Africa File, January 16, 2025: SAF Advances in Central Sudan en Route to Khartoum; Canadian Gold Mining Company Leaves Mali with Russia on Standby; JNIM’s Deadliest-Ever Attack in Benin; DRC Launches Counteroffensive Against Rwandan-backed M23

Africa File, January 16, 2025: SAF Advances in Central Sudan en Route to Khartoum; Canadian Gold Mining Company Leaves Mali with Russia on Standby; JNIM’s Deadliest-Ever Attack in Benin; DRC Launches Counteroffensive Against Rwandan-backed M23

Authors: Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson

CTP is delaying the next Africa File by one day until Friday, January 24, due to Martin Luther King Jr. Day and Inauguration Day in the United States. CTP will publish the subsequent Africa File as usual the week of January 30.

Data Cutoff: January 16, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

Sudan. The SAF recaptured Wad Madani from the RSF on January 11, an operationally significant district capital in central Sudan that will help to set conditions for the SAF to achieve its strategic objective of retaking the Sudanese capital, Khartoum. The capture of Wad Madani is part of the Sudanese Armed Forces’ (SAF) effort to encircle the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Khartoum and ultimately dislodge the RSF from the capital. The recapture of Khartoum is a strategic objective for the SAF that supports the SAF’s grand strategic aim of establishing itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan. The SAF capture of Khartoum could affect external support for the SAF and RSF from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, respectively.

Mali. The Canadian gold mining company Barrick Gold temporarily suspended mining operations in Mali, and Russia is poised to fill any potential void. Barrick’s decision is the result of a multiyear Russian-supported campaign to pressure Western gold mining companies out of Mali. Russia used this same strategy to secure access to uranium sites in neighboring Niger after the Nigerien junta pressured Western companies to suspend operations. Increased Russian access to mining in the Sahel will boost the Russian economy and mitigate Western efforts to economically isolate Russia.

Benin. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate JNIM carried out its deadliest-ever attack against Beninese forces in early January. The attack highlights the challenges Beninese forces face given the strong insurgent support zones across the border in Burkina Faso and Niger that enable major attacks in northern Benin. The growing strength of Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) in Benin challenges US efforts in the Gulf of Guinea to contain the Sahelian Salafi-jihadi insurgency.

DRC. The Congolese army and government-aligned forces have launched a counteroffensive against Rwandan-backed M23 rebels to reverse M23 advances toward two district capitals and regain control over key mineral-rich areas and supply lines in eastern DRC. Rwanda has continued to insist that the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) negotiate with M23, a nonstarter demand that will continue to hinder peace talks between the DRC and Rwanda.

Assessments:

Sudan

Sudan. The SAF recaptured Wad Madani from the RSF on January 11, an operationally significant district capital in central Sudan that will help set conditions for the SAF to achieve its strategic objective of retaking the Sudanese capital, Khartoum. Wad Madani is about 100 miles south of the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, in Gezira State. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured Wad Madani in December 2023 and used the city to supply its forces in Khartoum and elsewhere in central Sudan.[1] The RSF also used Wad Madani as a gateway to extend control over large areas of farmland and villages and threaten Sudan’s southeastern states.[2] The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) quickly advanced toward Wad Madani in January 2025 against little resistance. The SAF set conditions to retake the district capital with an offensive in central Sudan that began in October 2024 and retook several key RSF positions in Gezira and Sennar States.[3] Unspecified sources told Egyptian media that RSF fighters fled to the peripheries of Gezira State and north toward Khartoum.[4] The RSF commander acknowledged the loss of Wad Madani and called on RSF fighters to regroup.[5]

Figure 1. Sudan Army Advances in Eastern States: October 2024

 

Source: Sudan War Monitor.

