Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 27, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 27, 2025

Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, and George Barros

January 27, 2025, 5:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45 pm ET on January 27 ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces struck Russian long-range drone storage facilities in Oryol Oblast again on January 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 26 that the Ukrainian forces struck drone and thermobaric warhead storage warehouses, causing secondary detonations.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike destroyed over 200 Shahed drones. Oryol Oblast Governor Andrei Klychkov claimed on January 26 that Ukrainian forces repeatedly attempted to strike Oryol Oblast and that Russian electronic warfare (EW) interference downed a Ukrainian drone in Oryol Oblast.[2] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian forces struck the same drone storage facility at the end of December 2024.[3]

The European Union (EU) proposed an aid package on January 27 to Moldova and Transnistria to help the ongoing gas crisis in the pro-Russian breakaway republic as part of efforts to reduce Russia's ability to exploit Transnistria in its energy blackmail schemes targeting Chisinau.[4] The package includes an immediate loan of three million cubic meters of gas to Transnistria and offers a grant of 30 million euros (about $31.4 million) for Moldova to purchase gas – presumably from the European market – from February 1 to 10 to support Transnistria's electricity production for domestic consumption and export to the rest of Moldova. Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean noted that the EU will continue to support Chisinau after February 10 in order to ensure that Transnistria can continue to produce electricity for Transnistria and Moldova. The EU aid package offers to invest in Transnistrian electricity production and distribution over the next two years. The EU stated that it is also considering supporting coal deliveries from Ukraine to Transnistria and that it has supported the allocation of transmission capacity along the gas delivery route from Bulgaria and Romania to Moldova.[5] The Transnistrian Energy Operational Headquarters stated on January 27 that Transnistrian gas reserves are running out and will last only until early February 2025 "at most."[6] Russian business outlet Kommersant reported on January 27 that its sources stated that Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz is in discussions with Hungarian oil and gas company MOL and Hungarian electricity company MVM about buying gas for Transnistria, the delivery of which would begin in early February 2025 and continue until late March or early April 2025.[7] Recean confirmed on January 27 that MOL presented Moldovagaz with a draft contract on the supply of gas for Transnistria but that Moldovan authorities must verify the legality and compliance of the contract with national and international law.[8] Transnistrian authorities have previously rejected Moldovan and Ukrainian offers of aid.[9] ISW continues to assess that Transnistria's possible acceptance of aid from Moldova, Ukraine, or the EU and Transnistria's subsequent supply of cheaper electricity to the rest of Moldova would disrupt Russian efforts to use the energy crisis to strengthen Transnistria's economic dependence on Moscow, to posture Russia as the breakaway republic's savior and benefactor, and to leverage Chisinau's turn to higher priced European electricity as part of Moscow's anti-EU narratives.[10]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Khortytsia Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Andrii Hnatov with Ground Forces Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi on January 26.[11] Zelensky stated that Drapatyi will also remain Ground Forces Commander and that Hnatov will become Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff.[12] Zelensky noted that Drapatyi's dual position will help combine the Ukrainian military's combat operations with the proper training of brigades and that Hnatov will work to improve coordination between headquarters and the front.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck Russian long-range drone storage facilities in Oryol Oblast again on January 26.
• The European Union (EU) proposed an aid package on January 27 to Moldova and Transnistria to help the ongoing gas crisis in the pro-Russian breakaway republic as part of efforts to reduce Russia's ability to exploit Transnistria in its energy blackmail schemes targeting Chisinau.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Khortytsia Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Andrii Hnatov with Ground Forces Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi on January 26.
• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, and Kurakhove.
• The Russian government continues to expand the federal "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to install Kremlin-selected veterans into government positions, by creating similar programs for Russian veterans across government, including at the regional level.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 27 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 27 that Russian forces seized Nikolayevo-Darino (northwest of Sudzha), but ISW assesses that Russian forces likely seized the settlement as of January 21.[13] Fighting continued near Kositsa (north of Sudzha), and Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked near Nikolayevo-Darino on January 26 and 27.[14] Elements of the Russian Oryol Volunteer Detachment (1st Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Corps) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast, and elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating fiber-optic drones in Kursk Oblast.[15]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on January 27 but did not advance.[16] The Ukrainian Border Guard Service reported on January 27 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault with 10 pieces of equipment and an unspecified amount of infantry near Vovchansk.[17] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also conducted limited ground attacks in Derhachi Raion north of Kharkiv City, potentially referring to the Kozacha Lopan direction (north of Kharkiv City and northwest of Lyptsi).[18]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka; and south of Kupyansk near Hlushkivka on January 26 and 27 but did not make any confirmed advances.[19]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 27 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Novoyehorivka (southeast of Borova) and west of Nadiya (east of Borova), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[20] Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Lozova, Kolisnykivka, Zahryzove, and Zelenyi Hai; east of Borova near Kopanky and Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Makiivka, Novoyehorivka, and Hrekivka on January 26 and 27.[21]

