Iran Update, August 21, 2024

Aug 21, 2024 - ISW Press
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Iran Update, August 21, 2024

Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Kathryn Tyson, Kelly Campa, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

The Iranian Permanent Mission to the UN suggested on August 20 that Iran’s Axis of Resistance could conduct a ground attack into Israel in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks.[1] The Iranian UN mission likely published this statement to generate psychological and informational effects, rather than to signal Iran’s serious intention to conduct a ground attack into Israel imminently. The Iranian UN mission asserted that Iran could attack Israel “from the ground” while Israel is focused “on the skies and [its] radar screens.”[2] CTP-ISW has not previously observed Iranian officials threaten to conduct a ground incursion into Israel in response to Haniyeh’s death. Iran and its Axis of Resistance are unlikely seriously considering conducting a ground operation into Israel, however, given that such an operation would undermine their stated objective to avoid a large-scale war with Israel.

Iran and its Axis of Resistance are unlikely to risk triggering a large-scale war with Israel by conducting a ground operation into Israeli territory, and more likely seek to stoke fear and anxiety in Israeli society by presenting such an operation as a possible response to Haniyeh’s death. Israeli officials have repeatedly threatened military action to force the Radwan Force north of the Litani River if diplomatic efforts fail, and any ground attack into Israel is most likely to come from Lebanon.[3] Hezbollah’s Radwan Force, which is deployed in southern Lebanon, is designed for ground attacks to Israel. A ground attack from Lebanon would accelerate Israeli decision-making and trigger a war to force the Radwan north of the Litani, at minimum. Senior IDF officials have explicitly stated that Israel will not allow Lebanese Hezbollah to conduct an October 7-style attack in northern Israel.[4] The IDF has also consistently targeted Radwan Force commanders in recent months.[5] The IDF’s targeting of Radwan Force commanders illustrates that the most likely ground attack threat to Israel comes from Hezbollah.

CTP-ISW is currently not prepared to change its assessment that Iran and its Axis of Resistance will most likely conduct a coordinated, large-scale attack targeting Israel. Some recent Iranian statements and Western media reports diverge from CTP-ISW's ongoing assessment. Below are several of these statements and reports:

  • Unspecified Iranian officials told Western media that Iran will "delay” its attack on Israel if Israel and Hamas conclude a ceasefire-hostage agreement.[6] The Iranian UN mission similarly claimed in its August 20 statement that Iran seeks to “avoid any possible adverse impact” on the ongoing ceasefire-hostage negotiations.[7]
  • The Iranian president and his allies have advocated for attacking “secret Israeli bases” in Iraqi Kurdistan and Azerbaijan as a way to limit the risk of escalation.[8]
  • Some senior Iranian officials have called for killing senior Israeli political and military leaders instead of conducting a widescale attack on Israel.[9]

CTP-ISW does not dismiss the above statements and reports. These statements and reports, however, most likely do not reflect the views of the Iranian security establishment and members of the chain of command who are ultimately responsible for deciding and implementing Iran’s response. The Iranian UN mission, for example, reports to the Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry, which is part of the Masoud Pezeshkian administration. The Iranian UN mission’s statement that Iran seeks to avoid undermining ceasefire-hostage negotiations by conducting a strike therefore likely reflects Pezeshkian’s desire to avoid a direct strike on Israel rather than the views of the Iranian security establishment.[10] CTP-ISW continues to attach greater significance to statements from senior Iranian military officials and the Supreme Leader about how Iran will respond. These statements continue to indicate that Iran will most likely conduct a coordinated, large-scale attack targeting Israel:

  • Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered a direct strike on Israel during a Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) meeting immediately following Haniyeh’s death.[11] Khamenei has publicly stated that Israel should face a “harsh punishment” for killing Haniyeh.[12]
  • Senior Iranian security officials, including Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri and SNSC Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian, have suggested that both Iran and the Axis of Resistance will retaliate against Israel.[13]
  • Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps officials, including IRGC Deputy Commander Ali Fadavi, continue to indicate that Iran will attack Israel directly.[14]

CTP-ISW will continue to closely monitor statements from senior Iranian security officials and will reevaluate its current assessment if these officials alter their rhetoric regarding Iran’s retaliation against Israel.

