Media

Dr. Kimberly Kagan Speaks at Brookings Institution

Sep 1, 2009 - Kimberly Kagan

Prospects for Afghanistan's Future: Assessing the Outcome of the Afghan Presidential Election

Brookings Institution, Expert Panel, August 25, 2009

"The Afghan people voted on August 20 to select their next president. It remains to be seen which candidate will prevail. Questions also persist about the Taliban’s influence on the election’s outcome and about the viability of Afghanistan’s next government. The result of this election is critical for the Afghan people, NATO’s mission in their country, and for future regional and international security."

To see the full event summary, please visit the Brookings website.

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Afghanistan Project

Afghan National Army (ANA)

Afghan National Police (ANP)

Afghan Taliban (Quetta Shura)

Regional Command East

Kimberly Kagan Interviewed On Afghanistan - PBS "The News Hour"

Aug 25, 2009 - Kimberly Kagan

Leaders Warn Afghan War "Serious and Deteriorating"

Interview with Dr. Kimberly Kagan, President of the Institute for the Study of War

Televised Interview, PBS Channel, "The News Hour", August 24, 2009

Transcript:

RAY SUAREZ: Finally tonight, coming up with the right strategy and the right number of troops to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan, and to Margaret Warner.

MARGARET WARNER: Five months into President Obama's stepped-up campaign in Afghanistan, attacks by the Taliban and its allies are on the rise. American and Afghan casualties are growing, too. More U.S. troops have been killed already this year than in all of 2008. At the same time, polls show declining U.S. public support for the war.
Now, as the top American commander, General Stanley McChrystal, readies his major strategy review, debate is growing over whether more U.S. troops will be needed.

Yesterday, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen offered a stark assessment on CNN's "State of the Union" with John King.

ADM. MIKE MULLEN: I think it is serious, and it is deteriorating, and I've said that over the last couple of years, that the Taliban insurgency has gotten better, more sophisticated. Their tactics, just in my recent visits out there and talking with our troops certainly indicate that.

JOHN KING, anchor, CNN: You have no doubt he'll ask for more troops?

ADM. MICHAEL MULLEN: No, actually, we're not at a point yet where he's made any decisions about asking for additional troops. His guidance from me and from the secretary of defense was to go out and assess where you are and then tell us what you need. And we'll get to that point. And I want to, I guess, assure you or reassure you that he hasn't asked for any additional troops up to this point in time.

MARGARET WARNER: Separately, top regional U.S. commanders in Afghanistan told President Obama's special envoy, Richard Holbrooke, this weekend that they need more troops.
For more on this, we go to two experts who've been to Afghanistan this summer. Kimberly Kagan, president of the Institute of the Study of War, a Washington think-tank, she was in Afghanistan for four weeks this summer as part of General McChrystal's strategy assessment team. The views she expresses this evening are her own.
And Thomas Johnson, a research professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, he co-authored a piece on foreignpolicy.com this past week entitled, "Afghanistan is Today's Vietnam."
And welcome to you both.

Kimberly Kagan, I'll begin with you. Admiral Mullen calling it not just serious, the situation in Afghanistan, but deteriorating. Do you agree with that, and what is the evidence you look to, to tell you that?

KIMBERLY KAGAN: I do agree with Admiral Mullen's statement because the Taliban has actually been growing in its capacity to affect the population of Afghanistan, to perform certain functions that we think of as government functions, such as taxing the population, and also intimidating the population through assassination campaigns and through occupying towns and villages throughout Afghanistan. This is a sign of growing Taliban control in southern Afghanistan.
In addition to that, the Haqqani network, which is a distinct group from the Taliban...

MARGARET WARNER: Named for...

KIMBERLY KAGAN: Named for Jalaluddin Haqqani, now presumably led by one of his sons, as he is older, is actually growing in its capacity in the eastern part of Afghanistan to launch spectacular attacks against targets in Kabul and its surrounding provinces. And so what we have are two enemies fighting and actually enlarging their spheres of influence.

MARGARET WARNER: And, Professor Johnson, do you think it is deteriorating, I mean, even since U.S. troops began arriving in greater numbers? And is it because of more U.S. troops that we're seeing more attacks or, in fact, is it in spite of it?

THOMAS JOHNSON, Naval Postgraduate School: Well, I think the situation has been bleak for at least a year-and-a-half. And I think that it's gained the attention of Washington recently.
But there's no question at all that the situation has gotten very, very bleak. I mean, I was in Kandahar this summer, and it was very hard to talk to people that didn't show disgust with allied policies. The problem in Afghanistan is the delta or the difference between the people's expectations and what's been delivered.
So it's a very tough situation right now. But I don't think necessarily that it's a question of the number of troops. I think that, while more troops on the ground will help, I think the real problem is manpower distribution. I think that we still have too many troops that are staying behind the wire in forward operating bases.

MARGARET WARNER: Meaning they stay inside their bases rather than getting out?

THOMAS JOHNSON: Absolutely. I mean, if we're fighting a counterinsurgency, we have to interact with people.
So I don't think it's necessarily a qualitative problem. I think it's a quantitative -- I'm sorry, I don't think it's a quantitative problem. I think it's a qualitative problem. It's a manpower distribution problem.
My estimation is less than 4 percent of our troops are involved in reconstruction activities, and that's no way to secure a population and win a counterinsurgency.

MARGARET WARNER: Is that the way you see it? And in fact, does that mean more troops are or aren't the answer?

KIMBERLY KAGAN: I agree with Tom that the forces that we have in Afghanistan do need to be redistributed and focused on areas where the population is extremely vulnerable and where the insurgency is strong.
But I think, even if you do that and we get the troops without caveats outside of the wire, we will still need more forces in Afghanistan, because the population of Afghanistan is large. It's roughly 30 million people. And we simply do not have enough troops there to create the kinds of dense forces needed to secure the small neighborhoods all throughout Afghanistan where the insurgents are fighting.

MARGARET WARNER: And many in very rural areas. So fit this in with the theme of your piece this weekend that Afghanistan is today's Vietnam. I mean, in Vietnam, there was a steady increase in the number of troops. Is that the parallel you fear?

THOMAS JOHNSON: Well, I think -- yes, it is. Let me give you a number, different comparisons. In both Vietnam and Afghanistan, these are both countries that had defeated a European powerhouse over a 10-year guerilla war that then resulted in basically a north-south civil war.
They both are countries that have an uncontrollable border where the insurgents or the guerillas are taking refuge in a neighboring country.
In both instances, I think that we misread -- the United States, that is -- the actual enemy that we're fighting. In Vietnam, we thought the Viet Cong were primarily communist when they were nationalists that were trying to reunite the country.
I think, in Afghanistan, we view the Taliban as secular insurgents, when I think they're jihadists. I think that they're what Eric -- I forget his last name -- in "The True Believer" in the 1950s, when he wrote "The True Believer," I think these are true believes. And I think that it's basically they're insurgents wrapped in the narrative of a jihad, and that's a very different enemy than I think that we're -- than we think we're facing.

MARGARET WARNER: So, Kim Kagan, does that parallel or potential parallel offer a cautionary note about the prospect of steadily increasing forces? I mean, the additional U.S. forces President Obama ordered there aren't even yet fully in, are they?

KIMBERLY KAGAN: That is correct. There are more forces that will be arriving essentially over the course of the fall. But I think that we can get too focused on historical examples and historical analogies.
And although I agree with some of Tom's comparisons, I also think that the situation in Afghanistan is fixable and that the United States does have an opportunity to succeed.
I do think that more resources are necessary and required. And I share Tom's concern that they might be filtered in or trickled in rather than put in such that General McChrystal and his subordinates can conduct the decisive operations that they need to conduct in order to defeat the enemy.

MARGARET WARNER: Now, do you all read -- how do you read the comments we've heard from Admiral Mullen and the commanders who spoke to Ambassador Holbrooke and to the reporters traveling with them, talking about, in their case, the need for more troops? Do you see the military trying to prepare the public or the Obama White House for the request for more troops? Do you think that's what's going on?

