Iran Project

The Iranian April 13 missile-drone attack on Israel was very likely intended to cause significant damage below the threshold that would trigger a massive Israeli response. The attack was designed to succeed, not to fail. The strike package was modeled on those the Russians have used repeatedly against Ukraine to great effect. The attack caused more limited damage than intended likely because the Iranians underestimated the tremendous advantages Israel has in defending against such strikes compared with Ukraine. The Iranians will learn lessons from this strike and work to improve their abilities to penetrate Israeli defenses over time as the Russians have done in repeated strike series against Ukraine.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force launched a large-scale drone and missile attack from Iranian territory that targeted Israel from Iranian territory on April 13. This marks the first time Iran has targeted Israel directly from Iranian territory. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesperson Brig. Gen. Daniel Hagari confirmed that Iran launched drones and then missiles from Iranian territory toward Israel. The IRGC announced the start of operation “True Promise” at approximately 15:30 EST on April 13.

Iran appears to be exploiting the uncertainty surrounding its reported “imminent” attack against Israel to stoke psychological terror in Israel. The present nature of the information space makes it difficult to forecast when precisely Iran might launch a retaliatory strike into Israel if at all. Western estimations of when Iran will conduct an attack have varied and could be subject to change. The likelihood that Iran is spreading disinformation surrounding its strike exacerbates the issue further.

Bloomberg reported on April 10 that Iran or its proxies may conduct missile or drone strikes targeting military and government facilities in Israel in the coming days in response to the April 1 Israeli airstrike that killed seven IRGC officials in Damascus. Sources familiar with US and Israeli intelligence told Bloomberg that Iran or its proxies might use high-precision missiles in the strikes. One of the sources said that it is “a matter of when, not if” Iran will respond to the April 1 airstrike. Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz warned on April 10 that Israel would attack Iran if “Iran attacks [Israel] from its own territory.” IRGC-affiliated media dismissed Katz’s warning, claiming that Israel seeks to deter Iran from responding to the April 1 airstrike and warning that Iran must respond.

IRGC Navy Commander Rear Adm. Ali Reza Tangsiri implicitly threatened the United Arab Emirates (UAE) during an interview with Lebanese Hezbollah-controlled media on April 9, likely to pressure the UAE to sever ties with Israel. Tangsiri issued a series of threatening messages, all of which appear aimed at the UAE, during the interview. Tangsiri reiterated the long-standing Iranian threat to close the Strait of Hormuz and furthermore suggested that Israel is cooperating with the UAE against Iran. Tangsiri claimed that Israel is present in the UAE under the pretext of “economic work” but actually engages in security and military activities there that threaten Iran. Tangsiri’s decision to conduct the interview with an Arabic-language outlet further suggests that he intended to message to an Arabic-speaking audience.

Senior Iranian military officials have continued to suggest that they will carefully calibrate Iran’s response to Israel’s killing of senior IRGC commanders in Syria. This careful approach aims to avoid a direct war with Israel. Iranian Armed Forces Chief of the General Staff Major General Mohammad Bagheri said on April 6 that Iran will strike Israel “at the right time” during a commemoration ceremony for the IRGC officers killed in the likely Israeli airstrike on April 1.... Several senior Iranian clerics close to the Office of the Supreme Leader endorsed “strategic patience”—a long-standing regime policy that involves not immediately conducting a major response to Israeli attacks—in their weekly sermons on April 5. Such comments support CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran seeks to avoid a direct military confrontation against the United States and Israel. Strategic patience does not exclude an eventual Iranian retaliation, however.

Israel withdrew most of its forces from the Gaza Strip on April 7. Israeli officials and media sources have framed the withdrawals as part of their preparations for conducting a clearing operation into Rafah. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant announced on April 7 that Israeli “forces came out” of the Gaza Strip “and are preparing for future missions” into Rafah. Israeli military correspondents similarly interpreted the withdrawal as part of an IDF effort to reconstitute ahead of advancing into Rafah.

Some clerics close to the Office of the Supreme Leader suggested that Tehran will calibrate its response to Israel killing senior IRGC commanders in Syria in order to avoid a direct war with Israel.

Jaish al Adl, which is a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia, conducted unprecedentedly complex and sophisticated attacks targeting Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran. Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations throughout the Gaza Strip. Hamas rejected the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal. A senior US military official stated that the Houthis may be running low on their stockpiles of drones and anti-ship ballistic missiles due to persistent US airstrikes.

Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have signaled their desire to disrupt the “land bridge” connecting Israel to the Persian Gulf. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Secretary General Akram al Kaabi criticized the “land bridge,” which passes through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, in a speech on April 3. Kataib Hezbollah military spokesperson Hussein Moanes similarly declared on April 1 that the group is prepared to arm Iranian-backed militants in Jordan and “cut off” land routes that reach Israel.