Iran Update, July 10, 2023

Iran Update, July 10, 2023

Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Brian Carter, Annika Ganzeveld, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, and Amin Soltani

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched a new interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions.

Key Takeaways

1. Iranian-backed militias and Syrian regime forces deployed to Deir ez Zor in response to rumors of an imminent International Coalition attack to liberate cities there which began in late June.
2. Lebanese Hezbollah and Syrian-regime media outlets claimed the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will pressure Turkey to withdraw its forces from Syria in exchange for direct investment. Iran and Syria may aim to use the media outlets to shape negotiations ahead of talks between Turkey and the Gulf States about Syrian-Turkish normalization.
3. Four Jaish al Adl militants attacked a police station in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on July 8 in retaliation for the September 2022 “Blood Friday” massacre, indicating that Jaish al Adl is trying to portray itself as the bastion of Iranian Baloch citizens. The Iranian regime limited its response to condemning the attack, likely to maintain stability in this restive border region.
4. IRGC-affiliated media is touting the successes of Iran-sponsored armed resistance in the West Bank against the recent Israeli raids into the area.
5. President Ebrahim Raisi will visit Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe on July 11 to expand Iran’s economic influence in Africa, marking the first Iranian presidential visit to Africa in 11 years. Greater economic cooperation with African countries will not enable the Iranian regime to fix the structural flaws in Iran’s economy, however.

Iranian Activities in the Levant

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

Iranian-backed militias and Syrian regime forces deployed to Deir ez Zor in response to rumors of an imminent International Coalition attack to liberate cities there which began in late June.[1] Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC QF) and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) officials met on July 7 to discuss Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and US forces deployments north of Deir ez Zor city.[2] The IRGC QF Eastern Region commander ordered Iranian-backed militants on July 8 to transport short and medium-range rockets to an Iranian headquarters in Hatla and Marat, approximately 10 kilometers from SDF-controlled territory.[3] Syrian regime forces also reinforced military positions in Mayadin[4] The Russian-backed Syrian Arab Army 5th Corps deployed with ten tanks to Hatla.[5] SDF militants reinforced several military checkpoints in its territory with personnel and heavy machinery along the lines of contact with regime forces between July 8-10.[6]

SDF forces may be reinforcing their positions near Khasham in response to ISIS activity in the area, which would cause the influx of SDF-backed forces. Demonstrators chanting pro-ISIS slogans and carrying ISIS flags moved along the M7 road, a major road connecting Deir ez Zor city to al Suwar, on July 4.[7] The SDF responded with raids against alleged ISIS supporters and the deployment of “hundreds” of personnel.[8] A local journalist also reported the SDF tasked the Internal Security Forces (InSF) with relieving SDF-backed Deir ez Zor Military Council forces in the area.[9]

CTP is considering the hypothesis that Iran will use the militant and Syrian regime forces that have deployed to eastern Syria to pursue an offensive strategy against US forces in Syria. This is plausible because Iran instructed the IRGC QF to achieve total hegemony in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria in May 2023, as CTP previously reported.[10] Iran has taken steps to advance this goal. Iran has trained militias in Syria to use a range of improvised and advanced weapons to attack US forces and recruited sleeper cells for informant activity in SDF-controlled territory in eastern Syria to train and strengthen its offensive capabilities since May.[11] Iran also established several military facilities including a joint headquarters with Lebanese Hezbollah to orchestrate and sustain offensive operations.[12] Iranian-backed militias framed the US-led international coalition in Syria as an imminent security threat to local Syrians possibly to incite and sustain local support to expel US forces from Syria during two military parades in eastern Syria on June 24 and July 4.[13] The timeline below displays these developments in Deir ez Zor Province. This hypothesis is unlikely because Iranian-backed militants and officers fled Deir ez Zor Province for other provinces out of fear of International Coalition attacks[14] Indicators that would support the hypothesis include: 1) Iranian commanders ordering an attack on SDF-controlled territory; 2) Iranian-backed militants from other Syrian provinces deploy to Deir ez Zor Province; 3) Iran deploys militants from Afghanistan or Iraq to Deir ez Zor Province; 4) Iran messages support for the Syrian regime’s territorial claims in eastern Syria.

Sources: Eye of Euphrates, Middle East Eye, Washington Post, Deir ez Zor 24, Sada al Sharqieh.[15]

Lebanese Hezbollah and Syrian-regime media outlets claimed the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will pressure Turkey to withdraw its forces from Syria in exchange for direct investment.[16] International media reported on July 7 that Turkish President Erdogan will visit the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar on July 17 — 19 to secure 10 billion USD of direct investment for the Turkish economy[17] The Axis of Resistance media outlets linked Erdogan’s travel to the UAE with Syrian-Turkish normalization, citing the UAE’s financial influence over Turkey and the UAE’s involvement in other Syrian normalization efforts.[18]

Iran and Syria may aim to use the media outlets to shape negotiations ahead of talks between Turkey and the Gulf States about Syrian-Turkish normalization. Iran stands to gain similar economic and military benefits from a UAE-brokered normalization and an Iran-Russia-brokered agreement. Arab states investing in Syria would create opportunities for the Syrian regime to fund Iranian reconstruction projects. This would provide Iran with another avenue to circumvent sanctions and a source of revenue to improve its economy. Such circumstances would also empower Iran to send more funds to its proxy and partner militias throughout Syria, further reinforcing its military presence. A Turkish withdrawal from all or part of Syria would enable Iranian military and economic expansion into previously inaccessible regions in northwestern Syria.