THOMAS JOHNSON: I think that's a possibility. But, again, I do not believe that this is just a question of the number of troops.
I think a real problem in Afghanistan is that we've misread what regime legitimacy represents in Afghanistan. I mean, the father of modern sociology, Max Weber, talked about three types of points that bring up regime legitimacy. He talked about dynastic, he talked about legal, and he talked about religious.
I think that Afghanistan has had a long history of dynastic and traditional and religious types of legitimacy in the regimes. And we tried to paint a coat of democracy over Afghanistan that's been very difficult.

MARGARET WARNER: And, in fact, briefly, before we go, Kim Kagan, so last week we had this election. The results are still unclear, the election for president and the provincial leadership. How does that uncertainty cloud or affect the prospects for military success? Do you think it's a factor?

KIMBERLY KAGAN: I think that, regardless of whether Karzai wins or Abdullah Abdullah wins, there will be need for a continued presence in Afghanistan. I also believe that it is incredibly important for General McChrystal and all of the civilian apparatus to help create legitimate government institutions in Afghanistan that are capable of performing these functions that Tom mentioned for the people.

MARGARET WARNER: But that's a very long-range proposition, is it not?

KIMBERLY KAGAN: I don't think that that's something that can be done quickly. I think that it's something that will take time.

MARGARET WARNER: Kim Kagan and Tom Johnson, thank you both.

THOMAS JOHNSON: Well, thank you.

KIMBERLY KAGAN: Thank you.

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Regional Command South

Marisa Cochrane Discusses Iraqi Politics

Jul 10, 2009 - Anonymous

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ISW's Research Manager, Marisa Cochrane, speaks on Iraqi Politics at a Capitol Hill event hosted by the Center for Security Policy on July 10th, 2009.

Transcript:

Unavailable at this time

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Iraq Project

Government of Iraq

IIP

Iraq National List (Allawi)

ISW Webcast with Colonel Ryan Gonsalves

May 18, 2009 - Institute for t...

COL Ryan Gonsalves

In this four-part interivew, ISW President Kimberly Kagan discusses MND-N with Colonel Ryan Gonsalves. COL Gonsalves is the commander of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Cavalry Division in Kirkuk. The 2nd BCT has been heavily involved in defusing recent Arab-Kurd tensions in the area in and around Kirkuk. During the interview, Dr. Kagan poses questions about the political and military issues COL Gonsalves faces in Kirkuk including protecting the people, enabling the political process in Kirkuk, enabling communication, building trust, maintaining neutrality, and liasing with the Peshmerga and Iraqi Security Forces.

DVIDS Video Part 1

DVIDS Video Part 2

DVIDS Video Part 3

DVIDS Video Part 4

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Transcript:

<p> </p>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: center">                       INTERVIEW OF</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: center">                 COLONEL RYAN GONSALVES,</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: center">                 2nd Brigade Combat Team,</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: center">           1st Cavalry Division Public Affairs</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: center"> </div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: center">                       CONDUCTED BY</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: center">       DR. KIM KAGAN, Institute for the Study of War</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: center">      [Transcript produced from webcast recording.]</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt"> </div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt">                            </div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          [Video clip 1 of 4 begins.]</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          KAGAN: Hello, Colonel Gonsalves. This is Kim Kagan. How are you doing?</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          GONSALVES: Ma'am, I'm doing fine. How about yourself?</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          KAGAN: I'm doing very well. Thanks. Thanks so much for taking the time out to talk with us at the Institute for the Study of War today. I am really pleased to have you and to have you discuss your activities and the activities of the 2nd BCT, 1st Cavalry Division in Kirkuk. So thanks, and welcome.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          GONSALVES: Thank you very much. We are excited about doing this. Thanks again for giving us that opportunity.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          KAGAN: Well, I would love to begin by asking you what your mission is and what the mission is of 2nd Brigade Combat Team 1st Cav in Kirkuk.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          GONSALVES: Okay. I have prepared a short statement, just a couple of minutes, just to give you some framework. I know you were up here with your husband a couple of months ago, but I just want to reiterate for you and anybody else that's in the room for you.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          Blackjack is currently integrated as part of the security framework in Kirkuk, a disputed area in Northern Iraq. Since arriving, Blackjack was directed to enhance Kurdish‑Arab relations and to disrupt insurgent activities in Kirkuk. Our challenge during the integration was fully understanding the nature of Kurd‑Arab tension and promptly defining the operating environment, so that we could ensure that we were able to contribute to security in the area in a meaningful way with our Iraqi partners.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          We have identified thirteen drivers of instability in Kirkuk, and we have worked through the mitigators for each, which have translated into enduring framework tasks for units throughout our area.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          Our efforts are currently focused on issues associated with a disputed status of Kirkuk and the KRG boundary, a perceived lack of legitimate representative governance, security forces, insurgents, oil, drought, SOI transition, delivery of public services, land‑property disputes, the return and absorption of displaced people and unemployment.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          Key enduring tasks for Blackjack include protecting the people, enabling the political process to move forward, enabling communication, building trust within all communities, maintaining neutrality, reporting to our higher headquarters, liaisoning with the Peshmerga and connecting security forces throughout Kirkuk.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          Our mission is through, with, and by our Iraqi partners, Blackjack builds trust in all communities to enable dialogue by providing a secure environment for the political process to go forward, neutralize AQI and violent extremists, set the conditions and transition security, governance, essential service, and economics in a representative manner in order to enhance Kurdish‑Arab relations and protect the people in Kirkuk.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          We have completely reorganized the Brigade staff into three enduring working groups to more fully align with our operating environment and to account for the security agreement.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          Our ISF and security working group focuses on enabling partner initiatives throughout Kirkuk, as well as coordinating lethal targeting, contingency operations, assessments, and ISF training.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          We have also sourced an economics and governance working group that focuses on enabling the efforts of our Provincial Reconstruction Team, as well as synchronizing civil capacity and governance initiatives throughout Kirkuk.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          We have also sourced an investigative task force that interfaces with leaders throughout the Kirkuk legal system, to include provincial and district judges, to enable the rule of law throughout our area, and to train security forces on evidence collection, warrants, and sensitive site exploitation.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          These working groups enable us to partner with our Iraqi friends in an enduring manner and have proven invaluable in building relationships and enabling communication throughout Kirkuk.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          Blackjack is currently partnering with four Iraqi Army brigades and 38 police stations in Kirkuk to improve sustainable logistics and command‑and‑control capacity, intelligence sharing, and operational capacity.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          Since arriving, Blackjack has enabled in excess of 110 Iraqi Army and police search operations, detained fourteen high‑value targets, and found in excess of 150 pieces of ordnance from caches throughout Kirkuk, as well as 1,350 pounds of military‑grade and home‑made explosives.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          Every operation that we do is focused on strengthening and enabling the Iraqi Security Forces, and we work closely to ensure intelligence, legitimize security initiatives, and to connect the security forces with the people throughout Kirkuk.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          We have also adopted a very aggressive information operations stance in response to insurgent activities throughout Kirkuk, enabling the delivery of combined themes and messages through multiple media outlets simultaneously to provide communities throughout Kirkuk with the latest information on insurgent activities and tip lines to report in an effort to enable communication and connect security forces.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          The Kirkuk Provincial Joint Coordination Center consists of every emergency and first responder service provider in Kirkuk, as well as the Iraqi Army, Police, and essential service providers, and receives in excess of 250 calls every day.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          We've got a lot of work ahead of us, and we will continue to enable our efforts of our Iraqi partners throughout Kirkuk, but I am extremely proud of our soldiers and have embraced this mission and of tremendous effects we continue to achieve our Iraqi partners throughout the area.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          I am satisfied that we are making progress, and we still have a lot of work to do. We are on glide path, and I will be glad to take any questions you have, ma'am.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          KAGAN: Thank you so much, Colonel Gonsalves, and thank you very much for describing the work that the brigade is doing.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          I would like to go back to these drivers of instability that you mentioned and ask you, on the ground in Kirkuk and in neighboring areas, what kind of tension do you see between the Arab and Kurdish population, and how does it manifest itself on the ground?</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          GONSALVES: Well, for example, in Kirkuk City, the Kurds, the Arabs, the Turkmen, Christians, they all have been working together for a number of years, and they feel very comfortable with them solving their problems at the lowest level.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          What we saw when we first got here was a very structured Provincial Council that has been together since 2003, with some minor changes. So they feel that, politically, they can solve their problems.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          What they see is suggestions or implementation of programs from the Central Government that disrupt their ability to govern themselves. So, for example, we have had a security group formed from Baghdad to look at how they are going to infuse additional security forces in here, what changes do they need to make, and it has upset a lot of the people. Now what we see is Arabs supporting this working group in order to probably, possibly bring in more Iraqi Army and issue an operations command here, move some of the Peshmerga out, put in some national police. So that those are the things that we see that would drive a wedge or some instability between the Kurds and Arabs.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          Simple things like going out, setting up an Iraqi Army checkpoint about 200 meters away from an Iraqi Police checkpoint, the Iraqi Police don't understand why the Iraqi Army is there. It's a secure area, and it was near Dibis, once again, and the IP chief goes out to ask the Iraqi Army what, in fact, they're doing there, and the police chief gets drawn upon by the Iraqi Army.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          So the police chief being a great guy, Colonel Hussein goes back and tries the dialogue with General Jamal, the provincial director of police, and they work it out with the Iraqi Army and call us, and we help them, and that followed up with, you know, a demonstration of civilians that could possibly bear arms, Kurdish civilians that attack the Iraqi Army. So those are the types of things that we see that can cause instability here and that not cause a civil war but incite violence with enough vigor to cause us to do some other things that we don't want to do right now, and we want to move on with the rule of law and providing for capability and capacity‑building for the Iraqi Security Forces.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          [Video clip 2 of 4 begins.]</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          KAGAN: Can you tell me what is the degree that political actors within Kirkuk, Kurdish political actors, are taking their direction from the KDP and PUK party leaders?</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          GONSALVES: Well, what we see is the governor is very neutral. He does not take any of his direction from the KRG, whether PUK or KDP side.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          Now, obviously, you met Rizgar Ali who is the Provincial Council chairman that is a PUK and takes some direction from the PUK and the KRG, but we see that balance working out pretty well.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          The governor is very good to be very objective instead of subjective, and we have found that to be very good as he leads the provincial government to some type of resolution, we hope, on Article 23 and then eventually 140.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          But we see different provincial council members, whether they are Arab or Turkmen. They do have their sides of the story, and they have a very good IO theme, but I will tell you I have a lot of faith in the governor, and he is very neutral when it comes to the KRG, PUK, KDP.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          KAGAN: May I ask since that provincial council was seated in the last set of selections, what kinds of changes are you beginning to see as elections for the KRG provinces have been announced and the campaigns are underway?</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          GONSALVES: Yeah. We did not have provincial elections last time. We were the province that did not because Article 23 has not been resolved. So, once again, the majority of our provincial council has been seated since 2003. So we don't see much of the jockeying for positions as we see both Ninewa and Diyala, as you very well know, probably, talking to General Nixon recently, some issues going on with seating of Kurds and some of those folks feeling left out.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          But with the KRG elections right now, we don't see much jockeying. They are set to happen on the 25th of July, and we look forward to a pretty smooth election, but we don't see any influence on the provincial council on those elections at this time.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          KAGAN: Can you describe, without compromising your operations, what kind of security plans you are beginning to help see Iraqi Security Forces with and the Peshmerga forces with for the upcoming election?</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          GONSALVES: Ma'am, when we met, General Caslen and myself met with Prime Minister Barzani probably a month ago, he asked that we provide some support.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          I am not sure what that support is going to be as of yet. He hasn't come back to General Caslen, and obviously, it would be approved by General Odierno, General Jacoby, then down through General Caslen to us, but it may be as simple as information sharing, observation from ISR platforms, or, you know, something as simple as that.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          I don't think it is going to require Coalition Forces at polling sites and things of that nature.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          So I think it's going to be pretty minimal and things that we can track, but I would say it's probably going to be mostly information sharing and ISR platforms and things of that nature, ma'am.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          KAGAN: You mentioned earlier that, of course, in Kirkuk, you are not now seeing some of the same kind of political competitions that are ongoing in Ninewa and Diyala. Can you describe how the changing political dynamics in Ninewa and Diyala have affected your operations and the political environment within Kirkuk?</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          GONSALVES: Well, that's a great question because what we are seeing up in Ninewa is, you know, recently, last week, the newly elected governor was going to go to a soccer game, and it was just north of the city. He had a dispute with one of the Peshmerga individuals there at a checkpoint, and the escalations raised to where they had to cancel the soccer game, and General Caslen went up to kind of diffuse that situation.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          Same thing right now, we've got a combined operation in Ninewa with Peshmerga and IA, and we see some displacements of violent extremists up in here.