The Iranian Parliament approved all 19 of President Masoud Pezeshkian’s ministerial nominees on August 21.[15] This is the first time since 2001 and third time in the Islamic Republic’s history that all the President’s cabinet proposals got through the first round of voting in parliament. Parliament approved all of the ministerial nominees in the Khatami administration’s 2001 cabinet and the Rafsanjani administration’s 1989 cabinet.[16] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had seen and approved Pezeshkian’s nominees before Pezeshkian presented it to Parliament, presumably as a way to increase the likelihood that Parliament would approve his nominees.[17] Pezeshkian’s deliberate choice to obtain Khamenei’s approval demonstrates his approach to cooperate with Khamenei.

Pezeshkian’s selection and Khamenei’s approval of this slate of ministers sought to establish a cabinet based on “unity” between political factions. This strategy probably also increased the likelihood Parliament would approve the nominees. President Masoud Pezeshkian emphasized that his ministerial nominees demonstrated that his administration would move forward with “unity” before Parliament voted on the ministers.[18] Pezeshkian also highlighted his proposed list’s diverse political factions, ranging from moderates and conservative and including officials with security backgrounds.[19] Pezeshkian’s cabinet selections underline his intentions to appease political factions in Iran, reduce domestic political friction, and promote his agenda of national unity.

An unspecified Iranian official claimed that there is an ongoing “high-level debate” within Iran over the continued utility of the supreme leader’s 2003 fatwa against nuclear weapons. This debate is consistent with previous statements from Iranian officials that normalized discussions about Iran’s ability to procure nuclear weapons. Iranian officials continue to suggest Iran could change its nuclear strategy to address growing Israeli threats. An unspecified official told Al Jazeera that there is "high-level debate" over the continued utility of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's 2003 fatwa against the acquisition, development, and use of nuclear weapons.[20] The official said any shift in Iran's nuclear doctrine would be undertaken to address the threat Israel poses towards Iran.[21] The official noted, however, that a change in Iran's nuclear doctrine "does not necessarily mean moving towards nuclear weapons."[22]

Iranian officials have normalized discussions about Iran’s ability to procure nuclear weapons since April 2024 and there are some indications that Iran is setting conditions to be able to quickly move towards a weapon, should it choose to do so.[23] Axios, citing US and Israeli intelligence agencies, reported in June 2024 that Iran began running computer simulations that could support the research and development of a nuclear weapon.[24] Anonymous diplomats told Reuters on June 12 that Iran is installing new centrifuges at its nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow, increasing the Iranian capacity to enrich uranium.[25] The Iranian stockpile of 60-percent-enriched uranium separately increased by over 15 percent from February to May 2024, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency.[26] These technical developments are especially noteworthy given that senior Iranian officials have indicated that Iran could change its nuclear doctrine in response to threats.[27] Some Iranian officials, including a top foreign policy adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have threatened to pursue nuclear weapons development in recent months.[28]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said that it has defeated Hamas’ Rafah Brigade. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on August 21 during a visit to Rafah that the IDF 162nd Division has defeated Hamas’ Rafah Brigade and have uncovered over 150 tunnels between the Gaza Strip and Egypt.[29] Gallant said that roughly one hundred of the tunnels are relatively low-tech and shallow.[30] The IDF 162nd Division advanced into Rafah on May 7, and the IDF said on June 17 that it had dismantled about half of Hamas’ forces in Rafah.[31] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent said in June 2024 that the IDF would shift to a “targeted raid” approach in the whole of the Gaza Strip after the end of the Rafah operation.[32] Hamas fighters have conducted 16 attacks targeting Israeli forces in Rafah over since August 10.[33] Other Palestinian militias conducted a combined 17 attacks over the same 11 days.[34] Smaller Palestinian militias allied with Hamas can continue to target Israeli forces along the Philadelphi Corridor, even if Hamas is ”defeated.”