Russian milbloggers continued to complain about the Russian military command lying about battlefield successes, most recently in the Borova direction. Russian milbloggers denied on January 27 the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) January 20 claim that Russian forces seized Novoyehorivka, claiming that Russian forces are still 1.5 kilometers from the settlement and that there has not been movement in this area for some time.[22] One milblogger claimed that footage showing Russian forces in the settlement recently was fake.[23] Milbloggers noted that the Russian MoD's false claims of seizures negatively affect ongoing Russian offensive operations in the area, as Russian commanders, who think Russian forces have seized the settlement, will not order strikes against the settlement, leading Russian forces on the ground to not have proper fire support during assaults.[24] Russian milbloggers previously complained that Russian authorities lied about the seizure of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk), and the Russian military command reportedly arrested and removed several commanders overseeing the Bilohorivka sector in November 2024.[25]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January 27 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Novosadove and Ivanivka (both northeast of Lyman), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[26] Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Terny, Kolodyazi, and Yampolivka and towards Zelene Dolyna and east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske on January 26 and 27.[27]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported Russian offensive operations in the Siversk direction on January 27.

Russian forces recently advanced within central Chasiv Yar amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 27. Geolocated footage published on January 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Myru and Horkoho streets in central Chasiv Yar.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka and Orikhovo-Vasylivka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[29] Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Bila Hora, and Pretechyne on January 26 and 27.[30] Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on January 27 that Russian forces are increasing operating equipment, especially armored fighting vehicles, in the Chasiv Yar direction and recently blew up pipes of the Siverskyi Donets Donbas Canal in several places to create passages for armored vehicles, assaults, and logistics.[31] Zaporozhets stated that elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz and "Rusich" Russian Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group are operating on the southeast outskirts of Chasiv Yar and have likely undergone assault operations training. Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division continue operating in Chasiv Yar, including its 215th Reconnaissance Battalion and 331st VDV Regiment.[32]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on January 27. Geolocated footage published on January 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northwestern Toretsk.[33] Additional geolocated footage published on January 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced near the Toretska Mine in northern Toretsk.[34] Russian forces continued attacking near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Krymske; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on January 26 and 27.[35] Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) reportedly continue to operate in Toretsk, and drone operators of the 56th Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Katerynivka (northeast of Toretsk).[36]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on January 27 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed on January 26 and 27 that Russian forces seized Nadiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) and Novoandriivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) and advanced north of Novoandriivka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[37] Russian forces continued attacking near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe, Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene and Novoukrainka; west of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Kotlyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Novovasylivka, Novooleksandrivka, Uspenivka, Novoserhiivka, Sribne, and Nadiivka and towards Bohdanivka on January 26 and 27.[38] Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on January 27 that there are a large number of small combat engagements near Pokrovsk and that Russian forces are attempting to enter and envelop Pokrovsk from the west.[39] Trehubov assessed that Russian forces operating in the Pokrovsk direction may have a decreasing number of personnel due to their attempts to bypass Pokrovsk on its flanks instead of conduct frontal assaults against the settlement. Trehubov noted that the size of the combat engagements near Pokrovsk are not as large as those near Toretsk, but stated that the Pokrovsk direction is the most active direction on the frontline. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces use small columns of armored vehicles and tanks to disembark infantry but noted that the open terrain in the Ukrainian brigade's area of responsibility allows for such movement, as opposed to other areas in the Pokrovsk direction.[40] Elements of the Russian "Grom" Battalion of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Zelene.[41]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 27. Geolocated footage published on January 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Andriivka (northwest of Kurakhove).[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Slovyansk (northeast of Andriivka) toward the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Andriivka highway.[43] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however. Russian forces attacked northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko; west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Dachne, Kostyantynopil, and Ulakly; and southwest of Kurakhove near Yantarne, Rozlyv, and Zelenivka on January 26 and 27.[44] Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Andriivka; elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 68th Tank Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Dachne; and elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction.[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka on January 27 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka itself, northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne, north of Velyka Novosilka near Novyi Komar, and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on January 26 and 27.[46] Trehubov stated on January 27 that Ukrainian forces withdrew from southern Velyka Novosilka in order to avoid encirclement.[47] Trehubov also stated that Russian forces seized a significant part of the settlement but that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within Velyka Novosilka closer to the outskirts. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized all of Velyka Novosilka but have not finishing clearing the settlement.[48] Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate within Velyka Novosilka.[49]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Polohy direction on January 27. Elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy direction.[50]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Zaporizhia direction on January 27 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka and northwest of Robotyne towards Novoandriivka on January 26 and 27.[51] Drone operators of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division and 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[52]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dnipro direction on January 26 and 27 but did not advance.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that poor weather is limiting Russian and Ukrainian drone usage in the Kherson direction.[54] Elements of the Russian 81st Artillery Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[55]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 26 to 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 104 Shahed and decoy drones from Oryol and Kursk oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[56] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 57 drones over Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Khmelnytskyi, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts; that 39 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that Russian forces struck infrastructure and residences in Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Kyiv oblasts.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian government continues to expand the federal "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to install Kremlin-selected veterans into government positions, by creating similar programs for Russian veterans across government, including at the regional level. Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein announced on January 27 the "Kursk. Heroes!" program, a regional analogue of the "Time of Heroes" program.[57]

