Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 7, 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 7, 2023

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Layne Philipson, Madison Williams, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 7, 5:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Recent Russian gains in Soledar do not portend an imminent encirclement of Bakhmut, contrary to claims made by Russian sources. Even at the most generous interpretation of Russian milblogger narratives, which claim that Russian forces are fighting on the outskirts of Razdolivka (about 6km northwest of Soledar), Russian forces are still far from being within striking distance of an operational encirclement of Bakhmut.[1] In order to effectively cut Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Bakhmut, Russian forces would have to establish control of the T0513 Siversk-Bakhmut highway (currently 7km west of the furthest point of confirmed Russian advances in the Soledar area) and reach the E40 Slovyansk-Bakhmut highway (13km from the furthest point of confirmed Russian advance in the Soledar area) at least. Considering that the recent rate of gains in this area has been on the order of a few hundred meters a day, at most, it is highly unlikely that Russian forces will be successful in cohering a mechanized push towards these GLOCs and move towards encircling Bakhmut.[2] Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut would still have GLOCs available even if the Russians cut the E40, moreover, making the entire discussion of an encirclement at this point bizarre.

Russia continues to weaponize religion to perpetuate long-standing information operations and discredit Ukraine. Russian milbloggers responded to footage posted on January 7 of uniformed Ukrainian servicemen attending Orthodox Christmas services at the Kyiv-Perchesk Lavra and decried it as a reprisal and open war on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP).[3] Several milbloggers referred to the footage as evidence that the Lavra has been “captured” by “heretics and schismatics.”[4] The milblogger vitriol at the footage of Christmas services at the Lavra follows the decision by the Ukrainian government to take back control of the main cathedral of the Kyiv-Perchesk Lavra from the UOC MP and allow the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) to hold Orthodox Christmas services at the Lavra on January 7.[5] The Russian response to the Ukrainian government’s decision to transfer control of the Lavra to the OCU exemplifies Moscow’s continued weaponization of religion in order to frame Ukraine as evil and position Russia as the protector of Orthodox Christian values, as ISW has previously reported.[6]

The Ukrainian government has not disrupted the ability of observers to celebrate Orthodox Christmas in Ukraine. Russian milbloggers falsely presented the legal transfer of the Kyiv-Perchesk Lavra from the UOC MP, which the Ukrainian government maintains has explicit links to the Kremlin and has provided material and spiritual support to the Russian war in Ukraine, to the OCU as an attack on the ability of observers of Orthodox tradition to celebrate Christmas. Orthodox services continued through Ukraine, including in the Kyiv-Perchesk Lavra, throughout the course of the day on January 7.[7] The Ukrainian government position that elements of the UOC MP, from which Kyiv removed control of the Lavra, is supported by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s continued association with the Russian Orthodox Church. In his speech on Orthodox Christmas, Putin thanked the ROC for its continued support for Russian troops in Ukraine.[8] Ukraine is not suppressing the religious liberties of Orthodox Christians, contrary to the Russian information operation, and is instead taking the steps it deems necessary to distance Ukrainian cultural heritage from religious elements it asserts are linked to the Kremlin and its conduct of the war.

Russian forces reportedly continue to deplete their missile arsenal but will likely continue to be able to threaten Ukrainian critical infrastructure and civilians at scale in the near term. Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov published an infographic on January 6 detailing that Russian forces have expended roughly 81 percent of their strategic missile stocks and 19 percent of their tactical missile stocks.[9] Reznikov reported that Russian forces reportedly have remaining of their pre-war and post-invasion production stocks:

92 Iskander 9M723 missiles (11 percent),
52 Iskander 9M728/9M729 missiles (44 percent),
118 Kh-101 and Kh-555/55SM missiles (16 percent),
162 Kh-22/32 missiles (44 percent),
53 Kh-47M2 Kinzhal missiles (84 percent), and
59 sea-based Kalibr missiles (9 percent).[10]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that it would never run out of sea-based Kalibr missiles while conducting a massive series of missile strikes on December 29, 2022.[11] Russian forces last used sea-based Kalibr missiles in Ukraine during their ninth large-scale series of missile strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure on December 16.[12] Although the Russian military’s tactical missile stock is less expended, S-300 and 3M-55 Onyx missiles are less precise systems than Russian strategic missiles, which is likely why Russian forces have not used these systems extensively in large-scale missile strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure.

