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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 3, 2025
Apr 3, 2025 - ISW Press
Download the PDFRussian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 3, 2025
Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan with William Runkel and Nate Trotter
April 3, 2025, 6:50 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 10:45am ET on April 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russia seeks to leverage ongoing ceasefire and future peace negotiations to seize large amounts of territory in Ukraine and install a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv but will likely continue military operations in Ukraine if the Kremlin is unable to achieve a full Ukrainian surrender through diplomacy. Bloomberg reported on April 3, according to sources in Moscow familiar with the matter, that the Kremlin is "counting on US President Donald Trump to deliver an acceptable peace deal in Ukraine," but is prepared to continue the war if it is not able to secure its goals through negotiations with the United States.[1] The sources also claimed that the Kremlin is not concerned by Trump's recent statement that the United States is willing to introduce additional sanctions targeting Russian oil and secondary sanctions against buyers of Russian oil if Russian President Vladimir Putin does not make progress towards a general ceasefire.[2] The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence's (ODNI) 2025 Annual Threat Assessment stated that Russia is leveraging its control of the theater-wide initiative and ongoing political and information efforts amid negotiations to end the war in Ukraine to achieve significant concessions from Ukraine and the West.[3] The ODNI report assessed that Putin is "probably" more willing to incur the risks of a longer war than to agree to an end to the war that is unfavorable to Russia. The ODNI report further assessed that Putin "appears resolved and prepared to pay a very high price to prevail in what he sees as a defining time in Russia’s strategic competition with the United States, world history, and his personal legacy." The ODNI assessment that Putin remains committed to pursuing Ukrainian surrender through both diplomatic and military means is consistent with ISW's assessment that Putin is leveraging ongoing negotiations to secure additional concessions from Ukraine and the West as part of his long-term pursuit of total Ukrainian surrender.[4]
Russia is facing significant military and economic challenges that could seriously compromise Russia's ability to wage its war in Ukraine, factors that could increase the Kremlin's desire to accomplish its objectives in a mediated ceasefire or peace negotiation in the short-term if possible. The ODNI report assessed that Russia has suffered significant casualties in Ukraine and that Russia must contend with the poor quality of its new recruits.[5] The ODNI report assessed that the Russian economy is facing significant challenges as Russia continues to balance resource allocation between defense industrial production and civilian sectors. US European Command (EUCOM) Commander and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Christopher Cavoli stated on April 3 that Russian forces have lost over 4,000 tanks in Ukraine.[6] Cavoli stated that Russia started the war with a total of 13,000 tanks and are "starting to approach near the end" of the viable tanks in storage. Cavoli noted that Russia has expanded its capability to produce shells, cruise missiles, and first-person view (FPV) drones and that Russia is preparing either to continue offensive operations in Ukraine or to launch a future campaign against a NATO member state. Cavoli stated that the war in Ukraine has "distorted" the Russian economy and "turbocharged" the Russian defense industry at the expense of Russia's civilian economic sector and that it may be difficult for Russia to "unwind" this imbalance. Cavoli assessed that Russia will be able to replace the significant personnel losses incurred in Ukraine ahead of a future conflict in Europe but noted that Russia's ability to replace materiel losses is contingent on Ukraine's ability to inflict greater losses. ISW previously noted that Russia's ongoing and forecasted economic struggles are closely tied to Russian losses on the battlefield and that it is not possible for the United States or the wider West to exert maximum pressure on Russia with economic tools alone.[7] The United States can leverage Russian vulnerabilities and achieve a stronger negotiating position by continuing — or increasing — military aid to Ukraine such that Ukrainian forces can continue to inflict significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia.
