Ukraine Project

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 4, 2025

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi visited the Kyivska Electrical Substation in Kyiv Oblast on February 4 to assess damage to the substation as Russian long-range strikes targeting energy infrastructure continue to threaten Ukraine's nuclear power plants (NPPs) and Ukraine's energy production capabilities. Grossi did not specify when Russian forces damaged the Kyviska Electrical Substation but emphasized that a direct strike on the substation or a power supply disruption could cause a nuclear accident.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 2, 2025

Russian forces reportedly struck a dormitory holding Russian civilians in Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 1 as Russian authorities widely attempted to deny Russian responsibility for the strike and blame Ukraine. Russia continues efforts to illegally deport Ukrainian children to occupied Crimea and Russia under the guise of evacuation and rehabilitation programs.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 1, 2025

Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 31 to February 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast and occupied Crimea; seven Iskander-K cruise missiles from occupied Crimea and Donetsk Oblast; eight Kh-22 cruise missiles from Tu-22M3 aircraft; eight Kh-101/55 cruise missiles from Tu-95MS strategic bombers; 10 Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from tactical aircraft over Voronezh Oblast; two Kh-31P anti-radiation missiles from the Black Sea; and 123 Shahed and decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 31, 2025

Russian forces are expanding their salient north of Kupyansk as part of long-term operational efforts to push Ukrainian forces from the east (left) bank of the Oskil River. Russian forces appear to be developing and disseminating a doctrinal method for advances throughout the theater that aims to conduct slow envelopments of frontline towns and settlements at a scale that is reasonable for Russian forces to conclude before culminating. This Russian offensive method is bringing about slow operational maneuver on the battlefield, but these envelopments require significant planning, foresight, manpower, and equipment and do not restore rapid, mechanized maneuver to the battlefield.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 30, 2025

Kremlin newswire TASS published an interview with Valdai Discussion Club Research Director Fyodor Lukyanov on January 30 entitled "Don't count on big agreements," highlighting the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to shape domestic and global expectations about future negotiations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump.... Lukyanov's statements are yet another indication that the Kremlin remains committed to imposing its will and security interests on the United States and Europe and is not interested in compromising on this goal.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 29, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Western military assistance remains vital to Ukraine's ability to maintain its defense against Russian aggression. Putin gave an interview to Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin published on January 28 in which he claimed that the war in Ukraine could be over within two months if the West stops providing Ukraine with military assistance and that Ukraine's dependence on Western military aid indicates that Ukraine has "no sovereignty." Putin's claims about how quickly the war will end without further Western military assistance and his explicit rejection of Ukrainian sovereignty are a part of long-term Kremlin information operations aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and deterring additional Western military assistance.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 28, 2025

The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on January 28 to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria. The Russian delegation includes Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Presidential Special Representative to Syria Alexander Lavrentyev. Reuters reported that two Syrian sources stated that the delegation will meet with the new Syrian government sometime this week. Bogdanov told Russian state media outlet RT that the visit aims to strengthen Russian-Syrian historical relations based on common interests.

The Russia-Iran Coalition Deepens

Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally shifted and intensified the Russo-Iranian relationship. Tehran has leveraged Moscow’s growing material and financial requirements to sustain its war effort to support Tehran’s own domestic and foreign policy objectives. The core of the Russo-Iranian relationship is a mutually binding interest in challenging and eventually overturning the US-led world order. This shared ideological core allowed the Russo-Iranian relationship to weather and survive tensions and challenges that have arisen since 2022, and the United States should not expect this ideological core to weaken in the years ahead.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 27, 2025

Ukrainian forces struck Russian long-range drone storage facilities in Oryol Oblast again on January 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 26 that the Ukrainian forces struck drone and thermobaric warhead storage warehouses, causing secondary detonations. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike destroyed over 200 Shahed drones.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 26, 2025

Russian forces recently made further advances within Velyka Novosilka amid official Russian claims that Russian forces seized the entire settlement on January 26. Geolocated footage published on January 26 indicates that Russian forces advanced northward along Tsentralana Street in northern Velyka Novosilka. Some Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on January 26 that Russian forces completely seized Velyka Novosilka, whereas other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces had seized most of the settlement. Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are still clearing Ukrainian forces from the settlement, including the northern part, and that Ukrainian forces are still counterattacking in the area. ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces occupy 89 percent of the settlement, however.

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