Israeli if political efforts to stop Hezbollah attacks into northern Israel fail. This statement echoes previous Israeli statements about the possibility of operations into Lebanon.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in the “heart of Jabalia” on May 27.[62] The IDF 460th Armored Brigade seized a weapons cache in Jabalia based on intelligence from a detained Palestinian fighter.[63] The fighter had previously surrendered to the IDF and an Israeli military intelligence interrogator questioned him.[64] The IDF 460th Brigade have located and destroyed over one hundred Palestinian militia positions, including an improvised explosive device (IED) factory, fighting compounds, and tunnel shafts.[65] The IDF 7th Brigade engaged Palestinian fighters at close range and located mortars, small arms and explosives in eastern Jabalia.[66] The IDF reported that Palestinian fighters fired anti-tank guided missiles from a school in central Jabalia.[67] Several Palestinian militias targeted Israeli forces with mortar, rocket, small arms fire, and rocket-propelled grenades in Jabalia.[68]

The IDF 99th Division continued operations along the Netzarim corridor in southern Gaza City on May 27.[69] The IDF 679th Armored Brigade (Res.) has "significantly damaged” Hamas capabilities in the central Gaza Strip and the Sabra neighborhood and has “deepened [IDF] control” over the areas.[70] The IDF 679th Brigade has operated in Sabra neighborhood since mid-May to kill Palestinian fighters and destroy militia infrastructure above and below ground.[71] The Yahalom engineering unit and 679th Brigade detonated an 800-meter-long, 18-meter-deep tunnel in Sabra.[72] Israeli forces also killed several Palestinian fighters with tank fire along the Netzarim corridor.[73] The IDF Air Force also struck a rocket launcher that Palestinian militias had prepared to fire from the central strip.[74] Several Palestinian militias targeted Israeli forces along the Netzarim corridor and east of Maghazi camp with rocket and mortar fire.[75]

A Palestinian journalist reported that the IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Rafah on May 27. The IDF has not released a summary of the division’s operations in Rafah at the time of writing. A Palestinian journalist reported that Israeli armor remains active in Salam, Geneina, Tanour, Qeshta, and Brazil neighborhoods of eastern Rafah, however.[76] Palestinian militias continued to mortar Israeli forces at Salah Din border crossing on May 27.[77] Palestinian fighters also targeted Israeli forces with IEDs and rocket-propelled grenades in eastern Rafah.[78]

The IDF Air Force struck over 75 targets across the Gaza Strip over the past day, including military buildings and warehouses, rocket launch positions, observation posts, and Palestinian fighter cells.[79] The IDF Air Force struck rocket launchers in Rafah that Hamas used to fire eight rockets at central Israel on May 26.[80]

Palestinian militias have conducted two rocket attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on May 26. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DLFP), which is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, targeted an IDF site and an Israeli town near the Gaza Strip.[81]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least eight locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on May 26.[82] The al Quds Brigades fired small arms targeting three Israeli settlements near Jenin in the West Bank.[83]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least 16 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on May 26.[84]

The IDF conducted military exercises in northern Israel on May 27 to simulate a potential conflict in Lebanon.[85] The IDF 146th Division and 205th Reserve Armored Brigade participated in a training exercise for rapid deployment in challenging terrain.[86] The IDF also said that the 551st Reserve Brigade is training on the Israel-Lebanon border for operations in difficult terrain “deep in Lebanon.”[87] The IDF withdrew the 551st Brigade from the Gaza Strip in December 2023.[88]

Israeli Minister of Innovation, Science, and Technology and Likud Knesset Member Gila Gamliel said on May 27 that Israel will conduct a military operation targeting Hezbollah to return displaced residents from northern Israeli if political efforts to stop Hezbollah attacks into northern Israel fail.[89] Gamliel added that there is no date for residents to return to the north. Israeli residents protested in mid-May against the Israeli government for its failure to enable northern Israeli residents to return to their homes.[90] Hezbollah attacks have prevented the return of Israelis to northern Israel.

