Iran Update, October 11, 2024

 

Iran Update, October 11, 2024

Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Alexandra Braverman, Buckley DeJardin, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

The IDF 91st Division has seized terrain in an unspecified area of southern Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah direct fire attacks into Israel, supporting the stated Israeli war aim of returning Israeli civilians to the north.[1] An Israeli military correspondent reported that Israeli forces seized territory along ridges and hills just inside of Lebanon within a few days of the ground operation starting on October 1.[2] The military correspondent reported on October 10 that Israeli forces were continuing to clear Hezbollah military infrastructure from rural areas. Hezbollah fighters have previously used rural territory along the Israeli border to fire direct-fire weapons, such as anti-tank guided missiles and anti-tank guns, targeting Israeli forces and civilians.[3] Preventing Hezbollah from using these areas for its direct-fire weapons does not mean that Israel has achieved its objective of returning Israeli civilians to their homes in the north because Hezbollah can still fire longer-range indirect weapons, such as rockets and mortars.[4] These operations do, however, disrupt Hezbollah’s ability to use some of its weapons systems to target Israeli border towns.[5]

Israeli forces also appear to have at least partially secured some villages in southern Lebanon given the presence of Israeli journalists and unarmored engineering vehicles. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) guided Israeli journalists through towns in southern Lebanon on October 10 to report on the status of Israeli operations in the area.[6] Securing a village would require Israeli forces to prevent Hezbollah from using direct or observed indirect fire weapons against it.[7] A commander usually only secures an area for a time-limited period. The presence of these journalists and unarmored vehicles suggests some villages are at least partially secured given that the IDF would presumably employ armored engineering vehicles, as it has in the Gaza Strip, and would not allow civilian journalists access during major operations.[8] The IDF would need to meet these conditions prior to allowing Israeli civilians to visit Lebanese towns.

It is unclear why Hezbollah is not conducting meaningful defensive operations in response to Israel’s ground operations. CTP-ISW noted on October 10 that Hezbollah fighters do not appear to be defending against Israeli forces in these villages, as the Israeli forces have consistently encountered weapons caches and infrastructure formerly used by Hezbollah fighters that ”left the area.”[9] Israeli forces have also observed that Hezbollah fighters have preferred to engage Israeli forces from a distance or have fled outright during the IDF’s ground campaign in southern Lebanon.[10] CTP-ISW assessed that the Israeli air campaign into Lebanon has likely severely disrupted the strategic- and operational-level military leadership in Hezbollah and impeded Hezbollah‘s ability to conduct and sustain coherent military campaigns at least in the short term.[11] Even isolated tactical units should be capable of fighting effectively on their own for some time, however. Hezbollah could have made a deliberate choice to intentionally hold back its fighters, given that tactical elements would likely defend against Israeli forces absent direction from above.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened to start an “energy war” on October 10, which is likely part of an Iranian-led effort to compel the United States to pressure Israel into a less-costly retaliatory strike. The Iranian foreign minister reportedly threatened senior Saudi officials that the Axis of Resistance would attack Saudi energy assets if Saudi Arabia were to support an Israeli attack on Iran.[12] Reuters reported on October 10 that Gulf countries are pushing the United States to prevent Israel from attacking Iranian energy assets or infrastructure because they fear that such an attack could trigger Iranian-backed attacks on them.[13] This reporting suggests that Iran and its proxies are attempting to exert pressure on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, which Iran could calculate would then cause the US Gulf Arab allies to encourage US efforts to pressure Israel to conduct a less-costly strike on Iran.[14] Kataib Hezbollah spokesman Abu Ali al Askari released a statement on October 10, threatening to start an energy war with the aid of Iran in the Strait of Hormuz and the Houthis in the Bab al Mandab.[15] Askari’s statement characterized Arab and Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, as “evil regimes” for their support of Israel.[16] Askari also threatened to target US forces in Iraq and the region if Iraq is attacked or if Iraqi airspace is used to attack Iran, likely to pressure the United States to deter Israel from attacking Iran.[17] These threats support Iran’s efforts to deter a more costly Israeli strike on Iran.

