Iran Update, May 8, 2024

May 8, 2024 - ISW Press

Iran Update, May 8, 2024

Andie Parry, Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Kathryn Tyson, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Hamas’ leaders have very likely calculated that Hamas will survive a Rafah operation and that Hamas should therefore pursue its maximalist ceasefire demands without major concessions. Hamas’ maximalist ceasefire demands appear to have solidified as the IDF drew down its forces in the Gaza Strip beginning in late December 2023.[1] The drawdown indicated to Hamas that the group was winning by forcing the IDF from the Strip. Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar indicated to senior Hamas officials in February 2024 that the Hamas was “doing fine” and were “ready for...Rafah.”[2] Sinwar did not fear a Rafah operation because the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the northern Gaza Strip meant Hamas‘ remaining forces in the north would survive. Sinwar’s position almost certainly solidified in April after the remainder of IDF units withdrew from Khan Younis, permanently leaving only one brigade south of Gaza City in the Netzarim Corridor.[3] The withdrawal from Khan Younis will enable Hamas fighters to flee north as the Israeli operation begins.

Hamas introduced a ceasefire counterproposal on May 6 with two key changes that Israel had not accepted. The Hamas-proposed ceasefire includes two key stipulations that would satisfy Hamas’ maximalist demands: an end to the Israeli “blockade” and a permanent end to the war.[4] These conditions were not in the purported original text that Israel helped Egypt craft on April 26.[5] Hamas “accepted” the deal with the new stipulations after meeting with mediators in a series of meetings from May 3 to May 5.[6] Sinwar weighed in on the proposed deal on May 3 to raise several desired edits according to Arab mediators speaking to the Wall Street Journal.[7] A senior Hamas official spoke negatively about the proposal on May 2 before Hamas added the stipulations.[8] Israeli officials were not part of these early May meetings and only received the edited text an hour after Hamas “agreed” to the deal.[9] US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller characterized Hamas’ May 6 response as ”a counterproposal” that contained amendments to the original framework on May 7.[10]

The additional demands that Hamas introduced in the May 6 ceasefire counterproposal secure both Hamas’ survival and its ability to reconstitute by limiting Israel’s ability to disrupt supplies bound for Hamas. Hamas could use the end of an aid inspections regime to smuggle in new weapons and supplies to repair the parts of the tunnel system destroyed during the war.[11] A “permanent” truce would provide Hamas the time and space to reconstitute itself militarily and reassert its political authority in the Gaza Strip.[12] Hamas would break a ceasefire of any length at a time and for reasons of its own choosing because it desires to destroy Israel.[13] Hamas sees control of the Gaza Strip as a prerequisite to the destruction of Israel. Hamas’ survival as a military and political entity remains an unacceptable outcome to this war.

Hamas will likely survive a major Israeli operation in Rafah if a major operation occurs. Hamas infiltrated and then rebuilt itself in areas that the IDF withdrew from in December 2023 and April 2024.[14] Hamas units in these areas have conducted dozens of attacks targeting Israeli forces attempting to re-clear areas that the IDF had previously cleared.[15] Hamas and other militias have also mortared Israeli forces holding static positions in the central Gaza Strip’s Netzarim Corridor.[16] Hamas units outside of Rafah have also reportedly coordinated among themselves to conduct operations against the IDF by coordinating meetings between brigade and battalion commanders.[17] Hamas will survive a Rafah operation because it continues to operate from and control other territory in the Gaza Strip outside of Rafah.

This map displays engagements between Israeli and Palestinian ground forces across the Gaza Strip. The locations depicted are not exact.

A decapitation strategy aimed at killing Hamas’ senior leaders will not defeat or destroy Hamas. Israel may kill Yahya Sinwar during a major operation in Rafah, but his death will not achieve Israeli objectives. The United States pursued a decapitation strategy in its campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. This US strategy was not successful in destroying terrorist organizations in either country. ISIS and al Qaeda retained the ability to reconstitute themselves multiple times in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.[18] A decapitation strategy can degrade a terrorist organization, but cannot destroy one, particularly one as large, established, and well-organized as Hamas.[19]

Israel and Hamas said separately on May 8 that ceasefire negotiations are stalled after new talks in Cairo. Unspecified Israeli officials told Reuters that Israel sees no sign of a breakthrough in ceasefire talks, but that their delegation will remain in Cairo "for now.”[20] A media advisor to Hamas’ Political Bureau accused Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of “procrastinating” in ceasefire talks.[21] The Hamas official also said that the Hamas delegation left Cairo for Doha to assess the situation.