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Iranian officials continued to stress that Ebrahim Raisi’s death will not alter its foreign policy calculus. Interim President Mohammad Mokhber emphasized that Iran’s policy of supporting Palestinian militias will not change during a phone call with PIJ Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah on May 25.[91] Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Nasser Kanani echoed Mokhber’s statements in a weekly press conference on May 27.[92] Interim Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani separately expressed support for Raisi’s neighborhood policy on May 25 and called for expanding relations with Arab nations like Bahrain, Jordan, and Egypt.[93] Mokhber held a call with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and met with Iraqi President Abdul Latif al Rashid to discuss expanding ties on May 24 and 25^th respectively.[94]

Bagheri Kani met with Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad al Busaidi in Tehran on May 27.[95] Busaidi’s visit coincides with reports that Oman facilitated indirect talks between US and Iranian officials in mid-May. These talks reportedly centered on avoiding escalation amid regional attacks.[96]

Iran’s 12th parliament held its inaugural session on May 27.[97] Mokhber gave his first public speech as acting president in the session and praised Raisi’s time in office.[98] Parliament is the primary legislative body in the Iranian regime and it is currently controlled by hardliners, though it is a relatively weak institution in the Iranian political landscape. One of Parliament’s most important roles is selecting a parliament speaker, who will serve ex officio on other more prominent regime policymaking bodies, such as the Supreme National Security Council, Supreme Economic Coordination Council, and Supreme Cultural Revolution Council. Iran’s 12th parliament will select a speaker in the coming days.

Some Iraqi parliamentarians accused acting Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi of deliberately obstructing and delaying the election of a new parliament speaker.[99] Mandalawi—a Shia Kurd allied with the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework—has served as parliament speaker since the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court dismissed former speaker Mohammad al Halbousi in November 2023.[100] Mandalawi has remained in the position for over six months despite the fact that the parliament speaker position in Iraq is reserved for Sunnis.[101] Mandalawi adjourned two previous parliament sessions to select a new parliament speaker in January and May 2024 after no candidate attained the 165 votes required to become parliament speaker.[102] A member of the Sovereignty Alliance accused Mandalawi on May 24 of deliberately delaying the election of a new parliament speaker due to his “bias towards one party over another.”[103] The Sovereignty Alliance is headed by US-sanctioned businessman Khamis al Khanjar.[104] The Sovereignty Alliance candidate for speaker, Salem al Issawi, received 158 votes during the May 2024 speaker election, seven votes short of the 165 votes required to become parliament speaker.[105] The Shia Coordination Framework-backed candidate Mahmoud al Mashhadani came in second place with 137 votes.[106]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) intercepted a Houthi one-way attack drone over the Red Sea on May 26.[107] CENTCOM assessed that the drone was targeting merchant vessels in the area.

The Houthis claimed on May 27 five separate attacks targeting vessels in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea on unspecified dates.[108] The Houthis said that they targeted Marshall Islands-flagged tanker Largo Desert and the Panamanian-flagged container ship MSC Mechela in two separate attacks in the Indian Ocean. The Houthi movement also targeted the Liberia-flagged tanker Minerva Lisa in the Red Sea for planning to enter Israeli ports.[109] The Houthis claimed on May 27 that they conducted two attacks targeting two US Navy destroyers in the Red Sea.[110] CTP-ISW cannot verify if or when these attacks occurred.

[1] https://x.com/amirdaryoush/status/1794691702856491263 ;

https://x.com/SaraMassoumi/status/1794767590700786039

[2] https://amwaj.media/article/deep-dive-shamkhani-s-return-adds-complexity-to-iranian-nuclear-file

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-27-2023;

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/top-iranian-official-we-should-never-have-signed-obama-era-n1043971

[4] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/03/06/3093187

[5] https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-raisi-helicopter-crash-dead/32954491.html ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/03/06/3093187 ; https://www.iranintl.com/en/202405255731

[6] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202405264620

[7] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202405264620

[8] https://iranwire dot com/en/politics/129720-exclusive-iranian-conservatives-rally-against-saeed-jalilis-potential-presidency/

[9] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202405264620

[10] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/people/saeed-jalili

[11] https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3533492/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action/ ; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/saeed-jalili-the-former-nuclear-negotiator-that-rubs-diplomats-the-wrong-way/

[12] https://x.com/mojnews/status/1795111259689427042 ; https://www.iranintl.com/en/202405266214