Reznikov reported that Russia has managed to produce since the February 2022 invasion:

290 Kh-101 and Kh-555/55SM missiles (65 percent of the pre-war stock),
150 Kalibr missiles (30 percent of the pre-war stock),
36 Iskander 9M723 missiles (5 percent of the pre-war stock),
20 Iskander 9M728/9M729 missiles (20 percent of the pre-war stock),
and 20 Kh-47M2 Kinzhal missiles (47 percent of the pre-war stock).[13]

The Russian production of strategic missiles since the start of the invasion of Ukraine in comparison to the Russian military's pre-war stock highlights that Russia has not mobilized its military industry to support Russian military operations in Ukraine. A country would normally increase the production of missile, rocket, and other weapons systems and munitions before embarking on a major war and would normally put its military industry on a war footing once the war began.  Russia has done neither.  Putin’s failure to mobilize Russian industry to support the Russian war effort in Ukraine may result from fears that further economic disruptions could produce further domestic discontent in Russia because Western sanctions regimes have placed significant constraints on Russian military industry, or because of inherent limitations of Russian industry and military industry—or some combination of these factors. The current level of the Russian military’s depletion of strategic missile systems may constrain how often and at what scale Russian forces conduct future massive series of missile strikes in Ukraine, but Russian forces will be able to continue their campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure at scale in the near term and threaten the lives of Ukrainian civilians.

Russian forces have also reportedly depleted their arsenal of Iranian-made drones following an increased pace of drone attacks in Ukraine in the past month. Russian forces have reportedly expended 88 percent of their stock of the Shahed-131 and –136 drones that they have so far received from Iran, with only 90 Iranian-made drones remaining according to Reznikov.[14] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces increased their use of Shahed drones in attacks on Ukraine over the past month in order to maintain the pace of their campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure without further depleting their more valuable missile stocks.[15] Russia’s contract with Iran reportedly stipulates that Iran will send an additional 1,000 Shahed drones to Russia.[16] Russian forces will likely be able to conduct only a handful of massive drone attacks in Ukraine in the near term until Russia receives from Iran another delivery of drones, which reportedly come in batches of 200 to 300.[17]

Key Takeaways

• Recent Russian gains in Soledar do not portend an imminent Russian encirclement of Bakhmut.
• Russia continues to weaponize religion to perpetuate long-standing information operations and discredit Ukraine.
• Russian forces reportedly continue to deplete their missile arsenal and stock of Iranian-made drones but will likely continue to threaten Ukrainian infrastructure at scale in the near term.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Svatove and Kreminna.
• Russian forces made marginal confirmed advances in Soledar amid continuing Russian offensive operations around Bakhmut and along the western outskirts of Donetsk City.
• Russian forces continue efforts to establish further control over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).
• Ukrainian and European officials continue to warn that Russia is preparing for an imminent second wave of mobilization.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to transport Ukrainian children to Russian territory under the guise of medical rehabilitation schemes.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort);
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Svatove on January 7. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian troops northwest of Svatove in the Kupyansk direction are trying to improve their tactical positions and that Ukrainian troops repelled an attack near Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove).[18] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian troops attempted to counterattack towards Synkivka (45km northwest of Svatove).[19] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian troops attempted to advance on Stelmakhkivka and Novoselivske (13km northwest of Svatove).[20] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that a Russian engineering and sapper unit arrived in Svatove to examine options for potentially blowing the dam of a nearby reservoir in order to slow Ukrainian advances in the Svatove area.[21] Footage posted by Russian media outlet RIA Novosti shows a BMPT armored fighting vehicle in the Svatove area manned by personnel who appear to be wearing patches of the 3rd Army Corps.[22]

