Iran Project

Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid suggested that the Iranian regime may be responsible for or complicit in the recent chemical attacks on schoolgirls across the country. Abdol Hamid characterized the attacks as “a form of protest suppression” meant to target children who protested against the regime. Abdol Hamid also suggested that the regime has been unwilling to protect these schoolgirls due to their protest participation. He furthermore suggested that the regime knows who is responsible for the attacks and has lied to the public about them. Abdol Hamid thus criticized regime leadership for engaging in the great “sin” of lying, stating that “the worst ruler is the one who lies to their nation.” CTP previously reported that the regime has failed to take appropriate measures necessary to protect these schools and assessed with moderate confidence that a network of individuals whom the regime tolerates has coordinated the attacks.

The Iranian regime has apparently failed to take measures to protect schools following 46 separate reports of chemical poisonings targeting schoolgirls throughout the country on March 1. Social media users documented additional attacks on a girls’ schools and a dormitory in Ardabil and Alborz Provinces respectively on March 2. Iranian officials, media outlets, and the clerical establishment expressed alarm at ongoing attacks targeting Iranian schoolchildren on March 2. Vice President for Women and Family Affairs Ensieh Khazali announced that President Ebrahim Raisi ordered the formation of a special committee to investigate student poisonings. Two senior Iranian clerics separately urged the security and intelligence apparatus to address the issue on March 2. The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) denied that a plainclothes officer who was captured forcibly arresting a parent in front of a targeted school was affiliated with the LEC, and claimed that it had arrested four individuals connected to incident. It remains unclear, however, what meaningful action the regime has taken to identify and prosecute the perpetrators of ongoing attacks or secure Iranian educational facilities. There is currently no indication of who is responsible for this months-long campaign against Iranian school girls, and Iranian officials have blamed both foreign and domestic actors. CTP nevertheless assessed with moderate confidence on March 1 that a network of individuals whom the regime tolerates has coordinated this campaign and that the regime has allowed them—at least for now—to do so.

Regime incompetence and mismanagement is driving further protest activity and popular frustration toward the regime and may unite citizens with disparate grievances. The regime is facing several concurrent crises over its mishandling of economic, ecological, and security issues. The regime is continuing to victimize its people with a range of different problems, stoking anti-regime frustration across many different demographics.

Senior regime officials are increasingly acknowledging that the Islamic Republic risks permanently alienating itself from its people and that the problem is urgent, but have seemingly drawn different conclusions about how to mitigate this risk. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei implicitly warned of increased rifts between Iranian leadership and its youth in a speech addressed to the Assembly of Experts on February 23. Khamenei described the assembly—a body of 88 clerics responsible for supervising, dismissing, and selecting Iran’s Supreme Leader—as a paragon of democracy. All elected assembly members must secure approval from a separate supervisory council, vetted by Khamenei, before running for office. Khamenei stressed the importance of “preserving”-- possibly implying that the regime risks losing--the Islamic Republic’s social capital and called on the assembly to increase political participation among Iranian youth, echoing similar calls from actors across the Iranian political spectrum in recent weeks.[2] Khamenei added that measures to increase social capital must occur within the ideological boundaries of the regime, and tasked the Assembly of Experts with “monitor(ing) and maintain(ing) the overall movement and important parts of the regime (so that) the revolution does not digress like other revolutions.” Khamenei also seemingly warned against public criticisms of the regime’s core ideology, stating: “no one should say online or elsewhere that the Islamic Republic has created an enemy for itself” and advised officials against “talking loosely and illogically.” Khamenei seemed to frame connecting with Iranian youth as an uphill battle and told his audience that “one should not be offended by doubt … one should be prepared to face doubt.” Khamenei additionally urged officials to “perform (their) duties seriously and without fatigue or weakness of action,” possibly an exhortation to President Ebrahim Raisi, who attended the meeting. It is noteworthy that Khamenei did not signal his desire to end calls for the impeachment of Raisi administration officials, which parliamentarians have made in recent days as Iran faces significant economic challenges. The Supreme Leader previously instructed parliament against impeaching former President Hassan Rouhani in 2020, making his silence in this context conspicuous.

The Mahsa Amini protest movement has likely entered a new phase, although it is unclear what pattern of anti-regime activity will characterize this new phase. Protest activity has increased substantially in recent days, including at least 15 protests on February 16, 12 protests on February 19, 14 on February 20, and seven on February 21. This increased turnout is the most that CTP has recorded since assessing that the Mahsa Amini movement culminated in January 2023. This renewed protest activity could indicate that the movement has regained momentum after what was in effect an operational pause. It is unclear if protest activity in this new phase will resemble the patterns that CTP first observed in the Mahsa Amini movement or what form acts of anti-regime defiance will take. It is also unclear how long this uptick in protest activity will last.