Egyptian security sources told Reuters that Egypt would be open to an international presence along the Philadelphi Corridor for up to six months.[35] Egypt and Israel have not resolved their dispute over who will control the Rafah side of the Egypt-Gaza Strip border in the event of a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Israeli negotiators presented a map to Egyptian officials in recent days showing Israel reducing its forces but maintaining full control of the corridor, according to unspecified Israeli officials speaking to Axios.[36] Egyptian negotiators reportedly rejected the request to keep Israeli forces along the corridor.[37] Maintaining Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor will prevent Hamas and other Palestinian militias from rebuilding their capabilities quickly by interdicting major smuggling operations into the Gaza Strip that would accelerate Hamas’ ability to resupply itself, as CTP-ISW has argued previously.[38]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iranian Retaliation: The Iranian Permanent Mission to the UN suggested on August 20 that Iran’s Axis of Resistance could conduct a ground attack into Israel in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks. The Iranian UN mission likely published this statement to generate psychological and informational effects, rather than to signal Iran’s serious intention to conduct a ground attack into Israel imminently. Iran and its Axis of Resistance are unlikely to risk triggering a large-scale war with Israel by conducting a ground operation into Israeli territory, and more likely seek to stoke fear and anxiety in Israeli society by presenting such an operation as a possible response to Haniyeh’s death.
  • Risk of Major Iranian Drone and Missile Attack: CTP-ISW is currently not prepared to change its assessment that Iran and its Axis of Resistance will most likely conduct a coordinated, large-scale attack targeting Israel. Some recent Iranian statements and Western media reports diverge from CTP-ISW's ongoing assessment. CTP-ISW does not dismiss the divergent statements and reports. These statements and reports, however, most likely do not reflect the views of the Iranian security establishment and members of the chain of command who are ultimately responsible for deciding and implementing Iran’s response.
  • Iran’s Presidential Cabinet: The Iranian Parliament approved all 19 of President Masoud Pezeshkian’s ministerial nominees on August 21. Pezeshkian’s selection and Khamenei’s approval of this slate of ministers sought to establish a cabinet based on “unity” between political factions. This strategy probably also increased the likelihood Parliament would approve the nominees.
  • Iranian Nuclear Program: An unspecified Iranian official claimed that there is an ongoing “high-level debate” within Iran over the continued utility of the supreme leader’s 2003 fatwa against nuclear weapons. This debate is consistent with previous statements from Iranian officials that normalized discussions about Iran’s ability to procure nuclear weapons. There are some indications that Iran is setting conditions to be able to quickly move towards a weapon, should it choose to do so.
  • Rafah: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said that it has defeated Hamas’ Rafah Brigade. Egyptian security sources told Reuters that Egypt would be open to an international presence along the Philadelphi Corridor for up to six months. Maintaining Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor will prevent Hamas and other Palestinian militias from rebuilding their capabilities quickly by interdicting major smuggling operations into the Gaza Strip that would accelerate Hamas’ ability to resupply itself.

 

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF Air Force struck a Hamas command and control site in a school in western Gaza City on August 21.[39] The IDF said that Hamas used the Salah ad Din School to plan and conduct attacks. The IDF said that it took steps to reduce civilian harm, including through the selection of specific munitions and aerial surveillance.[40] Palestinian sources reported that the strike killed five Palestinians wounded dozens more in the attack.[41]

The IDF 252nd Division continued to operate near the Netzarim Corridor on August 21. The 252nd Division struck Hamas military buildings used to conduct attacks against Israeli forces.[42] Three Palestinian militias targeted Israeli forces along the corridor with rocket and mortar fire.[43]

The IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in Khan Younis on August 21.[44] Israeli forces killed Palestinian fighters and destroyed militia infrastructure in the Khan Younis area.[45] The 98th Division killed dozens of Palestinian fighters, conducted raids in the area on militia targets, and destroyed military compounds.[46] Israeli forces directed strikes on Palestinian fighters that launched rockets targeting Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip.[47] Hamas detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) at the entrance to a tunnel that Israeli forces discovered west of Hamad city, northern Khan Younis, on August 21.[48]

The IDF issued evacuation orders for parts of the humanitarian zone in Deir al Balah on August 21.[49] The IDF called on all civilians in the zone to move westward because the IDF would ”operate forcefully” against Palestinian militias in the area.[50] Photos posted by local journalists showed displaced Palestinians evacuating the area.[51] Israeli forces have advanced towards Deir al Balah since August 18.[52] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on August 19 showed flattened terrain and destroyed buildings northeast of al Qarara and in Wadi as Salqa, indicating that Israeli tanks or bulldozers recently operated in the area. The IDF stated that its 7th Brigade advanced north from Khan Younis to the “outskirts of Deir al Balah” on August 18.[53] Hamas targeted Israeli tanks advancing into Deir al Balah City with rocket-propelled grenades on August 21.[54]

The IDF 162nd Division continued to operate in Rafah on August 21.[55] Israeli forces killed dozens of fighters, destroyed militia infrastructure in the area, and located weapons caches that included IEDs, grenades, and Kalashnikov rifles.[56] Palestinian militias did not claim attacks targeting Israeli forces in Rafah on August 21.