Figure 2. The SAF Recaptures Wad Madani and Advances Toward Khartoum

 

Source: Kathryn Tyson

The capture of Wad Madani is part of the SAF’s effort to encircle the RSF in Khartoum and ultimately dislodge the RSF from the capital. The SAF launched an offensive against the RSF in Khartoum in September 2024 to relieve several besieged units in the city.[6] SAF units attacked from the west bank of the Nile in Omdurman, captured several key bridges, and established beachheads on the east side of the river.[7] These gains put SAF forces across the Nile and within four miles of besieged SAF positions around the SAF headquarters.[8] The SAF continued to advance in some areas of Khartoum in late 2024 and early January.[9] The RSF continues to hold most of Khartoum and parts of southern Omdurman on the west side of the Nile, while the SAF controls some small areas in Khartoum and northern Omdurman.[10]

Figure 3. Sudan Army Seizes Khartoum Bridgehead in Surprise Attack: September 26, 2024

 

Source: Sudan War Monitor.

The SAF is setting conditions to open a southern front toward Khartoum with the capture of Wad Madani. The SAF’s capture of Wad Madani severs RSF supply lines between Khartoum and central Sudan, allows the SAF to secure its own supply routes to the capital, and allows the SAF to pressure Khartoum from the south.[11] The SAF has already advanced north from Wad Madani toward Khartoum and captured several villages on a major highway that links the two cities.[12] An unspecified senior military officer told Egyptian media that that SAF units will advance toward Khartoum along three main routes to surround the capital from the east, west, and south.[13] The officer added that the SAF will work to clear RSF fighters from northern and western Gezira State to prevent the RSF from regrouping.[14]

The recapture of Khartoum is a strategic objective for the SAF that supports the SAF’s grand strategic aim of establishing itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan. SAF control over Khartoum would be a political victory that would boost the SAF’s claim to be Sudan’s only legitimate force. SAF Commander General Abdel Fattah al Burhan has conducted several regional and international tours since 2023 to garner international support. Burhan conducted several high-profile meetings with the leaders of Egypt, Qatar, South Sudan, and Turkey in 2023 in a bid to boost SAF legitimacy in the international community.[15] Burhan has also attempted to delegitimize the RSF and called for the RSF to be designated a terrorist group during a speech to the UN in September 2024.[16]

SAF control over Khartoum would be a military victory for the SAF that would allow the SAF to consolidate control over the eastern bank of the Nile River and prepare for future offensives that aim to militarily defeat the RSF in its strongholds in western Sudan. The RSF would struggle to recross the Nile as the SAF controls several key bridges on the river.[17] The Jabal Awliya Dam Bridge in southwestern Khartoum is the RSF’s last remaining route into and out of the city.[18] Khartoum also has airports and military infrastructure that are more centrally located than the SAF’s current command and logistics hub in Port Sudan, which is over 400 miles from Khartoum on Sudan’s Red Sea coast. The SAF and RSF have contested control over several manufacturing facilities and military bases since the civil war broke out in April 2023.[19]

An SAF offensive that dislodges the RSF from Khartoum would undermine the RSF’s own push to gain domestic and international legitimacy. The RSF sought before the war to integrate the RSF into a national military and play a broader role in the Sudanese government.[20] The RSF has established local governments and civil administrations in Darfur and southwestern Sudan since the war began to institutionalize and legitimize its control.[21] The RSF has also attempted to gain regional and international clout. RSF leader Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, released a competing address to the UN in 2024 after Burhan’s September speech and said that the RSF is “fully prepared” for a ceasefire.[22] Hemedti conducted a regional diplomatic tour and met with leaders in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda in January 2024.[23]

SAF control over Khartoum would further delegitimize the RSF by relegating the group mostly to its traditional areas of support in western Sudan, but RSF control of Darfur would still support continued operations against the SAF.[24] The RSF holds large swaths of territory in western Sudan and has repeatedly besieged the SAF’s last remaining base in al Fasher, North Darfur.[25] The RSF has used the region as a logistics hub to resupply its forces with weapons and fuel.[26] The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has armed RSF units with heavy weapons and other arms in Darfur through bases in neighboring Chad.[27] The RSF also profits from gold mining in Darfur to fund its operations.[28]

