Publications

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 19, 2023

April 19, 2023 - ISW Press

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) appears to be conducting a large-scale overhaul of domestic security organs. Russian state-controlled outlet TASS reported on April 19 that the FSB and the Main Directorate of the Security Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) have been conducting mass checks at the Moscow Central District Internal Affairs Directorate and several Moscow district police offices for the past several weeks due to “the leakage of data from Russian security forces at the request of Ukrainian citizens.” Another Russian source noted that the FSB and MVD have already detained police officers as part of this investigation. Russian outlets reported that the suspected police officers leaked personal data on Russian security forces to external individuals, some of whom are Ukrainian citizens. The reported FSB and MVD raids on the Moscow police departments are occurring against the backdrop of a series of arrests and dismissals of prominent members of Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) leadership. The Kremlin may be pushing for such arrests and investigations in order to conduct an overhaul of the domestic security apparatus to oust officials who have fallen out of Kremlin favor and consolidate further control internal security organs.

Iran Update, April 18, 2023

April 18, 2023 - ISW Press

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf met with several key regime powerbrokers on April 18, possibly to promote a pragmatic hardliner political agenda in Iran. Ghalibaf held an iftar dinner with Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri, Ali Larijani, and Gholam Ali Haddad Adel—all of whom were previously parliament speakers at various points. Nategh Nouri is a moderate politician affiliated with former President Hassan Rouhani. Rouhani’s former chief of staff—Mahmoud Vaezi—described Rouhani and Nouri as having a “very good relationship” and stated that “they see each other all the time” during an interview in January 2023. Ali Larijani comes from the wealthy and historically influential Larijani family, which Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has politically marginalized in recent years. Larijani frequently cooperated with Rouhani when they were both in power to promote a moderate agenda. Haddad Adel is a hardline politician and the father-in-law of Mojtaba Khamenei—the son of Ali Khamenei. All the individuals in the meeting represent important factions across the Iranian political spectrum.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 18, 2023

April 18, 2023 - ISW Press

Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to portray himself as a wartime leader in anticipation of a planned Ukrainian counteroffensive during his visit to occupied Kherson and Luhansk oblasts. The Kremlin announced on April 18 that Putin visited the headquarters of the Russian Dnepr Group of Forces in Kherson Oblast and the Vostok National Guard headquarters in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Putin visited occupied territories on April 17. Putin, however, stated that Orthodox Easter holiday is “coming up” in one of the videos, which suggests that his visit occurred prior to April 16. The Kremlin later edited the video to exclude Putin’s statement about the then-upcoming East holiday. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visited the Avdiivka frontline on April 18, and it is possible the Kremlin deliberately released footage of Putin’s visit to overshadow Zelensky’s visit in the information space. ISW reported on Russian milbloggers criticizing Russian officials for failing to visit the frontlines like Zelensky, and Putin had previously visited occupied Mariupol on March 19 to improve his appearance as a wartime leader. Russian occupation officials and milbloggers celebrated Putin’s visit and claimed that he boosted the morale of Russian servicemen preparing to repel Ukrainian counteroffensives. Geolocated footage shows that Putin visited Arabat Spit in southwestern Kherson Oblast - at least 130km from the nearest frontline.

Iran Update, April 17, 2023

April 17, 2023 - ISW Press

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani has allowed Iran—via its proxies—to expand its military influence in Iraq, specifically Kirkuk and Sinjar provinces, in recent days. The Popular Mobilization Authority—the official governing body of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)—announced on April 17 that the PMF will establish a new operational headquarters in Kirkuk Province on April 17. Sudani also gave permission to Popular Mobilization Forces Chairman Faleh al Fayadh to create a new PMF-affiliated brigade in Sinjar, Ninewa province on April 17, according to UK-based Al Araby. An unidentified PMF source cited by Al Araby claimed that the brigade will be comprised of Sinjar residents recommended by local officials and PMF leadership as well as members of the PMF and Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)-affiliated Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS). Sudani may have permitted these developments because his authority over the PMF has weakened in recent weeks. Sudani has suffered political losses to challenges from the Badr Organization in Diyala Province and former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, who sponsored electoral laws that will prevent Sudani from securing another term as prime minister, as CTP has reported.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 17, 2023

April 17, 2023 - ISW Press

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is seemingly regaining some favor with Russian President Vladimir Putin, likely as a result of the Russian conventional military’s inability to accomplish the tasks Putin had set for it during the winter offensive in Donbas. Wagner forces appear to be receiving reinforcements, ammunition, and political recognition – which is a stark deviation from the Kremlin’s previous efforts to expend Wagner forces and Prigozhin in Bakhmut since at least January 2023. Wagner-affiliated sources announced on April 17 that Wagner is training up to three motorized rifle brigades of mobilized personnel to reinforce Wagner‘s flanks in Bakhmut. Prigozhin also confirmed that Russian airborne forces (VDV) are operating alongside Wagner and indicated that Wagner is actively receiving artillery shells. Prigozhin advocated for Wagner to receive more artillery shells, which indicates that Prigozhin has reestablished his supply of ammunition from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). The Russian State Duma will also consider amendments to the Russian law on veterans’ rights to grant veteran status to private military companies (PMCs) and volunteers. Prigozhin had been routinely advocating for Wagner personnel to be recognized as participants of the ”special military operation” in Ukraine, and the adoption of this bill would signify that Prigozhin’s position in the Kremlin inner circle has improved.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 16, 2023