[13] http://www.khabaronline dot ir/(X(2ghjo))/detail/204345/Politics/election ; http://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/212705 ; https://iranwire.com/en/features/67353/

[14] https://x.com/SaeedAzimi1772/status/1794623808009273711 ; https://www.iranintl.com/en/202405266214

[15] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202310296623

[16] https://x.com/SaeedAzimi1772/status/1794623792607555787

[17] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/larijani-has-the-credentials-but-not-the-charisma-to-be-irans-president/ ; https://web.archive.org/web/20071024003006/http://isna.ir/Main/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-569141

[18] https://old.iranintl.com/en/iran-in-brief/irans-larijani-demands-public-explanation-about-rejection-his-candidacy

[19] https://x.com/SaeedAzimi1772/status/1794623792607555787

[20] https://x.com/SaeedAzimi1772/status/1794623802581926218

[21] https://x.com/SaeedAzimi1772/status/1794623800056881343 ; https://www.iranintl.com/en/202405266214

[22] https://iranwire.com/en/politics/129926-zakanis-presidential-ambitions-clashed-by-legal-challenges-and-public-criticism/

[23] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/people/alireza-zakani

[24] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/Palestine/382349/%D9%8A%D8%A3%D8%B3-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%86

[25] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/Palestine/382349/%D9%8A%D8%A3%D8%B3-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%86

[26] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%81%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86

[27] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%81%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86

[28] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%81%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86

[29] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/world/middleeast/us-iran-militias.html ;

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-armed-groups-dial-down-us-attacks-request-iran-commander-2024-02-18/

[30] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/world/middleeast/us-iran-militias.html

[31] https://t.me/elamharbi/3 ;

https://t.me/Tura313/45937%C2%A0;

[32] https://x.com/Ammar_Alhakeem/status/1794686945391456643

[33] https://x.com/Ammar_Alhakeem/status/1752637815043600551

[34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-26-2024

[35] https://www.ina dot iq/209673--.html

[36] https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?Key=1108963

[37] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-14-2023

[38] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1794847181176008828 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1794834778476200117

[39] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1794847181176008828

[40] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1794847184007164119

[41] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1794847184007164119

[42] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1794847186896974173

[43] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1794847186896974173 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1794847189761671324

[44] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/more-aid-trucks-expected-roll-into-gaza-2024-05-26/

[45] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/netanyahu-claims-i-am-blocking-deal-are-lies-rafah-strike-was-tragic-mishap/; www dot idf.il/204443

[46] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1794847189761671324 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1794834778476200117

[47] www dot idf.il/204443

[48] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1793167253514473962

[49] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/51833

[50] http://news.walla.co dot il/item/3666700

[51] http://news.walla.co dot il/item/3666700

[52] http://news.walla.co dot il/item/3666700

[53] https://www.haaretz dot com/israel-news/2024-02-22/ty-article-live/rocket-sirens-sound-in-eilat-u-k-weighs-suspending-arms-exports-to-israel/0000018d-cef4-df79-a5cd-eefe9ca40000?liveBlogItemId=1329204611&utm_source=site&utm_medium=button&utm_campaign=live_blog_item#1329204611 ; https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1759247993973223588 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rEYAXFona1o&ab_channel=WQADNews8

[54] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/idf-chief-said-to-unbraid-netanyahu-for-failing-to-lay-out-post-war-plan-for-gaza/

[55] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate032524 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate031924 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-14-2024 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate030824 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate022824

[56] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-18-2024

[57] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1795082328806416862

[58] https://www.facebook.com/EgyArmySpox/posts/pfbid02Rribct35GtAi6AAvFHSVTuuyDLdWB6uDkVkDsgQxne6Xni8Guw5aYKgjZSMQhPASl?__cft__[0]=AZUJPAnENzir_S_5X8nr87-dUKFkMgRH8EaCCAgOQk5NStfB0pt_GFoEZfIiILxlBMBNSwKSY93mVxCnYCZndNlprXPwVfvCHZBVISqbhrVhqBf4CgsDs_x9CXkjZCWVu2y2gPIABkbkigAiWNWSm6-ZgdLOqrys5DvJOG7J2xzQf3Wdeqfi5wBtw1wTe6YYl0IWOfOKvTftDxt-UL840zNg&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[59] https://www.ynet dot co.il/news/article/sj30ebzea#autoplay ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/10558