The US Treasury Department announced on April 2 that the United States lifted sanctions on Karina Rotenberg, the wife of Russian businessman and oligarch Boris Rotenberg.[8] The Treasury Department did not provide an explanation for lifting sanctions against Karina Rotenberg. Boris Rotenberg, a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, is the co-owner of the Stroygazmontazh group — Russia's largest construction company for gas pipelines and electrical power supply lines.[9] The US first sanctioned Boris Rotenberg in 2014 after Russia's annexation of Crimea.[10]
Key Takeaways:
- Russia seeks to leverage ongoing ceasefire and future peace negotiations to seize large amounts of territory in Ukraine and install a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv but will likely continue military operations in Ukraine if the Kremlin is unable to achieve a full Ukrainian surrender through diplomacy.
- Russia is facing significant military and economic challenges that could seriously compromise Russia's ability to wage its war in Ukraine, factors that could increase the Kremlin's desire to accomplish its objectives in a mediated ceasefire or peace negotiation in the short-term if possible.
- The US Treasury Department announced on April 2 that the United States lifted sanctions on Karina Rotenberg, the wife of Russian businessman and oligarch Boris Rotenberg.
- Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced in Kursk and Belgorod and near Lyman, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
- The Russian State Duma adopted a bill on April 3 to grant veteran status to Russian military personnel and volunteer formations that fought in Kursk Oblast.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Alleged Ceasefire Violations
Ukraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.
Russian sources continued to claim without evidence that Ukrainian forces violated the temporary energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 3 that Ukrainian forces struck electrical substations in Bryansk Oblast and occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast on April 2.[11] Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on April 3 that Ukrainian forces have conducted over 30 strikes on Russian energy facilities since March 18, when Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the unilateral suspension of Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure.[12]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 3 that Ukrainian forces are adhering to the terms of the temporary ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes and are conducting strikes solely on Russian military targets.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces have violated the ceasefire several times since Ukraine, the United, States, and Russia agreed to the temporary ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes and struck energy infrastructure in Kharkiv, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kherson oblasts in late March 2025.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian forces recently advanced along the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Guyevo, Kursk Oblast (south of Sudzha).[14]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to Oleshnya, Kursk Oblast (southwest of Sudzha) and east of Basivka, Sumy Oblast (northeast of Sumy City).[15]
Russian sources claimed that fighting continues in northern Sumy Oblast northeast of Sumy City near Basivka and Zhurvaka and that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Veselivka.[16]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Guyevo.[17]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on April 3 but did not advance.
Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued northwest of Belgorod City near Demidovka and Popovka.[18]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating in Belgorod Oblast.[19]
Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on April 3 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on April 2 and 3.[20]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on April 3 that Russian forces are restoring mechanized units and resupplying frontline units with ammunition.[21] The spokesperson added that Russian activity in the direction is limited to infantry attacks and drone strikes and that the Russian tactic of combining infantry attacks with armored vehicles has proven to be ineffective as Ukrainian forces quickly destroy Russian mechanized units and infantry without cover.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 3 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near the international border near Kamyanka on April 2 and 3.[22]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[23]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 3 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlaykivka, east of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Nadiya, and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka and Hrekivka on April 2 and 3.[24]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Novolyubivka (northeast of Lyman).[25]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 3 that Russian forces advanced two kilometers near Nove (north of Lyman).[26]
Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Katerynivka, Nove, Zelena Dolyna, and Novomykhailiva; northeast of Lyman near Novolyubivka, Kolodyazi, and Yampolivka; and east of Lyman near Dibrova and Torske on April 2 and 3.[27]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 3 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on April 2 and 3.[28]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 3 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 3 that Russian forces advanced north of the Dniprovskyy Pond in northwestern Chasiv Yar and towards central Chasiv Yar from positions near the Refractory Plant.[29] A Russian source claimed on April 3 that Russian forces seized a fortified area in southern Chasiv Yar.[30]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Chasiv Yar in the direction of Novomarkove and south of Chasiv Yar in the direction of Stupochky and Predtechyne on April 2 and 3.[31]