The Russian Cabinet of Ministers expressed its support on January 27 for Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov's draft bill that would allow the Russian military to call up conscripts, whom Russian authorities did not conscript during their conscription cycle, within one year following the announcement of their original conscription cycle.[58] Kartapolov stated that the Duma may begin discussing the bill before the start of the Spring 2025 conscription cycle.[59]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20266 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JsFSrh4VXijce8nM2NPbLb2KHd2pKLFPrHjkRbB2Pjnt5fKA2HBchxGa1Veit9W4l

[2] https://t.me/Klychkov_Andrey/4232

[3] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8692 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122824

[4] https://newsmaker dot md/ro/ue-salveaza-din-nou-r-moldova-3-mln-m3-de-gaz-pentru-transnistria-si-energie-electrica-pentru-malul-drept; https://moldova dot europalibera.org/a/chisinaul-si-ue-ofera-un-pachet-de-sprijin-regiunii-transnistrene-pentru-a-opri-criza-energetica/33290603.html; https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_329

[5] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_329

[6] https://president dot gospmr.org/press-sluzhba/novosti/informatsiya-opershtaba.html

[7] https://www.rbc dot ru/business/27/01/2025/679708b59a7947a5c1aead4b; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7459359

[8] https://www.ipn dot md/en/prime-minister-recean-confirmed-the-interest-of-hungarian-companies-in-7966_1111236.html

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012525

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012525

[11] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13079

[12] https://suspilne dot media/933967-komanduvaca-suhoputnih-vijsk-zsu-priznacili-ocilnikom-osuv-hortica/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/26/klyuchove-pryznachennya-na-shodi-myhajlo-drapatyj-ocholyt-osuv-hortyczya/

[13] https://t.me/mod_russia/48291 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/297841 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8182; https://t.me/DKulko/762

[14] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31613 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20271 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SKPt5sSrX97SgwfvLAJ7pRX3WNTdPzSufMqCBbQCX1hJWQ5hHADJdpnc923CdrGDl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/63225

[15] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61709 ; https://obl1 dot ru/reportage/orlovskiy-dobrovolcheskiy-otryad-ischet-artilleristov ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22979 ; https://t.me/EnotHersonVDV/5927 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13014

[16] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20292; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20271; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SKPt5sSrX97SgwfvLAJ7pRX3WNTdPzSufMqCBbQCX1hJWQ5hHADJdpnc923CdrGDl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4551

[17] https://www.facebook.com/DPSUkraine/videos/1187299282744971/?__cft__[0]=AZWjQLOAkLIePubUTlcigK3MMEwDaeSKT8xmKH4LzxKF2CCMwkbLi8dSUkaAtDi-RjMhRZLFS3vtBXMaL5sh0moQ1zXXHxyqGNc6kR0suSmgmED0bok9izYdvVOBp4-Py7z21LZMHFOXM79KxfJyNf11xzDGNf_kFGJMhLloUkoCLJ9fXpTXoPhuyK6s54Lla15NsmSLVTQk4N-4QEy1rext&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[18] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12348

[19] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20292; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20271; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4551; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SKPt5sSrX97SgwfvLAJ7pRX3WNTdPzSufMqCBbQCX1hJWQ5hHADJdpnc923CdrGDl

[20] https://t.me/rybar/67525; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152641

[21] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20292; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20271; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4551; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SKPt5sSrX97SgwfvLAJ7pRX3WNTdPzSufMqCBbQCX1hJWQ5hHADJdpnc923CdrGDl