Actors from across the Iranian political spectrum are publicly acknowledging Mir Hossein Mousavi’s February 4 call for “foundational change” in the Islamic Republic. Mousavi discussed holding a referendum on whether to maintain the Islamic Republic and suggested drafting a new constitution on February 4, as CTP previously reported. Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid expressed support for a referendum on the “regime and system” during his weekly Friday prayer sermon in Zahedan, Sistan, and Baluchistan Province on February 17. Abdol Hamid did not explicitly reference Mousavi, but his use of the term “referendum” demonstrates that he is likely seeking to keep Mousavi’s idea of “foundational change” at the forefront of Iran’s internal political debate.

Iran is reportedly taking advantage of humanitarian aid convoys to move rockets or missiles into eastern Syria. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that Iran-backed militants deposited two weapons shipments at a warehouse in Abu Kamal and a third at a warehouse in Deir Ezzour, Syria. Shipments to Abu Kamal and Deir Ezzour allegedly included munitions and unspecified logistical equipment according to SOHR. Iran-backed militias transported weapons shipments in humanitarian aid convoys for earthquake victims as CTP previously reported.

Iran targeted an Israeli-owned oil tanker in the Arabian Sea on February 10, according to Western reports. A BBC journalist announced on February 17 that Iranian drones had targeted the commercial Campo Square ship but caused no serious damage or casualties, citing a US military official. The source stated that the attack involved several Iranian ships and likely a Shahed-136 drone, one of the UAVs Russia has been using in its invasion of Ukraine. The February 10 attack on the Campo Square may be a retaliation to the Israeli drone strike on a military munitions factory near Esfahan City, Esfahan Province on January 28.

Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is positioning himself to reenter the political arena after a period of relative absence. Rouhani promoted his administration’s economic, foreign, defense, and health policies in a standing meeting with his former cabinet members on February 13 that he publicized. Rouhani stressed the need to “restore the people’s trust,” implicitly acknowledging deepening divides between the regime and the Iranian public following the Mahsa Amini protest movement, and called on Iranian officials to consider criticisms of the regime seriously. Rouhani framed ongoing unrest as economically-motivated, and endorsed less government involvement in the Iranian economy, a return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and democratically-held elections. Rouhani separately urged his former cabinet to provide policy recommendations to the Raisi administration, stating that “it is (their) national and religious duty to convey every opinion and thought (they) have to the government. Regardless of whether we think it’ll work or not.” It is noteworthy that Rouhani publicized his meeting with former moderate reformist officials, although such meetings are not new. Iranian media previously reported that Rouhani was cooperating with other moderate and reformists in attempt to regain political influence in early 2022.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force is probably reinforcing its military presence in northern Syria under the guise of providing humanitarian relief following the earthquake on February 6. IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani arrived in northern Syria on February 9—as CTP previously reported—with Quds Force official Mohammed Reza Zahedi—who formerly was a liaison to Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) and Syrian military intelligence for weapons shipments. The Quds Force’s mission—covert lethal activities outside of Iran, including asymmetric warfare and special operations—is ill-suited for disaster relief operations. Their arrival of under the pretext of disaster relief suggests Iran is attempting to exploit the humanitarian crisis to entrench and expand its military presence in northern Syria, as CTP previously reported.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Aleppo City, Syria on February 8. Iranian state media reported on Ghaani’s visit and published a video of him overseeing humanitarian operations in response to the February 6 earthquake that has devastated southern Turkey and northwest Syria. A pro-regime social media account also posted images of Ghaani meeting with an unspecified Iranian field commander.

Multiple Iranian political factions, including hardliners, are coalescing around the assessment that the regime has lost touch with its people. Former moderate President Hassan Rouhani continued to frame the deepening divides between Iranian leadership and its population as an urgent threat and suggested that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has failed to sufficiently address such divides on February 7. Rouhani described Khamenei’s efforts to grant amnesty to and commute the sentences of “tens of thousands” of prisoners and arrested protesters as “a starting point.” Rouhani called on the regime to pursue policies aimed at addressing protester grievances, including reviving the Joint Comprehensive Joint of Action and easing ongoing internet restrictions. Rouhani also stated that actions that damage “human dignity. . . go against national security and public interests,” inverting the regime’s narrative that anti-regime dissidents and critics threaten Iranian internal security. Rouhani previously criticized the regime for marginalizing moderate and reformist actors in the Iranian political sphere in an interview on February 1, as CTP previously reported.