The chief sergeant of a Ukrainian fire support company operating near Chasiv Yar stated on April 3 that Russian forces are accumulating forces along the Siversky Donets-Donbas canal, which runs through Chasiv Yar.[32] The officer said that Russian forces use motorcycles and buggies and occasionally conduct mechanized assaults in an attempt to advance from Chasiv Yar to Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar). The officer noted that Ukrainian drone strikes are inhibiting Russian advances.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[33]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 2 indicates that Russian forces advanced on Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street in central Toretsk, but this advance is not recent and likely happened in mid-March based on weather conditions visible in the footage.[34]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 3 that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Valentynivka and toward Sukha Balka (both southwest of Toretsk) and advanced in a forested area near the Tsentralna Mine in southern Toretsk.[35] A milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 20th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet unit) cleared Panteleymonivka (southwest of Toretsk).[36]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Toretsk itself; west of Toretsk near Leonidivka; north of Toretsk near Dachne, Druzhba, and Dyliivka; and northeast of Toretsk near Ozaryanivka and Krymske on April 2 and 3.[37]
A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Toretsk direction reported on April 3 that Russian forces are attacking Ukrainian positions using various means, including small infantry groups, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and occasionally attack in large assault detachments with armored vehicle support.[38] The battalion commander also noted that Russian forces are using stolen Ukrainian engineering maps to locate sewage and water pipes to infiltrate Ukrainian lines.[39]
Order of battle: Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division), 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]), and the 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a reconstituted Soviet unit) are reportedly operating near Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[40] Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Oleksandropil and Panteleymonivka (southwest of Toretsk).[41]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along Lenina Street in western Novoyelyzavetivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) and seized Nadiivka (west of Novoyelyazvetivka).[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced into the western outskirts of Solone (southwest of Pokrovsk).[43]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) advanced to central Troitske and that Russian forces seized Bohdanivka (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[44] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Kotlyarivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[45]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Vodyane Druhe, and Promin; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene and Vidrodzhennya (formerly Novyi Trud); and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Novoserhiivka, Nadiivka, Uspenivka, Kotlyne, Novoukrainka, Kotlyarivka, Sukha Balka, and Bohdanivka and toward Muravka on April 2 and 3.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Solone (southwest of Pokrovsk) and that Solone is a contested "gray zone."[47]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west along the T-0428 Andriivka-Novopavlivka highway west of Andriivka (west of Kurakhove) during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault.[48] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck 12 Russian vehicles and completely destroyed seven vehicles involved in the assault.[49]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the fields west of Kostyantynopil (west of Kurakhove), southwest of Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove), and in an area up to one kilometer deep and 1.5 kilometers wide near Bahatyr (southwest of Kurakhove).[50]
Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Oleksiivka, and Andriivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on April 2 and 3.[51]
Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on April 3 that Russian reconnaissance and sabotage units recently entered Rozlyv.[52] ISW observed evidence indicating that Russian forces likely recently seized Rozlyv as of April 1.[53]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 3 indicates that Russian forces advanced to the southwestern outskirts of Vesele (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[54] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Vesele (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[55]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in an area up to 1.5 kilometers deep and one kilometer wide near Fedorivka (northwest of Vesele), up to 500 meters deep and one kilometer wide near the Vilne Pole-Burlatske area (west of Velyka Novosilka), and south of Vilne Pole.[56]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele, Burlatske, and Dniproenerhiya and toward Myrne and west of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne, Novosilka, and Shevchenko on April 2 and 3.[57]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1461st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 36th CAA, EMD), 5th Tank Brigade, and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[58]
Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces reported on April 2 that Ukrainian drone operators recently destroyed two Russian Buk air defense systems and one Tor air defense system in an unspecified area of Donetsk Oblast.[59] Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces reported that the destroyed systems cost an estimated 50 million dollars.
Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 3 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on April 2 that elements of the Russian 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are advancing toward Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne).[60]
Russian forces attacked north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka and northwest of Robotyne near Stepove, Shcherbaky, Mali Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske on April 2 and 3.[61] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking along the entire western Zaporizhia Oblast frontline.[62]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction stated on April 2 that the Russian military command reinforced the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) and that the regiment intensified operations in the area.[63] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces primarily attempt to advance at night using heat-shielding cloaks and are leveraging dry ground conditions to probe Ukrainian defenses.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Lobkove and drone operators of the Chechen “Vostok-Akhmat” Battalion are reportedly operating near Robotyne.[64] Drone operators of the Russian ZVENO Reconnaissance Battalion are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[65]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dnipro direction on April 2 and 3 but did not advance.[66]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 2 to 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 39 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[67] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 28 drones over northern and eastern Ukraine and that 7 drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that drone strikes affected Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
The Russian State Duma adopted a bill on April 3 to grant veteran status to Russian military personnel and volunteer formations that fought in Kursk Oblast.[68] The bill also grants veteran status to Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), Rosgvardia, Federal Penitentiary Service, Investigative Committee, and other personnel who participated in operations to repel the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. The Kremlin's extension of veteran status will likely further strain the Russian state budget and economy and indicates that the Kremlin continues to prioritize appeasing the veteran population over long-term economic issues. Putin stated on December 19, 2024 that he would remedy the Russian government's mistake in failing to grant veteran status to personnel operating in Kursk Oblast.[69]
Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed Kremlin officials on April 1 to develop a policy that will integrate recent university graduates into the Russian military. Putin tasked the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and People's Front (formerly known as the All-Russia People's Front) to develop a special conscription procedure for university graduates to serve in the military.[70]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Nothing significant to report.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is suspending occupation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. Click here to read the April 3 Russian Occupation Update.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-04-03/putin-bets-trump-delivers-on-ukraine-while-priming-for-more-war
[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar033025
[3] https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2025-Unclassified-Report.pdf
[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031825
[5] https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2025-Unclassified-Report.pdf
[6] https://www.c-span.org/program/senate-committee/generals-testify-on-european-africa-combatant-commands/658098
[7] https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russia%27s%20Weakness%20Offers%20Leverage%20PDF.pdf
[8] https://meduza dot io/news/2025/04/02/ssha-snyali-sanktsii-s-zheny-borisa-rotenberga ; https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250402
[9] https://www.occrp.org/en/project/the-rotenberg-files/when-a-rotenberg-is-your-client
[10] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl23331
[11] https://t.me/mod_russia/50855
[12] https://t.me/tass_agency/309107 ; https://t.me/MariaVladimirovnaZakharova/10126
[13] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22645
[14] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8807; https://t.me/Arbat_dobrocor/1158
[15] https://t.me/wargonzo/25714 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26363
[16] https://t.me/wargonzo/25714; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26363; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26363; https://t.me/dva_majors/68232
[17] https://t.me/dva_majors/68256 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/7305
[18] https://t.me/wargonzo/25714 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/68232; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26399; https://t.me/milinfolive/145463
[19] https://t.me/epoddubny/23000 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22998
[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zFdmqMW8H7eNquBoddQEbUEvcwcwnhg1D2j5DPQgBovjmbK4udUYXo4hovBU8kr1l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22638; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22625; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7314
[21] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/03/praktyka-pokazala-shho-nahlost-ne-rezultatyvnyj-na-harkivshhyni-vorog-atakuye-pihotoyu-i-nakopychuye-syly/
[22]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zFdmqMW8H7eNquBoddQEbUEvcwcwnhg1D2j5DPQgBovjmbK4udUYXo4hovBU8kr1l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22638 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22638 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7314
[23] https://t.me/dva_majors/68239 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/68277
[24]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zFdmqMW8H7eNquBoddQEbUEvcwcwnhg1D2j5DPQgBovjmbK4udUYXo4hovBU8kr1l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22638 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22625 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7314
[25] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8805 ; https://t.me/Ci4team_4mb/352
[26]