The SAF capture of Khartoum could affect external support for the SAF and RSF from Egypt and the UAE, respectively. An unspecified source close to the Chadian president told Sudanese media in November 2024 that the UAE warned the RSF that it would cut support if the RSF did not take al Fasher, Darfur, from the SAF.[29] This threat establishes a precedent that the UAE’s support is conditional on positive battlefield developments. CTP has not recorded that the UAE has put any conditions on RSF control of Khartoum, however. The UAE is under heavy scrutiny from the United States for its support for the RSF, and the UAE assured the White House that it would halt support for the RSF in December 2024 after US lawmakers threatened to stop weapons sales to the UAE.[30] The US State Department has since said that the RSF has committed genocide in Sudan and sanctioned seven Emirati companies for providing weapons to the RSF.[31] The RSF’s battlefield losses reduce the incentives for the UAE to risk further retaliation from the United States and other members of the international community.

Egypt is invested in the SAF’s bid to recapture Khartoum. Sudanese media reported in December 2024 that the RSF’s capture of Khartoum was a red line for Cairo and that Egypt has insisted that the SAF retake Khartoum and has prioritized supporting SAF operations in Khartoum and Gezira state to that end.[32] Sudanese media previously reported in November 2024 that the SAF used Egyptian-deployed, Turkish-manufactured drones against the RSF exclusively in Khartoum.[33] Egypt has offered further support to the SAF as the SAF has made gains in central Sudan.[34] Egypt’s foreign minister said that Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia would provide training for the SAF on January 12.[35]

Mali

The Canadian gold mining company Barrick Gold temporarily suspended mining operations in Mali, and Russia is poised to fill any potential void. Barrick suspended operations after the Malian junta seized over $200 million worth of Barrick Gold stockpiles.[36] Barrick is the second-largest mining company in the world and owns the contract to the Loulo-Gounkoto mine in southwestern Mali. The mine produced 19.4 tons of gold in 2022 and accounts for nearly a third of Mali’s gold output.[37] Reuters reported that the loss of the mine would cut Barrick’s annual earnings before interest, tax, and amortization by 11 percent.[38]

The Malian government and Barrick had been at odds after both parties failed to agree on a restructured contract after Mali reformed its mining code in 2023 to secure a bigger share of mining revenue.[39] Mali attempted to pressure Barrick to comply with the new tax code, while Barrick insisted that its contract was based on the 1991 mining code and could not be changed “at will.”[40] Mali arrested four senior-level Malian employees of Barrick in September 2024 for alleged “financial crimes,” which likely refer to discrepancies with Mali’s mining code.[41] Mali issued an arrest warrant for Barrick’s CEO in December 2024.[42] Barrick warned in December 2024 that conditions at the Loulo-Gounkoto mine had deteriorated after the Malian junta began detaining employees without cause and blocking gold shipments.[43] Barrick then threatened to freeze operations in early January after the Malian junta threatened to seize its gold stockpiles.[44]

Barrick’s decision is the result of a multiyear Russian-supported campaign to pressure Western gold mining companies out of Mali. The junta adopted a new tax code in August 2023 that eliminated tax breaks for international companies and boosted the maximum Malian stake in gold mines from 20 percent to 35 percent.[45] The junta publicly framed the new tax code as part of its pro-sovereignty agenda. Malian officials said the new code allowed “gold to shine for Malians” and aimed to return mineral riches to Malians.[46] The French magazine Jeune Afrique cited anonymous Malian sources who claimed that the reformed code was the first planned step toward “expropriating Barrick Gold but without doing so too openly,” however.[47] The junta then arrested several Malian and non-Malian employees of Barrick Gold and the Australian-based Resolute Mining in 2024 for not abiding by the new code.[48] Mining industry experts have warned that these measures increased financial difficulties for effected Western mining companies and could lead companies to withdraw from Mali.[49] Several smaller mining companies have restructured their contracts, however, and most companies have so-far remained in the Sahel to try and protect the hundreds of millions of dollars that they have invested in their mines.[50]

