Publications

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, January 30, 2025

January 30, 2025 - ISW Press

The Taiwanese government has created a blacklist of 52 PRC-owned ships that warrant greater scrutiny to keep track of the PRC’s growing “shadow fleet” of ostensibly commercial vessels that act on behalf of the PRC. The Tokyo Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), an inter-governmental co-operative organization in the Asia-Pacific devoted to ensuring effective port state control, passed on a list of “problematic” ships to Taiwan, which the Taiwanese government later narrowed down to certain ships owned by PRC individuals or entities. The list focuses on cargo ships that are registered in Cameroon, Tanzania, Mongolia, Togo, and Sierra Leone. These five countries have the largest number of ships with problematic documentation, violations of maritime safety and labor regulations, or evasion of sanctions, according to Tokyo MOU.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 29, 2025

January 29, 2025 - ISW Press

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Western military assistance remains vital to Ukraine's ability to maintain its defense against Russian aggression. Putin gave an interview to Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin published on January 28 in which he claimed that the war in Ukraine could be over within two months if the West stops providing Ukraine with military assistance and that Ukraine's dependence on Western military aid indicates that Ukraine has "no sovereignty." Putin's claims about how quickly the war will end without further Western military assistance and his explicit rejection of Ukrainian sovereignty are a part of long-term Kremlin information operations aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and deterring additional Western military assistance.

Iran Update, January 29, 2025

January 29, 2025 - ISW Press

The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim Syrian government held a “victory conference” on January 29, during which it formalized much of its consolidation of power since the fall of Bashar al Assad. The conference announced the appointment of HTS leader Ahmed al Shara as the transitional president, though has informally been the de-factor of the interim government for months. Shara is now responsible for forming an interim legislative council until a new constitution is drafted and approved, according to the conference

Iran Update, January 28, 2025

January 28, 2025 - ISW Press

Turkish officials appear to believe that a planned call by imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm would pressure the SDF into an agreement to disarm and integrate into the HTS-led interim government. Turkey and Ocalan have reportedly reached an agreement in which Ocalan will publicly call on the PKK to “lay down arms” on February 15. Unspecified Turkish officials told regional media on January 27 that Ocalan's announcement would "easily" pressure the SDF to integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 28, 2025

January 28, 2025 - ISW Press

The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on January 28 to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria. The Russian delegation includes Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Presidential Special Representative to Syria Alexander Lavrentyev. Reuters reported that two Syrian sources stated that the delegation will meet with the new Syrian government sometime this week. Bogdanov told Russian state media outlet RT that the visit aims to strengthen Russian-Syrian historical relations based on common interests.

The Russia-Iran Coalition Deepens

January 28, 2025 - ISW Press

Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally shifted and intensified the Russo-Iranian relationship. Tehran has leveraged Moscow’s growing material and financial requirements to sustain its war effort to support Tehran’s own domestic and foreign policy objectives. The core of the Russo-Iranian relationship is a mutually binding interest in challenging and eventually overturning the US-led world order. This shared ideological core allowed the Russo-Iranian relationship to weather and survive tensions and challenges that have arisen since 2022, and the United States should not expect this ideological core to weaken in the years ahead.

Iran Update, January 27, 2025

January 27, 2025 - ISW Press

Gazan civilians began to return to the northern Gaza Strip on January 27 after Hamas fulfilled outstanding obligations under the ceasefire agreement. Hamas agreed to release a female civilian hostage held by Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) after the IDF prevented Palestinians from returning to the northern Gaza Strip on January 25 and 26.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 27, 2025

January 27, 2025 - ISW Press

Ukrainian forces struck Russian long-range drone storage facilities in Oryol Oblast again on January 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 26 that the Ukrainian forces struck drone and thermobaric warhead storage warehouses, causing secondary detonations. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike destroyed over 200 Shahed drones.

Iran Update, January 26, 2025

January 26, 2025 - ISW Press

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) agreed to release a female civilian hostage after the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) prevented Palestinians from returning to the northern Gaza Strip on January 25 and 26. PIJ confirmed that hostage, Arbel Yehud, is “alive and in good health” and stated it will release Yehud after reaching an agreement with the mediators. Israel accused Hamas of violating the ceasefire agreement on January 25 by releasing female soldiers before female civilians. In response, the IDF maintained its position in the Netzarim Corridor along al Rashid Road—the coastal road that connects the northern and southern Gaza Strip—preventing Gazans from returning to the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF reiterated on January 26 that it will only fulfill its requirement to allow Palestinians to move to the northern part of the strip once PIJ releases Yehud. The Palestinian Resistance Committee (PRC) and PIJ jointly took Yehud hostage on October 7, 2023.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 26, 2025

January 26, 2025 - ISW Press

Russian forces recently made further advances within Velyka Novosilka amid official Russian claims that Russian forces seized the entire settlement on January 26. Geolocated footage published on January 26 indicates that Russian forces advanced northward along Tsentralana Street in northern Velyka Novosilka. Some Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on January 26 that Russian forces completely seized Velyka Novosilka, whereas other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces had seized most of the settlement. Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are still clearing Ukrainian forces from the settlement, including the northern part, and that Ukrainian forces are still counterattacking in the area. ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces occupy 89 percent of the settlement, however.

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