The Islamic State’s Global Long Game and Resurgence in Syria Poses an Evolved Threat to the West

The Islamic State’s Global Long Game and Resurgence in Syria Poses an Evolved Threat to the West

Authors: Liam Karr and Brian Carter

Key Takeaway: The Islamic State has evolved and expanded globally since the territorial defeat of IS in Iraq and Syria in 2019, enabling the organization to continue to orchestrate and inspire attacks on the West. IS Turkey Province and the Afghanistan-based IS Khorasan Province are pivotal nodes in IS’s external attack network and have repeatedly demonstrated the capability to coordinate attacks outside of their primary areas of operation. IS has taken advantage of weak states and poor governance in Africa to establish growing affiliates that control territory, support the IS global network, and bolster IS propaganda narratives. IS in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is now resurging in Syria after a years-long campaign to reconstitute itself. Recent shifts in the international counterterrorism posture in Syria and Africa risk creating security vacuums that IS can exploit to strengthen further. IS's growing strength will inspire more lone wolf attackers and lead to more external attack plots against the West.

The Islamic State has evolved and expanded globally since the territorial defeat of ISIS in Iraq and Syria in 2019, enabling the organization to continue to orchestrate and inspire attacks on the West. ISIS lost control of 95 percent of the territory that it seized between 2014 and 2017 and lost control of its final territories in Iraq and Syria in 2017 and 2019, respectively.[1] IS has continued to expand across the globe since 2019, however. IS claimed its first attacks in the DRC and Mozambique in 2019 under the newly-founded IS Central Africa Province (ISCAP).^[2] IS also recognized smaller and less active provinces in India, Pakistan, and Turkey in 2019.^[3] IS eventually recognized IS-Mozambique as a distinct province separate from the Democratic Republic of the Congo–based ISCAP in 2022.^[4] IS also formally recognized IS Sahel Province as distinct from the Nigeria-based Islamic State West Africa Province in 2022.^[5]

IS has substantially restructured its General Directorate of Provinces—formerly known as the Administration of Distant Provinces until 2020—since the fall of its territorial statelet in the Middle East.[6] The directorate provides operational guidance and coordinates funding to all of IS’s global affiliates, plays a central role in external attack operations, and oversees internal administrative high-level affairs within provinces.^[7] IS created regional offices (Maktab)to oversee this support across its various provincial affiliates and its traditional core territories in Iraq and Syria around 2019.[8] This decentralized system helps coordinate financing, directives, and other support between the group’s personnel in local theaters, the global IS network, and central IS leadership despite IS’s weakened position in the Middle East.[9]

Figure 1. Overview of the ADP/GDP structure

 

Note: Maktab al Anfal is now defunct and has been subsumed under Maktab al Furqan.

Source: Tore Hamming.

The Afghanistan-based IS Khorasan Province and IS Turkey Province are pivotal nodes in IS’s external attack network and have repeatedly demonstrated the capability to coordinate attacks outside of their primary areas of operations. IS Khorasan Province (ISKP) and IS Turkey Province have made crucial contributions to several IS attack plots in 2023 and 2024.[10] Successful attacks include a July 2023 suicide bombing in Pakistan that killed at least 63 people, the January 2024 bombings in Kerman, Iran, that killed 94 people, and the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow, Russia, that killed 145 people.[11] European security forces have thwarted several attack networks with ties to ISKP and Turkey, and analysts and security officials warned in 2024 of a heightened risk of IS plots against the West.[12]

ISKP has relied on online recruitment and guidance to organize external attacks despite the counterterrorism pressure that the Afghan Taliban has imposed on ISKP.[13] ISKP attacks in its core areas of operation in Afghanistan have steadily decreased in the face of this pressure since the Taliban took control in 2021.[14] ISKP’s online methods differ from the historical modus operandi of Salafi-jihadi attackers traveling abroad to train before returning to their home country to carry out an attack.[15]