Russia had lobbied Mali to evict Western gold mining companies and reallot Western-owned contracts to Russian companies since the arrival of the Wagner Group in 2021. Wagner-linked individuals founded two mining shell companies in Mali in 2021 and 2022.[51] This effort matches the blueprint that Wagner used to gain access to gold mines in the Central African Republic.[52] Jeune Afrique reported in 2022 that Wagner-linked operatives then encouraged Malian officials to nationalize its mines and review the mining contracts of three of Mali’s most lucrative mines—including Barrick’s Loulo-Gounkoto mine, which anonymous Malian sources told Jeune Afrique was Russia’s most-preferred site, and Resolute Mining’s Syama mine.[53] Jeune Afrique reported in 2022 and 2024 that Russia was actively plotting Barrick’s removal with Malian authorities.[54]

Mali and Russia have increased cooperation on natural resource exploitation since March 2024. Malian and Russian officials developed a geological map for better resource exploration on March 21. The two countries then signed a series of agreements for the exploitation of oil, uranium, and gas in northern Mali on March 31.[55] Malian officials signed a memorandum of understanding with Russia’s Uranium One Group in July 2024 and discussed a joint lithium project with Russian officials at an event in Moscow in late September.[56] Uranium One Group is a subsidiary of Russia’s state nuclear company Rosatom and is expected to begin lithium exploitation in southern Mali over the next 24 months.[57] Malian media reported that Russia would begin lithium, oil, and gas exploitation in Mali in October 2024.[58]

Figure 4. Opportunities for Mali and Russia to Cooperate on Mineral Extraction

 

Source: Liam Karr; Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime; US Department of the Interior; International Atomic Energy Agency; Jules Duhamel.

Russia used the same strategy that it did in Mali to secure access to uranium sites in neighboring Niger after the Nigerien junta pressured Western mining companies to suspend operations. Bloomberg reported that Rosatom discussed taking over French-controlled Nigerien uranium supplies with Nigerien officials in June 2024.[59] The Nigerien junta then revoked the operating permit for one of French state-owned mining company Orano’s two active mines in July. The junta said it suspended the permit because Orano failed to heed ultimatums to resume production at the site.[60] Orano claimed that the decision was a fait accompli, however, and that the junta blocked Orano’s efforts to resume production and negotiate access to the mine.[61] Orano then suspended operations on its last active mine in Niger in October 2024 due to the closure of the Benin-Niger border after the 2023 Niger coup.[62] Benin is a primary export corridor for uranium production, and the border closure had blocked nearly $318 million of uranium exports across 2023 and 2024.[63] Nigerien Mining Minister Ousmane Abarchi invited Russian companies to explore Niger’s natural resources in November 2024 and confirmed that he was communicating with multiple Russian mining companies on uranium and other natural resources.[64]

Increased Russian access to mining in the Sahel will boost the Russian economy and mitigate Western efforts to economically isolate Russia. Russia has repeatedly sought to gain access to natural resources—primarily gold—from its partnerships with African countries to help offset the effect of Western sanctions.[65]

Russia does not produce lithium, which is crucial for green energy due to its use in rechargeable batteries for mobile phones, laptops, and electric vehicles.[66] The United States lists lithium as a critical mineral, meaning that it is important to national and economic security and that global demand outpaces supply.[67] The People’s Republic of China dominates the global lithium market, but Russia has tried to enter the market through mining deals in Bolivia and may have opportunities to exploit lithium deposits in eastern Ukraine.[68] Russia’s shift in lithium sourcing comes after Argentina and Chile stopped exporting lithium to Russia in 2022 due to Western sanctions.[69]

The Kremlin’s pursuit of uranium aims to increase its grip on the nuclear energy market to improve its leverage with countries that seek to cut Russian gas purchases.[70] Niger is the world’s seventh-largest uranium producer, is the second-largest producer on the African continent, and has the highest-grade uranium ores on the African continent.[71] France could be particularly vulnerable to the loss of access to Nigerien uranium as it relies on nuclear energy for 68 percent of its electricity and has relied on Niger for nearly 20 percent of the uranium it imports to power its nuclear energy facilities over the past decade, although France has tried to diversify its suppliers in recent years.[72]