US Central Intelligence Agency Director Bill Burns discussed ceasefire and hostage negotiations with Netanyahu in Israel on May 7.[22] Burns also met with Israeli Mossad Director David Barnea in Israel.[23] Burns was recently in Cairo for the latest round of ceasefire negotiations.

Key Takeaways:

Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas’ leaders have very likely calculated that Hamas will survive a Rafah operation and that Hamas should therefore pursue its maximalist ceasefire demands without major concessions. Both Hamas and Israel said on May 8 that talks are stalled.
Hamas After Rafah: Hamas will likely survive a major Israeli operation in Rafah if a major operation occurs because Hamas continues to control and operate from territory in the Gaza Strip outside of Rafah.
United States-Israel Relations: The limited Israeli operation to seize the Rafah crossing does not require a shift in US policy toward the war, according to US officials. The US Secretary of Defense confirmed that the United States paused a munitions shipment bound for Israel, however.
Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued a limited operation targeting Hamas fighters and infrastructure in eastern Rafah on May 8.
Iraq: The IDF confirmed that it intercepted an “aerial target” approaching Israel from the east after Iranian-backed militias in Iraq claimed a drone attack targeting southern Israel.
Yemen: CENTCOM reported that the Houthis conducted four attacks targeting maritime shipping on May 6 and 7.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Palestinian militias conducted four indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces along the Netzarim corridor north of the central Gaza Strip on May 8.[24] Six Palestinian militias have participated in daily indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces along the corridor since April 28.[25] Israeli forces have established forward operating bases along the Netzarim corridor to facilitate future raids into areas of the Gaza Strip.[26]

Israeli forces continued a limited operation targeting Hamas fighters and infrastructure in eastern Rafah on May 8.[27] Israeli forces advanced into eastern Rafah overnight on May 7 and seized control of the Rafah crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt.[28] The IDF 401st Brigade is at the Rafah crossing following IDF intelligence that Palestinian militias were using the crossing for military activity.[29] Israeli media reported on May 6 that the IDF chose to capture the crossing given its role in smuggling advanced weapons between the Gaza Strip and Egypt in the past.[30] Geolocated footage taken by Israeli soldiers and shared on social media shows that Israeli forces have advanced to areas northeast of the Rafah crossing.[31] The IDF Givati Brigade engaged Palestinian fighters in the area and began to destroy underground tunnel shafts.[32] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on May 7 shows flattened terrain west of Shokat al Sufi, indicating that Israeli tanks or bulldozers operated near the town. CNN reported on May 8 that satellite imagery shows Israeli forces forming possible forward operating bases near some bulldozed areas.[33]

Israeli forces engaged several Palestinian militias, including Hamas, in clashes in eastern Rafah. Palestinian fighters fired small arms, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), and mortars targeting Israeli forces as they advanced east of Rafah City.[34] The IDF said on May 8 that Israeli forces have conducted 100 airstrikes and killed 30 fighters in Rafah since they advanced into the area.[35]

US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller revised his May 7 statement on Israel’s seizure of the Rafah crossing.[36] Miller said on May 7 that that the Israeli operation to the Rafah crossing appears to be limited at this time, but that it does ”look like a prelude of a major military operation.” Miller revised his statement on May 8 saying, “we don’t know if it’s a prelude or not.”

Two US officials told Axios that the White House does not think that the Israeli operation to seize the Rafah crossing requires a shift in US policy toward the war.[37] The officials said that the Biden administration has been considering suspending weapons shipments to Israel or conditioning their use if Israel conducts a major military operation in Rafah. Two senior US officials said the Israelis made clear they wanted to capture the Rafah crossing to put pressure on Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar in the hostage talks. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu last week that a major military operation into Rafah would harm US-Israeli relations.[38]

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin confirmed that the United States has paused a shipment of “high-payload munitions” to Israel due to concerns over Israeli ground operations in Rafah.[39] Austin said at a Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee hearing that the United States is reviewing “near-term security assistance shipments in the context of unfolding events in Rafah.” An unspecified senior US official told Axios that the munitions in the shipment include 1,800 2,000-pound bombs and 1,700 500-pound bombs.[40] The official said that the Biden administration is especially focused on the preventing the use of the 2,000-pound bombs in Rafah because of the "devastating impact they could have in dense urban settings." Israeli officials have privately expressed to US officials “deep frustration” over the paused shipment, according to a source briefed on the matter speaking to CNN.[41] The officials said the decision may jeopardize the hostage deal negotiations at a critical moment.