The IDF Air Force struck about 30 militia targets in the Gaza Strip over the past day, including military buildings, Palestinian fighters, launching sites, operational tunnel shafts and an observation post.[57]

 

 

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Two Palestinian militias conducted a combined rocket attack targeting an IDF site in southern Israel on August 21.[58]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on August 20.[59] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms and detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting Israeli forces in the Balata refugee camp in Nablus.[60]

Hamas called on Palestinian fighters to mobilize in the West Bank on August 21. Hamas called for fighters to conduct attacks against Israelis in the West Bank and gather at the al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem on August 23.[61]


This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike that killed a senior leader of al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades in southern Lebanon on August 21.[62] The IDF said that the airstrike struck a vehicle in Sidon that killed Khalil al Maqdah, a senior al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades leader in Lebanon. The IDF reported that Khalil al Maqdah was the brother of Munir al Maqdah, a senior Fatah official in Lebanon who works with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah to plan and execute attacks on Israel.[63] The IDF assessed that the Maqdah brothers cooperated with the IRGC to transfer money and weapons to Palestinian militia cells in the West Bank.[64] The IDF said that it discovered an Iranian weapons smuggling network in the West Bank in March that was spearheaded by the Maqdah brothers.[65] The IDF said that two IRGC officials, Javad Ghafari and Ashgar Bagheri, coordinated with the two brothers to organize efforts to smuggle Iranian weapons into the West Bank.[66] The IDF said that Ghafari is the head of the special operations directorate within IRGC intelligence called Division 4000. Bagheri is the commander of Unit 840, which is a secret IRGC Quds Force unit responsible for external kidnappings and assassinations.[67]

The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting a Lebanese Hezbollah weapons depot in Bekaa Valley, Lebanon for the second consecutive day on August 21.[68] The IDF detected “secondary explosions” following the airstrikes.[69] The Israeli Army Radio reported that the Israeli airstrike in Bekaa Valley injured at least ten unspecified individuals.[70] Hezbollah responded to the IDF airstrikes in Bekaa Valley by firing Katyusha rockets targeting an IDF base in the Golan Heights.[71] The IDF detected at least 50 rockets and intercepted some of them. The remaining rockets struck civilian sites in Katzrin, approximately 1.5 kilometers away from the IDF base in the Golan Heights.[72] The rockets destroyed several houses in the town of Katzrin and injured one Israeli civilian.[73] IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari said that Israel will ”act accordingly” in response to the Hezbollah attack targeting Israeli civilians in the Golan Heights.[74] IDF 210thDivision commander Brigadier General Yair Peli traveled to Katzrin to assess the situation on ground and meet with local Israeli military and civilian leaders.[75]

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least twelve attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on August 20.[76] The IDF detected 40 launches that crossed from Lebanon and struck three locations in northern Israel.[77] Hezbollah also claimed that it fired one-way attack drones targeting Israeli forces in Upper Galilee.[78] The IDF intercepted some of the drones, and the remaining fell into open areas causing no casualties or damage.[79]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Likely Houthi fighters conducted a series of attacks using multiple small craft and several unidentified projectiles that disabled the Greek-flagged Sounion oil tanker in the Red Sea on August 21.[80] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that two small crafts approached Sounion and fired small arms targeting the oil tanker.[81] The security team aboard the Sounion returned fire. The Sounion was then struck with three unidentified projectiles about two hours after the first small arms attack. The UKMTO reported that the projectiles caused a fire onboard and led the vessel to lose engine power and its ability to maneuver.[82] The UKMTO reported the presence of an unidentified small craft “acting suspiciously” near Sounion after the fire.[83]

The UKMTO separately reported two explosions near a vessel approximately 57 nautical miles south of Aden, Yemen, on August 21.[84] The explosions did not cause any injuries or damage to the nearby vessel, and the vessel continued to its next port of call.