IS Turkey Province functions as a key facilitation node in external attack plotting. Several IS militants linked to attack plots in Germany and Russia traveled to Turkey before their attacks.[16] IS Turkey Province directly claimed responsibility for a small arms attack on a Catholic church in Turkey in January 2024.[17] The attack was IS’s first claimed attack in Turkey since 2017 and indicates that the group has some local attack capabilities. US sanctions on IS networks in Turkey indicate that IS Turkey Province is also involved in financing and smuggling schemes that support IS external operations.[18]

Figure 2. Islamic State Attack Claims in 2024

 

Source: Liam Karr; Aaron Y. Zelin, Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

IS has taken advantage of weak states and poor governance in Africa to establish growing affiliates that control territory, support the IS global network, and bolster IS propaganda narratives. The Islamic State has five highly-active provinces in Africa: DRC-based IS Central Africa Province (ISCAP), IS Mozambique Province (ISMP), IS Sahel Province (ISSP), IS Somalia Province (ISS), and Nigeria–based IS West Africa Province (ISWAP). Many African states experience severe governance challenges, including longstanding ethnic violence, poor public services, and security forces that are abusive, ineffective, and/or undersized.[19] IS’s African affiliates have capitalized on these gaps to establish themselves in ungoverned areas and exploit local grievances to co-opt local populations.[20]

Figure 3. Islamic State Affiliates and Pro-Islamic State Groups in Africa Pledge Allegiance to a New Leader: December 2022

 

Source: Kathryn Tyson; Liam Karr.

ISSP and ISWAP—and ISCAP, ISMP, and ISS to a lesser extent—control and govern more territory in their respective areas of operations than most other IS affiliates. For example, ISSP and ISWAP systematically levy taxes, enforce strict shari’a law, and otherwise control local economies and populations in parts of West Africa.[21] The other IS African affiliates conduct these activities on a more sporadic basis and otherwise attempt to proselytize local communities.^[22]

ISS and ISWAP play critical roles in IS’s global administrative network. ISS hosts the East Africa IS office, al Karrar, and ISWAP hosts the West Africa office, al Furqan. The al Karrar office oversees ISCAP, ISM, ISS, and IS cells in South Africa. ISS invests the hundreds of thousands of dollars that it generates every month through extortion rackets in the port of Bossaso in northern Somalia back into the IS network through the al Karrar office.^[23] The al Karrar office has sent trainers and some of its funds to ISCAP and ISM.^[24] This support has likely contributed to the growing capabilities of both groups since their founding.

The al Furqan office has sent funds, fighters, and guidance from ISWAP territories to ISSP, especially since ISSP’s expansion in 2022 and 2023. A UN report in June 2024 stated that ISWAP established facilitation cells and networks in northwestern Nigeria to move weapons, fuel, equipment, and fighters in support of ISSP operations at the behest of IS core leadership.^[25] Field researcher Vincent Foucher reported that ISWAP defectors previously claimed that ISWAP and ISSP sent cadres back and forth to each other, and IS supporters claimed that ISWAP fighters traveled to Mali to support an ISSP offensive against al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate in 2022.^[26]

Figure 4. Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation across West Africa

 

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

Africa has also become a haven for high-ranking IS leadership and a bridge between Africa and the Middle East. US officials said in 2024 that IS had elevated ISS Emir Abdulqadir Mumin to become IS’s “global leader.”^[27] CTP and multiple analysts have assessed that Mumin is likely the GDP head and not the official IS caliph.^[28] Voice of America reported an uncorroborated claim initially made by Middle East Institute scholar Guled Wiliq that presumed IS caliph Abu Hafs al Hashemi al Qurayshi arrived in Somalia from Yemen in June 2024.^[29] Nigeria-based open-source reporting network Zagazola claimed in January 2024 that the IS Shura Council was considering setting up a base for core leadership in Niger.^[30] CTP cannot verify either claim, and such relocations would risk undermining IS’s legitimacy by effectively admitting at least temporary defeat in its historical and religious heartland, the Middle East.