[27]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zFdmqMW8H7eNquBoddQEbUEvcwcwnhg1D2j5DPQgBovjmbK4udUYXo4hovBU8kr1l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22638 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22625
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22638; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22625
[29] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26410
[30] https://t.me/tass_agency/309089
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22638; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22625
[32] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/985839-vijska-rf-nakopicuutsa-na-mezi-kanalu-siverskij-donec-donbas-ta-namagautsa-jogo-perejti-5-osbr/
[33] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26389
[34] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1907727610802475170; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/851
[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26412; https://t.me/dva_majors/68232; https://t.me/yurasumy/22214; https://t.me/yurasumy/22217
[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26412
[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zFdmqMW8H7eNquBoddQEbUEvcwcwnhg1D2j5DPQgBovjmbK4udUYXo4hovBU8kr1l
[38] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/03/gotovi-zustrity-na-vyhodi-z-truby-v-toreczku-okupanty-probuyut-atakuvaty-z-kanalizacziyi/
[39] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/03/gotovi-zustrity-na-vyhodi-z-truby-v-toreczku-okupanty-probuyut-atakuvaty-z-kanalizacziyi/
[40] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13636
[41] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34045; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/160040
[42] https://t.me/PershyiTankovyi5OVMBR/41 ; https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1907783566848573511
[43] https://t.me/yurasumy/22215 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34042
[44] https://t.me/yurasumy/22213
[45] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63291
[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zFdmqMW8H7eNquBoddQEbUEvcwcwnhg1D2j5DPQgBovjmbK4udUYXo4hovBU8kr1l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22638 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22625 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63288
[47] https://t.me/yurasumy/22215 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34042
[48] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1363424128301028; https://x.com/GeneralStaffUA/status/1907720637197545662; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1907730393098252397; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1907732702331093478; https://x.com/Danspiun/status/1907740510564864170; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8804; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22644; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1907750244504207427
[49] https://x.com/GeneralStaffUA/status/1907720637197545662; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1907730393098252397; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1907732702331093478; https://x.com/Danspiun/status/1907740510564864170;
[50] https://t.me/voin_dv/14222
[51] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7314 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63291 ;
[52] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/985985-u-rajoni-sela-andriivka-na-novopavlivskomu-napramku-trivaut-boi-osuv-hortica/
[53] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2025
[54] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8803 ; https://t.me/pidrozdilshadowoficial/674
[55] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89278 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50856 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50865 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89338 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/68232
[56] https://t.me/mod_russia/50856 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50865 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89338 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63286 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/68232 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14222 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25714 ; https://t.me/sashakots/52847 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22212 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63295 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63287
[57] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7314 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zFdmqMW8H7eNquBoddQEbUEvcwcwnhg1D2j5DPQgBovjmbK4udUYXo4hovBU8kr1l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22638 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22625 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63286 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63295
[58] https://t.me/voin_dv/14217
[59] https://t.me/usf_army/497 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7282
[60] https://t.me/rybar/69360
[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zFdmqMW8H7eNquBoddQEbUEvcwcwnhg1D2j5DPQgBovjmbK4udUYXo4hovBU8kr1l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22638 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02M2LDayF6iTH88pmCFfL4yyseRYR2f8V8pH4Mt388h1dqrCVQDUDnbThAzxaoTEBfl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22625; https://t.me/dva_majors/68232; https://t.me/wargonzo/25714
[62] https://t.me/rybar/69360
[63] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dw3_GwIHW2I ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/02/maskuyetsya-plashhamy-nevydymkamy-vorog-otrymav-popovnennya-i-aktyvizuvavsya-na-orihovskomu-napryamku/
[64] https://t.me/rybar/69360; https://t.me/epoddubny/23004; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5617
[65] https://t.me/sashakots/52843; https://x.com/sashakots/status/1847981918492467462
[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zFdmqMW8H7eNquBoddQEbUEvcwcwnhg1D2j5DPQgBovjmbK4udUYXo4hovBU8kr1l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22638 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02M2LDayF6iTH88pmCFfL4yyseRYR2f8V8pH4Mt388h1dqrCVQDUDnbThAzxaoTEBfl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22625
[67] https://t.me/kpszsu/31822
[68] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/23589677
[69] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2024
[70] http://www.kremlin dot ru/acts/assignments/orders/76618 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/96009