[60] https://twitter.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1795098613825032560 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1795082328806416862

[61] https://twitter.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1787709665372930381

[62] www dot idf.il/204455

[63] www dot idf.il/204455

[64] www dot idf.il/204455

[65] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1794995859731476512

[66] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1794995798272356660

[67]www dot idf.il/204455

[68] https://t.me/darebmojahden/4768 ; https://t.me/darebmojahden/4769 ; https://t.me/abualiajel/235 ; https://t.me/alwya2000/6279 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2319 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2321

[69] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1794995864961716408

[70] www dot idf.il/204320

[71] www dot idf.il/204320

[72] www dot idf.il/204320

[73] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1794995864961716408

[74] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1794995864961716408

[75] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6517 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2317 ; https://t.me/mojahdeenpal/4540 ; https://t.me/mojahdeenpal/4539

[76] https://t.me/hamza20300/247618

[77] https://t.me/sarayaps/17982 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/17979

[78] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4272 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6520

[79] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1794995869114085382

[80] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1794783250910675420

[81] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4271 ; https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4272

[82] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6516; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1303; https://t.me/newpress1/77117; https://t.me/newpress1/77115; https://t.me/hamza20300/247634; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6518

[83] https://t.me/sarayajneen/1303

[84] https://t.me/mmirleb/4258; https://t.me/mmirleb/4260; https://t.me/mmirleb/4265; https://t.me/mmirleb/4269; https://t.me/mmirleb/4270; https://t.me/mmirleb/4272; https://t.me/mmirleb/4274; https://t.me/mmirleb/4276; https://twitter.com/GLZRadio/status/1795102132397314306; https://twitter.com/GLZRadio/status/1795070311970251200; https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1795140994859450389; https://t.me/mmirleb/4280; https://t.me/mmirleb/4283; https://t.me/mmirleb/4285; https://t.me/mmirleb/4287; https://t.me/mmirleb/4289

[85] www.idf dot il/204288; https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/israel-at-war/artc-israeli-military-conducts-war-exercise-to-prepare-for-northern-war

[86] www.idf dot il/204288; https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/israel-at-war/artc-israeli-military-conducts-war-exercise-to-prepare-for-northern-war

[87] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1795038118468272297

[88] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/as-2024-begins-idf-releases-5-brigades-from-gaza-but-says-fighting-likely-all-year/; https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israel-withdrawing-units-gaza-rcna131800

[89] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1795032601406701979

[90] https://twitter.com/kann_news/status/1790288362324038039; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/northern-residents-plan-to-disengage-from-israel-in-independence-day-protest/; https://www.jpost dot com/israel-hamas-war/article-800692

[91] https://president dot ir/fa/152101

[92] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/03/07/3093511

[93] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/669664

[94] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/03/04/3091882/ ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/03/05/3092595; https://president dot ir/fa/152089

[95] https://x.com/Iran_GOV/status/1795118494070997159

[96] https://www.axios.com/2024/05/17/biden-us-iran-regional-attacks

[97] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/message-content?id=56551; https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27308

[98] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/03/07/3093493

[99] https://www.middle-east-online dot com/%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%83-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AD-%D8%B3%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%AF-%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A

[100] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-4-2023

[101] https://apnews.com/article/iraq-parliament-speaker-halbousi-federal-court-4689a98ba4b52f7bee25cb8f7441756d

[102] https://www.rudaw dot net/english/middleeast/iraq/250120241 ;

https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Parliamentary-blocs-discuss-postponing-session-after-failed-speaker-election-seek-Supreme-Court-guidance ;

https://www.voanews.com/a/iraq-parliament-fails-to-elect-speaker-job-empty-since-november-/7617737.html

[103] https://www.middle-east-online dot com/%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%83-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AD-%D8%B3%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%AF-%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A

[104] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm847

[105] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-18-2024

[106] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-18-2024

[107] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1794796705549807921

[108] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1795134199059324977/photo/2

[109] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1795134199059324977/photo/2

[110] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1795134199059324977/photo/2