Iran and Russia are continuing to deepen bilateral relations. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Russian President Vladimir Putin for the first time in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, on October 11.[18] Pezeshkian expressed hope that Iran and Russia will sign the comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement during Pezeshkian’s upcoming trip to attend the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, from October 22-24.[19] This is a 20-year cooperation agreement between Iran and Russia that will replace previous cooperation agreements, but the exact specifics of the agreement are not publicly available.[20] Putin and Pezeshkian both said that Russia and Iran frequently share positions and coordinate regarding international events.[21] Putin approved the signing of a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with Iran on September 19.[22] Pezeshkian stated that he asked Putin to act "more effectively” in response to Israeli operations in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip.[23] Putin said that he was satisfied with the volume of trade between Iran and Russia.[24] Russian media reported that Pezeshkian accepted Putin’s invitation for an official visit to Russia at an unspecified time in the future.[25]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately met with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedow in Turkmenistan on October 11.[26] Pezeshkian expressed readiness to increase cooperation with Uzbekistan in scientific, industrial, and cultural fields.[27] Pezeshkian stated that Iran and Turkmenistan made agreements in the industries of gas and electricity that will be finalized in an upcoming joint economic cooperation commission in Tehran.[28]

The Israeli security cabinet convened on October 10 but did not vote on how to respond to the Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1.[29] An unspecified Israeli official told Israeli media that the cabinet did not make any “big decisions.” An unspecified Israeli security official stated that the cabinet seeks to postpone the vote to decrease the length of time between approval and execution of the Israeli retaliation.[30] Three US and Israeli officials separately told Axios that US President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “moved closer to an understanding” on the scope of Israel’s response to the Iranian ballistic missile attack during a phone call on October 9.[31]

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The IDF 91st Division has seized terrain in an unspecified area of southern Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah direct fire attacks into Israel, supporting the stated Israeli war aim of returning Israeli civilians to the north. It is unclear why Hezbollah is not conducting meaningful defensive operations in response to Israel’s ground operations.
• Iran and Iranian-backed Militias: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened to start an “energy war” on October 10, which is likely part of an Iranian-led effort to compel the United States to pressure Israel into a less-costly retaliatory strike. Current reporting suggests that Iran and its proxies are attempting to exert pressure on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, which Iran could calculate would then cause the US Gulf Arab allies to encourage US efforts to pressure Israel to conduct a less-costly strike on Iran.
• Iran-Russia Relations: Iran and Russia are continuing to deepen bilateral relations. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Russian President Vladimir Putin for the first time in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, on October 11.
• Israeli Strike on Iran: The Israeli security cabinet convened on October 10 but did not vote on how to respond to the Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF expanded its clearing operations around Jabalia on October 11. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on October 11 indicates that Israeli forces operated east and west of the Jabalia refugee camp. The IDF’s expanded clearing operation around the refugee camp on October 11 comes after the IDF 401st Armored Brigade (162nd Division) “completely encircled” Jabaliya on October 10.[32]

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, National Resistance Brigades, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Popular Resistance Committee launched mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces in Jabalia.[33] The Palestinian Mujahideen Brigades detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting an IDF tank in Jabalia refugee camp.[34] Hamas fired RPGs and detonated an IED targeting an IDF armored personnel carrier in Beit Lahia, which is north of Jabalia.[35]

The IDF reported on October 11 that the IDF 252nd Division raided a Hamas site in a pre-war school in Bureij in the central Gaza Strip.[36] The IDF killed several Hamas fighters during the raid and said that the fighters used the school compound to conduct attacks targeting Israeli forces operating in the area. The IDF stated that it destroyed Hamas observation posts, sniper positions, and weapons warehouses during the raid.[37]

PIJ and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine conducted a mortar attack targeting an IDF headquarters along the Netzarim Corridor on October 11.[38]

The IDF reported that Palestinian fighters killed a soldier in the IDF 401st Armored Brigade in the southern Gaza Strip on October 11.[39]

The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades conducted a rocket attack targeting Sderot in southern Israel on October 11.[40] The IDF intercepted the rocket fired from the northern Gaza Strip.[41]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

The IDF conducted airstrikes that killed two PIJ commanders in Tulkarm, West Bank, on October 10.[42] The two commanders were PIJ Tulkarm Battalion Commander Mohammad Iyad and Nour Shams refugee camp Battalion commander Muhammad Abdallah.[43] The IDF stated that Abdullah had succeeded the former PIJ commander in Nour Shams, who the IDF killed in August 2024.[44] The IDF reported that Abdullah was responsible for conducting several IED attacks targeting Israeli forces in Tulkarm.[45] The IDF ground forces also located a vehicle belonging to the fighters and captured two M16 rifles.[46]