Benin

JNIM carried out its deadliest-ever attack against Beninese forces in early January. Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) attacked the Point Triple security post in Benin’s Park W on January 8 and killed at least 28 Beninese soldiers.[73] Beninese forces defended the base after several hours of fighting and launched counterattacks in the following days.[74] JNIM published images on January 10 that showed weapons taken during the attack.[75] The group carried out its previous most deadly attack in July 2024, when the group killed 12 rangers near the Mekrou River.[76]

Beninese military officials described Point Triple as one of the “strongest & most militarized posts” in northern Benin, but the base may have lacked sufficient perimeter defenses.[77] Point Triple is in the Park W complex at the intersection of the Benin, Burkina Faso, and Niger borders. The base has substantial detection and prevention infrastructure, such as drones and a direct independent internet connection at the post to report suspicious activities immediately.[78] Open-source analyst Charlie Werb observed that satellite imagery from November 2024 and video footage of the January 8 attack showed that the base’s perimeter defenses consisted of shallow trenches and lacked sufficient physical barriers such as fences, walls, or wires, however.[79]

Figure 5. ISSP and JNIM Areas of Operations in the Littorals

 

Note: ISSP stands for Islamic State Sahel Province.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

The attack highlights the challenges that Beninese forces face given the strong insurgent support zones across the border in Burkina Faso and Niger that enable major attacks in northern Benin.[80] The UN reported in July 2024 that JNIM cells based in Burkina Faso carry out most of the group’s attacks in the littoral countries with the objective of establishing support zones over resources and logistic corridors that are essential for expansion.[81] Cross-border military cooperation against JNIM has heavily decreased since the coups in Burkina Faso and Niger in 2022 and 2023, respectively, and Burkinabe and Nigerien forces do not significantly contest these areas aside from occasional drone strikes.[82]

CTP assessed in October that JNIM would likely increase the severity of its attacks in Benin and Togo between November and April during the local dry season.[83] The dryer conditions enable JNIM fighters to more easily move through their support zones in the park complexes that straddle the borders of the littoral countries and the Sahel countries.[84] Seasonal rains often degrade access to and from JNIM’s support zones in the park networks along the borders of Benin, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Togo.[85] JNIM significantly increased its rate of attacks in Benin during the last dry season, when the group averaged over 14 attacks per month, compared with fewer than four attacks per month during the 2024 rainy season.[86]

JNIM’s growing strength in Benin challenges US efforts in the Gulf of Guinea to help contain the Sahelian Salafi-jihadi insurgency. The United States named Benin a key partner in bolstering resilience to security threats in West Africa and is heavily engaged with Benin via programs such as the US Global Fragility Act (GFA) and the US-German Coastal States Stability Mechanism (CSSM).[87] Both initiatives aim to enhance security through political, humanitarian, and military efforts that strengthen social cohesion and effective governance. Benin is  one of five coastal West African countries that receive support from the GFA, which backs long-term plans to increase community resilience and address the root political causes of instability.[88] The program is a whole-of-government plan that provides locally attuned development, political, and security assistance through the US Department of State, Department of Defense, and Agency for International Development (USAID).[89] USAID also helps fund CSSM, which has launched discussion groups and workshops with community members, security forces, and government authorities in northern Benin to improve local resiliency, collaboration, and stability.[90]

Benin has emerged as one of the primary US defense partners in West Africa since the United States withdrew from Niger in September 2024, after the Nigerien coup in July 2023.[91] The Wall Street Journal reported in September 2024 that the United States spent $4 million to refurbish an airfield in Parakou, Benin.[92] The Wall Street Journal also reported that US Africa Command has helicopters and medics stationed in Parakou to evacuate Beninese soldiers who are wounded in clashes with insurgents in northern Benin and a Special Forces team stationed in Cotonou to advise Beninese troops.[93]

DRC

The Congolese army and government-aligned forces have launched counteroffensives against Rwandan-backed M23 rebels to reverse M23 advances toward two district capitals and regain control over mineral-rich areas and key supply lines in eastern DRC. M23 launched concerted offensives toward two district capitals, Lubero and Masisi, at the beginning of December.[94] The UN reported in December 2024 that 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan troops in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) fight alongside M23 and “de facto control” M23 operations, and the United States condemned Rwanda on December 20 for providing artillery, reinforcements, and resupply convoys to support the latest M23 offensive.[95]