Houthi media claimed that the United States and United Kingdom conducted three airstrikes targeting as Salif, Yemen.[85]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah Spokesperson Abu Ali al Askari said on August 21 that Kataib Hezbollah has no obligation to stop attacks targeting US forces in Iraq.[86] Iraqi media sources reported on August 12 that Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al Sudani is actively trying to limit escalation between the United States and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including by sending a direct message to the militias that the Iraqi government will not allow attacks on US forces.[87] Askari’s statement comes after multiple Iranian-backed militia figures confirmed since July 30 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are prepared to resume attacks on US forces.[88] An unspecified source similarly told Iraqi-outlet Baghdad Today that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have “no red lines” for targeting US targets in Iraq, including Ain al Asad Airbase.[89] Newly-announced Iranian-backed Iraqi militia al Thawriyyun conducted the last rocket attack on Ain al Asad Airbase on August 5, injuring at least five US personnel.[90] The source added that the militias are focusing their military efforts towards combating Israel, noting ongoing operations targeting Israel from Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon.[91] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq and its constituent organizations have not claimed any attacks explicitly originating from Yemen or Lebanon, though the Islamic Resistance in Iraq probably has some fighters in both countries in order to coordinate with Lebanese Hezbollah and the Houthi Movement.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting an unspecified target in Eilat, Israel on August 20.[92] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also claimed on August 18 that it conducted a drone attack targeting a “military target” in the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights sometime between August 11 and August 18.[93] These are the first two attacks the Islamic Resistance of Iraq has claimed since July 23.[94]

 

[1] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/gaza-cease-fire-talks-put-iran-attack-on-hold-55bb399d

[2] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/gaza-cease-fire-talks-put-iran-attack-on-hold-55bb399d

[3] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-june-5-2024

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-17-2024

[5] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-19-2024 ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-6-2024 ;

https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-17-2024

[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/only-gaza-ceasefire-can-delay-irans-israel-response-sources-say-2024-08-13/

[7] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/gaza-cease-fire-talks-put-iran-attack-on-hold-55bb399d

[8] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/08/09/iran-president-masoud-pezeshkian-israel-revolutionary-guard/

[9] https://www.iranintl dot com/202408013888

[10] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/08/09/iran-president-masoud-pezeshkian-israel-revolutionary-guard/

[11] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/31/world/middleeast/iran-orders-attack-israel.html?smid=url-share

[12] https://www.barrons.com/news/iran-s-khamenei-vows-harsh-punishment-for-israel-after-haniyeh-killing-5ad481a8

[13] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/05/11/3132376 ;

https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/183841/

[14] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/685782 ;

https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/685978

[15] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/05/31/3133622;

https://apnews.com/article/iran-parliament-pezeshkian-cabinet-4f43823ce3aef39fde05c70782c96395

[16] https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2001-aug-23-mn-37364-story.html;

 https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-08-30-mn-1319-story.html

[17] https://www.khabaronline dot ir/live/1948114

[18] https://president dot ir/fa/153696

[19] https://president dot ir/fa/153696

[20] https://www.aljazeera dot com/features/2024/8/21/khameneis-calculus-ran-supreme-leader-faces-a-bitter-choice-re-israel ; https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2023/jun/12/supreme-leader-nuclear-weapons-diplomacy ; https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/16/when-the-ayatollah-said-no-to-nukes/

[21] https://www.aljazeera dot com/features/2024/8/21/khameneis-calculus-ran-supreme-leader-faces-a-bitter-choice-re-israel

[22] https://www.aljazeera dot com/features/2024/8/21/khameneis-calculus-ran-supreme-leader-faces-a-bitter-choice-re-israel

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-28-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-2-2024

[24] https://www.axios.com/2024/06/18/iran-nuclear-model-us-israel-assessing-intelligence  ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-18-2024

[25] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-expanding-enrichment-capacity-after-iaea-resolution-diplomats-say-2024-06-12/ ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/03/24/3103604 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-13-2024

[26] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/06/gov2024-26.pdf ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-13-2024

[27] https://www.aljazeera dot com/features/2024/8/21/khameneis-calculus-ran-supreme-leader-faces-a-bitter-choice-re-israel ; https://www.ft.com/content/64507ebb-bbb6-4c67-a954-b63e1aa49b77?accessToken=zwAGHEevv5jokc9kUH67u7ZMZ9OpVLY-GqSbdw.MEQCIBHZQ8oysood9eNrwcpA0-COILoXvT33Zl1MbGHAJk4UAiANt_u7pL8lGn8N77i4d78g2wroa5XLds0Er8kU1p6ZaA&sharetype=gift&token=23ce26c8-60af-481f-8d5d-af22a2f18ae4 ; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85474805 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-9-2024

[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-13-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-18-2024

[29] https://www.mako dot co.il/news-military/2024_q3/Article-1d897266f917191026.htm?sCh=31750a2610f26110&pId=173113802

[30] https://www.mako dot co.il/news-military/2024_q3/Article-1d897266f917191026.htm?sCh=31750a2610f26110&pId=173113802