The IDF reopened the Kerem Shalom crossing on May 8 to allow humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip.[42] The IDF closed the Kerem Shalom crossing on May 5 after a Hamas rocket attack that killed four IDF soldiers near the crossing.[43] The Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), which is the Israeli military body responsible for facilitating the flow of aid into the Gaza Strip, said on May 8 that aid trucks had arrived at Kerem Shalom for inspection.[44] The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) said on May 8 that no aid has entered the Gaza Strip from the crossing on May 8. UNRWA added that there are no workers to receive the aid due to Israel’s incursion into the area.[45] Egyptian officials told the Wall Street Journal that Egypt blocked all aid trucks in Egypt from entering the Strip by way of the Kerem Shalom crossing after Israel announced that it was reopening the crossing.[46] Egypt’s move cuts off the ability for aid trucks originating in Egypt to enter the Gaza Strip.

An Israeli Army Radio reporter said that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant approved the opening of the Kerem Shalom crossing after US pressure to do so.[47] US officials have repeatedly called for Israel to increase the flow of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip in recent weeks.[48] The reporter added that Israel assured the United States that aid flows would not be affected by the Kerem Shalom closure, but COGAT failed to implement the directive and to distribute aid.

Unspecified individuals fired small arms targeting trucks carrying Palestinian workers to the Kerem Shalom crossing on May 8.[49] The IDF said that the attack wounded several workers and that the IDF is investigating the attack.[50] The IDF emphasized that it opened the Kerem Shalom crossing to allow the entry of aid into the Gaza Strip.[51] Palestinian sources claimed that the IDF was responsible for the attack, adding that the workers helped to facilitate the entry of aid into the Strip.[52] Several Palestinian militias claimed small arms clashes targeting Israeli forces east of Rafah on May 8.[53]

The US military finished construction of an offshore pier on May 7 that will help increase the amount of aid brought into the Gaza Strip.[54] US Defense Department Deputy Press Secretary Sabrina Singh said that the pier is not yet operational due to inclement weather.[55] Singh said that the pier can facilitate the entry of 150 trucks into the Gaza Strip daily when operating at full capacity.

Palestinian fighters conducted two indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on May 8.[56] Hamas fighters fired a barrage of eight rockets targeting Israeli forces near Kerem Shalom in southern Israel.[57] This is the third attack targeting the area since May 5.[58] The IDF has said that rocket and mortar fire targeting the Kerem Shalom area is preventing the entry of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip.[59] The IDF Air Force also struck rocket launchers in Rafah that Hamas fighters used to fire rockets at an Israeli military site in Reim on May 7.[60] An Israeli military correspondent noted that Palestinian militias have repeatedly fired rockets into Israel as Israeli ground forces approached launch sites in eastern Rafah.[61]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's data cut off on May 7.[62]

Israeli forces destroyed a new Palestinian fighter group in Qalqilya on May 8.[63] A man named Alaa Nizal formed the group within the last few months. The IDF referred to the group as the Qalqilya Battalion. Nizal is not affiliated with any “terrorist organization” according to the IDF Ephraim Region Brigade’s intelligence officer. The Qalqilya Battalion received “hundreds of thousands of shekels” from an unspecified source to conduct attacks according to the intelligence officer.[64] Israeli forces targeted and killed Nizal and arrested almost 30 fighters from the Qalqilya Battalion in an operation on May 8.