The IDF reported on October 11 that Israeli forces operated in several locations across the West Bank in the past week and detained more than 70 wanted persons.[47] The IDF engaged Palestinian fighters in Aqaba and killed one of them.[48] The IDF also located and destroyed 6 IEDs in Beit Anan.[49] The IDF confiscated several firearms during the raids, including two M16 rifles.[50]

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least one location in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 10.[51] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms and detonated IEDs targeting Israeli forces operating in Faraa refugee camp, which is near Tubas.[52] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades separately detonated an IED targeting an IDF checkpoint in Qalandiya, north of Jerusalem.[53] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades also fired small arms targeting the settlement of Avnei Hefetz in the northern West Bank on October 11.[54]

Northern Israel and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

The IDF 91st Division continued clearing operations in several unspecified villages in southeastern Lebanon on October 11. The 91st Division directed an airstrike targeting the commander of the Radwan Force’s anti-tank unit in Mays al Jabal, Harib al Shajaa.[55] Shajaa directed anti-tank fire attacks on targets primarily around Ramot Naftali, Israel. Hezbollah claimed one rocket attack targeting Israeli forces on the outskirts of Blida.[56] Hezbollah-affiliated media claimed that Israeli forces do not control the town of Blida and are only positioned to sever its connection to Mhaibib.[57] Hezbollah claimed a separate rocket attack targeting Israeli forces around Yaroun.[58]

The IDF 146th Division continued clearing operations in southwest Lebanon on October 11. The 228th Infantry Brigade (Res.) (146th Division) directed an airstrike targeting Hezbollah fighters operating in a building in an unspecified area within the brigade’s area of operations in southern Lebanon.[59] The IDF observed secondary explosions following the strike, suggesting a weapons cache was present in the building. The IDF reported that the 205th Armored Brigade (Res.) (146th Division) has destroyed underground Hezbollah tunnels, “dozens” of militia infrastructure targets, and destroyed “many” weapons caches along the Israel-Lebanon border since October 7.[60]

UNIFIL reported that there were unspecified explosions at its headquarters in Naqoura, southwest Lebanon, for the second time in the past two days.[61] UNIFIL stated that two peacekeepers were injured by explosions that occurred near a UNIFIL watchtower. UNIFIL did not identify any actor responsible for the explosions. The organization said that an Israeli bulldozer struck and destroyed a portion of the UNIFIL headquarters border wall as Israeli tanks moved near the site.[62] UNIFIL previously reported that Israeli forces fired on two UNIFIL positions in southwestern Lebanon and injured two UN peacekeepers on October 10.[63]

Hezbollah has conducted at least 14 rocket and drone attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's data cut off on October 10.[64] Hezbollah conducted one rocket and one drone attack targeting Israeli military targets in Haifa.[65] The IDF reported that Hezbollah launched at least 150 rockets into Israel since CTP-ISW's data cut off on October 10.[66]

Israeli forces have continued their air campaign across Lebanon to degrade Hezbollah's military capabilities since CTP-ISW's data cut off on October 10. The IDF struck at least 115 Hezbollah targets, primarily in southern Lebanon.[67]

This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on October 10 to 2:00pm ET on October 11. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed two attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW’s last cutoff on October 10.[68] The claims include the following:

• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in the Golan Heights.[69]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Eilat.[70]

The IDF Air Force intercepted two drones “from the East” that did not cross into Israeli territory.[71] The IDF separately intercepted a drone west of Lachish in central Israel.[72] No actor has claimed the attack on Lachish as of this writing.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi sent separate letters to unspecified counterparts and international organizations urging collective diplomatic efforts to end Israeli operations in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip on October 10.[73] Araghchi called on the recipients of the letters to secure a ceasefire and increase humanitarian assistance in both Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. Araghchi separately sent letters to the UN High Commission for Refugees Filippo Grandi and President of the International Committee of the Red Cross Mirjana Spoljaric Egger expressing the need to increase humanitarian assistance and support to refugees. Araghchi also sent a letter to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Secretary General Hissein Brahim Taha reiterating the need for an “urgent meeting” of OIC leaders to find “practical solutions” for the people of Gaza and Lebanon.