April 16, 2023 - ISW Press

The Russian military command appears to be increasingly shifting responsibility for offensive operations in Ukraine to the Russian Airborne troops (VDV). The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on April 16 that it is highly likely that VDV commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky has returned to a “major” but unspecified role in Ukraine after reports that the Russian MoD replaced him on January 13. UK MoD noted that Teplinsky’s return to command in Ukraine will not be limited to just VDV units, but that it is also likely that Teplinsky will try to promote the VDV’s traditional role as an elite force. ISW previously assessed on April 1 that milblogger speculation that the Russian MoD recalled Teplinsky from ”leave“ suggests that Russia may be preparing to reshuffle senior commanders following the failed winter offensive and in preparation for a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive. The UK MoD’s apparent confirmation of Teplinsky’s reappointment to a senior command position supports ISW’s assessment, and additionally suggests that the Russian military command is likely seeking to place an increased emphasis on the role of VDV elements in Russian offensive operations. VDV units are actively engaged along critical sectors of the front in Luhansk Oblast and near Bakhmut and have recently received TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems, further indicating that the Russian military command may seek to elevate the VDV to greater operational prominence.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 15, 2023

April 15, 2023 - ISW Press

Reporting from some Western sources that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin called for Russia to end its war against Ukraine is inaccurate. Some Western reports covering Prigozhin’s April 14 essay on a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive and the future of the war miscontextualized a rhetorical statement in which Prigozhin established a strawman argument he attributed to Russia’s “internal enemies” who seek to rationalize Russia ending the war in Ukraine now. The point of his essay was to attack this strawman, not to advance it. Prigozhin actually called on Russia to commit to a decisive fight that will either defeat Ukraine or result in a temporary Russian defeat that will catalyze Russia’s nationalist rebirth and set conditions for future victory. A full reading of Prigozhin‘s essay, titled, “Only an Honest Fight: No Negotiations,” does not lend itself to any reasonable interpretation that Prigozhin advocated for an end to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Iran Update, April 14, 2023

April 14, 2023 - ISW Press

The Iranian regime is attempting to manage rising tensions with Azerbaijan without conceding its strategic interests in the Caucasus. Iran and Azerbaijan have engaged in several rhetorical and diplomatic altercations in recent weeks, partially due to the Iranian regime’s disapproval of strengthening Azerbaijani-Israeli relations. Supreme Leader International Affairs Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati published a statement on April 14 signaling the regime’s—and specifically Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s—aversion to continuing down a path of escalation with Azerbaijan. Velayati asserted that Iran has never been and never will be the initiator of a war. He added that Iran is concerned about Azerbaijan’s interests and security and titled his statement “I am also an Azeri,” likely to emphasize the cultural and historical overlaps between Iran and Azerbaijan. Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi separately discussed Azerbaijan in a Quds Day speech in Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province on April 14. Mousavi condemned Israel’s activities in Azerbaijan and stated that Iran desires “constructive” relations with its northern neighbor. Although Mousavi did not overtly threaten Azerbaijan, that he gave this speech in East Azerbaijan—an Iranian province that borders Azerbaijan—signals to Baku that the regime will not sacrifice its interests in the Caucasus to end the pattern of escalation. Mousavi additionally gave this speech on Quds Day—an annual Iran-sponsored holiday against Israel—to underscore that the regime will not tolerate Azerbaijan permitting Israel to use its territory to launch operations against Iran. The contrasting tone of Velayati and Mousavi’s statements reflects these officials’ different positions in the regime; Velayati is a diplomat and Mousavi is a military commander. It is unclear whether Iran’s approach to Azerbaijan will succeed in reducing tensions, however, given that Iran’s interests in the Caucasus are largely incompatible with those of Azerbaijan.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 14, 2023

April 14, 2023 - ISW Press

The Kremlin is likely attempting to portray Russia as an equal defense partner with China ahead of Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu’s visit to Moscow from April 16 to 18. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on April 14 that Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu will meet with Li to discuss bilateral defense cooperation as well as issues of regional and global security. Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister Qin Gang stated on April 14 that China will not sell weapons to Russia and will regulate the export of items to Russia that have dual civilian and military uses. Qin‘s comments represent a continuation of China’s efforts to rhetorically downplay its support for Russia and demonstrate that there are limits to the ”no limits” partnership that Russia and China declared before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. ISW assessed that Putin was unable to secure the no-limits bilateral partnership with China that he likely hoped for when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Moscow from March 20 to 22.

Salafi-Jihadi Movement Weekly Update, April 12, 2023

April 14, 2023 - ISW Press

Iraq and Syria. ISIS is executing a decentralized military campaign in northeastern Syria to destabilize the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). ISIS strategic communications provide guidance for operational and tactical commanders implementing the campaign. ISIS’s campaign design assumes military success will gain the support of local populations by delegitimizing the SDF as a security provider while lengthening the conflict to create time for ISIS to set conditions for the return to the “caliphate.”

Somalia. The Somali Federal Government’s (SFG) inability to escalate multiple fronts against al Shabaab could allow the group to repel renewed Somali offensive operations in central Somalia. Insufficient local support and the absence of expected regional troops are preventing or delaying the SFG from expanding additional fronts in central and southern Somalia, which will allow al Shabaab to concentrate its resources on the active Somali forces more effectively. Outreach to clans in central Somalia or the arrival of Kenyan or Djiboutian troops in Somalia could enable the SFG to increase operations on another front.

Pakistan. A large-scale campaign against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is unlikely to model previous Pakistani counterterrorism campaigns that helped contain the TTP between 2007 and 2014. The decentralization of the TTP, the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, and increasingly complex political conditions may limit the effectiveness of any potential campaign.

Afghanistan. Recent Taliban operations targeting Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) are targeting its ground lines of communication (GLOC) into Iran. Iran may be conditioning closer trade ties with the Taliban government on the Taliban giving priority to targeting ISKP networks near the Afghanistan-Iran border.

Pages