IS’s African affiliates contribute to IS external plots through the Global Directorate of Provinces and increase the risk of lone-wolf attacks by bolstering IS propaganda narratives. The UN and United States have confirmed that the al Karrar office has used operatives in South Africa to transfer money to ISKP.^[31] Swedish police have disrupted multiple attack and recruitment cells linked to ISS, and the former ISS emir’s alleged role as the GDP head would further connect ISS to external attack planning.^[32] ISS also hosts a significant number of foreign fighters, which increases the risk of external attack plots.^[33] Many foreign fighters are hardened ideologues who adhere to transnational Salafi-jihadism and demonstrate an interest in returning to their countries of origin to organize attack plots after being further radicalized in an active conflict theater.^[34] IS Sahel Province has set up facilitation networks between Europe and the Sahel to move foreign fighters, and Spain disrupted an IS cell based in of Morocco and Spain in 2021 that had links to IS Sahel Province, ISKP, ISIS, and IS cells in Europe.^[35]

IS’s African affiliates support IS propaganda that inspires and radicalizes lone-wolf attackers.^[36] IS African affiliates have claimed more attacks every year than all other IS provinces combined since 2023.^[37] IS’s African affiliates accounted for nearly 70 percent of all IS-claimed attacks in 2024 and 64 percent of all IS-claimed casualties according to the Washington Institute scholar Aaron Zelin’s Islamic State Worldwide Activity Map.^[38] IS media features on its African affiliates also highlight governance and religious efforts[39] This propaganda activity is critical to the Islamic State’s legitimacy as a governing power. IS media covers this activity to demonstrate its persisting strength around the globe despite the fact that it no longer controls a territorial caliphate in the Middle East.^[40]

Figure 5. Islamic State’s African Affiliates Dominate Global Activity in 2024

 

Note: Data period ends on December 19, 2024.

Source: Liam Karr; Aaron Zelin, Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

ISIS is now resurging in Syria after a years-long campaign to reconstitute itself. ISIS has gradually rebuilt its capabilities since 2022 in the central Syrian desert—where regime forces infrequently and ineffectively patrolled—and gradually infiltrated then-regime-held towns along the Euphrates River.[41] Neither the Assad regime nor Russian forces prioritized defeating ISIS and instead focused on suppressing threats to Assad’s rule.[42] The Assad regime did periodically prioritize engaging ISIS in the central Syrian desert, but only when Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-backed forces did not threaten the regime in the northwest.[43] ISIS in central Syria reached its post-Caliphate zenith in 2023, when the group killed hundreds of civilians in Spring 2023 and conducted two attacks in Damascus in Spring and Summer 2023.[44] The attacks demonstrated the group’s ability to infiltrate the capital and other major cities from Syria’s desert regions.[45]

ISIS is likely already exploiting the post-Assad situation in Syria to continue its slow reconstitution in central Syria. The Assad regime’s sudden collapse has provided ISIS an opportunity to seize large weapons stockpiles on former Assad regime bases throughout the desert. There is some evidence that ISIS has already taken advantage of this opportunity. US Central Command struck and destroyed a “truckload” of ISIS weapons that the group had likely taken from a former Assad regime stockpile, for example.[46] The interim Syrian government, for its part, lacks sufficient forces to patrol eastern Syria and the central Syrian desert adequately, both of which areas have long been secondary and tertiary priorities for Syrian governments.[47] The interim government also has little incentive to target ISIS as government forces contend with former Assad regime members in western Syria.[48] ISIS has recognized this reality and attempted to avoid Damascus’s attention by prioritizing attacks on the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces.[49] ISIS cannot yet seize ground, nor can it mount months-long campaigns, but it will certainly attempt to marshal the resources to seize ground and launch major campaigns in the coming months and years unless it is prevented from doing so.

Recent shifts in the international counterterrorism posture in Syria and Africa risk creating security vacuums that IS can exploit to strengthen further. ISIS could undermine both Western counter-ISIS efforts and the Syrian transition by conducting either major prison breaks in eastern Syria or sectarian attacks in western Syria or both. The SDF is focused on its fight against Turkey and Turkish-backed forces in northern Syria. This distraction could provide an opportunity for ISIS forces in northeastern Syria to free ISIS fighters held at SDF-run detention centers in northeastern Syria. The current US Central Command commander called these imprisoned fighters an ISIS “army-in-detention.”[50] ISIS could similarly undermine the Syrian transition and encourage sectarian tensions by targeting Syrian minorities, particularly in Syrian cities or minority areas. ISIS already conducted two separate attacks targeting the Shia Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Damascus in the summer of 2023.[51] Either course could significantly strengthen ISIS, either by reinvigorating its ranks with more veteran fighters freed from detention or by increasing ISIS’s ability to recruit new fighters if sectarianism spirals out of control.