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          Today, we had a VBIED or a suicide VBIED, and then yesterday, we had another VBIED. So we are seeing some of the violent extremists coming into Kirkuk that we haven't seen in a while, conducting those types of attacks that we see in Baqubah and Mosul. So that has had an impact on us operationally from a military perspective.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          From a political perspective, we see that not only are the Kurd‑Arab tensions here, they are starting to raise up in Ninewa, as well as Diyala Province. So it is all along that fault line now. We see this tension rising daily, not to a level that we can't control, but I think it was isolated in Kirkuk Province, and now it is kind of spreading all over, based on some of the results of the political leaders who have been in place.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          KAGAN: You spoke about enemy groups coming into the area. Can you tell me what enemy groups you are actually encountering? Let's begin with that one.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          GONSALVES: Well, right now, obviously, the AQI influence is still here, and that's what we think are the results of the VBIEDs that we saw and the first two round of attacks in March and April, and then the one that happened last night and today, we believe are AQI.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          But also, we have a second set here, and that is the JRTN, and we talked about this a couple of months ago, the Naqshbandi. Some of the extremists are funded through Syria, through al‑Duri and his network, some of the former Baathists. We see, you know, anywhere from two to 400 of those elements here within the province, and we are seeing attacks from those individuals.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          Now, we are collecting on those cells and acting on those cells and capturing some of those elements, but it takes a while to get into those cell networks and neutralize those cell networks.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          So those are the two primary elements that we see here in Kirkuk.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          KAGAN: Is there still Ansar al‑Sunnah in Kirkuk?</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          GONSALVES: Say again, please?</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          KAGAN: Is there still Ansar al‑Sunnah operating in Kirkuk?</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          GONSALVES: Yes, ma'am, and ISI as well to many other elements but small in nature, that we collect on, work with our Iraqi Security Forces, both on intelligence and acting on those, but, like I said, the two that we are really focusing on right now are AQI and Naqshbandi.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          KAGAN: Can you tell me what the differences are in the aims and methods of the AQI and Naqshbandi fighters that you encounter?</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          GONSALVES: Naqshbandi is more of small local attacks that we are seeing both on coalition and ISF, and the AQI are more of the high visibility, high profile, VBIED, SVEST, trying to incite violence and mostly targeting our Iraqi Security Force brothers.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          Most of the VBIEDs have been on either the Arab police, the emergency response unit, or the ESU, as of today, killing five members of their force, so JRTN, Naqshbandi kind of targeting both ISF and coalition and then AQI targeting ISF.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          KAGAN: Why do you think, if you can speculate or give us some evidence, that the Naqshbandi are so active in Kirkuk right now?</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          GONSALVES: Well, I think they're active in Kirkuk based on the fact that they get funding from Syria. Hawijah, which is just south of Kirkuk City, is predominantly Sunni. A lot of former Baathists were there. A lot of the old generals from the old regime resided there. So it has an influence, and it has a population that can be recruited in order to join their organization.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          So we feel that the populations there, the former Baathists, they field well to that particular party, and they have the means in which to recruit and have people attack us.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          [Video clip 3 of 4 begins.]</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          KAGAN: Can you tell me what ‑‑ we wonder if you've conducted some operations with your Iraqi Security Force partners against these enemy groups, and if so, could you describe a couple of them for us? For example, we are sort of checking on some operations that were ongoing last month.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          GONSALVES: Yes. And obviously, the ISF, both the IP and IA are always in the lead. They are warranted operations, and the majority of the time, we are providing the enablers, the air weapons team or the scout weapons team, ISR assets, medivac, the outer cordon or the Quick Reaction Force (QRF). Those are the types of things that we are supplying them with.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          For many of the Iraqi Police, they do the operations pretty much solely on their own, and same thing for the Iraqi Army. Now, obviously, some brigades are more capable than others, and we are working with those to build those capacities and capabilities of those forces up, but we have done ‑‑ like I told you before, we have captured fourteen HVIs (High Value Individuals). Many of those have been done by the Iraqis by themselves, and obviously, with the capabilities that we have, we can locate targets, help them locate those targets.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          So all our operations are combined, and we have done company‑level operations with them, platoon‑level operations, and over the period of 90‑some‑odd days since TOA, we do them, I would probably say, several times, you know, three or four times a week, but also, we have, you know, other forces here helping us out as well to conduct operations.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          KAGAN: Can you tell us more about the Iraqi Security Forces in your area and, indeed, the Kurdish forces in your area? What is the current role of the Peshmerga in a province and in Kirkuk specifically? Can you characterize the type of operation, types of operations that they are conducting on the ground?</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          GONSALVES: For the Peshmerga, we have the 10th Peshmerga Brigade, and it is commanded by Brigadier General Shirko, and they are predominantly in Shuwan, Laylan, and Qarah Anjir, and they have a battalion in Chamchamal which is in the KRG, and that is on the north, northeast and southeast part of the province, and they predominantly don't move anywhere. They are a static defense, and they do limited patrolling but mostly along the road network and in their headquarters area and basically just train for any type of threat that they would see in the future.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          The Iraqi Army which we partner with is the 12th Iraqi Army Division commanded by Major General Amir, and I think when you were here last time, he was a former brigade commander in the Dhibis area under the old regime, which kind of excited a few people and based on his past experience as a brigade commander there. But he's got four brigades in his division, the 49th which is newly forming out of Dibis, the 47th which has been formed for a while, 46th and 15th, and those are predominantly south of Kirkuk City, which we called the "Green Line" when you were here last, the Prosperity Line, which really runs from Dibis all the way to Laylan.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          So we are partnering our brigade with the 12th Iraqi Army, and we liaison with 10th Peshmerga Brigade.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          KAGAN: What are the challenges that you face in partnering with the 12th IA and communicating between them and the Peshmerga force?</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          GONSALVES: Well, we have these security meetings, and we are going to have them tomorrow, and what it is, we bring all the security elements together, the Peshmerga, the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Police, the intelligence agencies, both Asayesh and the NIIS here locally. We bring political leaders also into this, and we are also going to bring a governor into this security meeting, and that is where we discuss ‑‑ we are going to start this weekly ‑‑ discuss targeting. We are going to discuss operations for the next week, and we are going to talk about the approval process, especially when 30 June comes around. We will probably see a lot more involvement, both from the governor and the security chiefs within the Kirkuk Province.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          So the dialogue we have right now is working very well. When we first got here, it wasn't working too well. In January we got both General Amir from the 12th Iraqi Army and General Shirko from the 10th Peshmerga Brigade to talk. Dialogue...We put LNO in the PJCC. He has since been moved out, but we are going to put him back in. We got the approval through the Ministry of Interior.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          So we see the dialogue being increased daily, and the time to resolve an issue has shortened almost within minutes now. So we see a very positive aspect of having them communicate with each other. So we don't see the problems that we saw when we first got here. They are very quickly resolved, and it is just by talking and ensuring that the Iraqi Army tells the Iraqi Police what they're doing.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          Now, we still have small problems at the lower level, but we are working with our battalion commanders to talk to their brigade commanders and their battalion commander counterparts to work these things out.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          So we think we have infused ourselves pretty well in order to enhance that dialogue and enhance the relationship between the Arabs and Kurds at this time.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          [Video clip 4 of 4 begins.]</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          KAGAN: And that's a huge and tremendously important undertaking.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          I would like to ask a couple more questions, if I can.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          GONSALVES: Yes, ma'am.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          KAGAN: First, the United Nations made some recommendations about the ceded territories, and I was wondering what effect those recommendations had on the situation in Kirkuk, the military situation but also the political actors within Kirkuk City.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          GONSALVES: Yeah. Working with Stephanie from ‑‑ our UNAMI rep over there working with the PRT ‑‑ I guess it's a 502‑page report. It's not a published report, but they go around briefing some of the senior leaders, both in the KRG and the GOI and the Coalition Force senior leaders.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          I think there were four recommendations of which we were briefed on, but I'm not quite sure what the response of both the KRG and the GOI. I still think they are feeling it out. They are talking it amongst their own political leaders and see where it's going to take them.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          Our plan is as we get questions, we will get with our UN partners and try to develop some type of strategy to go back and at least be able to answer their questions. Obviously, we don't give recommendations, but our responsibility to them is to ensure that we get them accurate and timely information based on them asking us for additional support from the UNAMI crew here.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          KAGAN: Finally, to change the subject, back to something that you mentioned in our opening statement, you had explained that you had just organized your staff into three working groups. Can you just tell me where and why you got the idea to reorganize how the brigade operates and what benefits that reorganization provides you?</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          GONSALVES: Well, one, when we first came to theater, we were sitting in Kuwait. We were supposed to go to Baghdad, and we were supposed to go on the east side of the River, Adhamiyah and Sadr City. That changed based on General Odierno's focus on the Kirkuk Province based on the tensions that were forming in late January. So he asked us to move up here and occupy the brigade setup here, so that we could enhance Kurd‑Arab relations and work with our Iraqi Security Forces.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          Now, we have to understand that based on the way we were organized, we were probably going to have more of a kinetic fight. So we went the traditional line of, you know, S1 through S6, and the traditional ways of doing business.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          When we got here, MND‑North under General Caslen had broken his staff into four groups, ISF, Security, Economic, and Governance, and we just couldn't break down to four different sections. So, like I briefed, we broke down into three, which is ISF and Security is one, Economics and Governance the other, and then our Prosecution Task Force into the third. And that has worked absolutely wonderfully because what we found is in the traditional staffs, when you would have your meeting, you would spend the first 50 minutes trying to catch up, find out what was going on, enhance that dialogue, and bring everybody up to speed on situational awareness, and then spend ten minutes of your time trying to solve the problem.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          Now all our guys are together in their respective offices, seeing each other every day, talking to the same people at division and corps, and so we see the information flow enhanced. We see the response time to creating solutions to problems reduced drastically, and we think we have the right mix of people based on their personalities, education, and experience, and we think that it has worked out very well. I am a big proponent of what we did in reorganizing the staff for this particular fight.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          KAGAN: Colonel Gonsalves, thank you so much for spending time with us today at the Institute for the Study of War. Thank you very much for all that you are doing for our nation and for the Iraqis with whom you are working, and thanks, especially and above all, to the soldiers working with the Blackjack Brigade for all of their service to the nation. I really appreciate your taking the time with us today to discuss these really important issues.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          GONSALVES: Ma'am, thanks for the opportunity. It allows us to discuss what we're doing, but thank you for what you are doing back home. We appreciate the support, and I really look forward to your return here, and if you do come back to Iraq, we hope you have an opportunity to come up and visit us. We would love to take you around and show you some of the enhancements and improvements that we have made, both in the ISF and enhancing Kurd and Arab tensions. Thank you again, ma'am.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">          KAGAN: Thank you very much.</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height: 27.6pt">                          - - -</div>