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least 11 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on May 7.[65]

The IDF struck over 20 Hezbollah targets in Ramiya in southern Lebanon on May 8.[66] The IDF said that it targeted military buildings and infrastructure. Hezbollah mourned the deaths of two of its fighters on May 8 who were presumably killed in Israeli strikes.[67]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that Israeli is determined to facilitate the return of residents to northern Israel during a visit to the area on May 8.[68] Gallant said Israel has pushed Hezbollah further from the border, but that Israel is prepared to “activate” heavy firepower against Hezbollah “if there is a need.”[69]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

The Shia Coordination Framework—a coalition of Iranian-aligned Shia political parties—and allied Sunni parties are attempting to sideline the Sunni Taqqadum party’s candidate for parliament speaker. The Iraq Supreme Federal Court rejected a lawsuit on May 8 that two Iranian-backed Badr Organization members of parliament (MP) and one Kataib Hezbollah MP filed against Taqqadum MP Shalan al Karim.[70] The lawsuit claimed that Karim does not meet the prerequisites to be a MP and that the Supreme Federal Court should therefore suspend Karim from Parliament. The Federal Supreme Court said there is “nothing that would require revoking or dropping [Karim’s] membership.” Karim is the Taqqadum party’s candidate to replace interim speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi, a Shia Kurd allied with the Shia Coordination Framework.[71] Mandalawi has served as interim speaker of Parliament since November 2023 when the Federal Supreme Court removed former speaker and leader of the Taqqadum party Mohammad al Halbousi from office.[72] The Shia Coordination Framework filed a separate lawsuit against Karim in January 2024 in an attempt to sideline Karim’s candidacy for speaker in January 2023.[73]

The Siyada Alliance, al Azm Alliance, and al Watani party released a statement supporting the Shia Coordination Framework’s call to select a new Parliament speaker by May 14.[74] These three Sunni parties currently back Siyada Alliance member Salem Matar al Issawi for Speaker of Parliament.[75]

Halbousi rejected the Shia Coordination Framework’s deadline to select a new speaker.[76] Head of the Taqqadum Party Muhammad al Alawi called for parliament to reopen nominations for the speakership. Alawi said that the Taqqadum party rejects any candidate that is not from the Taqqadum party. He claimed that the other Sunni parties are attempting to marginalize 75% of Sunnis represented by the Taqqadum party.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—an umbrella organization of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed one drone attack on May 7 targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Eilat, southern Israel.[77] The IDF intercepted a ”suspicious aerial target” near Eilat that was approaching from the east.[78]

Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali discussed Russo-Iranian relations with Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian in Tehran on May 8.[79] Jalali and Abdollahian discussed Russo-Iranian transit, financial, and banking cooperation, as well as the status of the Iran-Russia comprehensive cooperation agreement. Iranian and Russian officials have repeatedly claimed in recent months that Iran and Russia have finalized this agreement.[80]

An Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry delegation attended a meeting to discuss Caspian Sea maritime boundary lines in Baku, Azerbaijan, on May 6 and 7.[81] Delegations from Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan also attended the meeting. The Caspian littoral states have long disputed maritime boundaries in the Caspian Sea, in large part due to the presence of vast oil and gas reserves in the sea.[82]

US CENTCOM reported that the Houthis conducted three drone attacks and one anti-ship ballistic missile attack in the Gulf of Aden on May 6 and May 7.[83] CENTCOM and a coalition ship intercepted two Houthi drones over the Gulf of Aden on May 6. A third Houthi drone landed in open water. CENTCOM reported that the Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile attack on May 7 did not damage any vessels.[84] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations reported on May 7 that the crew of a merchant vessel reported two explosions close to the vessel in the Gulf of Aden.[85] The Houthis have not claimed the attacks at this time of writing.

[1] https://x.com/2023gazawar/status/1769639838112706847; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-26-2024

[2] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hamas-thinks-it-could-win-gaza-war-with-israel-6254a8c6

[3] https://x.com/2023gazawar/status/1776939826496807280

[4] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2024/5/6/heres-everything-know-about-gaza-deal-hamas-agreed

[5] https://www.axios.com/2024/04/27/israel-gaza-ceasefire-humanitarian-hostage-release ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/israel-tells-egypt-its-giving-hostage-deal-last-chance-before-launching-rafah-op/ ; https://t.me/hamaswestbank/51292 ; www.al-akhbar dot com/Politics/381497/%D9%86%D8%B5-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%80-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3