Political upheaval in the Sahel led to the withdrawal of Western forces from the region between 2022 and 2023 and created a vacuum for ISSP to exploit. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger experienced several coups between 2021 and 2023 that installed anti-Western juntas.[52] These juntas expelled Western security partners and replaced them with much smaller groups of Russian forces.[53] The Sahelian juntas and their Russian backers adopted highly militarized counterinsurgency strategies that have failed to address lingering issues already-present in the Western-backed approach and simultaneously spread indiscriminate violence and abuses against civilians that further fuel the insurgencies.[54] These shifts have allowed ISSP to cultivate a strengthening and expanding hub along the borders of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.[55]

Figure 6. Salafi-Jihadi Area of Operations in the Sahel

 

The incoming Trump administration has signaled that it will take a different approach to US policy in Somalia. Incoming US President Donald Trump withdrew the 700 US forces in Somalia at the end of his first term in 2020 without changing the objectives of US forces combatting Salafi-jihadi militants in the Horn of Africa.[56] US President Joe Biden redeployed 500 US soldiers to Somalia in 2022.[57] Trump-aligned policymakers have unrelatedly voiced support to give US recognition to the de facto independent breakaway region in northern Somaliland.[58] Such a move would anger the Somali Federal Government.

IS’s growing strength could pose a major threat to the US homeland, the West, and US partners around the world and force tough trade-offs for policymakers. US and European officials had warned of a heightened risk of IS-orchestrated or IS-inspired attacks in the West for more than a year and thwarted numerous attacks in 2024 before the IS-inspired truck ramming attack in New Orleans, Louisiana, on December 31, 2024.^[59] IS’s growing strength and ability to inspire and orchestrate attacks could impose a trade-off for policymakers between providing resources for core US national security challenges—like countering Russia and China—or devoting more resources to counter the growing IS threat.

 

[1] https://www.state.gov/the-islamic-state-five-years-later-persistent-threats-u-s-options

[2] https://thedefensepost.com/2019/04/30/islamic-state-new-central-africa-province

[3] https://www.voanews.com/a/islamic-state-announces-pakistan-province/4918903.html; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/islamic-state-hits-turkey-after-years-plotting

[4] https://acleddata.com/2023/10/30/actor-profile-islamic-state-mozambique-ism

[5] https://acleddata.com/2023/01/13/is-sahels-tactics-cause-mass-indiscriminate-violence

[6] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-general-directorate-of-provinces-managing-the-islamic-states-global-network

[7] https://www.state.gov/terrorist-designation-of-isis-general-directorate-of-provinces-leaders; https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2F2021%2F98&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-general-directorate-of-provinces-managing-the-islamic-states-global-network; https://warontherocks.com/2024/07/a-globally-integrated-islamic-state

[8] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-general-directorate-of-provinces-managing-the-islamic-states-global-network

[9] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-general-directorate-of-provinces-managing-the-islamic-states-global-network; https://warontherocks.com/2024/07/a-globally-integrated-islamic-state

[10] https://warontherocks.com/2024/07/a-globally-integrated-islamic-state; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/from-tajikistan-to-moscow-and-iran-mapping-the-local-and-transnational-threat-of-islamic-state-khorasan

[11] https://jamestown.org/program/iskp-attacks-pakistans-religious-political-parties-for-participating-in-elections; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/04/world/middleeast/us-isis-iran-general-suleimani.html; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/22/world/europe/isis-moscow-attack-concert-hall.html

[12] https://apnews.com/article/germany-netherlands-terror-group-arrests-20856495d2f7530df8cf4635b26d3fb6; https://www.voanews.com/a/fbi-fears-coordinated-attack-on-us-homeland/7565964.html; https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/30/europe/how-isis-has-europe-and-the-us-in-sights-after-deadly-moscow-attack/index.html; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/25/us/politics/moscow-attack-isis.html