Tags

Iraq Project

Al-Qaeda in Iraq-MND-N

Arab-Kurd Tensions

Iraqi Security Forces

Northern Iraq

ISW Webcast with BG Nixon

Apr 16, 2009 - Institute for t...

In this six-part interview, ISW President Kimberly Kagan discusses MND-N with BG James C. Nixon. Nixon is the Deputy Commanding General of Operations in MND-N. During the interview Nixon gives an overview of MND-N, discusses the relationship between the different components of the area of operation such as Diyala and Mosul, the impact of this year's provincial elections in Iraq and the subsequent seating of provincial councils, the current challenges in the north related to Arab-Kurd tensions, and enemy threats.

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Transcript:

<p style="text-align: left"> INTERVIEW OF<br />
 BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES C. NIXON,<br />
 Deputy Commanding General of Operations,<br />
 25th Infantry Division<br />
 CONDUCTED BY<br />
  DR. KIM KAGAN, Institute for the Study of War<br />
 [Transcript produced from webcast recording.]</p>
<p style="text-align: left"> </p>
<p style="text-align: left"> Prepared by:<br />
 MALLOY TRANSCRIPTION SERVICE<br />
 7040 31st Street, N.W.<br />
 Washington, D.C.  20015<br />
 (202) 362 6622</p>
<p style="text-align: left"><br />
      <br />
 [Video clip No. 1 of 6 begins.]</p>
<p style="text-align: left"><br />
<b> KAGAN</b>:  Hello.  This is Kim Kagan.<br />
 <b>NIXON</b>:  Hi, Kim.  How are you?<br />
<b> KAGAN</b>:  I'm doing very well.  How are you doing out there?<br />
<b> NIXON</b>:  I'm doing fine.  I apologize for the timing issue but glad to get the opportunity to talk with you tonight.<br />
 <b>KAGAN</b>:  We are pleased to have the opportunity to talk with you.  If it looks like everything is streaming and ready, I'll go ahead and start asking you some large questions and talking with you for the interview.  Everything look good on your end?<br />
 <b>NIXON</b>:  Okay.  That sounds good.  Sure does.<br />
 <b>KAGAN</b>:  Terrific.</p>
<p style="text-align: left"><br />
 Well, this is Kim Kagan with the Institute for the Study of War, and today, we have with us Brigadier General James C. Nixon, the Deputy Commanding General of Operations for the 25th Infantry Division, which arrived in Iraq in November 2008 and assumed command of Multi National Division North on the 9th of December.</p>
<p style="text-align: left"><br />
 General Nixon, thanks so much for joining us.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  Thank you for having me tonight, Kim.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  We would very much like to understand and have you explain some of the situations that you face in Multi National Division North, which after all is such a complex area of Iraq. The first question I would ask of you is can you tell us about the problem set that you face in Multi-National Division North and perhaps give us an overview of who lives in MND North, and then we could perhaps go through the potential drivers of instability up there.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  Okay, I'd be happy to.<br />
As you know, it is a very complex area, a little bit larger than the size of Pennsylvania for the four provinces, excluding the KRG, but in the north, you've got Ninewa, which, the major city is Mosul there.  You have Salah ad Din in the center, and then to the eastern side, you have Diyala, and then above that, of course, Kirkuk.  As you know, each one of the provinces is very different.  Each one has a different subset of issues.  I can start really with Diyala, which I know the best of the four, and I will work around the area. In Diyala, it really is a microcosm of Iraq because all of the issues resident in Iraq are inside of Diyala.  It has about 55 percent Sunni and about 35 percent Shia, 15 percent or so Kurdish.  So you've got an ethnic mix.  It is bordered by Iran.  It is close to Baghdad.  It has had at times both JAM and al Qaeda influences, and then it has a disputed area up north, adjacent with Kurdistan.  It is one of our more challenging areas because it is so nuanced, and I can answer specific questions as we go forward.  In Kirkuk itself, largely stable security has very much improved since the Sons of Iraq came on board in the southern western sectors.  The combination of the Sons of Iraq, a strong police force in Kirkuk, and now the 12th IA have increased the stability, but obviously, the overriding concern in Kirkuk continues to be the Arab Kurd tensions. Again, I will be happy to go into further detail on that.<br />
 In Salah ad Din, probably our most progressed, progressive of the four provinces, a strong functioning provincial government, good economic base, a strong Iraqi Army leadership.  The major issue there really is disenfranchised personnel, primarily the former regime elements, and there is a large number because, as you know, Tikrit was really the center, Tikrit and Al Daur being the center of the former Baath party.<br />
 Then finally, our biggest issue at the moment is Mosul in the Province of Ninewa, and that still continues to be the largest threat of al Qaeda.  It has not had a very strong provincial government, although that is about to change, and also has disputed areas and Arab Kurd tensions as well.<br />
 I have walked around, but I guess I would like to say that across the board, what we have seen is great progress on a number of fronts, although there are clearly challenges ahead, but I would like to highlight most of those challenges are based largely on the successes that have been made in past rotations and in this rotations.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  Thank you very much. General Nixon, I understand from my team that my questions are not audible on the webcast.  So might I ask you please to repeat the questions before you answer them as we go forward?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  Absolutely.  Sure.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  Let's begin with Diyala Province, and perhaps you can explain to us whether the majority of violent activity within Diyala and provincial instability arises from enemy groups or whether it arises from ethno sectarian tensions.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  The question was whether the majority of violence in Diyala arises from ethnic groups or enemy insurgents or terrorists, and that is a difficult question.<br />
 If I could re-characterize it, I would re-characterize it to say that the majority of violence that I see in Diyala right now is based on a struggle for power amongst the elites.  And some of that is manifested in ethnic groups, and some of it is manifested by insurgent organizations, either al Qaeda or, in some cases, to a lesser degree, JAM special groups, but largely al Qaeda and other Sunni insurgents.<br />
 I would say that the level of violence in Diyala is at its lowest level, really since 2003, and largely the population has been passive.  But based on this increased security, I think there are growing expectations, primarily for central services but also for jobs.  And the elections, having now elected a Sunni provincial government or a Sunni majority provincial government, I think unless those expectations are addressed, then there is potential for that violence to increase, unless we can get those essential services and jobs out to the population.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  Can you tell us more about the individuals who have been elected to the provincial government?  Has the provincial council been seated, the provincial council chairman appointed and the provincial governor appointed yet?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  Well, like all things in Diyala and Iraq, it is going through the process right now.  The provincial council has met    the incoming provincial council has met a number of times, and we believe they have selected    they have met the requirements to meet post-elections or post-the announcing of the elections.  We believe they have selected a provincial governor, one deputy governor, the provincial council chairman, and deputy provincial council chairman.<br />
That is my understanding, both from the provincial reconstruction team, as well as those that we are seeing over the video here.<br />
It appears that they formed a coalition between the Tawafuq, which is a Sunni political organization, the Kurdish, as well as ISCI and Shia.  So it is a coalition, truly a coalition that expands all the ethnic groups.  Currently, my belief is the provincial governor will be from the Tawafuq party.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left">[Video clip No. 2 of 6 begins.]<br />
<b>KAGAN</b>:  As you look at the politics in Diyala, I would be very curious for your assessment of how much the national parties influence some of these local politicians.  For example, to what extent do the KDP and PUK actually give directives to the Kurdish members of the provincial government in Diyala?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  That's really hard for me to address.  Obviously, that is not one of my primary focuses.<br />
 I would suggest that because of the location of Diyala, there are external influences, both from Kurdistan through the political parties as you state and from Baghdad.  It is a key area that has external influences, both from Kurdistan, Baghdad, as well as because of its location from Iran.  So there is great pressure, I believe, on the political leadership, as well as the rest of the mechanism, the security apparatus in Diyala exerted from external factors.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  Can you explain a little bit more what interest, for example, the Prime Minister might have in the outcome of the political settlement of Diyala?  Likewise, what is the Iranian interest in Diyala Province?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  I think Diyala, one, obviously next to Iran, there has been a historic gateway over the years from Iran through Diyala into Baghdad.  That has been for hundreds of years.  So there is great interest.  There are a number of Iranian visitors that flow through that on a historic gateway to visit some of the sites there.<br />
 I think the interest from the Prime Minister is a number of things.  One, it is of course right outside of Baghdad.  So there is a central, close location.  There has been an ongoing struggle since 2003 between first JAM, then al Qaeda, now largely balanced and secure, but pockets of both exist inside of Diyala.<br />
 And then, obviously, it is also next to Kurdistan, and so you have the disputed area in the vicinity of Khanaqeen.  So there are a number of factors that make Diyala incredibly important to Baghdad, to Kurdistan, as well as Iran, and that results in interest by all the parties.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  We have read over the past weeks about an Iraqi led military operation in Diyala Province in the vicinity of Balad Ruz and Turki Village.  Would it be possible for you to describe the purpose of those operations, as well as their conduct and their result?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON:</b>  Sure.  When we arrived back into Iraq on this latest rotation, about five months ago, one of the things that was most surprising to me was a pretty significant support zone, al Qaeda's or ISI support zone, south of Balad ruz and the Turki Bowl region. It was defended by a belt of IEDs, and then we had some significant reporting that led us to believe they had set up a long term support zone.  Of course, that sits along lines of communication from Iran into Baghdad but, most importantly, sits right outside of Baghdad.<br />