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Kreminna on January 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops attempted to attack near Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna), Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna), and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[23]  A Russian milblogger noted that Russian forces are attacking towards Makiivka and that Makiivka and the surrounding area are a “grey zone.”[24] The Russian MoD reported Ukrainian assault groups are operating in the Serebrianka forest area southwest of Kreminna.[25]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces made marginal confirmed advances in Soledar, but Ukrainian forces maintain control of the settlement as of January 7. Geolocated footage shows a Wagner Group fighter at the Artyomsol Plant in central Soledar.[26] Russian milbloggers also broadly claimed that Wagner Group forces are fighting around Soledar on the streets in Pidhorodne, Krasna Hora, Krasnopillia, Blahodatne, Razdolivka, and Vesele and that Wagner Group fighters have taken complete control of Pidhorodne.[27] ISW has not observed visual confirmation to corroborate these extensive claims, beyond footage of the aftermath of urban combat and fighting in residential buildings in Soledar over the course of January 6 and 7.[28] A Ukrainian military correspondent posted a geolocated picture of himself in front of the Soledar Salt Mine in northwestern Soledar, indicating that Ukrainian troops hold the northwestern part of the settlement and repelled reported Russian attacks on this part of the mine.[29] Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces, Serhiy Cherevaty, denied Russian claims that Ukrainian troops are withdrawing from Soledar, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops continue to repel Russian attacks on the settlement.[30]

Russian forces additionally continued ground attacks south of Bakhmut on January 7. Geolocated footage confirms that Wagner Group forces advanced into Klishchiivka (6km southwest of Bakhmut).[31] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks south of Bakhmut near Ozerianivka and Klishchiivka.[32] Russian milbloggers additionally discussed fighting south of Bakhmut near Opytne.[33] Graphic drone footage posted on January 7 shows the corpses of Wagner Group forces scattered near Bakhmut, indicating that combat in this area continues to be highly attritional.[34]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the western outskirts of Donetsk City on January 7. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks near Pervomaiske on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City, and near Marinka and Pobieda on the southwestern outskirts.[35] A Russian milblogger reported that Russian troops are attempting to bypass Avdiivka (north of Donetsk City) from positions to the north, and that the next decisive offensive action in this sector will be on Pervomaiske.[36] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian troops conducted unsuccessful assaults northwest of Donetsk City towards Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka.[37] Social media footage shows Russian offensive operations within Marinka, where a milblogger claimed that Russian troops are trying to bypass Ukrainian fortifications from the south.[38] Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed or claimed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast and continued routine fire along the line of contact in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.[39]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued routine indirect fire west of Hulyaipole and along the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River in Dnipropetrovsk and Kherson oblasts on January 7 despite the declared Russian ceasefire.[40] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck Kherson City and Nikopol, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[41] Ukrainian Mayor of Kamianske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, Andriy Bilousov, reported that Ukrainian air defense shot down a Russian drone near the settlement.[42] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely tried to preempt criticism that Russian indirect fire continued during the period of the Russian ceasefire by claiming that Russian forces returned fire in Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kherson oblasts to suppress Ukrainian artillery strikes against Russian positions in southern Ukraine.[43]

Russian forces continue efforts to establish further control over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) as of January 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian occupation troops have forced about 3,000 employees at the ZNPP to obtain Russian passports.[44] Russian authorities likely forced many Ukrainian employees at the ZNPP to obtain Russian passports in order to support ongoing efforts to force the employees to sign employment contracts with Russian state nuclear power company Rosatom.[45] Energoatom reported that only 100 out of the 6700 remaining Ukrainian workers at the plant have signed contracts with Rosatom as of October 28, 2022.[46]

Russian sources claimed that Russian air defenses shot down a Ukrainian drone in the vicinity of Russian-occupied Sevastopol, Crimea on the night of January 6 to 7.[47] 

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Ukrainian and European officials continue to warn that Russia is preparing for an imminent second wave of mobilization. Head of the Estonian Defense Forces intelligence center Colonel Margo Grosberg stated that Russian authorities are preparing for an imminent second wave of mobilization while continuing covert mobilization and noted that details regarding this new wave will likely become clear following Orthodox Christmas.[48]  Grosberg noted that a printer in Krasnodar Krai has already received an order for 5,000 mobilization call-up slips.[49] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative Andriy Chernak reported on January 7 that Russian officials plan to mobilize up to 500,000 Russians, including residents of Moscow and Saint Petersburg, which arguably have faced lighter mobilization pushes in the past.[50] Ukrainian and Russian sources continue to detail ongoing Russian mobilization efforts in Russia and occupied parts of Ukraine and refusals of Russian officials to release soldiers with expired contracts.[51] One Russian source accused “provocateurs” of spreading false reports of mobilization to push a false narrative of the existence of a second wave.[52]  However, as Ukrainian and other officials have noted, and as ISW has previously reported, discussion of a “second” wave of mobilization is somewhat misleading because mobilization efforts never truly ceased after the purported “end” of partial mobilization.[53]  Even the initial partial mobilization efforts in Russia were not truly the first mobilization wave; moreover, they were the first mobilization efforts aimed at the reserve on the tail end of regionally-based volunteer recruitment drives throughout the summer of 2022.  The volunteer recruitment drives, finally, followed the call-up of Russian reservists in advance of the invasion of February 24, 2022.  Each successive reserve call-up reaches deeper into the pool of men who have been out of service longer, are older, in worse health, or were exempted in previous waves.