[13] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iskp-goes-global-external-operations-afghanistan; https://warontherocks.com/2024/07/a-globally-integrated-islamic-state

[14] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iskp-goes-global-external-operations-afghanistan

[15] https://warontherocks.com/2024/07/a-globally-integrated-islamic-state

[16] https://warontherocks.com/2024/07/a-globally-integrated-islamic-state

[17] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/islamic-state-hits-turkey-after-years-plotting

[18] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1181; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2406

[19] https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/the-underestimated-insurgency-african-states-at-risk-for-salafi-jihadi-insurgencies

[20] https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/the-underestimated-insurgency-african-states-at-risk-for-salafi-jihadi-insurgencies

[21] https://humanglemedia dot com/iswaps-tax-system-is-bleeding-farmers-dry-in-northeastern-nigeria; https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/the-underestimated-insurgency-continued-salafi-jihadi-capabilities-and-opportunities-in-africa; https://afriquexxi dot info/Dans-le-nord-est-du-Mali-l-Etat-islamique-en-voie-de-normalisation; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-one-year-after-nigers-coup#ISSP

[22] https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/04/analysis-islamic-states-current-dawah-campaign-across-africa.php

[23] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1652; https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4002636; https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2023-06/fatal-transaction-final_0.pdf

[24] https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/013/48/PDF/N2101348.pdf?OpenElement; https://extremism.gwu.edu/islamic-state-congo-growing; https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Fact-Sheet-Countering-ISIS-Financing-2-27-24.pdf

[25] https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2F2024%2F556&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False

[26] https://x.com/VincentFoucher/status/1836735523546607871; https://www.hudson.org/sahelian-or-littoral-crisis-examining-widening-nigerias-boko-haram-conflict

[27] https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/global-leader-isis-mumin-targeted-possibly-killed-us-airstrike-rcna157300

[28] https://www.voanews.com/a/islamic-state-in-somalia-poses-growing-threat-us-officials-say/7660468.html; https://x.com/caleb_weiss7/status/1802048975014690962; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-june-20-2024-africa-crucial-to-is-global-network-burkinabe-junta-faces-coup-risk#IS

[29] https://x.com/GuledWiliq/status/1802777636734693602; https://www.voanews.com/a/islamic-state-in-somalia-poses-growing-threat-us-officials-say/7660468.html

[30] https://x.com/ZagazOlaMakama/status/1752452102779998218?s=20

[31] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0616; https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/038/91/PDF/N2303891.pdf; https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/n2243078.pdf; https://www.voanews.com/a/how-iskp-has-affected-afghanistan-regional-security-in-taliban-ruled-country/6701180.html

[32] https://sverigesradio.se/artikel/sapo-fler-vill-gora-is-resor-till-afrika-fran-sverige; https://www.hiiraan dot com/news4/2024/May/196101/somali_imam_arrested_in_sweden_on_terrorism_charges.aspx; https://apnews.com/article/sweden-terror-arrests-islamist-extremism-9df35e15f6cd8d720e489ba47a0ccf36

[33] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/islamic-state-march-africa

[34] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-islamic-states-external-operations-and-the-french-belgian-nexus; https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-05/Sep__Foreign-Fighter-Returnees.pdf

[35] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/islamic-state-march-africa; https://undocs.org/S/2023/549; https://warontherocks.com/2024/07/a-globally-integrated-islamic-state; https://reliefweb.int/report/world/seventeenth-report-secretary-general-threat-posed-isil-daesh-international-peace-and-security-and-range-united-nations-efforts-support-member-states-countering-threat-s2023568-enar; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-april-19-2023#Sahel20230419; https://www.moroccoworldnews dot com/2023/10/358411/moroccos-bcij-arrests-4-isis-affiliated-suspects; https://www.moroccoworldnews dot com/2024/01/360459/moroccos-bcij-dismantles-four-member-isis-cell; https://www.moroccoworldnews dot com/2024/02/361097/moroccos-bcij-arrests-isis-affiliated-suspect-near-rabat

[36] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/01/03/taylor-swift-new-orleans-isis-terrorism