[31] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1787726223650492840; https://www dot timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-it-has-dismantled-half-of-hamass-forces-in-rafah-killed-at-least-550-gunmen/; https://t.me/moriahdoron/11176

[32] https://twitter.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1799679161004380328

[33] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2889 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2890 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2891 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2893 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2894 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2895 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2904; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2918 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2920; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2923 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2958 ; https://t.me/qassambrigades/31638 ; https://t.me/qassambrigades/31639 ; https://t.me/qassambrigades/31639 ; https://t.me/qassambrigades/31640 ; https://t.me/qassambrigades/31641

[34] https://t.me/kataebabuali/10818 ;

https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4381 ;

https://t.me/nedalps/4345 ;

https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7049 ;

 https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7060 ;

https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4383 ;

https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7069 ; https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4385 ;

https://t.me/khalaya_almujahidin/14825 ;

https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4387 ;

https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7112 ;

https://t.me/abualiajel/326 ;

https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4388 ;

https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4389 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7153 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7151 ; https://t.me/AymanGouda/6217

[35] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/blinken-egypt-seeking-progress-towards-ceasefire-gaza-deal-2024-08-20/

[36] https://www.axios.com/2024/08/19/netanyahu-ceasefire-hostage-deal-demands

[37] https://www.axios.com/2024/08/19/netanyahu-ceasefire-hostage-deal-demands

[38] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate081924

[39] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1826247087169683716   

[40] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1826243940837974182

[41] https://t.me/hamza20300/284886

[42] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1826168535933931808

[43] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7162 ; https://t.me/abualiajel/331

[44] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1826168479638081975

[45] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1826168479638081975

[46] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1826168479638081975

[47] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1826168479638081975

[48] https://t.me/qassambrigades/31646

[49] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1826183693787947512

[50] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1826183693787947512

[51] https://t.me/hamza20300/284857

[52] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate082024

[53] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1825191812711297348

[54] https://t.me/qassambrigades/31647

[55] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1826168423753084935

[56] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1826168423753084935

[57] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1826168535933931808

[58] https://t.me/pflpgaza1/14508

[59] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7156; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7157; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7158; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7159; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7163

[60] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7157

[61] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/53044; https://t.me/hamaswestbank/53045

[62] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1826218461984342429 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7161

[63] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1826218461984342429 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1826218153271050460

[64] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1826218465104924878 ;

[65] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-25-2024 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1772254358932996104

[66] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1826218468221325739

[67] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/backstory-behind-killing-qods-force-col-khodaei

[68] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1826101604065382566

[69] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1826101604065382566

[70] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1826017905651159428

[71] https://t.me/mmirleb/6266

[72] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1826140074636878261 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1826175495555162587

[73] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1826175495555162587

[74] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1826180771930833245

[75] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1826181225687507035

[76] https://t.me/mmirleb/6249 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/6253 ;

https://t.me/mmirleb/6255 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/6264 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/6266 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/6270 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/6273 ;  https://t.me/mmirleb/6279 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/6281 ;  https://t.me/mmirleb/6284 ;  https://t.me/mmirleb/6286 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/6288

[77] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1825954209239589134

[78] https://t.me/mmirleb/6273

[79] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1826188557557318082

[80] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1826217571458154965/photo/1 ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1826249013861244943

[81] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1826217571458154965/photo/1

[82] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1826217571458154965/photo/1

[83] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1826217571458154965/photo/1

[84] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1826255062127276448

[85] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1826256128923287794

[86] https://t.me/abualaskary/122

[87] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/المقاومة-العراقية-تهدد-بـ-رد-بلا-سقوف-اذا-تعرضت-يران-لقصف-مريكي; https://baghdadtoday dot news/255468-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%80%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%B6%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AA-%D8%AB%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AB-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D9%81%D9%82%D8%B7.html

[88] https://t.me/aishab_alkahf/205; https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2024/08/20/iran-linked-iraqi-militias-say-truce-with-us-is-over/?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=socialsharebtn&related=TheNatWorld,NationalComment,LifeNationalUAE,NatSportUAE&via=TheNationalNews; https://www.al-akhbar dot com/Palestine/385856/%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1-%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AB%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%A9 %D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7 %D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B5-%D9%86 %D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%87; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-30-2024

[89] https://baghdadtoday dot news/256193-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%AD-3-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B7-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF.html

[90] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-6-2024

[91] https://baghdadtoday dot news/256193-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%AD-3-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B7-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF.html

[92] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1234

[93] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1233

[94] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-24-2024

 

Tags

Iran Project