Russian authorities continue to recruit for territorial defense forces and perpetuate the unrealistic threat of a Ukrainian ground assault on Russian border regions. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 7 that Russian police in Belgorod Oblast are implementing a recruitment campaign following the failure of the initial plan to generate volunteers.[54] Russian servicemen reportedly visit residential areas, survey the male population of military age, and engage in discussions aimed at popularizing service.[55]

A Russian news outlet reported on January 6 that Russian authorities want to conduct “revenue mobilization” and collect a one-time payment of an unspecified amount from large businesses in order to fund the war and address problems in the state budget.[56] The source also claimed that Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin provided Russian officials in mid-December with relevant instructions for “revenue mobilization” and a proposal to allocate 175 billion rubles (about $2.4 million) to fund the war and additionally to provide for the resettlement of residents of Kherson Oblast to unspecified locations.[57] Russia continues to seek methods to circumvent growing financial difficulties, as ISW has previously reported.[58]

Russian military leadership continues to experience challenges with maintaining the morale of mobilized servicemen. A Russian mobilization Telegram channel posted video footage on January 7 in which previously mobilized servicemen of Belgorod Oblast asked to go home after stating that Russian leadership sent them to the territory of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) as cannon fodder.[59] A Russian source claimed on January 8 that mobilized servicemen of the 568th Howitzer Artillery Battalion, now subordinate to the DNR’s 1st Army corps, complained that their command is transferring them into an infantry role for which they were not trained.[60] Independent Georgia-based investigative organization Conflict Intelligence Team reported on January 6 that several mobilized Russian servicemen training in Belarus escaped from their unit and stated that the servicemen are on a wanted list in Minsk Oblast.[61]

Russian military leadership continues to face resistance in ethnic enclaves following past partial mobilization efforts. The “Free Yakutia Foundation,” established on August 24, operates similarly to the other ethnic advocacy groups in Russia with anti-war and anti-xenophobia sentiments and seeks independence from Russia.[62] The “Free Yakutia Foundation” states that Russia’s partial mobilization scheme is part of a larger effort to ethnically cleanse indigenous peoples from Russia and that Russian military leadership intentionally sends minority groups of Russia into Ukraine as cannon fodder.[63] A Russian source claimed on January 7 that the “Free Yakutia Foundation’s” emphasis on the Russian government as a totalitarian and oppressive institution is overstated and unpopular in Russia’s Yakutia (Sakha) Republic and that the West is fixated on dividing the Russian Federation along ethnic lines.[64] ISW has previously reported that ethnic minority enclaves largely face the brunt of force generation efforts, which may prove to be a source of domestic dissent for the Kremlin as the war continues.[65]

Some Russians continue to challenge Russian force-generation efforts. A Russian news outlet reported on January 6 that Russian authorities in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast detained three people, including two minors, on suspicion of intent to set fire to a military recruiting office using Molotov cocktails.[66]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities are continuing to transport Ukrainian children to Russian territory under the guise of medical rehabilitation schemes. Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai stated on January 7 that Russian occupation authorities transported 300 Ukrainian children to Moscow Oblast hospitals after Russian field doctors in Luhansk Oblast conducted medical exams to identify children with “serious injuries.”[67] Haidai also reported on January 7 that teachers in occupied Luhansk Oblast accept bribes from Russian occupation officials to provide authorities with lists of children for medical examinations.[68]

Russian forces and occupation authorities are continuing to take measures to control movement in occupied territories. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 7 that Russian forces are collecting data on local residents after Russian occupation authorities introduced special permits allowing civilian movement between settlements in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[69] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also reported on January 7 that residents must specify the purpose of their movement and identify the person they are visiting, allowing Russian forces to gather data on connections between residents in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[70]

Russian forces and occupation authorities are continuing to use intimidation to consolidate economic and administrative control of occupied territories. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 7 that Russian occupation authorities fully eradicated the Ukrainian hryvnia from circulation in occupied Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast, by threatening local entrepreneurs with fines and confiscation of property.[71] The Ukrainian General Staff stated on January 7 that Russian forces have increased seizures of residential property in Enerhodar as the number of houses abandoned due to forced evacuation has increased.