So we began an operation in complete partnership with the Iraqi Army to deliberately clear that area, to hold it, to bring back displaced personnel, because there was a number of villages that al Qaeda and ISI had forced the villagers out, and we were in the process of building that location.<br />
 It has been an ongoing operation for a number of months, and it has been extremely successful, extremely well coordinated between the Coalition Forces and our Iraqi Army partners.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  What effect do you think that those operations will have on AQI and ISI's ability to continue the fight in Diyala Province?  How have they reacted to these operations?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  I think we have significantly disrupted al Qaeda and ISI operations inside of Diyala.  The support zones and the safe locations that they have to really hide are becoming reduced daily because we are systematically clearing those, and we are holding them. We now have the capacity in the Iraqi Army to push those forces forward.  We have built the capacity in the Iraqi police then to establish police stations, and that is leading us to what really the main effort in Diyala is, getting displaced personnel back into their homes and then rebuilding the destruction that has really occurred over the last four or five years inside of Diyala. That over time will separate the few hard line terrorists from the population, and then, frankly, it is just a matter of time, al Qaeda and ISI, that we continue to defeat that organization inside of Diyala.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  In past years, particularly in 2007 and early 2008, when the ISF and Coalition Forces have conducted operations in Diyala Province.  AQI and ISI have moved from central locations in Diyala to remote areas, like Lake Hamrin or to the border of Salah ad Din Province.  Have you seen the enemy being able to move and re-concentrate elsewhere outside of Diyala?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  Well, clearly, there are indications of them moving.  They do not have the safe locations that they've had in the past, to the same magnitude, because of the increased capacity of the Iraqi Army.<br />
 So the luxury that we really have in Diyala now that we didn't have in the past was the ability to hold the population centers with the Iraqi police in partnership with Coalition Forces and then the increased capacity of the Iraqi Army to go out and clear those type of support zones, again, in conjunction with Coalition Forces, and then stay, hold that terrain, bring the personnel back in, and then ultimately build it.  Frankly, that was mostly a matter of capacity early on.  The increased security and increased capacity of the Iraqi Army has allowed us to do it during this rotation.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  I have a question that I am not sure that you can answer, and if you can't, just tell me, but you referred to the lines of communication from Iran running into Diyala Province, and you spoke about  the enemy in Diyala being mainly AQI and ISI.  The implication is that these Iranian lines are supporting in some way AQI and ISI activity.  Is that the case, and if so, what kind of support do you see for Sunni groups coming in from Iran?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  I don't want to get into the specifics of lines of communication or support. I would say overall that there continues to be indicators of Iranian influence on a number of levels inside of Diyala.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  Now, as we started to look at the ongoing operations in MND North, we noticed last week or the week before, an uptick in activities in Dalouiya which, of course, lies along the border, relatively, between Diyala and Salah ad Din Provinces.<br />
 Can you tell us more about what's been happening in that part of Salah ad Din and whether it is connected to the Diyala operation?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  Well, I think one of the things that MND North obviously brings to the fight is the ability to synchronize operations across the provinces, and there clearly is a scene that has developed, that had developed over time between Salah ad Din and Diyala.  So we are working both in Diyala and Salah ad Din to bring forces together, again, to clear those areas and then ultimately to hold them.  So that is a supporting effort into the larger operation that we have got going inside of Diyala.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"> [Video clip No. 3 of 6 begins.]<br />
 <b>KAGAN</b>:  Now, we have spoken about AQI, ISI, and JAM for a little bit.  Can you tell us whether there are other enemy groups within MND North that continue to have legs?  For example, do you see the Naqshabandi group, Ansar al Sunnah, or the former Baathist elements continuing the fight within MND North?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  Well, I think there are a number of groups that are out there that will continue to fight, and there is some tactical level of coordination between the pipe swingers, if you will.<br />
 Probably, the one that I personally see as having the biggest legs right now is the Jaish Al Naqshabandi, or JRTN, just from a standpoint of organization and their information operations and then their linkage back into the former regime elements.  That is one we take very seriously.  Obviously, they are focused on Coalition Forces, and we are very focused on the disruption and defeat of that network, but that is one that I am personally focused on.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  Can you talk about the new provincial council forming in Salah ad Din Province?  That was one of the provinces, obviously, where the elections did not have a clear and specific outcome.</p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  In Salah ad Din?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  Mm hmm.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON:</b>  I have a little bit less visibility on Salah ad Din, but the provincial council has met and formed and picked, I believe, or at least announced that Abu Mazan, a businessman, will take the lead. There has been a little bit or at least reporting of a little bit of turmoil over that, but the reporting that I am receiving is that they are on track. I expect, based on the effectiveness of the last provincial council, that the transition in Salah ad Din will actually be one of the more efficient across the provinces that we are focused on, but, again, I have a little bit less visibility in that area right now.</p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  Can we talk a little bit about Ninewa Province?  I would certainly be interested in your assessment of the rise of a new Sunni party.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  I'm sorry.  You were cut off.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:   All right.  Can you tell me about al Hadba and the formation of that party within Ninewa Province?  To what extent were you able to watch it originate at the beginning of your tour, and what is that party's leadership?  Who are they?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  Well, the al Hadba, we have watched it kind of as it developed.  We expected al Hadba to win.  We probably didn't expect them to win to the level that they did there.  Al-Nujaifi has been identified as the governor.  He has been pretty outspoken in some of his anti Coalition force rhetoric, although I think he is more pragmatic than that.<br />
 The scope that al Hadba won the rhetoric associated with the Coalition Force rhetoric associated with anti Kurd could create tensions up there, and there's going to be some challenges that we have to work through.<br />
 On the same level, on the same line, though, there may be opportunities in that to reach out to a number of the elements that continue to cause problems there, and he may be able to improve the security situation.  So that is one that my counterpart, General Brown, the other deputy commander, is working very hard.<br />
 I think we have tracked it pretty closely from the beginning.  We are working closely with them now, and we will continue to see how it will work out as the government is actually seated.  That will be one of, obviously, the key topics as we get out of the city discussion in June and what the security situation is there and whether the government of Iraq wants us to actually continue operations inside of Mosul or not.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  General Odierno raised that issue in several interviews over the end of last week and this weekend, and I obviously do not want you to comment on something that is a decision that will be taken at force level, but I would like your assessment of the security situation within Mosul proper, likewise in Baquba.  Can you tell us what kinds of challenges remain in those cities that keep you and perhaps your superiors concerned?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  Let me start with Baquba, and then I will work to Mosul.<br />
 In Baquba, again, the security challenges in Baquba are largely struggles for power, and I think we can continue to work through those.  As we are seating the provincial government, it will be one of the key pieces to that, and then getting essential services out to the population, I think to meet some of their expectations, and then finally to continue to work to professionalize the police force.  That is largely secure in Baquba right now.<br />
 So, overall, if we can get at those three pretty tough hurdles, I am very confident that Baquba will continue to improve.<br />
 In Mosul, as you know, we've got a pretty significant operation in conjunction with the Iraqi security forces, both IA and IP, to clear, hold, and then build in Mosul.  Again, the difference    and I would characterize the difference between Baquba and Mosul    is that the population is not passive in Mosul, and their views match the same views as some of the elites there.  So, until we are able to get to the level of security there that we can separate terrorists or the elites that are struggling for power in Mosul from the population, I think that will be a much more significant challenge.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  Looking at the political elites within Ninewa Province, can you tell me to what extent the new    the leadership that is struggling for power is a tribal leadership and to what extent it is a leadership more connected either with the urban centers or overarching political parties?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  I don't know, and I really am not that latched into Mosul that I would like to comment.<br />