[6] https://t.me/hamasps/20144 ; https://t.me/hamasps/20130 ; https://t.me/hamasps/20126 ;

[7] https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/gaza-cease-fire-talks-come-down-to-the-wire-in-cairo-7b8a5f51?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1

[8] https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-news-05-02-2024-0699ef663cba7318c375c0ee5bbf20ae; https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-799480#google_vignette

[9] https://www.axios.com/2024/05/07/us-israel-hamas-hostage-ceasefire-talks ; https://twitter.com/kann_news/status/1786734699513037053 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/israel-will-send-delegation-to-cairo-if-theres-positive-movement-on-deal-official/

[10] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/us-hamas-claimed-to-accept-ceasefire-offer-but-thats-not-what-they-did/; https://www.state.gov/?post_type=state_briefing&%3Bp=92333

[11] https://gisha dot org/UserFiles/File/LegalDocuments/procedures/merchandise/170_2_EN.pdf ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/10023

[12] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-4-2024

[13] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/من-نحن; https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-26-2024

[14] https://warontherocks.com/2024/02/hamas-is-returning-to-northern-gaza-because-israel-has-no-plan-for-the-day-after/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-10-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-16-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-22-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-30-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-18-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-4-2024

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-1-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-2-2024

[16] https://t.me/AymanGouda/6127; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1955; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1963; https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4223; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1980; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1968

[17] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/4940871-اشتباكات-عنيفة-داخل-مجمع-الشفاء-وخارجه-تعقّد-العملية

[18] https://www.voanews.com/a/us-general-islamic-state-afghan-affiliate-closer-to-attacking-western-targets/7008633.html; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/ending-the-us-presence-in-syria-could-cause-a-rapid-isis-reconstitution-and-threaten-core-us-national-security-interests; https://www.understandingwar.org/report/al-qaeda-iraq-resurgent#:~:text=Al%2DQaeda%20in%20Iraq%20is,havens%20in%20and%20around%20Baghdad.

[19] Read more about Hamas’ organization and a decapitation strategy here: https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-order-of-battle-of-hamas-izz-al-din-al-qassem-brigades

[20] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-pessimistic-gaza-truce-talks-delegation-remains-cairo-2024-05-08/

[21] https://www.alaraby dot com/news/مفاوضات-غزة-مستمرة-طاهر-النونو-لـالعربي-نتنياهو-يعرقل-الاتفاق

[22] https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news-05-08-24/h_12eea7dbe0d23847412639bb975fc6e1

[23] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-says-it-has-reopened-a-gaza-border-crossing-as-fuel-supplies-dwindle-719f5810?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1

[24] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1980; https://t.me/AymanGouda/6134; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1983; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1985

[25] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1931; https://t.me/mojahdeenpal/4470; https://t.me/sarayaps/17709; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1939; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6334; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1946; https://t.me/AymanGouda/6127; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1955; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1963; https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4223; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1980; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1968

[26] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-26-2024

[27] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1788132187499344321

[28] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1787724613595586696

[29] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1788132199054582078

[30] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1788132199054582078; https://twitter.com/GLZRadio/status/1787609888199188581

[31] https://x.com/2023gazawar/status/1788227357511213315; https://t.me/hamza20300/238306

[32] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1788132187499344321

[33] https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news-05-08-24/h_da1e90adc276922f08e774abf5abc9a2

[34] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6370; https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4226; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1984;

[35] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1788237686303584489

[36] https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news-05-07-24/h_1cbbf678a952579ea743ad81b2458204

[37] https://www.axios.com/2024/05/07/us-israel-rafah-red-line

[38] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/01/world/middleeast/blinken-netanyahu-israel-gaza.html; https://www.axios.com/2024/05/07/us-israel-rafah-red-line

[39] https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news-05-08-24/h_c8458bad4ac579658272db24ed470abd

[40] https://www.axios.com/2024/05/08/us-israel-bombs-shipment-gaza-pause

[41] https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news-05-08-24/h_0975be8f8ec64c259655aaa59bd91261

[42] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-hamas-war-kerem-shalom-crossing-rafah-crossing-gaza-negotiations/