Russian occupation authorities are continuing to intensify measures to consolidate social control of occupied territories. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 7 that Russian occupation authorities replaced all Ukrainian television channels with Russian programming in Melitopol and Pryazovske, Zaporizhia Oblast.[72]

Russian occupation authorities continued intensifying efforts to identify partisan activity in occupied territories on January 7. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 7 that Russian occupation authorities created a Telegram chatbot to encourage local residents to report on and identify Ukrainian partisans operating in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast.[73]

ISW will continue to report daily observed indicators consistent with the current assessed most dangerous course of action (MDCOA): a renewed invasion of northern Ukraine possibly aimed at Kyiv. 

ISW’s December 15 MDCOA warning forecast about a potential Russian offensive against northern Ukraine in winter 2023 remains a worst-case scenario within the forecast cone. ISW currently assesses the risk of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as low, but possible, and the risk of Belarusian direct involvement as very low. This new section in the daily update is not in itself a forecast or assessment. It lays out the daily observed indicators we are using to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we expect to update regularly. Our assessment that the MDCOA remains unlikely has not changed. We will update this header if the assessment changes.

Observed indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

• Nothing significant to report.

Observed ambiguous indicators for MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

• Nothing significant to report.

Observed counter-indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

• Commander of the Kyiv Defense Forces Lieutenant-General Oleksandr Pavliuk stated on January 7 that there is currently no immediate threat of a Russian offensive on Kyiv from Belarusian territory.[74] Pavliuk claimed that Russian forces are deployed near the Ukrainian-Belarusian border to pin Ukrainian forces on the northern border so that Ukrainian command cannot transfer these forces to eastern Ukraine.[75] Pavliuk stated that Ukrainian forces are considering the possibility of a Russian offensive in northwestern Ukraine in the coming months but have not observed Russian forces transfer the appropriate number of forces and means to Belarus in preparation for such an offensive.[76]
• The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 7.[77]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

Correction: A previous version of this report incorrectly identified Lieutenant-General Oleksandr Pavliuk by his previous position as the Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head. He is currently the Commander of the Kyiv Defense Forces.

[1] https://t.me/operativsvo/24715; https://t.me/kommunist/14742

[2] https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/1867

[3] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/10126; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/10125; https://t.me/kornilov1968/14679; https://t.me/sashakots/37956

[4] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/10125; https; ://t.me/kornilov1968/14679; https://t.me/sashakots/37956;

[5] https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-government-moscow-religion-orthodox-church-edafd7fef7f0d12e692a30e56a05ed1b; https://mkip.gov dot ua/news/8416.html

[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121422

[7] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/07/world/europe/ukraine-orthodox-christmas-russia.html

[8] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70334; https://t.me/news_kremlin/1344

[9] https://mobile.twitter.com/oleksiireznikov/status/1611449870040109058

[10] https://mobile.twitter.com/oleksiireznikov/status/1611449870040109058

[11] https://t.me/mod_russia/23017 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122922

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121622

[13] https://mobile.twitter.com/oleksiireznikov/status/1611449870040109058

[14] https://mobile.twitter.com/oleksiireznikov/status/1611449870040109058

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar123022 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010423

[16] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/rosiiski-terorysty-vykorystaly-blyzko-660-iranskykh-shakhediv.htm ; https://mobile.twitter.com/oleksiireznikov/status/1611449870040109058

[17] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/rosiiski-terorysty-vykorystaly-blyzko-660-iranskykh-shakhediv.html

[18]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0V9meYLzwcc7Wo5cNQ6YKneY67AXC35Vq3T8TFybpX5XFkmL1Dx5JSFpUtn3yL9Gjl

[19] https://t.me/mod_russia/23258

[20] https://t.me/wargonzo/10226

[21] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/07/rosiyany-mozhut-pidirvaty-dambu-svativskogo-vodoshovyshha-aby-spovilnyty-nastup-zsu/