 I mean, obviously, the tribes continue to be one of the major fabrics or major pieces of the fabric in Iraq, and I think the successful transition of Iraq, the tribes will be an important part of that, but as it relates to the specifics of Ninewa, I am really not that closely aligned to that.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"> [Videotape No. 4 of 6 begins.]<br />
 <b>KAGAN</b>:  What about in Diyala?  Can you help us understand the tribal situation in Diyala, its connection with the political apparatus, and perhaps whether there is still an overlap of   <br />
<b> </b></p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  The tribal    I'm sorry.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  Between enemy groups and tribal groups.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  Yeah.  The tribal situation in Diyala is a little bit different than any of the other tribal    or any of the other provinces, mainly because of the number of tribes.  There is a large number of tribes inside of Diyala, a 100 plus, and many of the smaller villages will have ten to fifteen different tribes in those villages that don't work necessarily closely together.  So that has made it easier for extremist groups to really be able to take over some of those villages.  So that is one of the dynamics in Diyala.<br />
 I think there are a number of significant, both Sunni and Shia tribes that we are working very hard with on the reconciliation, to try and work the reconciliation not only with the Central Government but through the paramount sheikhs of the tribes there, both as detainees return, as Sons of Iraq are being transitioned, as we continue to try and meet the expectations.  We have taken a very active role with the Diyala operations commander in reaching out to all of the paramount sheikhs to help take a lead in that.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  Just on a question of fact, who is the Diyala operations commander right now, the center commander?<br />
<b>NIXON</b>:  Staff Major General Tariq has been    came in as the Diyala operations commander about 90 days ago.  I'm sorry.  About two months ago.<br />
<b>KAGAN</b>:  And likewise, as a point of information, who is the PDOP in Diyala?<br />
<b>NIXON</b>:  Staff Major General Damouk is the PDOP in Diyala.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  Super.  Now, looking at these dynamics within Diyala, you mentioned that Sons of Iraq is one of the preeminent tests of the reconciliation process, and I wonder if you can tell me how the Sons of Iraq in Diyala have responded to some of the recent arrests of Sons of Iraq leaders in Baghdad, obviously using Iraqi warrants and Iraqi judges.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  I think the arrests in Baghdad have not been that significant in and of themselves.  I talk with a number of the SOI leaders shortly after that.  I mean, there is an understanding that there are    like anything else, there are some Sons of Iraq leaders out there that are not doing the right thing.  So I don't think that they were that surprised that some were arrested.<br />
 I do think there continues to be concern amongst the Sons of Iraq leaders that the Central Government of Iraq will not honor the commitment of doing the full transition and transfer, and that is what we continue to work really side by side, every day, with our Iraqi Army partners to facilitate the transition and then ultimately the transfer of those Sons of Iraq.<br />
 As you know, we have already transitioned them from control of the Coalition Force to control of the Central Government of Iraq through the Iraqi Army.  We are in the process of transitioning the pay from the Coalition Force to the Government of Iraq, and they have picked up the payments for those.  And then we are working with them to, one, transition twenty percent into the Iraqi security forces and then find suitable employment for the other 80 percent.<br />
 It is a difficult task.  It is challenging because, frankly, some people don't want it to happen, and bureaucracy is bureaucracy, but at the leadership level what I have seen is a full commitment both in IFCNR and in the Iraqi Army units to receive and transition the Sons of Iraq.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  One of the other contentious subjects in MND North, of course, is the tension between Arabs and Kurds, and I would like to focus now on this question, both in Kirkuk and in Diyala. The first question I would have for you is to what extent do you actually think that there are ethnic tensions on the ground in Kirkuk city and Diyala Province that are driving some of the dispute.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  Well, one, that's a great question.<br />
 When you talk to the local population, whether it's in Khanaqeen or Jalula in Diyala or whether it's in Kirkuk city or Laylan or Dibis in Kirkuk Province, the population have gotten    they have lived together for a long time.  They get along at that level, and they have continued to get along at the local level. There clearly is a struggle for the disputed areas that has continued to manifest itself between the KRG and the Central Government.  It has not yet spilled over into the local population that I have seen.  There also are some opportunists, I think, in particular terrorists, that are trying to exploit that scene in an attempt to inflame the population.<br />
So, to answer your question directly, I don't see it at the local level.  I am concerned that if there continues to be spectacular attacks by terrorists and there continues to be pressure, external pressure placed on them, then you can start to see it manifest itself more than it has at the local level.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  Can you explain, then, what these tensions look like perhaps in terms of the tensions between the Peshmerga forces and the Iraqi Army division, for example?  To what extent do you see in your area, a competition between Kurdish and other Iraqi forces for control of territory?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  I think what I have seen in both Diyala and Kirkuk is great professionalism, frankly, on both sides, by the Iraqi Army soldiers, as well as the Peshmerga soldiers.  So they are in the same battle space.<br />
 As you know, we brought them together to create a combined security arrangement to achieve the provincial elections without incident and very successfully executed that.  So I have been very happy with the restraint shown by both the Iraqi Army and the Peshmerga side. They are ultimately soldiers and ultimately, I believe, will do what they are directed to do, but what I have seen is they understand the stakes of the issues at hand, and there has been great efforts by the leadership on almost a daily basis to ensure that we don't incite tension or conflict, that we do everything we can to reduce it.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left">[Video clip No. 5 of 6 begins.]<br />
<b>KAGAN</b>:  Is the Iraqi Army or, indeed, are the Peshmerga forces able to use soft power in Diyala and Kirkuk?  Are they able to engage in any sort of reconstruction, or are they, in a certain sense, frozen from engaging in these other non combat issues?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  Well, I think that is actually one of the challenges right now because there is such great concern that whatever either side does will be overreacted to by the other side, in some cases, it is almost like being stuck in time.  So you will get a number of complaints from those villages that they are not being supported by either side, they are not getting the essential services that they need, they are not getting the influx of money that they need.  That is, I believe, one of the reasons.  Obviously, there are many others, but one of the reasons that we need to continue to work to resolve this.<br />
 We are taking a larger role from a Coalition Force standpoint on assisting with some of the essential services along the disputed areas and trying to get those projects in, particularly some of the outlying    not the major cities but the outlying areas.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  Can you simply explain why the coalition is taking a more active role?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  I think we are committed to do everything that we can do try and reduce the tension in those areas, in the effort to allow the political process to work.  So that is the primary focus that I have gotten, whether it has been in resources, whether it's time, energy, or money, to ensure that we give it very opportunity for the political apparatus to work to a solution.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  And can you describe a little bit more what that political apparatus might be?  For example, do you see the resolution of these issues occurring at the provincial level, the regional level, or at the national level within Iraq?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  I think my personal opinion - ultimately it is going to be a national level decision.  I mean, it is clearly nested in Article 23 for the power sharing at the provincial level within Kirkuk, but it is really the larger Article 140 discussion that addresses the disputed areas as part of the constitution. So I think it will ultimately be resolved at the national level.  I think maintaining the personal relationships, maintaining the level of calm, reducing tensions, it occurs at the local and provincial level, but the ultimate solution will be at the national level.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  Of course, Kirkuk did not actually hold provincial elections in January.  Are those elections now scheduled, and are there processes for undertaking those elections underway?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  They are not.  That continues to be a moving timeline.<br />