Figure 6. FARDC and M23 Battle for Control of Eastern DRC

 

Note The UN reports that 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan troops are fighting alongside M23 in eastern DRC and “de facto control” M23 operations.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

The Congolese army (FARDC) eventually halted the M23 advance in Lubero district near Mambosa, a town fewer than 15 miles south of Lubero town, on December 24 and launched a counteroffensive on December 27.[96] The FARDC has failed to recapture any operationally significant areas but is contesting Alimbongo and Kaseghe, two operationally significant crossroads towns that M23 captured in December.[97] One Congolese outlet reported that the two towns are essentially a no-man’s-land after M23 withdrew from these two towns and most of the local villagers fled toward FARDC-controlled areas.[98] FARDC and allied forces have also continued to clash with M23 along the M23’s flank in long-contested areas off the main highway, such as Luofo.[99]

Figure 7. M23 Lubero Offensive

Note: The UN reports that 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan troops are fighting alongside M23 in eastern DRC a “de facto control” M23 operations.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

M23 captured Masisi town on January 4 after a brief lull in activity along this axis in late December.[100] The FARDC launched a counteroffensive against M23 on January 8 and briefly recaptured Masisi town, but M23 quickly retook the district capital on January 9.[101] M23 still holds Masisi town as of January 16, but fighting continues in the surrounding area.[102]

M23’s capture of Masisi risks expanding the conflict in the eastern DRC. Masisi is the gateway to Walikale town, the westernmost district capital in the North Kivu region that serves as the gateway to the interior of the DRC along the RN3 highway. M23’s advances also give the group increased access to valuable minerals such as coltan, gold, and tin ores that will help fund its war machine. Southern Masisi district hosts coltan mines, while Walikale district has numerous cassiterite and gold mines as well as some coltan deposits.[103] Cassiterite and coltan are tin and tantalum ores, respectively. The United States designates both tantalum and tin as critical minerals due to their use in electronics.[104]

Figure 8. M23 Activity in Mineral-Rich Areas of the Eastern DRC

 

Source: Liam Karr; International Peace Information Service.

Pro-government forces have made significant advances along a third axis that likely seeks to recapture M23-controlled mineral-rich areas and supply lines southeast of Masisi town. Pro-government forces retook Ngungu, a town that M23 had held for nearly a year, on January 7.[105] Ngungu is located on key supply lines and near supply is a key node on a series of side roads that serve as a tertiary link between North and South Kivu in addition to the main RN2 and RN3 roads. Ngungu is fewer than 10 miles south of the lucrative coltan mines around Rubaya and fewer than 10 miles north of mineral-rich areas around Numbi, South Kivu. The UN said that M23 has controlled the production, trade, and transport of the mines around Rubaya since capturing the town in April 2024.[106] M23 generates $800,000 million in taxes from these mines and causes what the UN describes as the “most significant contamination of supply chains” in the Great Lakes region over the past decade by shipping tin, tantalum, and tungsten for export to Rwanda.[107] The US-based tech company Apple told its suppliers to stop purchasing minerals—including gold, tantalum, and tin—from the DRC and Rwanda on December 17 after a criminal complaint by the Congolese government that accused Apple of using conflict minerals.[108]

Figure 9. FARDC and M23 Battle Around Masisi Territory

 

Note: The UN reports that 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan troops are fighting alongside M23 in eastern DRC a “de facto control” M23 operations.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

The FARDC then launched operations against M23 positions south of Sake on January 12, an operationally significant crossroads town that M23 encircled for most of 2024.[109] Sake lies at the junction of the RN2 and several other major regional highways that serve as supply lines to Goma, the North Kivu provincial capital, and the Rwandan border. Clashes between pro-government forces and M23 have continued in the villages and hills around Ngungu and Sake, and Congolese outlet Actualite reported that M23 reinforcements arrived in the area on January 11.[110]