[22] https://twitter.com/tom_bullock_/status/1611691956995821568
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1611667530791149568
https://t.me/rian_ru/190594  

[23]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0V9meYLzwcc7Wo5cNQ6YKneY67AXC35Vq3T8TFybpX5XFkmL1Dx5JSFpUtn3yL9Gjl

[24] https://t.me/wargonzo/10226

[25] https://t.me/mod_russia/23258

[26] https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/17660

[27] https://t.me/operativsvo/24715; https://t.me/kommunist/14742; https://t.me/riafan_everywhere/15880; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74674

[28] ***GRAPHIC** https://twitter.com/toghrulmaharram/status/1611486869505691648?s=20&t=gQbH17R50KuyTpUDHJyLCA; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1611481263050985472?cxt=HHwWgMDQ5fbqkN0sAAAA
https://twitter.com/Amir_Intel/status/1611509584966844418; https://twitter.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1611437063634817024
https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1611435846992859160
https://t.me/wargonzo/10217
https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1611730284457631747; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1611481263050985472
https://twitter.com/Amir_Intel/status/1611667490865840128  https://t.me/rus_bakhmut/13490
https://twitter.com/1337kid_/status/1611350724935548928  https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1611709440352215042
https://t.me/yigal_levin/38452?comment=786950  

[29] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/1990
https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1611673984738775046
https://twitter.com/mitkoikBG/status/1611655690170388482
https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1611639976722145280

[30] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/01/07/soledar-ne-znahodytsya-pid-kontrolem-rf-sergij-cherevatyj/; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0V9meYLzwcc7Wo5cNQ6YKneY67AXC35Vq3T8TFybpX5XFkmL1Dx5JSFpUtn3yL9Gjl

[31] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1611652988292026368?s=20&t=2n5d30RahShYA-OTewt0gw; https://t.me/Tsaplienko/24062; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1611639530754347013?cxt=HHwWisC4iann2N0sAAAA; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1611639939166265344?cxt=HHwWgICz_Yv_2N0sAAAA; https://t.me/Tsaplienko/24062
https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1611730299976654849
https://twitter.com/doppelot/status/1611651030411870208  

[32]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0V9meYLzwcc7Wo5cNQ6YKneY67AXC35Vq3T8TFybpX5XFkmL1Dx5JSFpUtn3yL9Gjl

[33] https://t.me/wargonzo/10226; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74647

[34] GRAPHIC https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1611709440352215042
https://t.me/yigal_levin/38452?comment=786950  

[35]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0V9meYLzwcc7Wo5cNQ6YKneY67AXC35Vq3T8TFybpX5XFkmL1Dx5JSFpUtn3yL9Gjl

[36] https://t.me/wargonzo/10226

[37] https://t.me/mod_russia/23258

[38] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1610636766591225857 https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1611389333625344002; https://t.me/Fosfor_95/4355; https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1611730307232813060; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1611267705277140992; https://t.me/cmiye/8830; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74650; https://t.me/wargonzo/10226

[39]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TtVQgMaAgFXoiBJuuwbekCizycACpy4XfZDB3eRF5XhKnGucvsQR21NhDL67qav9l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0V9meYLzwcc7Wo5cNQ6YKneY67AXC35Vq3T8TFybpX5XFkmL1Dx5JSFpUtn3yL9Gjl; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/15888; https://t.me/wargonzo/10226

[40] https://t.me/khersonskaODA/2959 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TtVQgMaAgFXoiBJuuwbekCizycACpy4XfZDB3eRF5XhKnGucvsQR21NhDL67qav9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0V9meYLzwcc7Wo5cNQ6YKneY67AXC35Vq3T8TFybpX5XFkmL1Dx5JSFpUtn3yL9Gjl ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/15888 ;

[41] https://t.me/khersonskaODA/2959 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TtVQgMaAgFXoiBJuuwbekCizycACpy4XfZDB3eRF5XhKnGucvsQR21NhDL67qav9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0V9meYLzwcc7Wo5cNQ6YKneY67AXC35Vq3T8TFybpX5XFkmL1Dx5JSFpUtn3yL9Gjl

[42] https://t.me/belousov_andrei/2303

[43] https://t.me/mod_russia/23258

[44]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0V9meYLzwcc7Wo5cNQ6YKneY67AXC35Vq3T8TFybpX5XFkmL1Dx5JSFpUtn3yL9Gjl