 I think they look to do those elections in the summer, but they have not accomplished the preparation, I don't believe, yet to do those elections on schedule.  So I think they appear to be continuing to slip to the right.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  Is that a major subject for concern for either the officials within the KRG or for the people of Kirkuk?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  I'm sorry, Kim.  I couldn't understand the first part of your question.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  Is the slipping of the elections to the right, a major cause for concern, either for the KRG leadership or for the people of Kirkuk?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  I can't speak to the KRG leadership. I think there is some concern at the local level in Kirkuk just because they have not had the election, the provincial powers, laws that became a part of the other provinces based on the elections have not been effected yet inside of Kirkuk.  So I think there is a desire by the leadership in Kirkuk to hold the elections as rapidly as possible, at least by some aspects of leadership there.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  And what is it about the new provincial powers that benefits provincial communities?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  Well, the Provincial Powers Law    and I am obviously not an expert in it, but the provincial powers law does provide more power down to the provincial leadership than existed prior to the elections as it relates to budgeting, as it relates to control of the local police.  So it delineates those responsibilities and authorities at the provincial level and those in the Central Government and provides more authorities to the provincial level than existed prior to the elections.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  Can you tell us about the role that the United Nations played within the disputed territories and within Kirkuk?  What specifically is the UN trying to do, and how does that interact with your own operations on the ground?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  Well, as you know, the United Nations have been doing a study on the disputed areas for a period of time.  It is, in my understanding, the most extensive study that has been done on the disputed areas, and there is an expectation that that study will be released in the near future, although I don't know the exact date.<br />
 So I don't know that    my understanding is that it will not be binding, but it will provide more detail, I think, and more background than has been done before.  So I think from our standpoint, the effort that they put into it, the research that they have done will help provide a foundation that the political parties can use to reach a resolution of an issue.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  Now, within the Kurdish political parties, we have seen some churn, shall we say, in the politics between the KDP and the PUK over the past several months?  What kinds of insight can you provide us into what the differences are between the two Kurdish parties and how they are manifested in either their goals or their actions in national and provincial politics?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON:</b>  That is difficult for me because the area that I deal with is largely the PUK, and largely the KDP tends to work in the area that General Brown is at. There has been some turmoil there, that we have seen some of that manifest itself in the individuals that we deal with. I know there is an effort to consolidate many of the separate functions under one function, and I believe they are moving towards that.<br />
 So I don't really have enough depth of knowledge to compare and contrast the KDP and the PUK.  I would say it is important to understand that the KRG is not monolithic, and there are competing factions within it, and that complicates, in some cases, an already complicated situation.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  Would you feel comfortable talking about what you see of the PUK?  That is to say, what that party's goals and objectives are and how its leadership has been changing or interacting with the situation on the ground?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  You know, I don't   <br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  You don't have to.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  Yeah.  I would if I felt like I could put any insight on it, but I really deal with it at the security level, and I understand how it impacts it, but I'd prefer not to get into the inner workings of the PUK.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left">[Video clip No. 6 of 6 begins.]<br />
<b>KAGAN</b>:  That is absolutely fine.<br />
 Why don't we zoom out just a little bit, and let me ask you whether you found that the provincial council elections in Ninewa changed the focus of the national leadership on Kurdish Arab tensions, and did it actually, in a certain sense, shift a center of gravity from Mosul to Kirkuk?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  I don't know.  That's an interesting question.<br />
 I think I still consider the decisive point or the center of gravity of that discussion as being Kirkuk, but there are at least indicators on a number of sides that there may be more concern on Mosul now.  So I have always really considered Kirkuk to be the center or gravity, but it seems like there is, frankly, more concern on Mosul, partly because of the provincial elections there.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  Can you tell us more about the former Baath party elements throughout MND North?  You mentioned at the beginning of the interview that MND North had traditionally been the heart of the old Baath party.  To what extent do you see foreign support for old Baath party members?  To what extent do you see former Baath institutions still in place, and to what extent do you see even some of the new political parties reaching out to their former Baath roots?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  Well, it is very difficult to separate all those because you've got so many what I'll call "disenfranchised" that were in the Baath party because that was the predominant party and that's where they're at, and they have no opportunity to reconcile as they go through.<br />
 I think if they can figure out how to separate those that are prepared to move on to a new way of business and then reconcile them back in the government, there is great expertise, experience that is sitting out there, I think, ready to do that, but it is so intertwined, as you say, with other individuals that continue to believe that the right solution is to go back to the Baath party, best exhibited by Izzat al Douri brand, that I think it is difficult for all of us.  It is difficult for us as Coalition Forces to separate that, and to a degree, it is difficult for the Central Government to separate that.<br />
 So I believe it will continue to be a challenge to work through, but it is absolutely needed to work through and be able to separate the different bins of former Baathists that are out there, those that are terrorists that we still need to detain, those that    from those that want to be a part of really working and living in the new Iraq.<br />
 I know that didn't answer your question directly, but it is one of the more nuanced areas that we are continuing to try and sort ourselves through.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  Over the past few months, obviously, we have begun to structure our coalition operations under the framework of the security agreement that the United States and Iraq have signed, and I wonder whether you feel that the implementation of that security agreement has constrained what you're able to do in MND North, and secondly, how it is    how well the implementation is going, finally perhaps, how do you mitigate any constraints that that agreement places on you?<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON:</b>  That's a great question.<br />
 First, I would just say this.  The security arrangement, I think, was absolutely a step in the right direction and really continues to enhance the sovereignty of Iraq and moves us towards a transition much quicker.<br />
 We are doing the same mission that we were doing before it was signed.  We are doing it differently, and the way that we're doing it now is really in complete coordination with our Iraqi partners.<br />
 It has forced us to partner much closer.  It has forced us to combine ops and intel functions, so that they understand what we are doing and we understand what they are doing, and it has forced us to understand our objectives much clearer.<br />
 So, from my standpoint, you have to work harder than we had to before, but it is an improved product, and it really has allowed the Iraqi Army, I believe, and the Iraqi Security Force to move to the next level.<br />
 So, from that standpoint, I am very optimistic.  I haven't seen it to this point really constrain us from doing any mission that we were doing before, and the way that we have really continued that is by our closer and closer partnership with the Iraqis.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  We are running out of time, and so I have two final questions for you.  First, if you could just let us know for our own frame of reference, what you see as the main effort within MND North and what you see as the supporting effort, and then secondly, I would ask you whether you have any comments that you would like to make at the end of this interview regarding MND North.<br />
<br />
<b>NIXON</b>:  Oh, I'm sorry.<br />
 I think geographically, our main effort continues to be Ninewa and then followed closely by Diyala.  Our most dangerous course of action continues to be Arab Kurd tensions. Functionally, our main effort continues to be building the Iraqi Security Forces' capability, and this is more about capability than capacity because I think that is the thing that will continue to bridge the gap and make them successful as we conduct the responsible drawdown.<br />
 I would just like to make a couple of comments at the end.  I think, as you know, the conditions change rapidly here.  This is, without a doubt, the most complex environment that I've operated in, and I've operated in a number of wars, but because of where we're at and the partnership with the security agreement, it really means that you're talking about multiple enemies and multiple friends and the population, as the terrain.  So it is an extremely complex operating environment, and frankly, we're doing it with diminishing influence because there is an end state as we go through.<br />
 Where before we were at the center of the page, we are no longer at the center of the page, either for the problem or the solution, and we are rapidly moving off the page.  That requires us to partner closer than we ever have in the past, and it requires us to ask the deeper questions than we have in the past, on both sides.<br />
 And then, finally, I think the timeline has gotten us to a stage of those things that we must do because we know the clock is ticking, and to bridge the gap and to allow the successful transition that we've paid for on all sides with a lot of blood, sweat, and tears, there are things that we still need to get accomplished.<br />
 Having said all that, I continue to be humbled to work around the patriots, both American and Iraqi, that are sacrificing each and every day, and I have the utmost respect for them and their families that support their efforts.<br />
 That's really all I wanted to say, and I do appreciate the opportunity to talk with you tonight.<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>KAGAN</b>:  General Nixon, thank you so much for talking with me and with the Institute for the Study of War today, and thank you also to all of the soldiers of the 25th Infantry Division for all of the hard work that you are engaged in, in these truly complex circumstances.  We wish all of you the very best, and I believe the proper way to close this interview, then, would be for me to give you a big tropic lightning.<br />
 [Laughter.]<br />
 </p>
<p style="text-align: left"><b>NIXON</b>:  Well, tropic lightning to you too.<br />
<b>KAGAN</b>:  Thank you very much.<br />
      <br />
 </p>