Rwanda has continued to insist that the DRC negotiate with M23, a nonstarter demand that will continue to hinder peace talks between the DRC and Rwanda. Rwandan President Paul Kagame urged the DRC to directly negotiate with M23 on January 9, less than a week after M23 captured Masisi.[111] Congolese officials have called the Rwandan-backed M23 “terrorists” repeatedly, refused to negotiate directly with its representatives, and claimed that Rwanda supports M23 to expropriate the eastern DRC’s mineral resources.[112] This disagreement led all parties to call off a summit planned for December 15 with Kagame, DRC President Félix Tshisekedi, and Angolan President João Lourenço.[113]Angolan-mediated peace talks had established an UN-backed ceasefire in August and a concept of operations to dismantle a DRC-based Rwandan Hutu militia that contributes to the regional violence but had not addressed the role of M23.[114]

[1] https://www.madamasr.com/en/2025/01/11/news/u/sudanese-military-captures-wad-madani-begins-multi-front-push-toward-khartoum/

[2] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/sudan-army-recaptures-wad-madani

[3] https://www.madamasr.com/en/2025/01/10/news/u/sudan-nashra-military-intensifies-offensive-to-reclaim-wad-madani-rsf-drones-strike-merowe-northern-state-cut-power-supply-us-imposes-sanctions-on-hemedti-7-rsf-affiliated-companies-in-uae/; https://sudantribune.com/article294255/

[4] https://www.madamasr.com/en/2025/01/11/news/u/sudanese-military-captures-wad-madani-begins-multi-front-push-toward-khartoum/

[5] https://sudantribune dot com/article295805/; https://x.com/PatrickHeinisc1/status/1878199627649872119

[6] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-october-3-2024-khartoum-offensive-internal-somali-rivalries-benin-coup-attempt-russias-projects-in-the-sahel#Sudan

[7] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/sudan-army-seizes-khartoum-bridgehead; https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/sudan-army-seizes-halfaya-bridge

[8] https://acleddata.com/2024/10/14/turning-the-tide-the-safs-strategic-offensive-in-khartoum-and-the-rsfs-setbacks-sudan-october-2024/

[9] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/army-captures-samrab-khartoum-bahri; https://sudantribune dot com/article295832

[10] https://acleddata.com/2024/10/14/turning-the-tide-the-safs-strategic-offensive-in-khartoum-and-the-rsfs-setbacks-sudan-october-2024

[11] https://sudantribune dot com/article294283

[12] https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250113-48-hours-after-liberating-wad-madani-sudan-army-regains-control-of-tambul/; https://aawsat dot com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7/5100591-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85%D9%87-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9

[13] https://www.madamasr.com/en/2025/01/11/news/u/sudanese-military-captures-wad-madani-begins-multi-front-push-toward-khartoum/

[14] https://www.madamasr.com/en/2025/01/11/news/u/sudanese-military-captures-wad-madani-begins-multi-front-push-toward-khartoum/

[15] https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230907-sudan-s-general-burhan-seeks-rapid-political-solution-on-diplomatic-tour; https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/2023/09/13/sudans-al-burhan-visits-turkey-for-talks-with-president-erdogan/

[16] https://www.dw.com/en/sudan-fierce-clashes-in-khartoum-as-army-launches-offensive/a-70330464

[17] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/11/sudan-army-says-its-forces-enter-wad-madani-in-push-to-retake-city-from-rsf; https://sudantribune.com/article286704/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/drone-strike-targets-eastern-sudanese-base-during-visit-by-army-chief-witnesses-2024-07-31/

[18] https://www.madamasr.com/en/2025/01/11/news/u/sudanese-military-captures-wad-madani-begins-multi-front-push-toward-khartoum

[19] https://www.madamasr.com/en/2024/07/12/news/u/sudan-nashra-abiy-ahmed-visits-port-sudan-source-military-prepares-to-strike-rsf-rear-lines-to-cut-off-supplies-rsf-nears-south-sudan-ethiopia-borders/; https://www.voanews.com/a/massive-fire-as-sudanese-factions-battle-for-control-of-arms-factory/7127618.html; https://sudantribune.com/article295719/