[43] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-799923

[44] https://twitter.com/cogatonline/status/1788091840870117709

[45] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/05/08/israel-hamas-war-news-05-08-2024/d3e28a9a-0d03-11ef-ae0a-a6870885518d_story.html; https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4651014-israel-gaza-border-crossing-reopened-un-aid-still-stuck/

[46] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-says-it-has-reopened-a-gaza-border-crossing-as-fuel-supplies-dwindle-719f5810?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1

[47] https://twitter.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1788093349712249000

[48] https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3731827/austin-calls-for-rapid-increase-of-aid-into-gaza-through-all-crossings/; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2024/03/07/background-press-call-on-humanitarian-aid-for-gaza-ahead-of-the-state-of-the-union/; https://thehill.com/policy/international/4628754-blinken-israel-humanitarian-aid-gaza/

[49] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1788187472775504240

[50] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1788187472775504240; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1788187479914238356

[51] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1788187479914238356

[52] https://t.me/hamza20300/238239; https://twitter.com/ytirawi/status/1788188814432702708

[53] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1981; https://t.me/sarayaps/17730; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6369; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6370; https://t.me/AymanGouda/6135; https://t.me/sarayaps/17734

[54] https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3768093/floating-piers-cargo-ship-with-aid-for-gaza-face-weather-delays/; https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news-05-07-24/h_fc9835b410d51c7b774defd7a067af8c

[55] https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3768093/floating-piers-cargo-ship-with-aid-for-gaza-face-weather-delays/

[56] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1982; https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4225

[57] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1982

[58] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1973; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1954

[59] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1787940223734677759

[60] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1787940220920328506; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1978

[61] https://twitter.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1787873156172075119

[62] https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/3136 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6365 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6367 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6368

[63] https://www.idf dot il/%D7%90%D7%AA%D7%A8%D7%99-%D7%99%D7%97%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%94/%D7%9B%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%99%D7%99%D7%96%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%92%D7%93%D7%95%D7%93-%D7%A7%D7%9C%D7%A7%D7%99%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%90%D7%A8%D7%92%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%98%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%97%D7%93%D7%A9-%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%9C-%D7%9E%D7%97%D7%91%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%90%D7%99%D7%95%D7%A9-%D7%99%D7%94%D7%95%D7%93%D7%94-%D7%95%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%92%D7%95%D7%A2%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%97%D7%98%D7%9E%D7%A8-%D7%90%D7%A4%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%A4%D7%A7%D7%9E%D7%96-%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%95%D7%93-%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%9B%D7%96/

[64] https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/article-800391

[65] https://t.me/mmirleb/3711; https://t.me/mmirleb/3713; https://t.me/mmirleb/3715; https://t.me/mmirleb/3717; https://t.me/mmirleb/3719; https://t.me/mmirleb/3721; https://t.me/mmirleb/3723; https://t.me/mmirleb/3725; https://t.me/mmirleb/3727; https://t.me/mmirleb/3729; https://t.me/mmirleb/3731

[66] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1788181767699984584

[67] https://t.me/mmirleb/3734; https://t.me/mmirleb/3733

[68] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1788206428211052772; https://twitter.com/GLZRadio/status/1788204799395033178

[69] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1788206428211052772

[70] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%B6%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%A8-%D8%B4%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%85

[71] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/asaib-ahl-al-haq-and-badr-fall-out-over-controlling-new-parliamentary-speaker

[72] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/top-iraq-court-ends-parliament-speaker-halbousis-term-state-media-2023-11-14/

[73] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-15-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-28-2024

[74] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/ثلاثة-تحالفات-س-نية-تدعو-لل-سراع-في-عقد-جلسة-انتخاب-ر-يس-البرلمان-تعطيلها-يهدد-الديمقراطية

[75] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B1-%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%85%D8%AB%D9%84-75-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82

[76] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B1-%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%85%D8%AB%D9%84-75-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82

[77] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1090

[78] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1787949851012894994

[79] https://mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/744752

[80]

https://www.irna dot ir/news/85328317 ;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/12/29/3057257/

[81] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/214861/Baku-hosts-7th-meeting-of-High-Level-Working-Group-on-Caspian

[82] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-45162282

[83] https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3768218/may-7-centcom-update/

[84] https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3768218/may-7-centcom-update/

[85] https://twitter.com/UK_MTO/status/1787713610799603923