Iran Update, October 2, 2023

Iran Update, October 2, 2023

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, and Nicholas Carl

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates weekly on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Key Takeaways

1. Kuwaiti newspaper Al Jarida reported on October 2 that Iran and Russia have agreed to transfer unspecified weapons from Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) to Russian forces in Ukraine and to tribal insurgents fighting the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in eastern Syria.
2. Iraqi protesters gathered in at least three cities on October 1 to express frustrations over poor domestic conditions and the Iraqi political establishment. CTP recorded protests in Baghdad, Amarah, and Nasiriyah.

Iranian Activities in the Levant

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant, especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

Kuwaiti newspaper Al Jarida reported on October 2 that Iran and Russia have agreed to transfer unspecified weapons from Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) to Russian forces in Ukraine and to tribal insurgents fighting the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in eastern Syria.[1] Al Jarida cited an unidentified official in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force. The official accompanied IRGC Quds Force Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani on visits to Lebanon and Syria in September 2023, according to the report. ISW cannot corroborate or verify these claims.

The Al Jarida report is consistent with ISW’s previous reporting on Iran and Russia. ISW has previously reported that:

• Iran, Russia, and the Syrian regime are trying to prolong conflict in eastern Syria since fighting erupted between the SDF and Arab tribes in late August 2023.[2] Pro-regime forces have sent weapons into SDF-controlled territory and formed a tribal militia.[3] Pro-regime forces have also allowed tribal forces to use regime-controlled territory as a rear area. The ongoing clashes are fracturing the SDF and thereby support the coordinated campaign that Iran, Russia, and the Syrian regime are conducting to expel the United States from Syria.[4]
• Some Russian forces lack adequate artillery support in Ukraine and suffer from a shortage of artillery shells.[5] Russia’s defense industrial base has accelerated the production of shells and skipped quality assurance measures to do so.[6] LH maintains a vast and diverse stockpile of unguided artillery rockets, which it could provide to Russian forces[7] The Russian Ministry of Defense released footage of Iranian-made 122-mm Grad rockets in September 2023.[8]

The Al Jarida report also claimed that LH would provide weapons to Russia for its war in Ukraine in exchange for Russian forces transporting unspecified Iranian weapons through Syria to LH in Lebanon. ISW cannot corroborate or verify this claim as well. Israel frequently conducts airstrikes on Iranian weapons shipments into and through Syria as well as on advanced weapons research and development facilities.[9] Russia may be able to facilitate weapons shipments without risking Israeli airstrikes interdicting them. Russia and Israel have a complex relationship in Syria, as Israel has historically relied on Russia to curb Iranian activities in Syria.[10]

Iranian Activities in Iraq

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout Iraq. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

Iraqi protesters gathered in at least three cities on October 1 to express frustrations over poor domestic conditions and the Iraqi political establishment.[11] CTP recorded protests in Baghdad, Amarah, and Nasiriyah. Protesters in Baghdad voiced grievances, including worsening living conditions, government corruption, and recent election reforms that marginalize pro-protester candidates. Protesters in Amarah chanted against Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and Qais Khazali, who leads Iranian-backed militia Asaib Ahl al Haq.[12] Wael al Rikabi—a member of the State of Law party led by former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki—responded to the protests by rejecting the possibility of political reforms.[13]

The Iraqi protesters were commemorating the three-year anniversary of the Tishreen Movement anniversary, which was a large-scale protest movement in Iraq in 2019. The Tishreen Movement erupted in response to high unemployment, poor government service provision, and rampant corruption within the government.[14] Protesters at the time demanded election reforms that would increase popular representation in government and push back on large political parties that had consolidated power.[15] Then-Prime Minister Mostafa al Kadhimi made such reforms in 2020, which involved eliminating the list-based voting system in Iraq.[16] The Sudani administration later reversed these reforms in March 2023, as CTP previously reported, reinstituting the list system and again enabling large political parties to consolidate power.[17]

The protests on October 1 coincide with accusations that some actors in the Iraqi political establishment are preparing to interfere in the upcoming provincial elections in December 2023. The Democratic Change Forces coalition released a statement on September 20 asserting that “two influential parties” have coopted Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) to interfere.[18] The coalition called on the United Nations to send election observers to Iraq. The coalition was responding to Judge Haydar al Hanoun—the head of Iraq’s Federal Integrity Commission—announcing on September 14 that his commission will audit candidates in the upcoming provincial elections for financial corruption. [19] The audit will extend to the candidates’ families and affiliates. The election reform amendments in March 2023 prohibit individuals charged with corruption from running for office.[20] Haydar al Hanoun is affiliated with the Iranian-backed Badr Organization. CTP assessed in March that the Federal Integrity Commission could use these amendments to marginalize political opposition by charging them with corruption.[21]

[1] https://aljarida (dot) com/article/39651

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-29-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/syrian-democratic-forces%E2%80%99-arab-coalition-crumbling-creating-opportunities-isis-iran-and

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-29-2023

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/syrian-democratic-forces%E2%80%99-arab-coalition-crumbling-creating-opportunities-isis-iran-and

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2023; Grace Mappes

Recommend adding some extra recent reports on arty shortages to your endnote (no edits required): https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2023

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2023

[7] https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/hezbollahs-rocket-arsenal/

[8] https://t.me/mod_russia/30568; https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/mrl-iran-specs.htm

[9] https://twitter.com/IntelliTimes/status/1654815986921480192; https://twitter.com/AuroraIntel/status/1694440306215657574; https://www.syriahr.com/%d8%b7%d8%a7%d8%a6%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d9%85%d8%ac%d9%87%d9%88%d9%84%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d8%b3%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%af%d9%81-%d8%b4%d8%a7%d8%ad%d9%86%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%aa%d8%a8%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%af-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%a7/584912/; https://deirezzor24.net/%d8%ba%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%b7%d9%8a%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%86-%d9%85%d8%ac%d9%87%d9%88%d9%84-%d8%a7%d8%b3%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%af%d9%81%d8%aa-%d9%85%d9%88%d9%82%d8%b9%d8%a7%d9%8b-%d9%84%d9%84/

[10] https://www.timesofisrael (dot) com/russia-says-military-coordination-with-israel-in-syria-will-continue-as-usual/; https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/understanding-the-relationship-between-russia-and-syria/

[11] https://twitter.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1708430244355436988 ; https://twitter.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1708511210843295941 ; https://twitter.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1708504579619320188 ; https://twitter.com/absolute9right/status/1708839789615579423 ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A8%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%AE%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF

[12] https://twitter.com/absolute9right/status/1708839789615579423

[13] https://twitter.com/IRAQ24HD/status/1708578587941499224

[14] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50595212

[15] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/4/muhasasa-the-political-system-reviled-by-iraqi-protesters

[16] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iraqs-endless-electoral-law-debate

[17] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-20-2023

[18] https://almadapaper dot net/view.php?cat=298873

[19] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%87%D9%8A-%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%83-%D9%87%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AD%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3-%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B8%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%86

[20] https://iq dot parliament.iq/blog/2023/03/20/%d9%85%d8%ac%d9%84%d8%b3-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%86%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%a8-%d9%8a%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%b4%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d8%b5%d9%88%d9%8a%d8%aa-%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%89-%d9%82%d8%a7%d9%86%d9%88%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%86/

[21] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-20-2023