[37] https://x.com/Boswall_Jacob/status/1802626904844861934; https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b0001rin

[38] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/islamicstateinteractivemap

[39] https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_eds/2024/04/05/analysis-islamic-states-current-dawah-campaign-across-africa

[40] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/selling-long-war-islamic-state-propaganda-caliphate

[41] https://www.counterextremism.com/blog/isis-redux-central-syria-insurgency-june-2024

[42] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/ending-the-us-presence-in-syria-could-cause-a-rapid-isis-reconstitution-and-threaten-core-us-national-security-interests; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-russia-and-syrian-regime-are-coordinating-expel-us-forces-syria; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-update-special-edition-iran-russia-and-syrian-prioritization-of-challenging-the-united-states-over-isis-will-present-isis-with-space-to-grow-its-capabilities-rest-and-refit

[43] https://www.counterextremism.com/blog/isis-redux-central-syria-insurgency-june-2024

[44] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-may-10-2023; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-august-2-2023#IraqSyria20230802

[45] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-august-2-2023#IraqSyria20230802

[46] https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4016426/centcom-forces-kill-isis-operatives-destroy-truckload-of-weapons-in-syria-airst/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-24-2024

[47] https://x.com/Al7khalidi/status/1876241806423425259

[48] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1876553569660535226; https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1876554803855376819; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1876540024445075772; https://t.me/damascusv011/27442; https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1876255100160844107

[49] ALL GRAPHIC https://jihadology.net/wp-content/uploads/_pda/2025/01/The-Islamic-State-al-Naba%CC%84-Newsletter-476.pdf;  https://jihadology.net/wp-content/uploads/_pda/2024/12/The-Islamic-State-al-Naba%CC%84-Newsletter-475.pdf; https://jihadology.net/wp-content/uploads/_pda/2024/12/The-Islamic-State-al-Naba%CC%84-Newsletter-474.pdf

[50] https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/Transcripts/Article/3332606/senate-armed-services-committee-hearing-on-posture-of-uscentcom-and-usafricom-i/

[51] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-august-2-2023#IraqSyria20230802

[52] https://africacenter.org/spotlight/understanding-burkina-faso-latest-coup; https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2023/08/the-niger-coups-outsized-global-impact

[53] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-update-special-edition-western-failures-military-coups-and-kremlin-gains-undermine-us-geostrategic-and-counterterrorism-interests-in-the-sahel; https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/35590/us-withdrawal-from-niger-completed; https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2023/09/05/how-france-was-driven-out-of-the-sahel_6124522_7.html; https://www.pism.pl/webroot/upload/files/Raport/PISM%20Report%20Africa%20Corps_.pdf

[54] https://hir.harvard.edu/how-france-failed-mali-the-end-of-operation-barkhane; https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2024/sahel; https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/03/28/mali-army-wagner-group-atrocities-against-civilians; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/07/rights-abuses-often-tipping-point-for-extremist-recruitment-un-study-finds; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/how-the-wagner-group-is-aggravating-the-jihadi-threat-in-the-sahel

[55] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-one-year-after-nigers-coup#ISSP; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-areas-of-operation-in-the-sahel https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-one-year-after-nigers-coup#ISSP

[56] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/04/world/africa/trump-somalia-troop-withdrawal.html

[57] https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2022/03/15/us-troops-commuting-to-somalia-is-inefficient-and-risky-top-africa-general-says; https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/16/us/politics/biden-military-somalia.html

[58] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somaliland-votes-with-leaders-seeing-international-recognition-reach-2024-11-13; https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/10402; https://www.semafor.com/article/12/10/2024/somaliland-trump-white-house-looks-set-to-recognize-the-region

[59] https://apnews.com/article/fbi-hamas-attack-isis-bb1ceb7ce51cfc05ed751d2ce7983fcd; https://apnews.com/article/fbi-afghanistan-justice-department-election-2e13aac1b28342be32513eaf58212ada; https://www.npr.org/2024/03/25/1240780292/us-officials-warn-of-isis-k-threat; https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/14/politics/isis-us-fears-terror-attack/index.html; https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/191/91/pdf/n2419191.pdf; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/islamicstateinteractivemap/#home