Iranian Domestic and Political Affairs

This section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here.

Four Jaish al Adl militants attacked a police station in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on July 8 in retaliation for the September 2022 “Blood Friday” massacre, indicating that Jaish al Adl is trying to portray itself as the bastion of Iranian Baloch citizens.[19] The militants, who wore suicide vests and were equipped with grenades, stormed Police Station 16 in Zahedan, killing two Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officers.[20] All four assailants died during the attack.[21] Jaish al Adl is an anti-regime militant group that operates around the Iran-Pakistan border region and regularly conducts attacks against Iranian regime security forces.[22] Jaish al Adl issued threats against the regime in October 2022 following security forces’ violent suppression of protesters in Zahedan on September 30, 2022, an event that became known as “Bloody Friday.”[23] Jaish al Adl emphasized after the attack on July 8 that civil disobedience is insufficient to secure Baloch rights and vowed to conduct more ”targeted and harmful” attacks in the future.

The Iranian regime limited its response to condemning the attack, likely to maintain stability in this restive border region. Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanani “strongly condemned” the attack on July 9.[24] IRGC-affiliated media blamed the attack on prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid.[25] Sistan and Baluchistan Province is a historically restive region that is home to a large Sunni Baloch population.[26] Sistan and Baluchistan Province residents hold numerous grievances against the regime, including discrimination against Sunni Baloch citizens and severe water shortages.[27] Residents in this province have protested the regime’s treatment of Sunni Baloch citizens in Zahedan every Friday for forty weeks.[28] The regime previously conducted negotiations with Sunni Baloch clerics following the “Bloody Friday” incident.[29]

The July 8 attack may strain Iran’s relationship with Pakistan, which Iran accuses of harboring Jaish al Adl militants.[30] The Iranian regime has frequently called on the Pakistani government to crack down on Jaish al Adl.[31] Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi stated on July 9 that Iran “expects neighboring countries to take care of and control their borders.”[32] Iran may place increased pressure on Pakistan to dismantle Jaish al Adl cells in the coming weeks.

IRGC-affiliated media is touting the successes of Iran-sponsored armed resistance in the West Bank against the recent Israeli raids into the area. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency argued on July 8 that Israel’s recent operations in the West Bank demonstrate that Israel is unable to deal with the resistance operations in the area.[33] Tasnim further claimed on July 10 that these raids demonstrated the success of Iran’s strategy to arm resistance groups in the area.[34] Israeli forces raided the West Bank town of Nablus and conducted air and ground operations in another West Bank town, Jenin, between July 3 and 7.[35] Palestinian militants thanked Iran and the broader Axis of Resistance for their help during the recent raids.[36] CTP previously assessed that Palestinian militants will likely receive Iranian assistance to rebuild the military capabilities the IDF degraded.[37]

President Ebrahim Raisi will visit Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe on July 11 to expand Iran’s economic influence in Africa, marking the first Iranian presidential visit to Africa in 11 years.[38] Raisi’s three-day trip will include the participation of Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and unspecified Iranian businesspeople, underscoring the economic focus of the trip. Iranian media separately reported that Raisi will discuss trade—including Iranian oil derivate and fuel sales—with African officials. Iranian media framed Raisi’s visit as an extension of his Latin America tour to Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela in June 2023, which also focused on expanding economic cooperation with these states.

Greater economic cooperation with African countries will not enable the Iranian regime to fix the structural flaws in Iran’s economy, however. Greater bilateral trade with foreign countries would enable Iran to increase its capital inflows but will not solve the problems that underlie Iran’s economic instability. Fundamental economic reforms—such as reducing the dominance of para-statal organizations in Iran’s economy and combatting corruption and nepotism—would be necessary to meaningfully improve Iran’s economy.[39]

Iranian officials will likely discuss other avenues of cooperation, including environmental diplomacy, with their African counterparts. Iranian media reported that Raisi will discuss Iran participating in “extraterritorial cultivation” on African soil during his trip, which would mitigate the ramifications of Iranian water shortages.[40] Iran has previously supplied arms to Kenya and other African states and may leverage Raisi's trip to strengthen security ties with Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe and export arms.[41] Iranian officials have expressed interest in using arms sales to generate revenue for the economy in recent weeks. Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri stated on May 31 that Iran will export its military capabilities to “friendly” countries.[42] Bagheri also called on Foreign Affairs Ministry officials to relay Iran’s willingness to export its defense capabilities to foreign dignitaries.