[45] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/12/14/bilshist-praczivnykiv-zaes-vidmovlyayutsya-ukladaty-dogovir-z-rosatomom/

[46] https://t.me/energoatom_ua/10414

[47] https://t.me/rybar/42527 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/95210 https://t.me/razvozhaev/1809

[48] https://news.err dot ee/1608842200/intelligence-chief-second-russian-call-up-likely-after-orthodox-christmas; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/6788; https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-jan-4-6

[49] https://news.err dot ee/1608842200/intelligence-chief-second-russian-call-up-likely-after-orthodox-christmas

[50] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/rosiiska-vlada-15-sichnia-mozhe-oholosyty-pro-dodatkovu-mobilizatsiiu.html

[51] https://semnasem dot org/news/2023/01/06/zhitelnica-makeevki-rasskazala-ob-oblavah-voenkomata-na-sotrudnikov-shahty; https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-jan-4-6; https://www dot kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/384658/; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/6740; https://twitter.com/brewerov/status/1611004954654969857?s=52&t=5fhMiGysfH4KmgdMLYg4qw;%20https://t.me/sotaproject/51994; https://t.me/tverskey/2936

[52] https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-jan-4-6; https://t.me/sotaproject/51994

[53] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120322; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-1; https://isw.pub/UkrWar113022

[54]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0V9meYLzwcc7Wo5cNQ6YKneY67AXC35Vq3T8TFybpX5XFkmL1Dx5JSFpUtn3yL9Gjl

[55]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0V9meYLzwcc7Wo5cNQ6YKneY67AXC35Vq3T8TFybpX5XFkmL1Dx5JSFpUtn3yL9Gjl

[56] https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/13647; https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-jan-4-6;

[57] https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/13647

[58]https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Operations%20Assessments%20November%2025.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20October%208.pdf

[59] https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/17706; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/6802

[60] https://t.me/notes_veterans/7327

[61] https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-jan-4-6; https://charter97%20dot%20org/ru/news/2023/1/6/531135/

[62] https://www.instagram.com/reel/Cm1cZNuh-aM/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link; https://www.instagram.com/p/ChpNUZQJZm3/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link

[63] https://www.instagram.com/freeyakutiafoundation/?hl=en; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nosebe8kxeQ; https://www.instagram.com/p/ChpNUZQJZm3/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link

[64] https://t.me/rybar/42532;%20https://t.me/rybar/42533

[65] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct18; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct5; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignSept22; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignJuly24

[66] https://t.me/bazabazon/15260; https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-jan-4-6

[67] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/7877

[68] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/7877

[69] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/07/rosiyany-vykorystovuyut-speczperepustky-na-tot-dlya-zboru-informacziyi-shhodo-misczevyh-meshkancziv/

[70] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/07/rosiyany-vykorystovuyut-speczperepustky-na-tot-dlya-zboru-informacziyi-shhodo-misczevyh-meshkancziv/

[71]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0V9meYLzwcc7Wo5cNQ6YKneY67AXC35Vq3T8TFybpX5XFkmL1Dx5JSFpUtn3yL9Gjl

[72]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TtVQgMaAgFXoiBJuuwbekCizycACpy4XfZDB3eRF5XhKnGucvsQR21NhDL67qav9l

[73] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/07/okupanty-zaklykaly-meshkancziv-melitopolya-pysaty-donosy/

[74] https://suspilne dot media/353624-navkolo-kieva-dekilka-rubeziv-oboroni-protaznistu-blizko-tisaci-kilometriv-general-lejtenant-oleksandr-pavluk/

[75] https://suspilne dot media/353624-navkolo-kieva-dekilka-rubeziv-oboroni-protaznistu-blizko-tisaci-kilometriv-general-lejtenant-oleksandr-pavluk/

[76] https://suspilne dot media/353624-navkolo-kieva-dekilka-rubeziv-oboroni-protaznistu-blizko-tisaci-kilometriv-general-lejtenant-oleksandr-pavluk/

[77]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0V9meYLzwcc7Wo5cNQ6YKneY67AXC35Vq3T8TFybpX5XFkmL1Dx5JSFpUtn3yL9Gjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TtVQgMaAgFXoiBJuuwbekCizycACpy4XfZDB3eRF5XhKnGucvsQR21NhDL67qav9l