[20] https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/power-struggle-sudan; https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/04/whats-behind-fighting-sudan

[21] https://www.radiotamazuj dot org/en/news/article/new-government-under-rsf-formed-in-south-darfur; https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/rsf-establish-civil-administration

[22] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-rapid-support-forces-fully-ready-ceasefire-political-talks-hemedti-2023-09-21/

[23] https://adf-magazine.com/2024/01/hemedti-makes-diplomatic-tour-of-east-africa-while-rsf-fighters-gain-ground/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-paramilitary-leader-hemedti-meets-civilian-leaders-tour-2024-01-01/

[24] https://acleddata.com/2024/05/17/sudan-situation-update-may-2024-the-rsf-sets-its-eyes-on-north-darfur/; https://www.csis.org/analysis/preventing-another-darfur-genocide

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[29] https://sudantribune dot com/article293583

[30] https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241219-uae-promises-not-to-arm-sudan-paramilitaries-us-lawmakers-say-1

[31] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2772

[32] https://3ayin.com/en/egyptsaf/

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[37] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1544504/politique/au-mali-wagner-voit-grand-dans-les-mines-dor

[38] https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/mali-started-flying-gold-stocks-out-barrick-site-saturday-sources-say-2025-01-13

[39] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-adopts-new-mining-code-boost-sectors-contribution-gdp-mines-ministry-2023-08-08

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[110] https://kivumorningpost dot cd/2025/01/14/masisi-combats-violents-a-ngungu-et-les-environs-entre-fardc-wazalendo-et-m23; https://kivumorningpost dot cd/2025/01/09/masisi-reprise-des-combats-entre-m23-et-fardc-a-ndumba-et-masisi-centre; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/01/10/actualite/securite/masisi-poursuite-des-combats-sur-laxe-shasha-bweremana; https://kivumorningpost dot cd/2025/01/10/masisi-violents-combats-entre-m23-et-fardc-wazalendo-a-ngungu; https://actualite dot cd/2025/01/10/rdc-nouvelles-offensives-de-larmee-pour-recuperer-masisi-centre-dautres-fronts-se; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/01/13/actualite/securite/de-violents-combats-signales-ce-lundi-masisi; https://actualite dot cd/2025/01/12/rdc-nouveaux-affrontements-entre-les-fardc-et-le-m23-masisi-et-nyiragongo-ce-dimanche

[111] https://apnews.com/article/rwanda-congo-m23-paul-kagame-rebels-fe10a96587d03a29161b8c5f6f1b7e1c

[112] https://www.africanews.com/2023/12/11/drc-incumbent-president-tshisekedi-vows-to-rid-country-of-m23-rebels-at-goma-campaign-rall; https://trtafrika dot com/africa/drc-government-rejects-talks-with-m23-rebels-13468982; https://www.mediacongo dot net/article-actualite-143779_agression_les_fdlr_sont_des_minerais.html; https://ipisresearch.be/weekly-briefing/why-the-dr-congo-is-putting-apple-on-the-spot; https://www.ft.com/content/ecf89818-949b-4de7-9e8a-89f119c23a69; https://greatlakescrisis dot org/is-peace-possible-without-dialogue

[113] https://www.voanews.com/a/dr-congo-rwanda-peace-talks-canceled-/7901906.html

[114] https://x.com/angola_Mirex/status/1818436276996968860; https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2024-09/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-27.php; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20241105-rdc-goma-lancement-officiel-m%C3%A9canisme-de-suivi-de-la-crise-s%C3%A9curitaire-dans-l-est; https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/245/84/pdf/n2424584.pdf; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2024/11/24/actualite/securite/est-de-la-rdc-langola-et-la-monusco-saccordent-sur-le-soutien-au; https://kivumorningpost dot cd/2024/11/25/rdc-m23-langola-et-la-monusco-signent-un-protocole-daccord-sur-le-mecanisme-de-verification-ad-hoc-renforce; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1634705/politique/exclusif-ce-que-prevoit-laccord-signe-par-la-rdc-et-le-rwanda