Ukraine Project

Lessons of the Minsk Deal: Breaking the Cycle of Russia's War Against Ukraine

Some peace deals lead to peace, others to more war. The Minsk II deal aimed to end Russia’s limited invasion of Ukraine in 2015 but instead laid the groundwork for the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022. The United States must learn from the Minsk deal or risk a direct Russia-NATO conflict that puts American lives at risk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 10, 2025

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced the Ukrainian "Drone Line" project on February 10 as part of ongoing Ukrainian efforts to integrate drone and ground operations. Umerov stated that the Ukrainian military will "scale up" five existing drone regiments and brigades in the Ukrainian military and border guard service and will integrate infantry and drones into a single strike system, which will enable Ukrainian forces to create kill zones 10 to 15 kilometers deep, will provide constant aerial support and infantry cover, and will detect and destroy Russian forces before they can approach Ukrainian positions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 8, 2025

Russia may be providing drone and missile technology to North Korea in exchange for North Korean troops fighting in Kursk Oblast. Japanese outlet NHK, citing multiple sources familiar with Russia–North Korea relations, reported on February 8 that Russia has agreed to assist North Korea in developing and mass-producing various types of drones ... [but] remains reluctant to help North Korea develop nuclear weapons, fearing that North Korean nuclear tests could further strain relations with the United States and complicate relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Ukraine’s Kursk Incursion: Six Month Assessment

A small group of Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast have complicated the Russian military's efforts to advance in Ukraine over the last six months. Roughly a division's worth of Ukrainian troops have undermined the Russian military's ability to launch or renew offensive operations in lower-priority areas of the frontline and to reinforce priority efforts with elite airborne (VDV) and naval infantry units. The Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast is a partial proof of concept of how limited Ukrainian battlefield activity that leverages vulnerabilities in Russia's warfighting capabilities and that integrates technological adaptations with mechanized maneuver can have theater-wide impacts on operations.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 5, 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his willingness to negotiate with Russia from a principled position that preserves Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the long run. Zelensky reiterated during an interview published on February 4 that Ukraine cannot and will not compromise its sovereignty in future peace negotiations, but that Ukraine's partners are not currently providing Ukraine with sufficient military assistance for Ukrainian forces to push Russian forces from all occupied Ukrainian territory.

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