[22] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2025; https://t.me/dva_majors/63278; https://t.me/yurasumy/20788 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31605 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31606 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31607

[23] https://t.me/yurasumy/20788

[24] https://t.me/dva_majors/63278; https://t.me/yurasumy/20788

[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111624

[26] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30738

[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20292; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20271; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4551; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SKPt5sSrX97SgwfvLAJ7pRX3WNTdPzSufMqCBbQCX1hJWQ5hHADJdpnc923CdrGDl

[28] https://geoconfirmed dot org/ukraine/7df3dff1-3ecc-4616-c8fa-08dd3bdfeee4; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1883717987460583501; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4509

[29] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30741

[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20292; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20271; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SKPt5sSrX97SgwfvLAJ7pRX3WNTdPzSufMqCBbQCX1hJWQ5hHADJdpnc923CdrGDl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4551

[31] https://suspilne dot media/933979-usaid-prizupinae-finansuvanna-proektiv-v-ukraini-drapatij-keruvatime-osuv-hortica-1069-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1737966065&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/27/chasiv-yar-pryyihaly-shturmuvaty-rosijski-pidrozdily-shho-vbyvaly-odyn-odnogo/

[32] https://t.me/mod_russia/48298; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22979; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31609

[33] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25060; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2585472334976132&ref=sharing; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1883797440543035818

[34] https://geoconfirmed dot org/ukraine/85a12e78-91f3-46fe-c8ff-08dd3bdfeee4; https://t.me/liut_npu/644

[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20292 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20271 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SKPt5sSrX97SgwfvLAJ7pRX3WNTdPzSufMqCBbQCX1hJWQ5hHADJdpnc923CdrGDl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4551 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85182 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24463

[36] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13304 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152673 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85182 

[37] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30725; https://t. Me/yurasumy/20797 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61697; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152641

[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20292 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20271 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SKPt5sSrX97SgwfvLAJ7pRX3WNTdPzSufMqCBbQCX1hJWQ5hHADJdpnc923CdrGDl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4551 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20798 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61684 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61697 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22988 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/63225 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152685

[39] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/934483-ukrainski-vijska-uniknuli-otocenna-na-pivdni-velikoi-novosilki-ta-vidijsli-tregubov/

[40] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/27/na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-okupanty-aktyvizuvaly-vykorystannya-bronetehniky/

[41] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85165

[42] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25062; https://t.me/oaembr46/1324; https://geoconfirmed.org/ukraine/ac763037-a3a0-40b5-c8ea-08dd3bdfeee4; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1883592045903905014; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1883572984964895110

[43] https://t.me/rybar/67494 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61702  

[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SKPt5sSrX97SgwfvLAJ7pRX3WNTdPzSufMqCBbQCX1hJWQ5hHADJdpnc923CdrGDl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20271 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20292 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4551 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/63225 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24463 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61702  

[45] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61702 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13023 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13305 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/63221; https://t.me/dva_majors/63234 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85161 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20795

[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20292; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20271 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SKPt5sSrX97SgwfvLAJ7pRX3WNTdPzSufMqCBbQCX1hJWQ5hHADJdpnc923CdrGDl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4551; https://t.me/wargonzo/24463

[47] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/934483-ukrainski-vijska-uniknuli-otocenna-na-pivdni-velikoi-novosilki-ta-vidijsli-tregubov/

[48] https://t.me/wargonzo/24463

[49] https://t.me/voin_dv/13015 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31600 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/20411 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13017 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13037

 

[50] https://t.me/voin_dv/13019

[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20292; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20271; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SKPt5sSrX97SgwfvLAJ7pRX3WNTdPzSufMqCBbQCX1hJWQ5hHADJdpnc923CdrGDl

[52] https://t.me/dva_majors/63225

[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20292; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20271; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SKPt5sSrX97SgwfvLAJ7pRX3WNTdPzSufMqCBbQCX1hJWQ5hHADJdpnc923CdrGDl

[54] https://t.me/rusich_army/20397

[55] https://t.me/dva_majors/63213

[56] https://t.me/kpszsu/27633

[57] https://t.me/Hinshtein/9363

[58] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1004894; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/01/27/pravitelstvo-rf-podderzhalo-ocherednoy-zakonoproekt-o-rasshirenii-prav-voenkomatov-teper-prizyvnika-mogut-otpravit-v-armiyu-dazhe-cherez-god-posle-okonchaniya-prizyva; https://t.me/tass_agency/297840

[59] https://t.me/tass_agency/297882