 

[1] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1844411991072571501

[2] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1844411991072571501 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-1-2024

[3] https://apnews.com/article/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-evacuees-gaza-war-1841834d89af938a8445821567640aea#:~:text=Among%20approximately%2060%2C000%20Israelis%20evacuated,Lebanon%20have%20also%20been%20displaced.

[4] https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/1835890307763757535

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-30-2024

[6] www dot jpost.com/israel-news/article-824138 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/15342; www dot timesofisrael.com/finally-on-the-offensive-idfs-91st-division-slices-through-hezbollahs-front-lines

[7] https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm3-90.pdf

[8] https://armyrecognition.com/focus-analysis-conflicts/army/conflicts-in-the-world/hamas-israel-war-2023/israeli-army-uses-puma-armored-vehicles-with-carpet-mine-clearing-system-to-destroy-hamas-tunnels

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-10-2024

[10] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15318 ; https://x.com/israelradar_com/status/1842559548646670685?s=46&t=TMbDQtRFur-HDVAEVR7Byg

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-28-2024

[12] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/stop-israel-bombing-irans-oil-sites-gulf-states-urge-us-2024-10-10/

[13] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/stop-israel-bombing-irans-oil-sites-gulf-states-urge-us-2024-10-10/

[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/stop-israel-bombing-irans-oil-sites-gulf-states-urge-us-2024-10-10/

[15] https://t.me/centerkaf/4640

[16] https://t.me/centerkaf/4640

[17] https://t.me/centerkaf/4640

[18] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/697639/

[19] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/697639/ ; https://unitingtocombatntds.org/en/get-involved/events/brics-summit-2024/ ; https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/russia-signals-upcoming-signing-of-strategic-partnership-accord-with-iran

[20] https://amwaj.media/article/iran-russia-get-closer-as-20-year-agreement-within-reach

[21] https://t.me/tass_agency/278778; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/697639/ ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/46338

[22] https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/russia-signals-upcoming-signing-of-strategic-partnership-accord-with-iran

[23] https://president dot ir/fa/154542

[24] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/697639/

[25] https://t.me/tass_agency/278763

[26] https://president dot ir/fa/154534 ; https://president dot ir/fa/154531

[27] https://president dot ir/fa/154534

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[29] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15377 ;

[30] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15377

[31] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/10/biden-netanyahu-call-israel-attack-iran

[32] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-10-2024 ; www dot idf.il/239034

[33] https://t.me/sarayaps/18664 ; https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4434 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7681 ; https://t.me/abualiajel/433

[34] https://t.me/darebmojahden/5261 ; https://alqassa dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8166/%D8%AA%D8%AF%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B8-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B0%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86-105-%D9%88%D8%A5%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%85%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AD-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A7

[35] https://alqassa dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8166/%D8%AA%D8%AF%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B8-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B0%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86-105-%D9%88%D8%A5%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%85%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AD-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A7

[36] https://www.idf dot il/239292

[37] https://www.idf dot il/239292

[38] https://t.me/pflpgaza1/14687

[39] https://idfanc.activetrail dot biz/ANC111020204809470943

[40] https://t.me/nedalps/4426

[41] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1844709002610983188

[42] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1844447329568592362 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/15371 ; https://t.me/alredalsrey/742

[43] https://t.me/alredalsrey/742 ; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1844577357882892741

[44] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1844577357882892741 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-29-2024

[45] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1844575289457729956

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[51] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7677

[52] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7677

[53] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7679

[54] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7682

[55] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1844639364363468905

[56] https://t.me/mmirleb/7780

[57] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/90392

[58] https://t.me/mmirleb/7789

[59] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1844639367827997165

[60] https://www.idf dot il/239239

[61] https://t.me/UNIFIL_Lebanon/230

[62] https://t.me/UNIFIL_Lebanon/230

[63] https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-10-october

[64] https://t.me/mmirleb/7767 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7771 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7772 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7774 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7775 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7776 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7778 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7779 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7781 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7782 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/90403 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7785 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7784 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7786

[65] https://t.me/mmirleb/7774 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7782

[66] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1844643204995424343 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1844643208837390490 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1844741703023952045 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1844751568748372437 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1844756188107342170

[67] data available upon request

[68] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1331 ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1333

[69] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1331

[70] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1333

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[72] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1844584855398470031

[73] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/697559/